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INDIA

AND

LORD ELLENBOROUGH

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INDIA

AND

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India is no longer the land of enchantment and romance —of exaggeration and wonder. It has been transferred from the realms of fancy to that of fact. For nearly a century its interests, real or supposed, have afforded topics for discussion to parliamentary orators and ephemeral writers. During that period, the readers of political journals have been at intervals excited by startling intelligence from the East; often of successes the most astonishing and unexpected, occasionally of reverses equally unlooked for. At one time our isle has been "frighted from its propriety" by denunciations of delinquency in the high places of India; at another, the tax-bearing people of Great Britain have been encouraged to look for relief to a country which the imagination pictured as the seat of riches, which no extravagance could exhaust, though exercised through as many millions of years as Hindoo chronology claims for the age of the earth. Gradually, however, the public mind settled down to more sober views, and at present there

seems more danger of the value and importance of India being underrated, than of their being estimated at an undue height.

As to the extent of country properly comprehended under the name of India, opinions may differ. In conformity with popular acceptation, its boundaries may be assumed as follows:—On the north, the mountains which form for a part of the line the southern boundary of Nepaul, and for the remainder, that of Chinese Tartary; on the south, the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal; on the east, the territories constituting the Burman empire; and on the west, the river Indus for the more northern part, and the ocean for the southern. The country thus bounded extends into twenty-four degrees of latitude, and as many of longitude, and is estimated to contain a million and a quarter of square miles. Much of the land within this vast area is to be classed among the most fertile in the world, and it is overspread by an active and industrious population, the number of which cannot be reckoned at less than a hundred and fifty millions. The soil and climate are peculiarly suited to the production of various commodities, some of which are of high price, and some in universal demand. Among the latter may be mentioned cotton and sugar. Cotton might be produced in India to any extent that even the devouring appetite of the manufacturing districts of England and Scotland is likely to claim, and sugar to meet the demands of the whole world. The larger portion of this great and rich country renders homage to the Queen of Great Britain, and much of the remainder, though under princes nominally independent, is practically subject to the British Government.

For three centuries England has been endeavouring to extend its colonial dependencies. Myriads of Englishmen

have quitted their native shores for the desolate wastes of distant climes, there to extend the foundations of their country's greatness, and raise new out-posts for its maintenance. The reign of George III. witnessed the violent severance of the better portion of these offshoots from the parent stock. The North American colonies dissolved their connection with the land whence they had sprung; and the country which had previously constituted a main arm of the strength of Great Britain was thenceforward to become permanently a commercial rival, sometimes a political enemy. But the loss which was sustained in the West was compensated in the East. About the time when indications of the approaching conflict with America began to appear, the English in India exchanged the character of tenants of circumscribed factories for that of lords of extensive provinces. At the time when, after an inglorious war, the reluctant consent of the British sovereign was extorted to the acknowledgment of American independence, some additions had been made to the first acquisition, and before the close of his reign the British were paramount in India, exercising positive rule over the better part of the country, holding military possession of a portion of the rest, and overawing, by their predominant power and influence, the whole. It would be idle to discuss whether India is a colony or not. If not a colony, it is something better. If it be desirable to occupy distant lands in the name of England; slowly and laboriously, and at vast expense, to establish civilized communities in dependence upon the country which sends them forth, how much more desirable must it be to receive the transfer of a country, not only of immense extent, but of almost unbounded capacity of production, the natural fertility of which has been increased by the sedulous culture of ages, and where nothing is

wanting but that reformation in the " spirit of man," and that security to life, property, and industry, which European rule and that alone is able to give. " Ships, colonies, and commerce," were the objects declared to be specially sought by the man to whose genius and good fortune Europe, with one exception, succumbed. That exception was found in the country which, small in its extent, and limited in its natural resources, was mighty in the spirit of its sons, by whose courage and enterprise it had spread its limbs into every clime and covered every sea with its ships, richly freighted to meet the wants of every people. Napoleon, at least, understood the value of India; and happy would he have been to have wrested this precious possession from the " nation of shop-keepers," whom he at once despised, envied, hated, and feared.

India gives to Great Britain a vast accession of political power in reference to the other nations of Europe. If it were lost, the amount of loss would be incalculable and irretrievable. There is no empire on the opposite side of the world to be gained to compensate the privation, as was the case when the American colonies of Great Britain renounced their allegiance. If the British possessions of India were again over-run by native powers, the loss of them would be deeply felt; if transferred, in whole or in part, to any European rival, it would be felt still more deeply, inasmuch as that rival, whoever it might be, would gain to the extent of our loss. The loss in reputation would be greater even than that of dominion, and Great Britain would sink in the scale of European nations from a first to a third or fourth rate power. In this humble position, moreover, we must not expect to pursue our trade with India as now. The restoration of native governments would restore all the uncertainty, the vexation, the tyranny, and extortion

which they were wont to exercise towards merchants, and which they still exercise wherever they are not controlled or overawed by British influence. If the territory lost to England passed into European hands, our prospects would scarcely be better, seeing the almost universal jealousy of our trade which pervades Europe, and the wide-spreading confederacies which are formed against it. India now receives annually upwards of £5,000,000 in value of our manufactures. How much would be taken if our political connection were severed? India now affords employment to upwards of 200,000 tons of our shipping. What amount of tonnage would be thus occupied were the power of Great Britain not paramount in that country? The civil and military services of India open honourable sources of employment to many thousand Englishmen, all of them finding therein respectable means of subsistence, and some of them returning to their native land with decent competency for future years. Besides this, India remits annually a tribute of £3,200,000, to meet charges of various kinds defrayed at home. Among these charges are the dividends on East-India Stock, and the interest on East-India Bonds. Were India lost, what would be the fate of these dividends and this interest? Either the claimants must lose their property, or the nation must take the charge upon itself. Would the creditors of India be satisfied with the former branch of the alternative? Would the people of England, already complaining heavily of the pressure of taxation, and recently extricated from heavy financial embarrassment only by the re-establishment of an impost peculiarly offensive, and on that account always understood to be a special reserve for periods of war—would the people of England, thus taxed, thus relieved, be likely to submit to the latter? Would the millions who are *not* creditors

of India, but who would share in the common evils resulting from its loss, if lost unhappily it should be, be willing to take upon themselves the additional loss of the hundreds who *are* creditors? This is a question which, when the good government of India is concerned, should, in common prudence, never be absent from the minds of those who have a direct pecuniary interest in maintaining the existing relations between that country and England.

Besides the holders of East-India Stock and the bond creditors of the East-India Company, there is another class of persons interested in like manner in maintaining the peace and security of India in dependance upon Great Britain—the creditors under the various loans raised by the Indian Government at various times for various public objects. Part of these creditors are natives of India, or residents in that country, but part also are European born, and resident here. The interest upon their capital invested in India is remitted through private sources, and its amount is not readily ascertainable; it is, however, large. To the head of private remittances, must also be added the savings of individuals in India sent or brought home for investment, and the whole must be combined with the sums remitted for public purposes, before we can know the total amount of the wealth which India annually renders to her European protector in return for the advantages bestowed on her by the connection. Politically, commercially, and financially, then, the safety of India is an object of paramount importance to Great Britain. Territory, power, and wealth are the adjuncts of the connection, and unless infatuation, like that which lost America, prevail, every effort will be made to preserve it. Territory equal in extent to Europe, if the dominions of Russia, Sweden, and Denmark be excluded; power rivalling that of Rome in its

brightest days, and surpassing that of any other country whose history is on record; wealth in all the abundance that can flow from natural advantages improved by active commerce; these are the gifts of India to Great Britain, and the full measure of their value is not yet enjoyed. Under British protection, India will become every year more settled, more peaceful, more industrious, and more prosperous. Its territory will receive the advantages of better cultivation, its revenue will increase, its facilities for commercial intercourse will be multiplied and extended; it will become more free from internal commotion and less readily assailable by external force; all British institutions there will acquire that stability which time only can bestow, and while the possession of this noble appanage of Great Britain may still excite, as it has before excited, the envy of other powers—though such feeling may increase with the advance of that whereon it feeds, it will but become more impotent as India shall become more valuable and more closely bound to the country which is destined, as we trust, to be the instrument of promoting—gradually and safely, but not less surely—its progress in all that can conduce to its permanent happiness.

Most extraordinary is the subjection of India to Great Britain. It is extraordinary in its origin and progress, for the dominion was not sought, but almost forced on the possessor. It is the result, not of any deeply laid plan of policy, but of circumstances which no one could or did foresee. It is extraordinary, again, in regard to the means by which the dependant country has been brought into obedience to its superior, and by which the authority of the latter is maintained. The instrument by which these objects have been effected is an army, commanded, indeed, by British officers, but composed of native troops

—of men differing from those whom they serve in descent, in language, in creed, in modes of thought, in habits of life—in every thing, in short, in which man can differ from man;—some of them fierce and fanatical in the extreme, all of them intensely imbued with prejudice, calculated to shock the feelings of their rulers on the one hand, and on the other, to render those rulers objects of contempt to the masses below them—yet all rendering prompt and cheerful obedience, patient under privation, brave in action, in all situations dutiful, and even affectionate, where not irritated by ill-treatment. Such is the army of India—such is the composition of that force which has been the chief instrument of winning for Great Britain its gorgeous eastern empire. Before the experiment was made, such an army would have been judged to be but a rope of sand; yet it is by an agency which, while untried, must have been deemed so unsuitable to the purpose, that Divine Providence has transferred the sceptre of India from Mahommetan and Hindoo rulers, born in the land in which they held sway, to the Christian sovereign of a small kingdom, distant thousands of miles.

The extraordinary circumstances which mark this connection do not end here. Not only is it, in ordinary language, accidental, but it is anomalous. Great empires have arisen from small beginnings. The sword of the conqueror has sometimes been rapid as well as widely sweeping in its achievements. But India has been added to the dominions of the British crown, not by the wisdom or the good fortune of the servants of that Crown—of its acknowledged and accredited ministers—but by the labours of a small and, for a long period, an obscure body of British subjects, who, seeking for themselves the profits of mercantile adventure, have given to their country the most magnificent boon ever bestowed.

At the very close of the sixteenth century, a period when the commercial spirit was superseding that passion for military adventure which formed the distinguishing feature of the middle ages, but when commerce itself, as Coleridge has observed, partook of the character of romance, a small association of merchants, stimulated by the successes of the Portuguese and the Dutch, obtained a charter from the Crown for carrying on an exclusive trade with India. At this time, when the authority of the Crown, though theoretically subjected to constitutional checks, was in practice little controlled by them; when the chief, if not the principal, business of the House of Commons was understood to be that of granting money to supply the necessities of the sovereign, and when they were not safe from reproof if they presumed to interfere with matters which were regarded at court as beyond their sphere and above their capacity, the association gave an early and notable proof of independence. It is of small importance in regard to their commercial history, but as illustrating the spirit which they displayed when humble petitioners for favour at the hands of a sovereign all but absolute, it is not altogether irrelevant to a part of the inquiry to which the attention of the reader will shortly be called. The petitioners had been encouraged to make preparations for a voyage while their patent of incorporation was under consideration. But the kindness of the Government extended further than this. Whether with a view to benefit the Company, or to promote the interests of an individual, the Queen's advisers recommended Sir Edward Mitchelbourne for employment in the proposed expedition; the committee who managed the affairs of the subscribers—the germ of the present Court of Directors—refused their consent, at the very moment when they were applicants for an exercise of

royal indulgence; when they hung on the breath of the sovereign for corporate existence, they repelled the attempted dictation of the Queen's servants as to the agents whom they should employ in the conduct of their affairs. They put in peril the grant which they sought rather than compromise their independence. The example thus furnished by the authorities of the East-India Company when feebly struggling into existence, should never be absent from the minds of their successors.

While this manifestation of independence was honourable to the Company, it was scarcely less honourable to the Queen's ministers that they abstained from resenting it as an offence. The charter applied for was granted, and the Company commenced its operations. But it was no safe or easy path which the petitioners had obtained the royal sanction to pursue. They went forth as traders, but as warriors also. They had formidable enemies in those nations who had preceded England in the enjoyment of the commerce of the East, and with the Portuguese their conflicts were frequent and sanguinary. In the Dutch they encountered not only commercial rivalry and open hostility, but cruelty and perfidy; and the murder of several British subjects (servants of the Company) by the Dutch Government of Amboyna, perpetrated as the result of a pretended judicial inquiry, attests but too well the malignity with which the new adventurers were regarded and the fearful extent to which it was carried.

Nor was it abroad only that the Company had to contend with dangers and difficulties. At home, though addressed less powerfully to the feeling of physical fear, they were neither few nor trifling. The rights secured, or thought to be secured, by royal charter, were repeatedly invaded under royal authority. New associations were

empowered to compete for a share in the trade which had been given to the Company by a solemn act of the Crown, and, in addition to these breaches of faith, the funds of the Company were sometimes put in requisition to meet the exigencies of the state.*

Amidst all these discouragements and embarrassments the Company kept on, sometimes on the verge of destruction and never enjoying any long immunity from difficulty. They established settlements, some of which were lost; while others, Fort St. George and Fort William, remained to become the seats of powerful governments. From the British Crown they received the Island of Bombay, which had been part of the marriage portion of Catherine of Portugal, wife of Charles II., and this was the only territorial acquisition which the Company ever acquired through the English Government. All besides was gained by their own exertions, and the courage and military talent of their servants. Rarely did any long interval elapse without some occasion calling those qualities into exercise. The Company were engaged in hostilities, sometimes with the Mahrattas, sometimes with the Moguls, and with various fortune. Triumph now attended their arms, and now their factories were plundered and burned, and their servants

* On one occasion the sovereign engaged in a transaction with the Company of very questionable character. Charles I., in want of money to carry on the disputes with the Parliament, adopted the extraordinary expedient of supplying his necessities by resorting to a practice, not unfrequent with bankrupt or swindling traders, but which, it is to be hoped, is almost or entirely without parallel in the annals of public finance. He bought the Company's stock of pepper on credit, and sold it immediately for ready money, at a loss of about thirteen thousand pounds A small part of this debt was subsequently allowed to the Company as a set-off against a claim for customs duties, but the greater part appears to have been lost.

slain or made prisoners. At home their difficulties did not abate. A new company was raised and incorporated, and the old one was compelled to save itself from dissolution by consenting to a union of the two. Thus arose (1709), "The United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies," which in the course of years became the most powerful corporation which the world had ever seen.

For more than a quarter of a century after the junction, the Company was silently acquiring power and importance and stability. Their credit was found useful in ministering to the necessities of the state by loans granted in consideration of their exclusive privileges; but excepting with regard to the aid which the Company were thus enabled to furnish, those who were intrusted with the administration of public affairs in England seem to have bestowed little thought upon India. A striking illustration of this occurred in the year 1746, when Fort St. George was suffered to fall into the hands of the French. Some petty additions had been made to the British naval force in the Indian seas, but they were inadequate. From advices received by the Court of Directors, that body became convinced of the necessity of further reinforcements. The subject was urgently pressed upon the attention of the Admiralty, but the answer was, that the fears entertained by the Court were groundless, and that no French ships had sailed for the East Indies. Slowly and reluctantly, some preparation was after a time commenced, but it was too late. News arrived that the celebrated La Bourdonnais had sailed with a fleet from the Mauritius, and the next intelligence was, that he had taken Fort St. George, which was only recovered by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.

The Company had, however, by this time, with little

assistance from the state to which they belonged, established a high confidence in the British name; and even at this early period, though it would be ridiculous to dignify their small possessions by the name of territory, they were regarded as having a political existence, and their alliance and support were on more than one occasion invoked by native princes. This result was undoubtedly favoured by the peculiar state of society in India, where almost any one who could collect a body of armed followers might aspire to something of a princely character, and where both landed and monied capitalists frequently found it necessary to resort to such means for their safety. But the tact with which the Company and their servants conformed to this and other native habits was remarkable, while, by engrafting on an eastern stock the spirit, energy, and discipline of Europe, they were silently, but deeply, laying the foundations of the Anglo-Indian empire, as it now exists. The rivalry of the French kept them constantly on the alert; the memorable contests for the Soubahdarship of the Deccan and the Nabobship of Arcot gave strength and coherence to their military establishments; and the disastrous capture of Calcutta by Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, with the murderous horrors of the Black Hole, did but afford occasion for the British power, exercised and maintained by the British East-India Company, to spring into a degree of vigour and security greater than had previously been known. The military genius of the young writer, Robert Clive, unexpectedly developed by the circumstances among which he had been thrown with far different views, shed lustre on the Company's service, while it upheld their power and influence. The Great Mogul Empire was now breaking up, and the address of Clive procured for those whom he served the gift of

the Dewanny* of three of its richest provinces. The territory known as the Northern Circars was also added to the dominions of the Company.

In looking back from this period at the history of the Company, it is impossible not to be impressed by its singularity. For more than a hundred years their career had been an almost unbroken series of difficulties and misfortunes. For upwards of thirty years afterwards they enjoyed comparative ease, but little distinction. The calm was broken by calamity—the loss of one of their most important settlements. The misfortune was overcome; the Company advanced from the position of an Association of Foreign Traders to that of one of the political powers of India, and in about fifteen years to that of a leading power. This rank was gained, after a series of contentions with an European rival, powerful, ambitious, and of military habits, by men whose chief business in India was not the acquisition of territory, and who belonged to a nation less influenced by the love of conquest than any of its neighbours. Power and dominion of equal extent were never in any other instance acquired with so little of aggression. Circumstances favoured the aggrandizement of the Company, and those circumstances were prudently watched and carefully improved.

The Dewanny was acquired in 1765. The news of the acquisition, as might be expected, had a powerful effect on the members of the Company at home. But the elation was not confined to them, it extended to the nation at large, and wherever a newspaper found its way, the most extravagant visions of wealth to be derived from England's new possessions were raised and entertained. The enormous for-

* The Dewanny was the right of collecting the revenues; and as he who enjoys the profits of the land is virtually its master, the gift was, in fact, the transfer of the provinces themselves, Bengal, Behar, and Orissa.

tunes acquired by a few individuals in India, within periods which seemed inadequate to their accumulation, unless rupees were to be picked up on the highway, tended to feed these imaginings, which did not, as might have been supposed, prevail exclusively among the more ignorant part of the community; the Cabinet and the Parliament shared in them, and bent an anxious eye towards the mine of inexhaustible treasure, which it was believed the East-India Company had found. The proprietors of India Stock called loudly for increased dividends. The Court of Directors prudently discouraged the desire, and in this they were supported by the ministry; the latter body, however, intending, when time and opportunity should suit, to pounce upon the acquisitions, which it was soon murmured were unfit to be retained by a Commercial Company, and which, indeed, it was asserted, the Company, as subjects of the King of Great Britain, could not legally possess. Had a strong ministry at that time existed, it is probable that a desperate attempt would have been made to transfer India from the care of the East-India Company to that of the immediate servants of the Crown, the revenue expected therefrom being much wanted to supply the Home Exchequer, and the patronage being, in ministerial eyes, still more desirable even than the revenue. But the ministries which for some successive years went into office and came out again—for so brief was their tenure of employment and so insecure at all times their position, that it is more accurate thus to advert to them than to speak of their having *held* office—these evanescent administrations, which appeared and vanished like figures in a phantasmagoria, were all so weak, that it was with some difficulty that they could be held together till the next succeeding change was ripe, and they were, consequently, not in a condition to

peril the utter wreck of their miserable craft, by bearing down directly on the East-India Company. Further, there was at that time a spirit abroad among the public out of Parliament, so utterly hostile to any thing that should tend to increase the power or influence of the Crown, that an attack upon the revenues of India, if accompanied by any considerable extension of ministerial patronage, would probably have raised a storm, more violent than any—and they were neither few nor light—which the advisers of the Crown had to encounter. There was, however, a great show of doing something. Papers were called for, inquiries instituted, resolutions moved, and Acts for limiting the amount of the dividends of the East-India Company passed. Hints of something further were thrown out, and Alderman Beckford, a man whose wealth exceeded his knowledge as far as his popularity transcended his modesty, was chosen as the mouth-piece of one of the sections of political party to claim for himself and his "brother landholders" the revenues of India as lawful spoil. Behind the curtain which veils the proceedings of cabinets from vulgar gaze, intrigues were going on for effecting covertly, that which it was not convenient or safe to attempt openly. Not only were the public excluded from all knowledge of these mysteries, but even those most closely interested in the subject of them—the Court of Directors of the East-India Company. Commissions were secretly despatched to India, designed to supersede the authority of the Company. The consequence was, that at Madras, the scene chosen for this singular specimen of diplomacy, the servants of the Company and the servants of the Crown became involved in fierce disputes, to the astonishment of native powers and the discredit of the British name. The Governor and Council remained and exercised their

powers as before. The King's commissioner came, and though he did not presume to set aside the former authorities, he acted in perfect independence of them. Madras rivalled Brentford with its two kings, saving that, at the former place, instead of amicably smelling to one nosegay like the polite potentates of the latter, the governor and the commissioner pursued opposite lines of policy, and gave and received mutual affronts in a manner calculated to afford to the natives a most edifying impression of the manner in which public affairs were managed in England.

A ministry which seemed to enjoy a firmer seat than any which had for some time preceded it, at length ventured upon a step somewhat more decisive than had been attempted before. Lord North, whose political courage was far greater than his political success, was the premier under whose auspices the Act of 13 George III., called the Regulating Act, was passed. The minister who lost the dependencies of the British Crown in America undertook to provide for the good government of the people of India, newly transferred to British rule. The augury was not the most happy, but the bill was, upon the whole, better than its paternity might be supposed to indicate. It made great changes in the constitution of the East-India Company, some of them improvements; but the alterations effected in India were marked by a right ministerial love of patronage. The Government of Bengal, the chief settlement, and the seat of the controlling authority, was vested in a governor and council named in the bill,—consequently named by the minister; the council consisted of five, two of whom were servants of the Company, but three—a standing majority—were either friends whom the party which then held the reins of power at home wished to benefit, or enemies whom they wished to conciliate. It has

been conjectured, with some probability, that one of the three* was the author of a series of political letters, distinguished alike by their wit, eloquence, and acrimony, directed during several years against various unpopular public men, and even the august personage whom they served, or wished to serve; and that the appointment to India was the price of his silence. This, however, is but conjecture; but the fact is indisputable, that in re-modelling the Government of India, under the Regulating Act, one prominent object, if not the most prominent, was to open for the minister an entry to the patronage of that country —that patronage which he and his predecessors had so long and so ardently coveted. The nomination of the Council of Bengal, which the ministers enjoyed, under cover of a parliamentary majority, was not all they gained. A new source of patronage was devised in the erection of a Supreme Court of Judicature at Calcutta, where English law was to be administered by English judges, nominated by the Crown and rewarded by large salaries. Into the consequences that followed, this is not the place to inquire; the subject is noticed only in reference to patronage. But though this famous Regulating Act bore on its face the unequivocal stamp of jobbing, it is not to be inferred from this fact (no extraordinary one) that interference on the part of the Crown or the Parliament with the newly-acquired authority of the East-India Company was altogether to be condemned. The acquisition of the Dewanny and of other territorial rights had changed the character and circumstances of the Company. The Crown and the country had become materially interested, and it was quite right that provision should be made for securing the honour and interest of

* Sir Philip Francis, believed by many to have been the author of Junius's letters.

both. For this purpose it was required, that all the Company's correspondence relating to civil or military affairs, the government of the country, or the administration of the revenues, should be laid before the Treasury by one of the secretaries of state. This was certainly not more than might reasonably have been expected. The East-India Company was not to become an independent sovereign, nor was the Dewanny to be looked upon as its private estate, which it might manage, alienate, or retain at its pleasure. The territory gained in India was to be regarded as an integral part of the British empire. The Company were not to establish an *imperium in imperio*; they had a right to expect to continue stewards of the domain, and it was for the benefit of both countries that they should; but, like all other stewards, they must account. The great evil of the Act of 1773 was, that it interfered injuriously, as well as offensively, with the exercise of the functions of the Company, by giving to India a parliamentary council; but there was this source of consolation, that the arrangement was temporary. It was renewed by an Act passed in 1779, and again by another in 1780, on each occasion for one year. The ministry were too insecure and too much embarrassed by their ill success in America, and the torrent of public indignation which followed, to think of tightening their grasp upon the patronage of India. They had reason for congratulation in being able to keep things as they were. This much they were able to effect. In 1781 another Act was passed for temporarily regulating the government of India and the affairs of the East-India Company, and two* parliamentary

* It seems to have been the prevailing opinion of the day, that India committees must necessarily hunt in couples. A few years before a similar nomination of two committees, carrying on their inquiries simultaneously, was ridiculed by Burke, who compared them

committees, one secret and one open, were appointed to investigate the Company's affairs. These continued to inquire and report, while rapid changes passed over the political system. The manifold blunders and failures of the American war at length precipitated Lord North from the seat of power. The Marquis of Rockingham succeeded, but his death was attended by the death of his administration. The Earl of Shelburne then took the reins of power, but was soon obliged to drop them; when they were caught up by an administration strong (as far as a combination of powerful families could confer strength) beyond any which had preceded it, and perhaps any which has followed. The great Whig party under Mr. Fox, and the party which had for a long period acted under Lord North, had coalesced, and those who had for years denounced each other as enemies of the country, now entered the cabinet arm-in-arm. The statesman, whose policy had dismembered the empire, and his eloquent rival, who had declared that for that policy he deserved to lose his head, divided between them the secretarial duties of the state. A Whig nobleman,* potent in wealth, took his seat at the Treasury as the ostensible head of this motley cabinet; the remaining offices were allotted among the adherents of the two great chiefs, who, like the two ladies in Canning's burlesque of the German drama, had suddenly made up their minds to swear an eternal friendship. This ministry, proudly conscious of its strength, felt no hesitation in screwing its courage to the point of grappling with the

to two parts of a smoke-jack—the one committee, whose proceedings, it seems, were slow, to the weight—the other, who were more vivacious, and, in the language of the great statesman, went "like hey! go mad," to the flyer, and he concluded that by the combined operation the Company were to be roasted.

* The Duke of Portland.

East-India Company; and one of the boldest and most extraordinary plans ever devised for aggrandizing a political association at the expense of chartered rights, public liberty, and royal prerogative, was the result of their councils. It proposed to take away from the Company all their political power, and to vest it in the hands of commissioners, to be named in the first instance by Parliament. But, further, the Company were not even to retain the management of their commercial concerns. These were to be committed to another set of commissioners, also to be named in the first instance by Parliament, and who were to act in subordination to the political commissioners. The entire patronage of India was thus to be transferred to the nominees of the Coalition Ministry, who already commanded the votes of about two-thirds of the House of Commons, and, thus fortified, might soon have increased their majority to nine-tenths of that assembly. But the very step meant to render them unassailable proved the cause of their overthrow. Beyond the walls of Parliament they had no party; public opinion was universal and clamorous against the Coalition Ministry and its favourite child, the India Bill. At court they were in no better odour than in the country; the King hated them, and this monster bill afforded him the means of getting rid of them. It passed the Commons triumphantly, and though warmly opposed in the Lords, would have passed there also but for the sudden announcement of the King's hostility. This induced the Peers to pause; the King availed himself of the pause to dismiss his ministry, and call a new one to his councils, and thus was turned aside this fearful blow, aimed not at the East-India Company only, but at the independence of Parliament, the liberties of the people, and the dignity of the Crown. The new ministers were of

course in a minority in the House of Commons, and a bill introduced by them for the government of India necessarily failed. But a new Parliament was called, and the result of the elections gave them a triumphant majority, by the aid of which an Act was passed (1784) which was the foundation of the system under which, with some slight occasional modifications, India has been governed down to the present time. Under this Act the Court of Directors were to continue to conduct the government of India, as well as their own commercial concerns; but in exercising the former duty, their Acts were to be subject to the approbation of a Board, composed of persons nominated by the Crown. There were certain exceptions to the exercise of the authority both of the Court and the Board. Affairs requiring secrecy were to be withdrawn from the cognizance of the Court at large, and transacted by the Board, through a secret committee chosen by the Court of Directors from their own body. The discretion of the Board was, however, limited by defining the subjects on which secret orders were to be given—they were declared to be "the levying of war or making of peace, or treating or negotiating with any native princes or states of India."* Further—the Board were to have nothing to do with the general patronage of India. The right of making nominations, whether to the civil or military services, was reserved exclusively to the Court of Directors.†

* Extended by 3 & 4 Will. IV., cap. 85, by adding the words "or with any other princes or states touching the policy to be observed with respect to such princes or states."

† This was in accordance with the judgment of the greatest and wisest statesmen who have thought on the subject. In a speech of Burke, made in July, 1773, and reprinted from an old magazine, in the 'Portfolio' for November, 1844, that distinguished man thus expresses himself:—"God knows, that the places, and pensions, and expectances furnished by the British establishment, are too powerful

It has not been the practice for the Court to interfere with the subsequent progress of those admitted to the services, but to leave their advancement to the established rules of promotion and the discretion of the local governments. There is an exception to this in the case of members of the councils of the chief and subordinate presidencies. To these offices the Court have invariably appointed in conformity with the provisions of the law on the subject.

As no useful purpose would be answered by minutely tracing the slight variations made in the law previously to the year 1833, it will be most convenient to proceed at once to that important era in the history of the Company when their trade, thrown open as to India in 1813, was entirely suspended. But when this great commercial revolution took place, the government of India was continued in the East-India Company, on conditions little varying from those previously imposed. The Board, the Court, and the Secret Committee, with their respective rights and duties, as already explained, are still preserved. The powers

for the small remains of patriotism and public spirit that remain in our island. What then will become of us, if Bengal, if the Ganges pour in a new tide of corruption? Should the evil genius of British liberty so ordain it, I fear this House will be so far from removing the corruption of the East, that it will be corrupted by them. I dread more from the infection of that place, than I hope from your virtue. Was it not the sudden plunder of the East that gave the final blow to the freedom of Rome? What reason have we to expect a better fate? I conjure you by every thing a man ought to hold sacred; I conjure you by the spirits of your forefathers, who so nobly fought and bled for the cause for which I now plead, I conjure you by what includes every thing—by your country—not to yield to the temptations which the East, in the hands of the Crown, holds out—not to plunge into the gulf of corruption, and drag after you your posterity—your country."

of the chief local government have been considerably extended, and the parties comprising it are termed the Governor-General of India in Council. The Governor-General and the governors of the subordinate presidencies, under this and former Acts, are appointed by the Court of Directors, subject to the approbation of the Crown. The appointment of Commander-in-Chief of the forces of India, and of provincial commanders-in-chief, also rests with the Court, subject to the like approbation. The members of the respective councils are appointed as before, with the exception of an additional member to the Council of India, whose office is created by the Act last named, and whose appointment by the Court is made subject to the approbation of the Crown.

It will be evident, from the above sketch, that the policy adopted by successive Parliaments, from the year 1784 downwards, has been to secure to the Court of Directors of the East-India Company a large and responsible share in the government of that country, and that to that end very extensive powers have been reserved to the Court. Among the most important of these is the power of recall. This power, indeed, is inherent in the Company. It is a portion of its original authority, the exercise of which it has always enjoyed, with the exception of a few years after the passing of the Regulating Act, when it was temporarily suspended with regard to the Governor-General and his Council, in order that the nominees of the ministry might retain their appointments. But during the same period, the power of appointing members of Council was also suspended, except with the approbation of the Crown; and even in those evil times when corruption was rampant, and legislation was directed rather to private than public objects, the renewal of the right both of nomination and removal was expressly

provided for.* Decency—even according to the standard of decency then prevailing in political circles—required this much. Except in the charters to which the Company traces its original constitution, this right of recall is nowhere pretended to be given or created; it is, throughout the statutory enactments affecting the Company, recognized as something previously existing, an undoubted and unquestionable right. It is thus referred to in the 33 Geo. III. (1793), chap. 52, where a section (35) giving to the Crown the power of recall is succeeded by another (36) which runs thus:—"Provided always, and be it further enacted, that nothing in this Act contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, to preclude or take away the power of the Court of Directors of the said Company from removing or recalling any of the officers or servants of the said Company, but that the said Court shall and may at all times have full liberty to remove, recall, or dismiss any of such officers or servants at their will and pleasure, in the like manner as if this Act had not been made, any Governor-General, Governor, or Commander-in-Chief, appointed by his Majesty, his heirs or successors, through the default of appointment by the said Court of Directors always excepted;† any thing herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding." A similar proviso is found in the Act 53 Geo. III., chap. 155, sec. 80, wherein, after the right of the Court to appoint to the offices of Governor-General, Governor, and Commander-in-Chief, has been re-assured to the Court, subject to

* "And from and after the expiration of the said term of five years, the power of nominating and removing the successors of Governor-General and Council shall be vested with the Directors of the said United Company."—13th Geo. III., cap. 62, sec. 10.

† If the Court neglect to appoint to these offices within a limited period, the right of appointment (for that turn) lapses to the Crown.

the approbation of the Crown, the Act continues, "Provided always that nothing herein contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, to take away or affect the power of the said Court of Directors to remove or recall any such Governor-General, Governor, or Commander-in-Chief, but the said Court shall and may at all times have full liberty to remove, recall, and dismiss any such Governor-General, Governor, or Commander-in-Chief, at their will and pleasure, in the like manner as if this Act had not been made." Again, in the 3 & 4 William IV., chap. 85, an Act effecting greater changes in regard to the Company than any other passed from the commencement of its existence, the right of recall is not less distinctly recognized. The 74th section secures the right of the Crown in this respect, the 75th reserves that of the Court of Directors. "Provided always, and be it enacted, that nothing in this Act contained shall take away the power of the said Court of Directors to remove or dismiss any of the officers or servants of the said Company, but that the said Court shall and may at all times have full liberty to remove or dismiss any of such officers or servants, at their will and pleasure." The remainder of the section exempts from recall by the Court, as before, any servant of the Company appointed by the Crown, in consequence of the default of the Court to appoint.

The power of the Court to recall is indeed so clear, that to argue in defence of it may seem like an ostentatious lighting of lamps amid the blaze of a noon-day sun. An array of authority, on a point so indisputable, may appear entirely superfluous, and it would be so, but for the extraordinary statements which are reported to have been made on the subject. It is said to have been stated that the retention of a free exercise of the power of recall by the

Court " must have resulted from an oversight,"* that the law upon this point " was renewed without consideration," or " at all events without discussion."† Now, it must have been a very extraordinary oversight which could lead to the continuance of such a power for sixty years after the government of India became the subject of permanent regulation, and could not only so continue the power, but recognize it over and over again in solemn acts of the Legislature. These recognitions, indeed, are *mere* recognitions—they convey no new power: they only bear testimony to the existence of one previously possessed. But to talk of " oversight " in the face of these recognitions is surely trying the possible effect of bold assertion, far beyond the limits of common prudence. A clause, like this, solemnly recognizing a power so great and important, slipping into an Act of Parliament—aye, into several Acts of Parliament—no one knows how, is a fact, if fact it be, somewhat startling. Such a fact is surely without parallel, except in the case of Dibdin's Jew, who, on his return from a walk, finding a gold watch in his pocket which was not there when he set out, records the discovery in his journal with the quiet comment, " dropt in by accident." And so it seems that this clause found its way into Act after Act, and no one could account for it. There it stood plain and clear as the type of the royal printer could make it, to sear the eyeballs of those who loved it not; but how it came there they knew no more than that mysterious personage who is said to inhabit the lunar planet—" dropt in by accident!" But then the clause was renewed, in the last instance at least, (in 1833), " without consideration," or " at all events without discussion." The proof offered of this is, that upon refer-

* See Hansard's Debates, vol. 74, p. 276.

† Ibid. vol. 74, p. 345.

ence to the *Mirror of Parliament* for that year, it does not appear that there was a single word said about it in either House.* This may be quite true, but it only proves that the clause passed without parliamentary discussion. It does not prove that those who framed the Act or those who passed it were ignorant of what they were doing—that the extent of the power in question, and the possibility of its being called into exercise, were altogether overlooked. To prove this, the eminent person whose hostility to the clause induced him thus to account for its introduction is reported to have said, "I have looked into the papers of the correspondence between the Directors and the Board of Control, and there is not one single word said of it in these on either side; and I have looked into the debates of 1784, when Mr. Pitt first brought in the bill containing this ill-omened clause, *for it was in that originally*, and I find not one single word said on either side in either House."† Now the papers of correspondence between the Directors and the Board here referred to are undoubtedly those connected with the renewal of the Company's government and the suspension of their trade, effected by the Act of 1833, which papers were printed by order of the Court of Directors for the information of the Proprietors, and collected in a volume, the title-page of which bears the date of that year. These papers, it is alleged, have been "looked into," and found to afford no trace of the subject of recall by the Court having undergone any consideration; "there is not one single word said of it in them on either side." The look bestowed on these papers must certainly have been very transient and cursory, for it does happen, that instead of containing "not one single word" on the subject,

* See Hansard, vol. 74, p. 345.

† Hansard, vol. 74, p. 345.

they contain several words, which words occur in at least three different places. At page 4, in a "Memorandum, or paper of hints," transmitted to the Chairman of the Company by the President of the Board, the following passage presents itself: "Appointment of governors subject, as now, to the approbation of the King, but the Board to have a veto on the recall. The same with regard to commanders of the forces." It seems then that the subject was not overlooked by the ministers,—nor was it by the members of the Court. At page 127 of the volume, the following passage occurs in a dissent recorded by Henry St. George Tucker, Esq.: "The retention of the power to recall governors and commanders-in-chief appears to me to be highly essential to the respectability and efficiency of the Court of Directors. This power has been rarely exercised, and there can be no temptation to abuse it; but if it be withdrawn, the public functionaries abroad may set at nought the authority of the Court, and may hold us in contempt. A governor may be lavish in the public expenditure, may think only of providing for his own dependents or those of the ministry, may be indolent and inactive, or arbitrary and capricious in the exercise of his powers, and notwithstanding these and other defects of character and conduct, he will retain firm possession of his station, as long as he can succeed in propitiating the ministry of the day, who may be interested in his continuance of office, and even derive influence and advantage from his mal-administration." Again, at page 187, it will be found that the President of the Board, in replying to a letter from the Chairman and Deputy-Chairman of the Company, thus expresses himself: "I do not know if the words 'exercising the same powers as the Company now possess under their charter' are here introduced

with any specific reference. To the general propositions which they express, his Majesty's ministers have, through me, repeatedly declared their adherence, and they are not aware that it is, in the slightest degree, impaired by any modification they contemplate in the existing system. Whatever changes Parliament may in its wisdom see fit to adopt, will, I doubt not, be made without detriment to the substantial authority of the Company. It is possible that the words in question have been inserted in consequence of the hint thrown out in the memorandum, that the Board should have a veto on the recall of governors and military commanders in India. In order to obviate misconstruction, I avail myself of this opportunity to inform you, that it is not the intention of his Majesty's ministers to insist on the suggestion just mentioned."

And was the insertion then of the provision of recognition in the new Act an "oversight?"—was the retention of an unqualified power of recall by the Court allowed "without consideration?" Above we have an official suggestion from the ministry for the modification of the power—an argument against its modification by a member of the Court of Directors, and finally a formal withdrawal of the proposal for modification by the authority from whom the proposal came—and all these are contained in the volume which was searched without one single word on the subject being found!

Let us pass on to the consideration of the statement, that the clause recognizing the right of the Court to recall was originally in the Act of 1784, and that, notwithstanding, nothing was said on the subject in the course of the debates in either House. Here, unfortunately, is manifested a defect of vision exactly opposite in nature to that which prevailed when the correspondence on the renewal of the

Company's powers in 1833 was examined. In the correspondence, that which is obvious to all the world besides, is unseen by the examiner. In the Act of 1784, that which no one else can discern is distinctly visible. Like him

> "Who to the Dean and silver bell can swear,
> And sees at Canons what was never there,"

the examiner of the Act of 1784 finds a clause—an "ill-omened clause" it is called, which the Act does not contain—which it certainly never did contain, unless it has dropped *out* by some chance not less wonderful than that by which the same "ill-omened clause" dropt *into* a later Act. The power of recall by the Court is not adverted to in that Act, the reason probably being that as the Court already possessed the power, and no intention existed of interfering with it, there was no absolute necessity for bringing it forward. It was distinctly recognized in the succeeding Act of 1793, and at this distance of time it is not easy to determine the motives to such recognition. It probably originated in some apprehension, on the part of the Court, that their right might, by lapse of time, be overlooked or forgotten. But why is the clause in question—the clause which is *not* in the Act of 1784, and which *is* (whether by oversight or otherwise) in the Act of 1833—called "an ill-omened clause?" Whatever view may be taken of the question—whether or not the Court of Directors should possess the power of recall, the clause is a very harmless one. The right of the Court does not depend upon it. The sum of its possible effect is, to put a stop to quibbling. Suppose the clause had been left out of the last Act, by which the administration of the government of India was continued to the East-India Company, would the power of recall have thus been silently dropped, like the clause itself, from the Act of

1784? Certainly not. The Act of 1833 is only part of the law under which the authority of the Company is exercised, and it happens to contain the following section (not let in, it may be presumed, by "oversight"): "And be it enacted, that all and singular the privileges, franchises, abilities, capacities, powers, authorities, whether military or civil, rights, remedies, methods of suit, penalties, provisions, matters and things whatsoever, granted to, or continued in, the said United Company by the said Act of the fifty-third year of King George the Third, for and during the term limited by the said Act, and all other the enactments, provisions, matters and things contained in the said Act, or in any other Act or Acts whatsoever, which are limited, or may be construed to be limited, to continue for and during the term granted to the said Company by the said Act of the fifty-third of King George the Third, so far as the same or any of them are in force, and not repealed by, or repugnant to, the enactments hereinafter contained; and all powers of alienation and disposition, rights, franchises, and immunities which the said United Company now have, shall continue and be in force, and may be exercised and enjoyed, as against all persons whomsoever, subject to the superintendence, direction, and control, hereinbefore mentioned, until the thirtieth day of April, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four."

The right of the Court of Directors to recall without reference to any other authority, then, is clear; it is recognized by the Act under which the Company's term of government was last renewed; and if that Act were silent on this particular point it would be immaterial, for the right rests on preceding charters and acts, the validity of which is therein solemnly affirmed. Indeed the right is not a subject for question, though, in some quarters, it is mat-

ter for great wonderment how it ever came to exist, and how it came to be continued to this good year 1844, then to be exercised, to the astonishment of at least one of those through whose "oversight" it had been permitted to be retained. The learned individual thus amazed "verily believes," according to Hansard, "it was left in one India bill after another, from a perfect persuasion that it would never be acted upon,"—a different thing by the way from 'oversight'—"but would remain a dead letter, unless some extraordinary emergency—some crisis of the fate of our Indian empire—might render it necessary for the Directors to exercise this most anomalous and extraordinary jurisdiction."* Now what sort of emergency, what sort of crisis is here contemplated? And who is to judge whether the emergency be sufficiently great, or the crisis sufficiently dangerous to render "necessary" the exercise of the power? Who can judge but the Court, who are intrusted in this case with uncontrolled authority? In their judgment the recall of Lord Ellenborough was necessary—in the judgment of their learned critic it was not. The whole question resolves itself into a matter of opinion, and to talk of limiting the exercise of a strictly legal right, by reference to considerations of which no philologer can fix the exact meaning, and which no casuist can reduce to logical distinctness, is idle in the extreme. The qualification, therefore, of the position first laid down, by reference to an emergency or a crisis, is worth nothing—in the language of the law, it is void for uncertainty, and we are thrown back upon the naked principle, the principle evidently entertained by the speaker, that this important power of recall, so long enjoyed and so frequently confirmed by solemn acts of the legislature, ought never to be exercised at all. In the language above quoted

* Debates, vol. 74, page 345.

from the parliamentary debates it is to be "a dead letter." And can it be that the legislature, passing clause upon clause recognizing the power, has been only adding fresh acts to a solemn farce—that the intention was to give the semblance of power and withhold the reality? If such were the case, most clumsily has the intention been fulfilled, for the power has actually been conceded; and not until it is used in a manner which does not meet the approval of one noble peer do we hear that the law on the subject was never designed to have any effect—that its framers meant nothing—or worse than nothing, for if this interpretation of their intentions be correct, they must have meant to deceive. In what a dignified position does this place both the Legislature and the East-India Company! The latter, it seems, were trusted with the power of recall, upon much the same condition as the Vicar of Wakefield's daughters enjoyed the privilege of pocket-money; each of the young ladies received a guinea, with a strict injunction never to change it. This we are told was for the honour of the family. For whose honour the Court of Directors were to have charge of a power which they were never to use, does not appear. The contract between the Legislature and the Company, in this view, would be much like one described by Selden in his Table Talk. "Lady Kent articled with Sir Edward Herbert that he should come to her when she sent for him, and stay with her as long as she would have him, to which he set his hand; then he articled with her that he should go away when he pleased, and stay away as long as he pleased, to which she set her hand." So, by law, the Court of Directors are to have the power of recalling a Governor-General "at their will and pleasure"—thus runs the Act—but then, on the other hand, the Governor-General may hold office as long as he shall please (at least as far as the Court are

concerned), do what he may—except, indeed, on the occasion of some great "emergency," some fearful "crisis" not defined nor definable—one of those extraordinary events which set at defiance all ordinary rules, and of course among others, the rule that the Court of Directors should not recall a Governor-General unless it is his pleasure to come back. Thus, for instance, if a Governor-General should throw off his allegiance to the British Crown, should declare himself sovereign of India, and raise an army to support his pretensions, why, such a case perhaps might be regarded as an "emergency," a great "crisis," and the Court of Directors might resort to a recall. True it is, that the case is not very likely to occur, and if it did, the exercise of an independent power of recall would scarcely be indispensable, for no authority in this country would oppose the views of the Court; and if the Court are to act on their own sole responsibility only when no human being can differ from their judgment, it must be granted that their responsibility is not very onerous.

But it is not so. The right to recall is not a mere name; it is not a piece of solemn, but hollow pomp—an appendage of state harmless as the sword that dangles by the skirts of a court-dress, for show and not for service, or as the mace of the Lord Mayor, which has never been raised as a weapon of offence since wielded by Sir William Walworth, in Smithfield. It is a substantial power, and it is a power necessary to enable the Court of Directors to discharge their functions with efficiency. Without it a contumacious servant might altogether defy them. He may be disobedient now, but it is at his peril. For the exercise of the power of recall the Court, like all persons in the country who are intrusted with political authority, are responsible. They are not to exercise it

capriciously, or without just cause. Indeed, it should never be exercised but with the highest degree of gravity and deliberation. So great is the punishment thereby inflicted upon the offending party—so deep is the wound inflicted upon his reputation—so fearful the effect upon his prospects —that those at whose bidding the punishment descends may well pause before they strike. A meritorious minister may be excluded from the cabinet by jealousies and dissensions among his colleagues, or he may be removed by the influence of parliamentary faction. Neither of these causes can operate in the Court of Directors. They may act erroneously in dismissing one of their servants, but the presumption must always be that they act honestly.

The Court have certainly shewn no undue appetite for the exercise of this great power of recall. The first instance of their recalling a Governor-General does not occur till sixty years after the Government of India was placed on its present footing, and during that period the power of recall has been exercised only once with regard to the governor of a subordinate presidency. The novelty of the event which has deprived Lord Ellenborough of office, has more than any other cause drawn attention to his removal, and the habitual moderation of the Court in the exercise of its power, has thus given to the act a degree of public interest which but for this circumstance it could scarcely have commanded. If the recall of a Governor-General were of frequent occurrence, it would pass with little observation; but the rarity of such an event, together with the circumstances under which it is understood that the appointment of Lord Ellenborough was made, and those under which it was annulled, give an impulse not only to popular curiosity, but to the inquiries of those who desire to form a rational judgment on the merits of the case. The circum-

stances here alluded to are these. It is believed, that in appointing his Lordship to the office of Governor-General, the Court of Directors were nearly unanimous; it is pretty generally known that on the question of his removal they were quite unanimous. Now if he had been elected by a bare majority and afterwards removed by a bare majority, there would have been room for ascribing his removal plausibly, whether justly or not, to personal feeling, or to chance operating through the periodical changes in the Court, which take place under legislative provision. But when all but unanimity of opinion in selecting him, is succeeded by perfect unanimity as to the necessity for his removal, it is quite impossible to attribute the later act to any such causes as those adverted to. Again, if his Lordship's tenure of office had been of extraordinary length, circumstances might readily be imagined to have arisen gradually to cool the affection of his friends, and give confidence to his enemies. But his Lordship retained his honourable appointment for only about two years, and the accomplishment, within so brief a period, of a revolution of opinion, so great and general, in the body to whom he owed both his appointment and his recall, is certainly a startling fact; and the more so when the character of that body is taken into consideration. If any one quality were to be selected as peculiarly characteristic of the Court of Directors of the East-India Company, it would be caution. Every member of the Court has a pecuniary stake in India, and the Court collectively are the representatives of the great body of claimants upon its territory. Among the Directors are men personally acquainted with India, and with the sources from which danger in that country is likely to arise; men trained by long experience in civil, political, legal, military and maritime affairs; merchants of great eminence and bankers of

the highest standing; most of them are of mature age, and the political opinions of the majority are those of the party with which Lord Ellenborough has generally acted. If indeed a body eminently conservative in its views and habits, and cautious beyond the ordinary measure of caution, were sought for, it would be found in the Court of Directors of the East-India Company;—if they be found to act rashly, there is no faith to be placed in human discretion. By that body Lord Ellenborough was elevated to the office of Governor-General—by that body he has been dismissed, under circumstances of striking singularity. It remains to inquire into the reasons for this last step; and there is no satisfactory mode of ascertaining them but by examining his Lordship's policy and conduct during the brief term of his government.

In ordinary candour, it must be admitted, that on the arrival of Lord Ellenborough in India, his situation was neither enviable nor easy. He found the long triumphant flag of England humbled by disaster and defeat. A vast army had been sacrificed without any countervailing advantage; isolated bodies of British troops still remained exposed to danger, while a number of unhappy captives were in the hands of a ruffian chief, on whose probable disposal of them no one could guess; the power of the British name had received a fearful diminution; the spirit of the army was shaken by the disasters which had overtaken their comrades, and the past and the future seemed alike involved in gloom. The earliest impressions and earliest declarations of Lord Ellenborough were such as became a British Governor-General. He arrived at Calcutta on the 28th February, 1842, and on the 15th March following his Lordship in Council addressed the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Jasper Nicolls, in language well suited to the circumstances which surrounded him.—"Whatever course," it is

observed, " we may hereafter take must rest solely upon military considerations, and have, in the first instance, regard to the safety of the detached bodies of our troops at Jelalabad, at Ghuznee, at Khelat-i-Ghilzie, and Kanda ar, to the security of our troops now in the field from all unnecessary risk, and, finally, TO THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF OUR MILITARY REPUTATION, by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Affghans, which may make it appear to them, to our own subjects, and to our allies, that we have the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities, and violate their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately from Affghanistan, not from any deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because we are satisfied that the king we have set up, has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he has been placed."* In a subsequent part of the same letter his Lordship, after urging the necessity of paying regard to circumstances in coming to action with the enemy, so as to secure to the British force the advantages derived from their superior discipline, thus continues: "At the same time we are aware that no great object can be accomplished without incurring some risk, and we should consider that the object of striking a decisive blow at the Affghans, more especially if such blow could be struck in combination with measures for the relief of Ghuznee—a blow which might re-establish our military character beyond the Indus, and leave a deep impression of our power and of the vigour with which it would be applied to punish an atrocious enemy—would be one for which risk might be justifiably

* Papers relating to military operations in Affghanistan, presented to both houses of Parliament by command of her Majesty, 1843, p. 167.

incurred, all due and possible precaution being taken to diminish such necessary risk, and to secure decisive success."* His Lordship likewise adverts to the release of the prisoners taken at Kabool, as an object "deeply interesting in point of feeling and of honour," and suggests, with a view to attain it, the taking of hostages from those parts of the country which the British force might be able to occupy, as well as the prospective advance of General Pollock beyond Jelalabad even to Kabool.

Thus much was well, but how did his Lordship fulfil the expectations which he had thus excited? He found that considerable preparations had been made for recommencing operations in Affghanistan, and he proceeded to complete and to add to them. He left Calcutta and his Council in order that he might be nearer to the seat of war and give the weight of his personal influence and the advantage of his personal superintendence to the affairs in progress on the frontier. This seemed to indicate not only great energy, but great determination of purpose; and those who observed the conduct of the Governor-General, who knew the character of the officers and men at his disposal, and who thought, moreover, of the great objects before him—the military reputation of Great Britain to be re-established—the terror of its name to be restored—treachery to be punished—and its surviving victims, comprising women and children as well as men, to be rescued —those who felt the importance of these objects, and who witnessed or heard of the restless vivacity of the Governor-General, never doubted that all would be well—never supposed for a moment that any check would be put upon the ardour of the military commanders, that any obstacle would be interposed between their desire for action and the

* Papers—*ut supra*—page 168.

gratification of it; or that he who had thought the prosecution of the war a matter of so much importance, as for the sake of aiding it to separate himself from his Council, and make a journey of several hundred miles, was prepared to acquiesce in so pitiful a termination of the labours of himself and his predecessor as that of merely getting the troops in Affghanistan back again to India. Yet thus it was. Some ill success befel the British cause—Ghuznee was surrendered to the enemy, General England failed in his attempt to join General Nott at Kandahar, and further, a bad spirit was understood to prevail in a part of the force under General Pollock. The new Governor-General, it became apparent, in spite of his high purposings, was not a man to encounter difficulties or persevere under discouragement—his moral courage oozed away as he approached the scene of action, and the "re-establishment of our military reputation—the decisive blow at the Affghans"—and the safety of the prisoners—were all cast to the winds. On the 19th April, General Nott was ordered to destroy Kelat-i-Ghilzie, to evacuate Kandahar, and to fall back to Quetta.*

In advising the Commander-in-Chief of the transmission of these orders, the Governor-General says, "The severe check experienced by Brigadier England's small corps on the 28th ultimo—an event disastrous as it was unexpected—and of which we have not yet information to enable us to calculate all the results, has a tendency so to cripple the before limited means of movement and of action which were possessed by Major-General Nott, as to render it expedient to take immediate measures for the ultimate safety of that officer's corps, by withdrawing it, at the earliest practicable period, from its advanced position, into nearer

* Papers, pages 223, 4.

communication with India."* On the very day on which these orders to General Nott and the letter to the Commander-in-Chief bear date, the Governor-General published a notification of the successful advance of the troops under General Pollock into the Khyber Pass, and of the evacuation by the enemy of the fort of Ali Musjid.† On the same day the Governor-General addressed to Sir Jasper Nicolls a second letter, the subject being the position of General Pollock,‡ to whom he desired the Commander-in-Chief to transmit instructions; and this was followed by a third, in which the nature of these desired instructions is unequivocally anticipated. His Lordship says:—"What ulterior destination may be given to those corps, when that of Major-General Nott, having drawn off the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghilzie, shall be concentrated ultimately in the vicinity of Sukkur, and *that of Major-General Pollock having drawn off the garrison of Jelalabad shall be again on this side of the Khyber Pass*, is a matter for the most serious consideration, and one upon which I am most anxious to have the opportunity of conferring personally with your Excellency, or with some officer in your confidence, whom you may depute to me for that purpose."§ His Lordship then alludes to the possibility of selecting a new line of advance should the war be renewed *after the retreat of the two Generals as above assumed*, but immediately adds:—"It will, however, likewise be for consideration, whether our troops, having been redeemed from the state of peril in which they have been placed in Affghanistan, and, it may still be hoped, not without the infliction of some severe blow upon the Affghan army, it would be justifiable again to push them for no other object than that of revenging our

* Papers, page 224.
† Papers, page 201.
‡ Papers, page 224.
§ Papers, page 225.

losses and of re-establishing, in all its original brilliancy, our military character." For no other object! The restoration of our military character is not much it seems, and the safety of the prisoners nothing, for this point is not adverted to. Two days after this, namely, on the 21st of April, the Governor-General received authentic information of Sir Robert Sale's victory at Jelalabad and of General England having regained, without further loss, his position at Quetta, where he had been joined by the rest of his brigade. These events he communicated to the Secret Committee in a letter dated the 22nd, together with the following account of their influence, or rather want of influence, on his opinion with regard to the necessity for retreat. "These several events, although they improve our prospects to some extent, have in no respect altered my deliberate opinion, that it is expedient to withdraw the troops under Major-General Pollock and those under Major-General Nott at the earliest practicable period into positions, wherein they may have certain and easy communication with India;"* that is, to withdraw the troops of General Pollock to Peshawur, and those of General Nott to Quetta. "That opinion," his lordship adds, "is formed upon a general view of our military, political, and financial situation, and is not liable to be lightly changed." The same general views are expressed in nearly the same words in a letter dated the 24th April, to Mr. George Clerk, the Governor-General's agent with the Sikh Government—"To regain concentrated positions for our armies, having easy and secure communications with India, is the present object of the Government, and one not lightly to be changed;" and again—"All that the Governor-General regards"—*all*, be it observed—"is the security of our communication with the troops beyond

* Papers, page 223.

the Upper Indus, and their withdrawal, at the earliest practicable period, from their advanced positions, in a state of continued efficiency, undiminished by the climate or by the enemy."* Such was the unvarying tenor of Lord Ellenborough's language from the time that he quitted his council and acted without advice or check of any kind. The burden of his instructions was retire—fall back—get towards India as fast as you can—leave the Affghans to themselves, and by consequence leave the British prisoners to be mal-treated and murdered by those whom our pusillanimity will thus relieve from the restraint hitherto imposed by their fears.

Reverses had shaken his lordship's confidence in every thing but his own judgment; success had no power to re-assure him. And yet, on one occasion, he did indulge in a flight of expectation which, to all but himself, must appear most extravagant. It has been seen how he spoke of the situation and prospects of the British armies in Affghanistan on the 19th, 22nd, and 24th April. On the 28th he caused no less than three letters to be written to General Pollock, one intimating his belief in the reports of the death of Shah Shoojah, and his conviction of the impossibility of the British Government recognizing a successor under the circumstances that prevailed; a second, giving permission to treat with a *de facto* government for the exchange of prisoners, if such government were capable of carrying an exchange into effect; and a third, the crowning letter of all, announcing that the aspect of affairs in Upper Affghanistan appeared to be such, that his lordship could not but contemplate "the possibility"—a possibility indeed—of General Pollock having been led to "advance upon and occupy the City of Kabool."† Certainly his lordship's

* Papers, page 232. † Papers, page 235.

notions of possibility were not narrow. He speaks of marching to Kabool as coolly "as maids of fifteen do of puppy dogs." This offhand way of treating a great and most difficult military operation—an operation so great and so difficult, that the Governor-General seems, both before and after this communication, to have regarded it as all but hopeless, is highly characteristic. The consistency of his lordship is not less remarkable. At one time to advance, is treated almost as much beyond rational contemplation as a journey to the moon. At another the march of an army from Jelalabad to Kabool is spoken of as lightly as a walk from London to Highgate. But, let justice be done—though the Governor-General actually indulged in a vision of the possibility of an army situated like that of General Pollock, without preparation and without arrangement or understanding with General Nott, pushing on to Kabool and occupying it as easily as a party of schoolboys would run over Blackheath, he still harps on his old string, retirement. General Pollock is assured that the Governor-General's views are unchanged, and that if he should be at Kabool, he must leave it as quickly as possible. "If that event," the imaginary march to Kabool, "should have occurred, you will understand, that it will in no respect vary the view which the Governor-General previously took of the policy now to be pursued. The Governor-General will adhere" (this WILL is very characteristic also) "to the opinion, that the only safe course is, that of withdrawing the army under your command, at the earliest practicable period, into positions within the Khyber Pass, where it may possess easy and certain communications with India."* But the hallucination about marching to Kabool afforded but a temporary interruption to the

* Papers, page 235.

uniformity of the Governor-General's strain. Only nine days before it commenced,—that is, on the 19th April,—he had called on the Commander-in-Chief to furnish additional instructions to General Pollock, and it has been seen what sort of instructions were expected. Sir Jasper Nicolls seems to have doubted as to the propriety of thus embarrassing the general; whereupon Lord Ellenborough, unable to brook delay, himself undertook the duty of reading a lecture on war,—not to Hannibal, but to a very able and experienced officer, who, in the judgment of his immediate military superior, stood in no need of the assistance. "The general," said Sir Jasper Nicolls, "is a clear-headed, good officer, and you have loaded his advance with heavy cautions."* These heavy cautions, however, were repeated in a letter dated the 4th May. Not quite a week had elapsed since the Governor-General had hoped or feared, it is difficult to say which, that General Pollock was at Kabool, or in full march thither. On the 4th May, he indulges imaginings as to what the general is about, as he did on the 28th April, but their complexion is not quite the same. Let the reader judge. Here is Lord Ellenborough's vision of General Pollock, as presented to his Lordship's mind on the date first named above, but last in the order of time,—viz. on the 4th May: "The most recent accounts which have been received of the difficulty experienced by you in obtaining supplies at Jelalabad, and in bringing forward supplies from Peshawur; and the very deficient means of movement, as well as of provision, which you possess, induce the Governor-General to expect"—now mark the expectation; within a week after, he thought it possible that General Pollock had gone to Kabool—"that you will have already decided upon withdrawing your

* Papers—*ut supra*—page 240.

troops within the Khyber Pass into a position wherein you may have easy and certain communication with India, if considerations, having regard to the health of the army, should not have induced you to defer that movement."* And while the reader notes the marvellous consistency of these expectations, between the indulgence of which six days only intervened, let him not omit to notice the testimony given by the Governor-General to the means possessed by General Pollock for making the march to Kabool, which it was thought possible he might have undertaken—"the very deficient means of movement as well as of provision which you possess"—these are the Governor-General's words, and yet he dreamed that in such circumstances an officer of so much ability and so much experience as General Pollock should commit the folly of marching for Kabool; this too, in the teeth of his own avowed opinion thus declared: "His Lordship is too strongly impressed with confidence in your judgment to apprehend that you will ever place the army under your command in a situation in which, without adequate means of movement and supply, it could derive no benefit from its superior valour and discipline, and might be again subjected to a disaster which, if repeated, might be fatal to our power in India."* Most just was this his Lordship's impression; but how is it to be reconciled with his former impression or supposition, something less than a week old?

Before the letter of the 4th May was written, the Commander-in-Chief had come to the rescue, and had issued instructions in general accordance with the Governor-General's wishes; so much so, indeed, that his Lordship tendered in return, not only his approbation, but his thanks; and in order that the instructions might have all the weight

* Papers, page 241.

which his own military knowledge and experience could give them, Lord Ellenborough lost no time in assuring General Pollock, by another despatch, that his judgment confirmed that of the Commander-in-Chief.* The orders thus embodying the views of the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief were very distinct. After adverting to the instructions given to General Nott to evacuate Kandahar, and retire first upon Quetta, and ultimately upon Sukkur, it is added, "You are required to make a similar movement in Upper Affghanistan, and to WITHDRAW EVERY BRITISH SOLDIER FROM JELALABAD TO PESHAWUR."†

From these orders no deviation was to take place, except in three possible cases. First, that certain negotiations in progress for the release of the prisoners lately confined at Buddeabad should have been brought to such a point that its accomplishment might be endangered by withdrawing; secondly, that before the receipt of these orders, General Pollock should have despatched a lightly-equipped force to endeavour to rescue those prisoners; thirdly, that the enemy at Kabool should be moving a force to attack that of the English general. In this "improbable case," as it was most justly termed, it was held to be advisable to inflict a blow on the enemy, but provided only that "any respectable number of troops" should "have descended into the plain below Jugdulluk" with the intent of making such an attack as that referred to. If the number were not "respectable," or, though "respectable," should not have advanced beyond Jugdulluk, but were only on their way thither, the British army was to run before them. With regard to the prisoners, the qualification introduced was as follows: "I allude entirely to the officers and ladies now or

* Papers, pages 242, 243. † Papers, page 242.

lately at Buddeabad, or its vicinity. Those at Kabool cannot, I think, be saved by any treaty or agreement made, under existing circumstances, at Jelalabad." So their recovery was given up. Such were the instructions of which the Governor-General entirely approved, as he assured the Commander-in-Chief and General Pollock. Lest General Nott should be inconveniently influenced by a professional passion for maintaining his country's honour, he, too, on the 7th May, was once more addressed; he was apprized of the nature of the instructions which had been forwarded to General Pollock, and reminded of the tenor of those previously transmitted to himself. The 13th May produced another letter to General Nott, adverting to the proposed advance of General England to join that officer, and admitting that the position of the former at Kandahar was more favourable than it had been supposed to be when the orders of the 19th April were issued; "But," it was added, "this improvement of your position is not such as to induce his Lordship to vary those instructions, in so far as they direct your retiring upon Sukkur. That movement you will make at such period, and with such precautions, as may best conduce to the preservation of the health of your troops and the efficiency of your army. The Governor-General understands that, consistently with the necessary regard to these objects of primary importance, you cannot retire below the passes till October."* This extension of time is attributed by Lord Ellenborough to the advice of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Jasper Nicolls.* A similar extension was conceded to General Pollock, in accordance, as it would appear, with the views of the General himself, acting under the discretion intrusted to him by the Commander-in-Chief, when, in compliance with

* See Papers, page 251.

the pressing desire of the Governor-General, he issued his further instructions. This is to be inferred from a letter of Mr. Clerk to Sir Jasper Nicolls, dated 5th May, in which he says: "Adverting to the opinions expressed by General Pollock, in his letter written after the arrival of Captain Mackenzie in his camp, I conclude that, with the discretion vested in him under your Excellency's orders, he will not abandon either the British captives, or the position he holds at Jelalabad."*

Referring to this letter from Mr. Clerk, Lord Ellenborough, writing to the Commander-in-Chief on the 14th May, says: "The advance of the season, however, which really renders the retirement of Major-General Pollock at the present moment a measure of some hazard to the health of his troops—the improved facilities which the major-general finds of obtaining supplies of provisions—but, more than all, *the influence which those now about him*, anxious to vindicate the army by some signal blow against the Affghans, and to effect the restoration of the prisoners to liberty by negotiation supported by force, must necessarily have upon his mind,—all these things induce me to apprehend that it will hardly be until October that the major-general will commence his homeward march."†

Notwithstanding all the reasons here enumerated in favour of delaying the retirement of General Pollock, the measure was obviously not in favour with the Governor-General. This might be presumed from the somewhat ungracious reference to the "influence of those about" the general, and the presumption is strengthened by a letter to General Pollock, dated the 29th of May, written, as it

* Further Papers, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 17th February, 1843.

† Papers, page 252.

appears, under a deep apprehension that the General might have mistaken his instructions, and have given to the discretion left him wider limits than those by which it was intended to be circumscribed. The date of this letter, however, affords some food for reflection. The ostensible occasion of its being written is a passage in a letter from Mr. Clerk to General Pollock, dated the 18th of May, a copy of which was forwarded to the Governor-General on the 21st. In this letter, Mr. Clerk had expressed his belief that, with the negotiations pending in front, General Pollock would not withdraw. There is no evidence as to the time when this letter was received by Lord Ellenborough, but it is certain that on the 14th of May he was in possession of a letter addressed by Mr. Clerk, on the 5th of that month, to Sir Jasper Nicolls (already quoted), in which he says (speaking of General Pollock), "I conclude that with the discretion vested in him under your Excellency's orders, HE WILL NOT ABANDON EITHER THE BRITISH CAPTIVES, OR THE POSITION HE HOLDS AT JELALABAD." The Governor-General, on the 14th of May, if not before, knew that such was Mr. Clerk's belief, and that it was formed upon opinions expressed by General Pollock; but he takes no notice, beyond a brief reference to it in addressing the Commander-in-Chief on the subject of General Pollock's remaining, until October, beyond the Khyber Pass, in which measure, though with some reluctance, he seems to acquiesce. But on the sight of another letter, shewing that Mr. Clerk continued to hold the opinion which he had declared in the previous letter, namely, that General Pollock would not withdraw, the Governor-General is suddenly thrown into an agony of apprehension and anxiety. He has good reason, on the 14th May, for believing that General Pollock intends to follow a certain course, which he

disapproves, yet he does nothing, but waits the result with as much calmness as a Swiss herdsman expects the avalanche which is to crush his cottage to atoms, or a good Mussulman the fire which is raging three houses off, and must soon reach his own. But Mr. Clerk's letter of the 18th May rouses him. Why? Thus is the question answered by the letter to General Pollock of the 29th May: "As Mr. Clerk was, on the 18th instant, in possession of the orders addressed to you by the Commander-in-Chief, on the 29th ultimo, the Governor-General infers that in so expressing his belief that you would not withdraw, with the negotiations pending in your front, he had in view the paragraphs in those orders which relate to negotiations for the release of the prisoners."* "*The Governor-General infers!*" Did he only infer? Had not Mr. Clerk, in his letter to Sir Jasper Nicolls, dated the 5th May (a copy of which letter was in Lord Ellenborough's possession on the 14th), used these memorable words?—"I conclude that with the discretion vested in him (General Pollock), under your Excellency's orders, HE WILL NOT ABANDON EITHER THE BRITISH CAPTIVES OR THE POSITION HE HOLDS AT JELALABAD;" and after this the Governor-General—cautious man—can only "infer" allusion to the said discretionary power. But the ground of this inference is worth looking at: "As Mr. Clerk was, on the 18th instant, in possession of the orders addressed to you by the Commander-in-Chief on the 29th ultimo, the Governor-General infers," &c. Indeed Mr. Clerk *was* in possession of the Commander-in-Chief's orders on the 18th of May, for he was in possession of them on the 5th, when he wrote the former letter. That letter commences: "I do myself the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 30th ultimo, enclosing a copy of your Excel-

* Papers, page 294.

lency's orders to Major-General Pollock, of the 29th ultimo." This letter was before Lord Ellenborough on the 14th; from it he knew that Mr. Clerk had the Commander-in-Chief's orders on the 5th, and that he was of opinion that General Pollock would exercise the discretion thereby allowed, and remain at Jelalabad. Yet the Governor-General, on the 29th, speaks of Mr. Clerk's being in possession of those orders on the 18th as though he was ignorant of his possessing them on the 5th, and he "infers" that Mr. Clerk's belief as to General Pollock's course has some reference to the discretion vested in that officer, a point distinctly noticed in the letter of the 5th, which Lord Ellenborough had lying before him fifteen days before he drew this notable inference.* However, having drawn it—and the task required no extraordinary measure of sagacity—he caused General Pollock to be enlightened as to the precise limits of his discretion with regard to the prisoners. The general was informed that the instructions could only apply to negotiations, almost brought to a close at the time of receiving the Commander-in-Chief's letter—not to any then pending, the event of which might be doubtful, still less to any which might be subsequently commenced. The letter thus closes:—"The Governor-General does not suppose that you can have misunderstood those instructions"—the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief—"but if the observation in Mr. Clerk's letter of the 18th instant had been suffered to pass in silence, that silence might have appeared to be acquiescence in a wrong interpretation, and you might possibly have been so misled into adopting it."† Yet Mr. Clerk's letter of the 5th, referring to what he believed to be the General's opinion as to

* Mr. Clerk's letter of the 5th May does not appear in the Blue Book, but is printed as a supplementary paper.

† Papers, page 295.

withdrawal, was "suffered to pass in silence;" and on the 14th Lord Ellenborough had made up his mind to General Pollock's protracted stay at Jelalabad. On the 29th he becomes frightened, and directs a letter to be written to General Pollock, warning him not to be too zealous in his endeavours to obtain the release of the prisoners. Is this the conduct of a great statesman? Is it that of a man even of plain common sense? No; it is that of a man so vacillating as to shift with every breeze, and even without any external cause for change, or so incompetent to the duties of his high charge, that all his faculties were overwhelmed, and he forgot by the end of the month what he had written at the middle of it; or, what is far worse, that of a trickster, anxious only so to play his cards as under all circumstances to exonerate himself from blame, and whatever might befal the army at Jelalabad, be able to secure his own reputation from wreck. But if this letter of the 29th May spoke the honest judgment of the Governor-General—and if it did not, let his friends find an excuse for his duplicity—it is clear that he was then anxious for the return of the army. Unless the negotiations for the release of a part—only a part—of the prisoners were complete, or nearly so, at the time of General Pollock's receiving the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, he was to come back. This is the purport of the letter, and happily it is so decisive, that there is no possibility of explaining away its obvious meaning; and, let it be remembered, that when these explanatory instructions were given, Lord Ellenborough knew that General Pollock was deficient in the means of moving his troops, but had excellent means of providing for their comfort where they were.

The next letter addressed to General Pollock is dated the 1st June. It treats of the continued stay of the general at Jelalabad as then a settled point; and what is

its tone? that of disappointment, chagrin, and fear. "The retirement of your army," it is observed, "immediately after the victory gained by Sir Robert Sale, the forcing of the Khyber Pass, and the relief of Jelalabad, would have had the appearance of a military operation successfully accomplished, and even triumphantly achieved. Its retirement, after six months of inaction, *before a following army of Affghans*, will have an appearance of a different and less advantageous character."* Here, again, it is plain that it was the wish of Lord Ellenborough that General Pollock should retire immediately after effecting a junction with Sir Robert Sale. He not only directed this at the time, but more than six weeks after the junction had been effected, we find him lamenting that his directions had not been followed, and predicting evil from their having been neglected. In this letter a melancholy acquiescence is accorded, not to the arguments in favour of the army remaining, but to the force of circumstances, which rendered it impracticable for it to move. "Since circumstances seem to compel you to remain there till October,"—this is the language used under the instructions of the Governor-General.

We have now to consider a letter to General Pollock, dated June 6th. This, like the letter of the 29th May, is explanatory of previous orders, the Governor-General having a great horror of General Pollock's misunderstanding his instructions. Some thoughts had been entertained of making over the fort of Jelalabad to the Sikhs, and General Pollock had been instructed to give them possession if required by Mr. Clerk to do so. This had been adverted to in a letter from General Pollock to the secretary to the Governor-

* Papers, page 297.

General, and forthwith a letter is despatched, "at headlong speed," to prevent any thing so calamitous as General Pollock's concluding that he was to stay at Jelalabad till it should be decided whether the fort should be given up to the Sikhs or not. It was known that General Pollock would not move till October. The delay had been coldly and sullenly assented to, but yet on the 6th June it is deemed requisite to warn General Pollock not to delay, with reference to any arrangement with the Sikhs, his movement from Jelalabad, which was not expected to take place for four months. This is not very intelligible, but it marks very distinctly the eagerness of the Governor-General for the return of the army—an eagernesss so extreme, as apparently to involve his faculties in oblivion with regard to every thing else. The answer of General Pollock, though framed in perfect accordance with the relative situations of the Governor-General and himself, yet conveys to the former a very severe though dignified reproof by a mere calm statement of facts. The general says, "Had it been in my power to retire on Peshawur, I should not have delayed doing so for the purpose of making over Jelalabad to the Sikh troops, unless the transfer could have been effected immediately. It will be observed that in my letter, No. 64 (to which yours, No. 313, is a reply), I have stated that, owing to the want of carriage-cattle, it was not in my power to withdraw this army."*

General Nott does not appear to have been written to so frequently as General Pollock, but whenever he was addressed the tone of communication was the same—retire, retire, retire. On the 1st June, he was apprized, by order of Lord Ellenborough, that General Pollock

* Papers, page 325.

could not move before October. On the 4th July,—and the date is remarkable—he was informed of an intended movement of General Pollock on Pesh Bolak, and subsequently in advance. This communication was accompanied by a copy of the letter addressed to General Pollock on the 1st June; the letter lamenting that the latter officer had not retired immediately after his arrival at Jelalabad, and foretelling evil results from his stay; and the following reason is assigned for the transmission of this copy to General Nott—in order "that you may not be misled into the belief that any change has taken place in the main object of the instructions heretofore furnished to the major-general,"* that object being to get the army away as quickly as possible. On the same day (July 4th) the same steadfastness of purpose is avowed in a letter to General Pollock—"No change has from the first taken place in the Governor-General's views of the expediency of withdrawing your army at the earliest period consistent with the health and efficiency of the troops; that is, as is now understood, at the beginning of October."†

Thus it is seen, that from the close of the month of March, or at all events from the commencement of April to the beginning of July, the instructions of the Governor-General were directed to one object—that of facilitating the retirement of the armies in Affghanistan—with little regard to national honour, and with none to the safety of the prisoners detained by the enemy.

At length, the dawn of a change appears. How was it brought about? Was it effected by any process of reasoning within the mind of the Governor-General, by the operation of new and unlooked-for events, or by some other cause? Certainly not by either of the two causes above re-

* Papers, page 326. † Papers, page 327.

ferred to. His lordship, it may be presumed, meditated on the circumstances under which he had to act, but the result was only to wed him more closely to his favourite plan of bringing back the armies in Affghanistan as early as possible. The current of events had been chequered; evil had been succeeded by good, but the Governor-General was unaffected; his views, on his own authority, were unchanged. True it is, that he continued to talk, at intervals, of "striking a blow at the enemy," and if the enemy could have been defeated by words, the Governor-General was not the man to spare them. But, at least until the month of July, he contemplated nothing beyond desultory and unconnected attacks—mere "chuppaos;"* "you may make your strength severely felt by sallies of this description, should they be practicable," it is observed in the letter to General Pollock, June 1st, "and create a strong desire on the part of the enemy"—for what? "to induce you to leave the country." Oh most lame and impotent conclusion! And is this the language of a British Governor-General of India? Let not the shades of Clive and Cornwallis and Wellesley and Hastings hear it!

But to the reasons of the change. There were men who felt that, to abandon Affghanistan without some manifestation of military power, without some effort to recover the British subjects, treacherously kidnapped into captivity, would be a national disgrace. Such men were General Pollock and General Nott. The latter officer, on first learning that an intention was entertained of retiring from Jelalabad as soon as the garrison were relieved, remonstrated. The intention, it should in justice to Lord Ellenborough be observed, was entertained before his arrival, and therefore

* A chuppao is an attack generally made by night, and for plunder: a surprise; a foray.

he is accountable only for adopting it. In this part of his conduct, as in those parts which present a fairer appearance, he has no pretensions to the blame or the praise due to originality of thought. General Nott remonstrated, representing the evil effects likely to result from quitting Affghanistan under circumstances which could not fail to leave behind us an impression that retirement was the consequence of weakness. The letter conveying this remonstrance was dated the 24th March. On the 18th April, General Nott again delivered his opinion on the question, and in a manner worthy of his character. Although he had then ground for concluding that the offer of advice hostile to retreat would not be very favourably received, he did not hesitate to avow his conviction that the difficulties of prosecuting the war to a more honourable conclusion had been greatly overrated, and that "unnecessary alarm had been created respecting the position of" the troops in Affghanistan. In a passage in the former of these letters the question of immediate retirement is discussed in so just and forcible a manner, that it is due to the gallant officer to quote it. "If Government intend to recover, even temporarily and for the saving of our national honour, their lost position in this country, even if doubtful of the policy that it may be deemed expedient to pursue, I earnestly hope, that before any immediate retrograde step is made, in either direction, our whole position in Affghanistan will be attentively viewed; and that the effect which a hasty retirement would certainly and instantly have on the whole of Beloochistan, and even on the navigation of the Indus, will be taken into consideration. At the present time the impression of our military strength among the people of this country, though weakened by the occurrences at Kabool, is not destroyed; but if we now retire, and it should again become necessary

to advance, we shall labour under many disadvantages, the most serious of which, in my opinion, will be, a distrust of their strength among our soldiers, which any admission of weakness is so well calculated to induce; and in what other light could a withdrawal from Jelalabad or Kandahar be viewed? If retirement should become necessary, it should take place simultaneously and at a proper season. If Government should select Kandahar as the point whence future operations against Kabool are to be directed, still the retention of a position at Jelalabad, in considerable force, will be of the most essential service in all future contemplated operations. In the sanguine hope that some unforeseen circumstances may have occurred to postpone the execution of the Government order for the evacuation of Jelalabad, I have thought it incumbent on me to address this letter to you."* Now here it will be seen that General Nott looked to future operations against Kabool; he deemed them necessary to the vindication of his country's honour, and the retention of a position at Jelalabad in considerable force he regarded as essential to success. He did not abandon all hope of again visiting Kabool and deem retirement the only course open, as did the Governor-General, nor did he propose to run headlong for Kabool without provisions or means of carriage, a step which the Governor-General thought General Pollock might possibly have hazarded. His advice was to stand fast, retaining all the advantages which were possessed, and looking forward to employ them usefully to aid in pressing forward to Kabool when the proper time arrived. In his letter of the 18th of April, General Nott says, "Perhaps it is not within my province to observe, that, in my humble opinion, an unnecessary alarm has been created regarding

* Papers, pages 245, 246.

the position of our troops in this country, and of the strength and power of the enemy we have to contend with. This enemy cannot face our troops in the field with any chance of success, however superior they may be in numbers, provided those precautions are strictly observed, which war, between a small body of disciplined soldiers and a vast crowd of untrained, unorganized, and half-civilized people, constantly renders necessary. True, the British troops suffered a dreadful disaster at Kabool, and it is not for me to presume to point out why this happened, however evident I may conceive the reasons, and the long train of military and political events which led to the sad catastrophe."* After receiving the orders to retire at once from Kandahar, General Nott was obviously in expectation that a better spirit might come over the mind of the Governor-General, and that delay might be beneficial in affording time for the transmission of counter orders. Writing to General Pollock, on the 30th May, he says, " I have withdrawn the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghiljie ; the order left me no discretion ; the same order applies in the same positive manner to Kandahar ; however, it will take some time to arrange, and before I can possibly carry it into effect, there will be ample time for the Government, should they deem it advisable, to send me other orders. I shall be prepared to ADVANCE or retire agreeably to the pleasure of Government."†

Such was the language, such the views and hopes of General Nott. What were those of General Pollock ? To ascertain them it is requisite to refer to a letter from the general dated the 13th May, the fate of which was somewhat extraordinary, it having, by a very remarkable accident, strayed into a wrong bundle of papers, from which

* Papers, page 247. † Papers, pages 313, 314.

retirement it did not emerge till the pertinacious and troublesome inquiries of some members of Parliament had reached Hindostan. This letter was written after the receipt by General Pollock of the Governor-General's letter, adverting to the possibility of the general having advanced to Kabool, and also after the receipt of the letter of the Commander-in-Chief, enforcing the general views of Lord Ellenborough as to the necessity for retreat. Referring to the former communication, General Pollock says, "I trust that I am not wrong in considering this letter as leaving to me discretionary powers; and coming as it does from the supreme power in India, I venture to delay for some days acting up to the instructions communicated in his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's letter, dated 29th ultimo." The general, it will be seen, thus eagerly caught at Lord Ellenborough's allusion to the possibility of his having advanced, and construed it into a permission to delay acting up to the instructions of a later date which he had received from another quarter, and which directed him, except under certain specified circumstances, to retire. General Pollock, after adverting to the reason of his not having advanced towards Kabool, thus goes on: "With regard to our withdrawal at the present moment, I fear that it would have the very worst effect; it would be construed into a defeat, and our character as a powerful nation would be entirely lost in this part of the world. It is true that the garrison at Jelalabad has been saved, which it would not have been had a force not been sent to its relief; but the relief of that garrison is only one object; there still remain others which we cannot disregard. I ALLUDE TO THE RELEASE OF THE PRISONERS." General Pollock then alludes to the negotiations in progress respecting the prisoners, and remarks, "If while these communications were in progress. I

were to retire, it would be supposed that panic had seized us. I therefore think that our remaining in this vicinity (or perhaps a few marches in advance) is essential to uphold the character of the British nation; and in like manner General Nott might hold his post, at all events, till a more favourable season." Lord Ellenborough had expressed much anxiety respecting the health of the troops; and undoubtedly this was a most important consideration. General Pollock thus answers: "I have no reason yet to complain that the troops are more unhealthy than they were at Agra. If I am to march to Peshawur, the climate is certainly not preferable; and here I can in one or two marches find a better climate, and I should be able to dictate better terms than I could at Peshawur." To the dread of being attacked and beaten, General Pollock was as insensible as to that of climate, but he felt deeply the necessity of the co-operation with General Nott. He says: "I cannot imagine any force being sent from Kabool which I could not successfully oppose, but the advance on Kabool would require that General Nott should act in concert, and advance also. I therefore cannot help regretting that he should be directed to retire, which, without some demonstration of our power, he will find some difficulty in doing."* Thus thought General Pollock; thus did he express himself strictly in accordance with the views of General Nott, though without concert; but with what a wide difference from those entertained and avowed by the Governor-General!

It has been intimated that this letter of General Pollock met with some remarkable adventures. In the Blue Book laid before Parliament it was not to be found, but its existence was ascertained from a reference made to it in another letter, which did appear. The Marquess of Lansdowne,

* Affghanistan supplementary paper, presented to Parliament 1843.

in the House of Lords, and Lord Palmerston, in the House of Commons, called for its production, but her Majesty's ministers answered that they had it not, and knew nothing about it—that they had caused search to be made for it at the East-India House, and that there also the return was *non-inventus*. This appeared strange, but there was no remedy. Neither Court nor City could furnish copy of the letter, though evidently an important one, and by what means it had failed to reach the authorities at home was but matter for fruitless conjecture. At last the Secret Committee received a letter from the Governor-General, giving the following account of the matter—the spontaneous tender of his lordship in consequence of reading the "debates in Parliament."* "The original despatch of the 13th May never reached the office, and must have been lost in transit. The duplicate was received and acknowledged on the 11th of July. It is the practice of the Secretary's office to keep the unreported papers on all important subjects for each month together, and to forward copies of them to the Secret Committee by the monthly overland mail. The despatch in question was inadvertently put up in its proper place in the May bundle of reported papers, instead of being left for a time, as it should have been, amongst the unreported papers of July. Hence when the July papers were copied for transmission to the Secret Committee, this despatch was omitted."† Such, according to the old rhyme,

"Is the history
Of this wonderful mystery."

This is the explanation given "on authority." Really Indian affairs are strange matters. The paper in question

* The letter of the Governor-General and that of General Pollock, *then* first forwarded, were laid before Parliament, and printed.

† Affghanistan Supplementary Paper.

gets from a place where it should be, to a place where it evidently should not be (though Lord Ellenborough calls it "the proper place"), with as much facility as we have seen a clause escape out of one Act of Parliament and creep into another. This wonderful transposition is worth looking into on account of its curiosity. "The original despatch never reached the office, and must have been lost in transit." Here we are led to ask what place it was that the despatch never reached?—"the office," but what office? Does Lord Ellenborough mean that it never reached his hands? that it was intercepted by the Affghans, whose vigilance thus occasioned such an infinity of trouble to various parties—to the Marquess of Lansdowne and Lord Palmerston in asking questions; to the Queen's Ministers in declaring themselves unable to answer them; to the clerks of the Board of Commissioners and of the East-India Company in looking for the copy of a paper of which copy never arrived; and, lastly, to Lord Ellenborough, in giving the account of the transaction above quoted? Is this his lordship's meaning, or does he mean that after he had received and read it, the despatch was lost in the course of transmission to some office where it was to be deposited? Surely, where explanation was the object, a little more clearness might have been attained. But the original despatch was lost—when, where, how—whether before or after Lord Ellenborough had an opportunity of becoming acquainted with its contents, does not appear. Now for the duplicate. "The duplicate was received and acknowledged on the 11th July;" here we are at sea again. It is not quite apparent whether both the receipt and acknowledgment are to be assigned to the 11th July, or the latter only. Was the letter acknowledged on the same day on which it was received, or some time afterwards? If on the

day it was received, there seems to have been marvellous haste in acknowledging a letter which had then become stale, and which with reference to a change which had come over the policy of the Governor-General did not call for any extraordinary promptness. Yet, with reference to this change of policy, we cannot but perceive how flattering it is to the sagacity of Lord Ellenborough, that, before he was in possession of the letter of General Pollock (assuming that he did not receive it till the 11th July), he had become a convert to the opinions therein maintained, so far as to allow a practical trial to be made of their soundness. But we must proceed with the explanation:—It seems that "it is the practice of the Secretary's office to keep the unreported papers, on all important subjects, together, and to forward copies of them to the Secret Committee by the Monthly Overland Mail." Well, this "practice" appears a very natural and reasonable one, but it is to be presumed that the papers thus kept together are placed with reference to the month in which they are *received*—not according to the dates they bear. If a letter, dated in November, 1843, should happen, from any cause, not to be received till November, 1844, it would (it is to be supposed) be placed with the papers of the latter month, not of the former. How extraordinary then was it, that a letter received in July (if it were not received till then) should be transferred, "inadvertently," to the month of May, with which it had no connection but in respect of date! What a strange inadvertency this must have been—to carry back the paper from the current month under which it ought to have been copied for transmission home to a past month—the papers of which had, as it seems, been copied and transmitted previously, or else how did this particular paper escape the process? If, indeed, the original had been received in

May, as it might have been, and after being perused by Lord Ellenborough had been handed over by his Lordship for deposit among the papers of the month, the duplicate might properly have been put there too, and this would seem to have been the case, for Lord Ellenborough says that such was its "proper place;" but then how are we to account for his lordship's apparent ignorance of the contents of this letter? Besides, as the original had never been received at "the office," whether received by Lord Ellenborough or not, those whose duty it was to put up the papers in their proper places must have known this, and as they at least knew nothing of the first copy of the despatch, that copy never having come into their hands, this second copy became virtually the original. They knew no other, and they could not conclude that a paper which had never come into "the office" had been previously copied therein for transmission to England. The explanation, in fact, explains nothing. The matter is still wrapt in mystery, and should any successor of the elder D'Israeli, in emulation of that agreeable writer's "Curiosities of Literature," make a collection of the "Curiosities of Statesmanship," the narrative of the wonderful events which befel General Pollock's letter, and their consequences in the British Parliament and elsewhere, will well deserve a place.

To proceed with the correspondence of General Pollock. That officer, it will be remembered, was unable, from want of the means of carriage, to move from Jelalabad, either in advance as he would have wished, or in retreat, as desired by the Governor-General. In a letter dated the 20th May, he had suggested that he should be authorized to remain at Jelalabad till the autumn, as supplies were plentiful, and the situation quite as healthy as Peshawur.* This was

* Papers, page 296.

answered on behalf of Lord Ellenborough by the letter of the 1st of June, already referred to, expressive of disappointment that the retreat of the army did not take place immediately after the forcing of the Khyber Pass, and the relief of Jelalabad, when, in his lordship's opinion, it "would have had the appearance of a military operation successfully accomplished, and even triumphantly achieved."* This view of the matter is remarkable enough, but it is not the most singular feature in this singular letter, which, to use the language of a learned lord, affords matter for "much pondering." The authority solicited for retaining the army of Jelalabad is not formally and distinctly given, neither is it refused. His lordship only talks "about it and about it." It is assumed in the following passage (already quoted), that the army will remain, "since circumstances seem to compel you to remain there [at Jelalabad] till October;" and shortly after, it is observed, "you have already full powers to do every thing you may deem necessary, for the comfort of your troops and for their efficiency."* This hesitating, rambling mode of treating such a subject is strange enough in a state paper. But there are things yet more strange. The Governor-General compels us to go back to the famous letter from General Pollock of the 13th May, which emerged from darkness only at the call of two potent magicians, yclept Lansdowne and Palmerston. His lordship acknowledges General Pollock's letter of the 20th May, but he says not one word of the letter of the 13th (the modest, retiring letter, that kept out of the way). Perhaps he had not received it. This supposition will, indeed, account for his not discussing its contents, but will it account for the absence of all allusion to it? It was evident that it was a most important letter.

* Papers, page 297.

But perhaps Lord Ellenborough knew nothing about it —he was ignorant of such a letter ever having been written. Not so, for General Pollock, in the letter which was so fortunate as to obtain an answer (that of the 20th May), says, "I have already, in my letter dated the 13th instant, entered on the subject,"* that subject being nothing less than the withdrawal of the army from Jelalabad to Peshawur, and yet this letter receives no more notice than if it had been a complimentary note inquiring after his lordship's health—possibly not so much. Whether his lordship had received the letter or not, his silence is alike inexplicable. If he had received it, how came he not to acknowledge the receipt—if he had not, how came he to pass over the mishap so calmly? His lordship must answer —no one else can. The despatch to the Secret Committee reporting this correspondence throws no light upon the affair, but seems to make it more mysterious. In an early part of the despatch, General Pollock's want of carriage is noticed, and it is observed, "the season is now, however, too far advanced to make it probable that Major-General Pollock will be able to commence a retrograde movement for some months." In a subsequent part, one of the letters of General Pollock is thus noticed: "On the 20th May, the Major-General (Pollock), in reply to the letter addressed to him on the 4th, again represented the difficulty under which he laboured in procuring camels at Jelalabad, and under the circumstances stated, requested that he might be permitted to defer his retrograde movement until the month of October or November next. But you will perceive elsewhere,† that circumstances connected with the disorganization of the Sikh troops in the rear of our

* Papers, page 296.

† This refers to a letter on the subject, addressed by order of the Governor-General to the Commander-in-Chief.

army in Affghanistan, make me more earnestly desire the speedy return of that army to the Sutlej; and that in order to enable Major-General Pollock to meet any difficulties in procuring carriage and supplies, treasure to the amount of ten lacs has been directed to be sent to Jelalabad."* From this statement, had it stood alone, what could the Secret Committee and the Board of Commissioners have concluded? Obviously that General Pollock's request had been refused—that he had been peremptorily ordered to return. Could they have thought that even the desponding acquiescence "since circumstances seem to compel you to remain" had been given; and taking the statement in connection with the passage first quoted, what could they make of it? Nothing consistent or intelligible; the whole seems a piece of studied mystification.

But now the curtain must rise upon a new scene in the strange drama before us—a scene, in the language of melodramatic managers, replete with striking effects. On the 4th of July we have seen that the Governor-General caused a letter to be written to General Nott cautioning him against concluding from General Pollock's movements, that any change had taken place in the main object of the instructions issued to the latter officer, those instructions having been invariably directed to his retirement at as early a period as possible. We have seen that on that same 4th of July General Pollock was also addressed in a similar strain.† But on that very same 4th of July, the two generals were addressed in two other letters which may be regarded as unexampled specimens of political chicanery. Men may have seen something like them before, but nothing so good of the kind. The principal letter, that to General Nott, is indeed a master-piece, and the greatest adepts in that crooked science which disregards means, and looks but

* Papers, page 263. † See page 57.

to ends, and those selfish ends, may hail Lord Ellenborough as a worthy brother. The Jesuits immortalized by Pascal might be delighted with him—Talleyrand give him a fraternal embrace, and Machievelli, as belonging to a graver and less excitable nation, bestow on him a gracious smile of approval. Lord Ellenborough had always held out the retirement of the army as the chief object of his policy, and had strenuously urged that such retirement should be as early as possible. Does he continue to hold the same opinion still on this same 4th of July? He does—for he says so in the two brief and simple letters addressed on that day by his orders to the two generals; nay, more, he says the same in the second and more elaborate letter of that date to General Nott, the Jesuitical letter just introduced to the notice of the reader. Listen to him: "Nothing has occurred to induce me to change my first opinion, that the measure, commanded by considerations of political and military prudence, is to bring back the armies now in Affghanistan at the earliest period at which their retirement can be effected consistently with the health and efficiency of the troops, into positions wherein they may have easy and certain communication with India; and to this extent the instructions you have received remain unaltered."* "To this extent!"—What extent? To bring back the armies to proximity with India as soon as possible. There is no limitation here—it is, in the more expressive than elegant phraseology of our brother across the Atlantic, "going the whole hog." Get back the troops as soon as you can is the substance; albeit, dilated in diplomatic fashion, it occupies more space than these simple words. "But," his Lordship commences his next sentence—Touchstone proves that there is great virtue in an "if," and a voice from Allaha-

* See page 328.

bad demonstrates—practically, too, the best of all modes of demonstration—the virtue of a "but." "But the improved position of your army, with sufficient means of carriage for as large a force as it is necessary to move in Affghanistan, induces me now to leave to your option the line by which you shall withdraw your troops from that country." This reads well; the general, as a military man, and acquainted with the localities, might undoubtedly be a better judge upon such a matter than the most richly gifted Governor-General not thus qualified. Lord Ellenborough proceeds to speak of the line by Quetta and Sukkur, which he pronounces eligible—and so for mere retreat it might be. He then passes to another line, and the description of it almost takes away the breath of the reader. The line is by Ghuznee, Kabool, and Jelalabad! This—let all attention be given—this is laid down as a line of retirement from Kandahar to India, and being laid down by such eminent authority, it is not to be disputed that it is such a line, though certainly not the nearest, nor the most direct. It is as though a man at Gloucester should say, "I'll retire to London, and I think the best line will be by Birmingham and Manchester." Well, let us admit that General Nott, in going from Kandahar to Ghuznee, and from Ghuznee to Kabool, is to be considered as retiring upon India. It is hard, very hard, to receive, but it is nothing compared with what must yet be submitted to. General Nott's line is marked out, but what is to become of General Pollock? He, too, must retire, and his presence has long been required in Peshawur, with all convenient speed (perhaps the qualifying epithet might have been omitted). Of course, now that he is provided with the means of carriage, he is at once to take the retrograde step, the necessity for which has been so unceasingly rung in his unwilling ears. Yes, General Pol-

lock is to retire, but not *immediately*, to Peshawur. He is to vary his line of march—slightly,—by a deviation in the direction of Kabool! Perhaps he may reach that place, memorable from the atrocities of which it was the scene, perhaps he may not reach quite so far, as the purpose of his *retiring* in this direction is represented as being to support General Nott—but towards Kabool is his course. Retire from Jelalabad towards India by Kabool! To adopt the mode of illustration before resorted to, this is as though a man at Northampton should talk of retiring to London by way of York. Every mile he traverses carries him away from the place that he says he is going to, nor has he the pretence afforded by a movement somewhat oblique to set his conscience at rest. He is going away from the place that he professes to be anxious to reach, in a manner most direct, palpable, and undisguised, that can be conceived. He does not cast even a sidelong glance towards the avowed point of his destination; he turns his back upon it, and must know what he is about. But there is a result, which evidently follows, from the mode of speaking adopted by Lord Ellenborough on this occasion, of which, perhaps, even he was not aware. The marches of General Nott and of General Pollock to Kabool were marches made in retirement—that is settled—well then, the march of Lord Keane was the same,—we are accustomed to speak of this as an advance, but it is now clear that we have been wrong,—General Pollock and General Nott marched to Kabool, and these marches were steps in retirement. Lord Keane made a similar march, and, therefore, his lordship must also have been retiring; though, so blindly infatuated have we always been, that we have regarded his march as an advance. It is useless to say that the two Generals, Pollock and Nott, did not mean to remain; that they were only to perform

certain acts, and then to evacuate the country. This does not convert an advance into a retreat; and, moreover, this was precisely what was contemplated in the case of Lord Keane and his army. They were not to remain; they were to fix Shah Shoojah on the throne, and then to withdraw. But stifling for a time—if we can—the laugh of derision which such perversion of language cannot fail to raise, let us ask, why was this contemptible juggling with words resorted to? The answer is plain—to save the infallibility of Lord Ellenborough. He had been for months saying that there was no course but retreat, and he continued to say so when forced by a regard to his reputation to yield—not to the more mature dictates of his own judgment—but to the counsels of others, and to change his policy. He thought the change might be masked—so he goes on still preaching retreat, but giving a new gloss to the old text. Retreat was still the word—the decree for its accomplishment had gone forth—but—the line of retreat was open—and what an extraordinary line it was has been already shewn. But to forget for a moment—if possible—the astounding audacity of this proceeding, let us look at the consistency which marked it. A letter is written to General Nott on the 4th July, telling him that the Governor-General's mind is unaltered, and that he must not conclude otherwise from any movement of General Pollock. Another letter is written on the same day, giving the general permission either to act in accordance with the Governor-General's views which remained unchanged, or to follow his own. The latter letter is not placed upon record, which Lord Ellenborough seems to think a marvellously deep piece of policy. Why was it not placed upon record? Was it to keep its contents entirely secret? Secrecy is a good thing in such cases, but the danger to be apprehended

was not likely to be provoked by the letter giving sanction—coldly and hesitatingly and reluctantly, indeed, but still giving it to a bold and manly course of action; the source of danger was to be found in the timid and cowering instructions for retreat. The generals invariably urge, that the design to retreat should, as far as possible, be concealed from the enemy—that the knowledge of such a design would embolden them, while the apprehension of more vigorous proceedings would keep them in a state of alarm. It was therefore the letters which contained the whining deprecations of any protracted occupation of the country that ought to have been kept especially secret,—but these were brought upon record, while that which allowed the generals to prosecute the war to an honourable conclusion—though with a sword suspended over their heads,—was deemed so dangerous, that for this or some other reason, it was for a time kept back.

So dishonest a paper as the second letter, addressed, on the 4th July, 1842, by Lord Ellenborough to General Nott, has rarely seen the light; but dishonesty is not its only characteristic; it is ungenerous to a degree that could not have been expected in a man holding the office of Governor-General of India. Lord Ellenborough casts from himself all responsibility, and throws it upon General Nott. Most judiciously was the burden bestowed; but ought a Governor-General of India thus to relieve himself at the expense of one under his orders? His lordship knew that if the armies in Affghanistan were brought back without making some demonstration of their power, and without some attempt to rescue the prisoners, he should be met by a universal shout of execration from his countrymen at home; but he shrunk from the responsibility of directing any measures necessary for the vindication of the

national honour, so he hit upon the expedient of leaving all to General Nott. He saws and balances through a letter of considerable length, and at last comes to no conclusion but that of advising nothing. Let the reader judge. After stating that he left to the general's "option" the choice of a line of retreat, he thus proceeds:—"I must desire, however, that in forming your decision upon this most important question, you will attend to the following considerations:—In the direction of Quetta and Sukkur, there is no enemy to oppose you: at each place, occupied by detachments, you will find provisions, and probably as you descend the passes, you will have increased means of carriage. The operation is one admitting of no doubt as to its success. If you determine upon moving upon Ghuznee, Kabool, and Jelalabad, you will require for the transport of provisions a much larger amount of carriage; and you will be practically without communications from the time of your leaving Kandahar. Dependent entirely upon the courage of your army, and upon your own ability in directing it, I should not have any doubt as to the success of the operation; but whether you will be able to obtain provisions for your troops, during the whole march, and forage for your animals, may be a matter of reasonable doubt. Yet upon this your success will turn. You must remember that it was not the superior courage of the Affghans, but want, and the inclemency of the season, which led to the destruction of the army at Kabool; and you must feel as I do, that the loss of another army, from whatever cause it might arise, might be fatal to our Government in India. I do not undervalue the aid which our Government in India would receive from the successful execution by your army of a march through Ghuznee and Kabool, over the scenes of our late disasters. I know all the effect which it

would have upon the minds of our soldiers, of our allies, of our enemies in Asia, and of our countrymen, and of all foreign nations in Europe. It is an object of just ambition, which no one more than myself would rejoice to see effected; but I see that failure in the attempt is certain and irretrievable ruin; and I would endeavour to inspire you with the necessary caution, and make you feel that, great as are the objects to be obtained by success, the risk is great also."* Now this language is substantially—"I have set before you the advantages and disadvantages of every conceivable course—do as you please, but take care that what you do is the best that can possibly be done." Let us mark the generosity of this proceeding—suppose that General Nott had participated in the more than girlish timidity of Lord Ellenborough, and had said—"I can get back in safety to Sukkur, so I will run no risk by trying to reach Kabool," he then would have incurred all the odium attendant on so inglorious an abandonment of Affghanistan. It would have been said—"you had permission to go on, and you did not." The Governor-General would thus have been exonerated; and now that he has found men more courageous than himself—men who dared to perform what he did not even dare to recommend, shall he enjoy any portion of the praise due to their noble conduct? Justice forbids it. What, give the prize to one who never entered the lists, or even divide it between the gallant soldiers to whose counsel the movement is to be attributed, as is its success to their arms—divide it between these distinguished men and "a certain lord, neat, trimly drest," whose dislike "to those vile guns" was so great that he thought it better to fly than to fight! Honour, never-dying honour, rest on the heroes who rescued the British name in Affghanistan from the contempt

* Page 328.

into which it had fallen! but let not another, presuming upon the accident of his having at the time held the highest office in the government of British India, be allowed to step in, and rob them of any portion of the glory which is theirs, and theirs alone.

Is there on record any parallel to the conduct of Lord Ellenborough? Yes, one instance occurs. The readers of Roderick Random will remember, that while that erratic person is serving as a surgeon's mate on board a man-of-war, his superior, one Dr. Macshane, proposes to amputate a sailor's leg, in a case where Roderick and one of his comates do not think the operation necessary. The doctor, shocked at the contumacy of his assistants, at first talks big, and declares that he is not accountable to them for his practice; but not feeling quite secure in his own judgment, and not liking to bear the responsibility of operating in opposition to theirs, he, after slight consideration, hits upon the expedient of turning the case over to his mates, and holding them accountable for the result. Just so did Lord Ellenborough. He gives orders, against which remonstrance is made by those who are to execute them. He persists for a while, and then, in conformity with the precedent afforded by the case of Dr. Macshane, he lets his troublesome advisers do as they please, but saddles the concession with a complete transfer of all responsibility from himself. Jack Ratlin, the wounded sailor, recovered under the hands of the two mates—no thanks to Dr. Macshane. The honour of England was vindicated in Affghanistan—but no thanks to Lord Ellenborough. He renounced all claim to praise by renouncing all responsibility. He would have nothing to do with the march to Kabool. Like the sceptical Philosopher Marphurius, in Le Marriage Forcé, he said, "Je m'en lave les mains," though with far

better luck; Molière's hero received a hearty thrashing for his indifference;—

> " But yet, as fortune, by the self-same ways
> She humbles many, some delights to raise,"

Lord Ellenborough, by a like manifestation, gains an Earl's coronet, and a Grand Cross of the Bath.

Yet indifferent as was Lord Ellenborough to some things, which appealed powerfully to the feelings of men inferior in rank to the Governor-General of India, it must not be supposed that he was on all subjects equally philosophical. He was not such " a dish of skimmed-milk " but that there were matters capable of moving him, and the letter to General Nott affords an instance. Anticipating that the general would be so hot-headed as to advance upon Ghuznee and Kabool—to *retreat* by way of these places it should have been said—anticipating this movement, Lord Ellenborough thus instructs the gallant officer upon a very important point relating to his conduct at the former place. " You will bring away from the tomb of Mahmood of Ghuznee his club which hangs over it, and you will bring away the gates of his tomb, which are the gates of the temple of Somnauth."* Let the defamers of Lord Ellenborough now stand forth and say, if they dare, that he is without enthusiasm. The charge is false. His enthusiasm may be of extraordinary character—it may require extraordinary occasions to call it forth—but it is clear that it may be called forth. Though it may slumber long, it exists. True, that the reparation of the damaged honour of Great Britain did not provoke it; true, that it was proof against the claims of the brave men, delicate women, and innocent children who were in captivity among the Affghans; but it is raised to boiling-heat by the thoughts of a mouldy old club and a pair of

* Page 328.

rotten gates. No, it would be wrong to charge Lord Ellenborough with being deficient in generous enthusiasm, but the feeling is in him of a singular kind. The club, alas! eluded the grasp of the victors of Ghuznee; but the gates —thrice happy chance! were taken; a fact as well known as John Gilpin's ride to Ware and back again.

> "I am a linen-draper bold,
> As all the world doth know."

And Lord Ellenborough took good care that all the world should know the story of the gates of Somnauth. The Hindoo princes, he thought, would be delighted with it, and he rushed to electrify them with the good news as eagerly as ancient Pistol to communicate to Sir John Falstaff the news of the accession to the throne of his old boon companion, Henry the Fifth.

> "Sir John, I am thy Pistol and thy friend,
> And helter-skelter have I rode to thee,
> And tidings do I bring, and lucky joy,
> And golden times, and happy news of price."

But ancient Pistol never uttered such fustian as is to be found in a certain Indian state paper. Who has forgotten the famous proclamation which threw Europe, Asia, and America, into apoplectic fits of laughter, except when the risible propensity was subdued by rising feelings of disgust or apprehension? That a Christian nobleman should have dictated such a proclamation and sent it forth, with the stamp of his authority, is indeed calculated to excite impressions of deep regret, not less than of surprise. But that any man, except the concoctor of a low American newspaper—one of the fraternity transatlantically denominated *Slangwhangers*—could have written such a paper, would have exceeded belief were not the fact before us. If there be in existence any state paper with which it may fitly be

compared, it must have emanated from the cabinet of King Chrononhotonthologos. But to this sounding prelude what succeeded? The parading of the gates was to delight Lord Ellenborough's "brothers and friends,"—so he styled them—the Hindoo princes and chiefs. Did it answer the purpose? Far from it. His lordship's enthusiasm was shared by none. No man in India but himself cared for these gates, or deemed them worth a thought. To him they furnished a stand on which to hang the flowers of Bedlam eloquence, and there their importance ended. They slumber in obscurity, no one knows where. Certainly they have not been honoured with a triumphal progress into Guzerat, as Lord Ellenborough proposed, and it seems that if they had, there is no temple for them!

The folly of this unparalleled proclamation is obvious enough—the political danger attending its issue is not less apparent. His lordship had a keen scent for danger when British honour was to be vindicated and British prisoners rescued. How came his apprehensions to be lulled into insensibility when he prepared this extraordinary paper? Did his lordship think that in this proclamation he should carry with him the feelings of the Mahomedan subjects of the British Crown? Did it never occur to him that the almost divine honours claimed for a trumpery piece of carpenter's work might be offensive to those who, though aliens from the Christian fold, have yet a deep horror of idolatry, and of all that ministers to it? Did he overlook the fact, that the capture of these gates, if a triumph for the Hindoos, was a triumph over the Mahomedans, or did he think that there was no danger in irritating the latter? Did he forget how proud and excitable is the Mahomedan character—that those by whom the gates of Somnauth were carried to Ghuznee

were followers of Mahomed, and that the original capture of the gates, like their recapture, was less a national than a religious cause of triumph? Did he forget that thousands of Mahomedans were serving in the British armies, and that it was scarcely worth while to offend them for the sake of trumpeting the march of the gates, of which the tomb of Mahmood the Destroyer had been despoiled, even though the tomb his lordship assured his "brothers and friends 'looked' upon the ruins of Ghuznee,"—an extraordinary proceeding on the part of the tomb. Did he forget HIS OWN declaration—surely he could not forget *that* whatever else might slip from his memory, that the war had "assumed a religious as well as national character?"* or did he disregard the possible consequences of disgusting a host of bold, reckless, uncalculating men, whose "brothers and friends" in Affghanistan professed, like themselves, the creed of Mahomed? True, no harm has followed. The Mahomedan population of India have cast aside their ordinary gravity, and, like all the world beside, laughed at the mad effusion which the Governor-General thought would please everybody, and found to please nobody. But because no mischief has ensued, are we to acquit the man who provoked it? A burning brand may be thrown into a mass of combustibles, and it may happen that the mass does not take fire, but we do not thereupon conclude that the application of the brand was a prudent or even an innocent act. Lord Ellenborough's proclamation has turned out only a good jest, but it might have been no jest at all. There would have been nothing like a jest in a widely-spread Mahomedan revolt. We might have been satisfied, as we are now, that Lord Ellenborough did not intend to produce such an out-

* Letter to Sir Jasper Nicolls, 15th March, 1842. Papers, page 167.

break—that his lordship, in fact, meant nothing by his proclamation—that it was a mere flourish of words, as unmeaning as a flourish of trumpets; but had an insurrection followed, it would have consoled us little to recollect that it had no more dignified origin than the passion of a Governor-General for writing turgid nonsense.

There was another proclamation issued a few months before, something in the same strain with the Somnauth paper. One passage is very characteristic of the author. "Disasters unparalleled in their extent, unless by the errors in which they originated, and the treachery by which they were completed, have, in one short campaign, been avenged upon every scene of past misfortune." Now did it become the Governor-General of India thus publicly to cast a stigma on his predecessor, whoever he might have been? It is not necessary to defend the policy of Lord Auckland—many, and among them some of the highest authorities on Indian affairs, condemn that policy—but, whether it were right or wrong, Lord Ellenborough had no right to sit in judgment upon it—no official right; he might hold his own opinion, he might express that opinion to his friends, or after he had quitted office, not before—he might have diffused it by means of the press; but as Governor-General of India, Lord Ellenborough had no right publicly to criticise his predecessor. The bad taste of the proceeding is aggravated by the character of the party attacked. The administration of Lord Auckland terminated amid clouds; but who is there of any party who will deny to his lordship the character of an upright, conscientious, and intelligent functionary? Moreover, Lord Auckland was eminently a modest and unpresuming statesman: Oh! how unlike, in this respect, to his successor.

Towards the conclusion of this proclamation, the first in

order of time, though the second noticed, are two intimations of very singular character viewed in connection with that which has followed. The first of them is to the effect that "the rivers of the Punjaub and the Indus" are to "be placed between a British army and an enemy approaching from the West." The Indus, therefore, is to be one of the boundaries of British territory and occupation. The sentence immediately preceding the passage above quoted commences thus:—"Content with the limits nature appears to have assigned to its empire, the Government of India will devote all its efforts to the establishment and maintenance of general PEACE." This last word brings us to the second point, which is prominently put forward in the sentence with which the proclamation concludes:—"Sincerely attached to peace, for the sake of the benefits it confers upon the people, the Governor-General is resolved that PEACE shall be observed." Here are two things pronounced distinctly; first, that Lord Ellenborough would regard the Indus as a natural boundary of the British Empire in the East, and secondly, that his policy should be pacific—

> "The lady doth protest too much, methinks,
> Oh! but she'll keep her word."

Let us see how the Governor-General kept his. Peace had been his unceasing song. He had sung it after dinner at the London Tavern when about to proceed to India, and he continued to encore himself upon all fitting occasions, and some unfitting ones, after he arrived in that country. He would have purchased peace with Affghanistan, even though national dishonour were the price. He afterwards became more warlike. The military had gained laurels in Affghanistan, a portion of which he transferred to his own brows; but while they were ripening, a series of events were in progress in Sinde, which, in their termination,

illustrated, in a most extraordinary manner, both the consistency of his lordship's professions with his actions, and the pacific character of his policy.

Sinde had been for many years under a government of an extraordinary character. It was divided into three states, Hydrabad, Khyrpoor, and Meerpoor, subject to rulers called Ameers, some of whom exercised the powers of sovereignty in undivided tenancy. Of these states, Hydrabad was the chief. The East-India Company long maintained some commercial intercourse with Sinde, but no political connection subsisted between the Company's government and that of any of the states of Sinde till the year 1809, when, it being an important object to keep the French from gaining any footing in India, a treaty was concluded, by which the rulers of Hydrabad bound themselves not to admit that people to settle in their country. In 1820, another treaty was concluded, by which all Europeans and Americans were to be excluded from settling in the dominions of Sinde. In 1832, it being an object with the British Government to open the navigation of the Indus, another treaty was concluded, by which that object was attained, subject to three conditions—the exclusion of the transit of military stores by the river as well as by the roads of Sinde, the exclusion of armed vessels, and the prohibition of English merchants settling in the country. By another treaty with Khyrpoor, the passage of the river was conceded upon the same terms as might be agreed upon with the Government of Hydrabad. A supplementary treaty, having reference especially to the tolls to be levied, was concluded with the Hydrabad Government very soon after the former treaty; and in 1834, a commercial treaty, in conformity with a provision in the supplementary one, was entered into with the same state, and extended to

Khyrpoor, as previously agreed upon. In 1838, another treaty was formed, by which the British Government undertook to use its good offices to adjust differences existing between the Ameers and Runjeet Singh, the Sikh ruler, who meditated the extension of his conquests in the direction of Sinde. By this treaty, also, the Ameers agreed, for the first time, to receive permanently a British minister to reside at Hydrabad, or elsewhere within their dominions, as he might deem expedient.

Sinde was formerly a dependency of the Mogul empire. About the middle of the last century it became subject to Kabool, but from the weakness of the Government of that country, the dependency was little more than nominal. When the British Government resolved to support the claims of Shah Shoojah, and reinstate him in possession of his dominions, it was deemed necessary to settle the relation of Sinde with Kabool, and accordingly, by an article in the Tripartite treaty, to which the British Government, Runjeet Singh, and Shoojah-ool-Moolk were parties, it was provided that, on the payment, by the Ameers, to Shoojah-ool-Moolk of a sum to be fixed under the mediation of the British Government (part of which was to be paid by Shoojah to Runjeet Singh), all the claims of the ruler of Kabool upon Sinde, whether of supremacy or for tribute, were to be relinquished, and the country was to continue to belong to the Ameers and their successors in perpetuity.

The conclusion of this treaty, and the mode in which their interests were affected by it, were communicated to the Ameers by the British minister at Hydrabad, who was instructed, also, to announce the approach of the army intended to reseat Shah Shoojah on the throne of Kabool. A long course of diplomatic proceedings, varied by sundry hostile acts on the part of the British Government, too

well known to require detail, here followed. These ended in the conclusion of new treaties, the effect of which was to add the Ameers to the number of princes over whom the British Government held control by the tenure of a subsidiary alliance. Thus matters stood in February, 1842, when Lord Ellenborough arrived to take the reins of government in India.

It is not offering his lordship any injustice to say that almost from the period of his entering upon the duties of his office, he seems to have contemplated the reduction of Sinde to the condition of a British province, in name as well as in fact. On the 6th May, 1842, he writes to the political agent in that country thus: "The Governor-General is *led to think* that you *may* have seen reason to doubt the fidelity of some one or more of the Ameers of Sinde."* Accordingly, with reference to what his lordship had been "led to think" *might* have occurred, he transmitted a letter, to be addressed to any one or more of the Ameers who might incur suspicion. This letter, which breathes gunpowder in every line, thus concludes: "On the day on which you shall be faithless to the British Government, sovereignty will have passed from you; your dominions will be given to others" (to whom?—we shall shortly see), "and in your destitution, all India will see that the British Government will not pardon an injury received from one it believes to be its friend."† In the letter of instruction to the political agent, this passage is referred to as "no idle threat, intended only to alarm, but a declaration of the Governor-General's fixed determination to punish, cost what it may, the first chief who may prove faithless, by the confiscation of his dominions."‡

* Correspondence relating to Sinde, 1836, 1843. Printed in conformity with a resolution of the General Court of Proprietors of East-India Stock, 17th November, 1843. Page 347. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

Proceeding onward, we find another letter addressed by order of his lordship to the political agent in Sinde, under date the 22nd May. The British, as is well known, had, on advancing upon Affghanistan, taken possession of certain towns and fortresses belonging to the Ameers of Sinde. Whether this were justifiable or not, this is not the place to inquire; but this much is quite certain without any inquiry, that we had possessed ourselves of these places avowedly for military purposes, and that our retention of them was professedly only temporary. In the letter last referred to, the political agent in Sinde is thus instructed: "In any future negotiation with the Ameers of Khyrpoor, you will therefore bear in mind that it is the wish of the Governor-General to possess the island of Bukkur and the town of Sukkur, with such an ample *arrondissement* as may give every facility for the maintenance of a good police within the town, and for the formation of commercial establishments therein; regard being had likewise to the changing character of the Indus, and the necessity of providing for every variation in the course of that river which the localities make it possible to foresee. The island of Bukkur would be considered as a citadel and arsenal of the town of Sukkur, and should be rendered easily defensible by a small force."* If advantage should be taken of an expression in a previous part of this letter, "his lordship feels that it will be necessary, *at least until the affairs of Affghanistan shall assume a more settled and satisfactory form*, to retain a position on the Indus, and to have the means of acting upon both banks"—if advantage be taken of the above qualification to say that Lord Ellenborough meant to retain possession of certain parts of Sinde only for a limited period, an answer is furnished by himself in the following passage from the latter part of his letter. "The

* Correspondence, page 350.

Governor-General would consider that it would be a most desirable arrangement if, in lieu of all tribute payable, under treaty or otherwise, by the Ameers of Sinde and of Khyrpoor, such cessions of territory as may be necessary were made to us at Kurrachee, the island of Bukkur, and the town of Sukkur, and all claims to tribute payable by the Ameers to us, or to any other power, were, after such cessions, to be cancelled, in consideration of the establishment of the perpetual freedom of trade upon the Indus, and of such other provisions for the freedom of transit through their respective territories as it might appear expedient to make." Thus it is obvious that even at this early period of his administration Lord Ellenborough contemplated permanent territorial acquisition in Sinde.

On the 4th of June we have another letter to the political agent in Sinde, in which his lordship is represented as "resolved to keep every thing within the Lower Indus in his hands." In this letter he inquires "whether the territories under Meer Roostum Khan be in such a position as to make it easy to annex a portion thereof to the dominions of the Khan of Bhawulpore, whose dominions his lordship is desirous of increasing, in reward for his own uniform fidelity and that of his ancestors."* Here we find Lord Ellenborough treating the dominions of the Ameers as though they were his own—not only assigning as much as he thought fit to the Government of which he was the representative and head, but proposing to carve them out for the benefit of others, provided that they lay conveniently for the purpose.

Shortly after this, the reader of the Sinde correspondence is treated with a specimen of his lordship's usual vacillation. A letter addressed to the political agent on the 10th of

* Correspondence, page 370.

July concludes thus: "After all, it will be a matter for consideration, before the final instructions shall be issued to you, whether any probable benefit to be ever derived from the treaty could compensate for the annual expenditure which would be brought upon the Government of India by the maintenance of a large force at Sukkur and Kurachee."* On the 22nd May, the Governor-General had been most anxious to retain possession of Kurachee, Bukkur, and Sukkur. But between that date and the 22nd July, "consideration like an angel came," and he began to doubt whether these places were worth the expense of keeping.

A new actor, and one destined to play a very important part, now appears on the stage. This is Sir Charles Napier. This functionary was not only to hold the chief military command in Sinde and Beloochistan, but within those limits was to "exercise entire authority over all political and civil officers." Such are the instructions of the Governor-General, dated the 26th August. They conclude thus: "It may be convenient that you should at once be informed that, if the Ameers, or any one of them, should act hostilely, or evince hostile designs against our army, it is my fixed resolution never to forgive the breach of faith, and to exact a penalty which shall be a warning to every chief in India. On the other hand, it is my intention to seize the first opportunity of bestowing substantial benefits upon the Khan of Bhawulpore, as a reward for the constant support which the British Government has received from him and his ancestors."† Here the old spirit again breaks out. The Ameers had as yet not gone the length which would afford a decent pretence for depriving them of their territory; but the eye of Sir Charles Napier was to be kept on them in the hope that they would. The

* Correspondence, page 381. † Ibid. page 384.

fruit was not quite ripe, but it was to be watched till it could be gathered with some appearance of propriety; and when the much-desired opportunity arrived of stripping the tree, a friend and neighbour was to be thought of, and a good basket-full of the produce handed over to him. These things it was "convenient"—that is the word—that Sir Charles Napier should know. That Sir Charles Napier might be informed of every thing that the Ameers had done of a hostile character, and even of every thing that *might be so construed*, Major Outram was, on 1st September, instructed to "explain to the major-general (Napier) the actual state of things, shewing him what had been done by the Ameers and chiefs, in pursuance of the treaties, and place before him, with *judicial accuracy*, the several acts whereby the Ameers and chiefs may have seemed to depart from the terms or *spirit* of their engagements, and to have evinced hostility or unfriendliness towards the Government of India."* One might suppose that this was an extract from a letter to an attorney, directing him to lay before counsel a statement of facts, for the purpose of framing a criminal indictment. Of these instructions to Major Outram, Sir Charles Napier was advised, in a letter reiterating the Governor-General's determination to inflict signal punishment upon any of the chiefs who might have evinced hostile designs.† Indeed, these denunciations of "signal punishment" occur so frequently in his lordship's communications respecting Sinde, as to mark beyond the possibility of mistake the feelings and intentions which were cherished by him.

On the 23rd October, the desire which the Governor-General had long felt, of being munificent at the expense of others, is found prevailing in great activity. In a letter of that date, to Sir Charles Napier, he says, "I am very anxious to be enabled, as the result of any new arrangement with the

* Correspondence, page 385. † Ibid. page 386.

Ameers, to have at my disposal the Pergunnahs of Bhoong Bhara, and, if possible, Subzulkote likewise, in order to bestow them in free gift upon the Khan of Bhawulpore. No chief in India deserves so well of the British Government as that Khan. He and his family have been faithful for three generations, and I know no measure which would be so conducive to our reputation and influence (certainly there is none that would be so gratifying to myself) as to be enabled to make this gift to him. The cession should be made to us, and then we should give it over to the Khan; and, as there may be some difficulty in the proposed arrangement with the Ameers, it would be better to say nothing to the Khan till the thing is done." * The Governor-General is "very anxious" to get a portion of the property of the Ameers of Sinde to give away to a third party, because that third party deserved well of the British Government. Nothing, he thinks, would conduce so much to "our reputation" as to take from John and give to Peter! "The cession should be made to us, and then we should give it over to the Khan!" Let us by threats or cajolery get possession of something that does not belong to us, for the sake of generously bestowing it upon a friend. The exercise of gratitude is as delightful as it is respectable, and it is the more delightful (though perchance not the more respectable) when it can be indulged, not at our own proper cost, but at that of our neighbours. This is the morality of a British Governor-General who flourished in India in the year 1842.

Under the same date, the 23rd October, another letter to Sir Charles Napier occurs, in which his lordship says, "I am inclined to think that the Ameer Nusseer Khan will be so wrong-headed, or so ill-advised, as to persist in refusing to observe the conditions of the treaty, in which case

* Correspondence, page 392.

he must be at once compelled to do so; and if the Government is obliged to incur any expense for the purpose of so compelling him, the least punishment which can be inflicted upon him is that of defraying the expense."* In a letter formerly quoted, we find that his lordship was "*led* to think" that which was most convenient for his purpose. Now he is "*inclined* to think," an assertion which it cannot be doubted was quite in accordance with fact. It being settled that Ameer Nusseer Khan would oblige the British Government to incur expense, and that he ought to defray it, the master passion of the Governor-General suddenly peeps out again. "But," he continues, "I should prefer depriving him of territory." Territory again! "Still harping on my daughter;" and his lordship proceeds, through a portion of the remainder of his letter and a rather respectable postscript, to offer suggestions for disposing of the territory of which Nusseer Khan was to be deprived with as much coolness as the commissioners under an inclosure act might make allotments to the parties interested. As is frequently the case in regard to right of common, there were some rather complicated questions, which, however, the Governor-General discusses with perfect *sang-froid.*

It cannot be denied that in Sir Charles Napier the Governor-General found an efficient and by no means a scrupulous agent. In a paper of considerable length (so considerable indeed, that its author terms it "an essay rather than a letter"), Sir Charles Napier shews a degree of aptitude for following up the suggestions of his superior which is perfectly astonishing.† After some observations on the expediency of keeping the Ameers strictly to the terms of their treaties, he says, "By treaty, the time for

* Correspondence, page 393.

† See the paper in Correspondence, page 394.

which we may occupy our present camps is unlimited;"—true, Sir Charles, true; but surely you are aware that the occupation was always professed to be temporary, though no precise time was fixed for its conclusion. Having always professed an intention to depart as soon as the circumstances which led to your presence shall have ceased, will you stay for ever, because the exact moment for your departure has never been determined? This would be just what we should look for in a Mahratta visitor—first to get a temporary footing, then to make it permanent; but from the Government of British India we expect something better. If honour and good faith find no place beside in India, let them at least irradiate the counsels of British statesmen and British soldiers, whether they emanate from Calcutta, from Simla, or from Sukkur. You will not force one party to observe the strict letter of a treaty, and claim for yourself the privilege of violating its spirit, together with an understanding so distinct as to have acquired almost the force of a formal treaty! Yes, even this is what is recommended. The position that the time for the stay of the British army is not limited, is laid down, not as an idle display of dialectic sagacity, but as a basis on which to rest a most formidable scheme of aggression. Sir Charles Napier's argument may be stated, in an abridged form, thus:—If we depart, we must soon come back; therefore we ought to stay. If we stay, our camps will grow into towns, and the inhabitants will engross all the trade of the Indus. These towns will flourish, while the territory of the Ameers will decay. The rival governments will quarrel, and the stronger will swallow up the weaker. This is all very straightforward, and having brought his *sorites* to a conclusion, Sir Charles asks, "If this reasoning be correct, would it not be better to come to

the results at once?" And he answers, "I think it would be better, if it can be done with honesty." Now this qualification is somewhat embarrassing; but Sir Charles Napier is too experienced a tactician, and too brave a man, to despair. He proves to his own satisfaction that the Ameers deserved all that he proposed to bring upon them, because they were charged with certain acts of apparent hostility, some of which were very questionable in point of fact, while others were of very trifling nature; and further, because they had a passion for hunting, rivalling that of even our William the First. The fact is, that both the Governor-General and the chief military and political functionary in Sinde had made up their minds to a particular course; and, this being the case, there was no difficulty in finding reasons to justify it. It is but a new illustration of the old fable of the Lion and the Lamb. The stronger animal wanted a meal, and the casuistry of hunger readily furnished him with pretexts for gratifying his appetite. So Sinde was coveted, and a pretext for taking the whole, or a part, was eagerly sought for, and, it is unnecessary to say, not sought in vain. Sir Charles Napier, who, to render him justice, speaks out with most soldierly frankness, says, "I have maintained that we want only a fair pretext to coerce the Ameers."* And again: "They have broken treaties"—as he proposed to break the implied obligation to depart at a proper time—"they have given a pretext;" and the Governor-General, under whom Sir Charles Napier served, was not more slow in laying hold of it than was Sir Charles in advising such a step.

Still some degree of caution was to be observed; greatly as the object was desired, there was danger of going too fast. What instructions Lord Ellenborough carried from

* Correspondence, page 395.

home cannot be known; but apart from all fear on this head, there were grounds for hesitation sufficient to make even the most quixotic pause. There was the Court of Directors of the East-India Company watching the proceedings of their Governor-General; there were the Proprietors of East-India Stock; there was the Press of England; there was the British Parliament; and there was the whole body of the British people. The Ameers, too, were not so hostile as they ought to have been. "The Ameers," says Sir Charles Napier, writing to the Governor-General on the 8th of November, "have not committed any overt act;"* but there was some comfort, inasmuch as it was to be hoped that they would. "If they refuse to listen to reason," he shortly afterwards observes; "if they persist in sacrificing every thing to their avarice and their shikargahs, or hunting grounds, they must even have their way, and try the force of arms at their peril, if so they are resolved."†

And truly the crisis was approaching. From the time of his arrival in India, the Governor-General had marked out Sinde for a prey. In furtherance of the *denouement* which had long been foreseen and prepared, the existing treaties were voted obsolete and inapplicable to the then state of affairs, and new ones were submitted to the unhappy Ameers, which, it was anticipated, they would reject. This is evident from the letter of Lord Ellenborough to the Secret Committee, of the 19th of November, 1842, wherein he says: "I cannot but apprehend that the Ameers of Hydrabad and Khyrpoor will resist the imposition of the terms I have deemed it just and expedient to demand from them, in consequence of the violations of treaty, and the *acts of intended hostility*, of which *they appear* to have been guilty."‡ Surely this is strange

* Correspondence, p. 476. † Ibid. p. 476. ‡ Ibid. p. 488.

phraseology. What a confusion of intention and action! "Acts of intended hostility!" Was it mere intention that was imputed to the Ameers? If so, what is meant by "acts?" Or had they actually manifested their hostility by overt acts? If so, what means the word "intended?" But passing this, how hesitating, qualified, and unsatisfactory, is the mode in which these intentions or actions, or whatever they were, are spoken of! "Acts of intended hostility of which they *appear* to have been guilty." So then the Governor-General was not quite sure. Appearances indeed were, in his judgment, against the Ameers—there was ground for suspicion—was there not ground for doubt on the other side? Would he visit mere appearance with severe punishment and call this "just and expedient!" This is a revival of "Lydford Law;" hang the accused first, and try him afterwards.

But what sort of terms were those which Lord Ellenborough expected would be rejected by the Ameers? They were terms nearly as offensive as it was possible to frame. Nothing short of the total deprivation of territory and sovereignty could exceed them in this respect. The Ameers were to be relieved of all pecuniary payments, and this article, naturally enough considering who framed them, parades conspicuously in the very front of the drafts of the revised treaties. This is the single sweetener thrown into the bitter potion which the unfortunate Ameers were called upon to swallow. Tribute was to cease, but, in conformity with views long entertained and avowed, large cessions of territory were required—a sacrifice known to be most hateful to the Ameers. With regard to the portions of territory to be held by the English, the Ameers were to be entirely at the mercy of those who demanded them, for the limits were not defined in the draft of treaty, nor were they

to be determined by commissioners chosen by the parties respectively interested, but by the agent of one of them, namely, by Sir Charles Napier! Was ever such a mode of dealing heard of? The representative of the British Government in India walks into the country of a power with whom his Government has for some years maintained friendly relations, and which relations are about to be revised—only revised—and says, "I am instructed to take a portion of your territory—I cannot, at present, tell you how much; I must see how much we want—in the meantime there is a treaty which you are to sign without muttering a word of dislike." This course of proceeding placed the Ameers in worse than a state of vassalage. The draft of treaty would seem to have been studiedly drawn with a view to give to them as much pain as possible—to give the deepest wound to their feelings of self-respect, and to add to their humiliation every ingredient of bitterness of which it was susceptible. They were to relinquish the right of coining money, one of the most valued appendages of sovereignty—the British Government were to coin it for them, and none but the rupee thus specially coined and the Company's rupee were to circulate in Sinde. The very coin which passed from hand to hand among the subjects of the Ameers was to testify to their degradation. Further, they were to supply, at a price to be fixed, fire-wood, for the purpose of steam navigation, in whatever quantities the officers of the British Government might from time to time require; and failing in this, those officers were to be empowered to cut down wood within a specified distance of the river—an exercise of which power would have had the effect of destroying the shic-karzars, or hunting preserves, in which these princes delighted. Such was the mode in which Lord Ellenborough proposed to treat a power with which he was ostensibly

desirous of maintaining friendly terms. If this treaty were a specimen of his friendship, what must his enmity be? It is worth while to see what account the Governor-General gives of the matter. In a letter to Sir Charles Napier, dated November 4th, he says, "The treaty proposed to be imposed upon Meer Roostum and Meer Nusseer Khans, rests, for its justification, upon the assumption that the letters said to be addressed by Meer Roostum to the Maharajah Shere Sing, and by Meer Nusseer Khan to Beebruck Boogtie, were really written by those chiefs respectively, and that the confidential minister of Meer Roostum did, as is alleged, contrive the escape of the Syud Mahomed Shureef."* Here are Lord Ellenborough's motives as stated by himself. There is his defence—he has chosen his ground and he must stand on it. This was perfectly understood by Sir Charles Napier, who, in a letter to the Governor-General, of the 17th November, says, "The whole proceedings towards the Ameers now depend, as I construe your decision, upon three things:—1st. Is the letter of Meer Nusseer Khan, of Hydrabad, to Beebruck Boogtie, an authentic letter or a forgery? 2nd. Is the letter of Meer Roostum Khan, of Khyrpoor, to the Maharajah Shere Sing, an authentic letter or a forgery? 3rd. Did Futteh Mahomed Ghoree, confidential agent of Meer Roostum Khan, of Khyrpoor, assist in the escape of Mahomed Shureef?"†—These are the three points, and how does the general dispose of them? The first letter, that alleged to be written by Meer Nusseer Khan, of Hydrabad, is about as vague as native letters generally are; but if it were genuine, it would seem to indicate that the Ameer had fomented movements hostile to the British cause, and that he meditated shaking off his connec-

* Correspondence, page 472. † Ibid. page 486.

tion with British Government.* But its genuineness cannot, as it seems, be proved. The seal, the great evidence of its authenticity, is pronounced, by certain witnesses, to be that of Meer Nusseer Khan; but then Sir Charles Napier measures the details with a pair of compasses, and it is found that they do not correspond with those of the seal known to be in use by the Ameer. This would seem to discredit the letter, for an inscription upon a seal is not a shifting thing, in which the letters are sometimes of one size and sometimes of another, with variable distances between them. But as the half-starved apothecary, Lampedo, had a remedy, even though soul and body were divorced, so Sir Charles Napier has one for this awkward flaw in the evidence against the Ameers. It "is accounted for by the circumstance (said to be notorious), that the Ameers have two seals."† Now it seems that the fact of their having two seals was not positively "notorious"—it was only "said to be" so;—and thus the rumour of a rumour is the ultimate evidence upon which this charge rests. Was this a sufficient ground for such a proceeding as that which Lord Ellenborough founded upon it—even though strengthened by the declaration of Sir Charles Napier, "that no one has a doubt of the authenticity of the letter?"‡

The second point relates to the letter of Meer Roostum of Khypoor, referring to a supposed treaty between that prince and the ruler of Lahore. With regard to this letter, Sir Charles Napier says, there are doubts on the mind of Major Outram whether the Ameer was privy to it or not; but that it certainly was written by his confidential minister, and bore the Ameer's seal;§ and he concludes, that Lord

* See Correspondence, page 440. † Ibid. page 486. ‡ Ibid.

§ Mr. Clerk, British Envoy at Lahore, to whom this was, with some other letters, transmitted, doubted of their authenticity. See Correspondence, page 478.

Ellenborough will hold, that Meer Roostum must be responsible for the acts of his minister. He was right in concluding that such would be the decision of the Governor-General, but this system of making the prince responsible for the act of his minister is a reversal of the old doctrine, that the minister is responsible for the acts of the prince. We have seen how one of the Ameers was dealt with as to evidence. Now we have another sentenced to equally severe treatment on account of a letter which there is not the slightest proof that he ever saw.

The third point relates to the escape of an insurgent leader from the custody of the British authorities, and the evidence, if it be worthy of belief (which is not quite certain), proves that the aforesaid confidential minister was in correspondence with him; but, as in the former case, there is nothing to implicate his master.

Such is the evidence collected by Sir Charles Napier, with regard to which he observes: "If I have your lordship's answer, saying, that you consider the above sufficient to act upon, I shall lose no time in proposing your draft of the new treaty to the Ameers."* His lordship did think it sufficient, and Sir Charles was instructed to act.

He did act, and a strange and disgusting combination of vile intrigue and unjustifiable violence marked his course. Meer Roostum, the unhappy chief of Khyrpoor, had a brother, named Meer Ali Morad, who was anxious to supplant him. It seems that, by the established rule of succession, he would have succeeded to this dignity on the death of his brother, though the latter had a son, but he was unwilling to wait. Sir Charles Napier lent his countenance to the designs of Meer Morad Ali, promised him the support of the Governor-General,† and the result was, that the chiefship (the turban it is somewhat affectedly called) was trans-

* See Correspondence, page 486. † Ibid. page 515.

37741

ferred to the usurping brother. He was desirous of something more; having obtained the chiefship prematurely, he wished to divert the line of succession in favour of his own family. "The rightful heir at Ali Morad's death is his nephew, the son of Meer Roostum."* These words are Sir Charles Napier's. But Ali Morad wished his own son to succeed, and a British officer does not shrink from asking a British Governor-General whether or not this could be accorded. What says the Governor-General? He shall not be misrepresented; he shall speak for himself. "I shall therefore gladly see established the right of primogeniture in the direct line; and this you may, if you deem it advisable, communicate to Meer Ali Morad; and I have little doubt, that once established in the possession of the turban, with our support, he will be able, with the concurrence of a majority of the family, to establish the more natural and reasonable line of succession to the turban, and clothe the measure with the forms of legality; but recognizing, as I do, Meer Ali Morad as the successor to Meer Roostum, according to the present custom, whereby the eldest son of Meer Roostum is superseded, I could not at once recognize the eldest son of Meer Ali Morad as his successor, in contravention of the very principle upon which his father's rights are founded."† Most straightforward and righteous policy! The rights of the heir cannot be invaded openly and immediately, but they shall be undermined—they shall be attacked secretly and by degrees. This is the policy of a British Government in the nineteenth century of the Christian era! Can the annals of the most depraved of native states furnish any thing more crooked, despicable, and base than this?

Chicane requires time—violence is more prompt. Sir Charles Napier had wormed Meer Roostum out of the

* Correspondence, page 511. † Ibid. page 512.

chiefship, and prevailed on the poor old man ("poor old fool" the general calls him *) to surrender himself to the usurper of his rights.† Lord Ellenborough approved the

* See Correspondence, page 509.

† Sir Charles Napier subsequently endeavoured to shew that he had nothing to do with the transfer of the turban. In a paper drawn by him and which appears in the Supplementary Correspondence relating to Sinde, pp. 114, 115, he says, "when I heard that he [Meer Roostum] had resigned the turban to Ali Morad I disapproved of it, and Mr. Brown will recollect my sending Ali Morad's vakeel back to him with this message. I even recommended him to return the turban and merely act as his brother's lieutenant." Again in a letter to the Governor-General in Council (page 116), he says, "I assuredly did not press the abdication of the turban by Meer Roostum, nor did I ever advise it." Sir Charles Napier, however, admits (page 114) that he ever advised Meer Roostum to seek the "protection" of his brother and be guided by him, though he boasts as follows:—"I gave Meer Roostum the option and invitation of coming to my camp and putting himself under my protection." He says further, "by my advice, which, let the reader observe, was not given till it was asked, I secured to Meer Roostum the honourable and powerful protection of the British Government. This he did not choose to accept—he went to his brother."

With reference to these statements, nothing more is necessary than to quote Sir Charles Napier's words from the first volume of Correspondence relating to Sinde. At page 510, we find him reporting a proposed escape of Meer Roostum to his (Sir C. N.'s) camp, on which he observes, "I DID NOT LIKE THIS, AS IT WOULD HAVE EMBARRASSED ME VERY MUCH HOW TO ACT, BUT THE IDEA STRUCK ME AT ONCE THAT HE MIGHT GO TO ALI MORAD, WHO MIGHT INDUCE HIM (AS A FAMILY ARRANGEMENT) TO RESIGN THE TURBAN TO HIM. * * * * I therefore secretly wrote to Roostum and Ali Morad, and about one o'clock this morning I had an express from Ali Morad to say, that his brother is safe with him." Again, at page 515, Sir Charles Napier writing to the Governor-General, after adverting to a particular view which he entertained as to the policy of the Ameers, says, "This made me venture TO PROMISE ALI MORAD YOUR LORDSHIP'S SUPPORT IN HAVING THE TURBAN, which your Lorship has approved of. The next step was

step, and on the day which among his countrymen is eminently one of peace and good-will, recorded his approval. On Christmas-day, 1842, he wrote to Sir Charles Napier, "I entirely approve of all you have done and express your intention of doing."* But the course of events did not run smooth. The degradation of Meer Roostum, according to Sir Charles Napier, "burst upon his family and followers like a bomb-shell." Alarmed at what they witnessed, and not knowing what to expect next, they fled towards Emaun-ghur, a fortress situate about a hundred miles within the great sandy desert separating Sinde from Jessulmair. What did the British general? He determined to follow them with an armed force, in order to prove, as he says, "that neither their deserts nor their negotiations can protect them from the British troops;"† —be it remembered, we were at peace with the Khyrpoor state—"war has not been declared,"‡ observes Sir Charles Napier; "nor," he continues, "is it necessary to declare it." The people of Sinde, it seems, were not entitled to the benefit of any of those principles which have been established for the regulation of hostile proceedings between nations, and which serve to distinguish civilized warfare from mere brigandism. The general is fond of calling them barbarians, and he seems to have treated them as something even lower than barbarians. To the beasts of the forest—animals *ferœ naturœ*,—the sportsman allows what is called "law;" the unhappy Sindians were allowed none. Sir Charles Napier marched; he arrived at Emaun-ghur, and on arriving, coolly determined to "blow it down."§ He

to secure him the exercise of its power now, even during his brother's life. This I was so fortunate to succeed in BY PERSUADING MEER ROOSTUM TO PLACE HIMSELF IN ALI MORAD'S HANDS."

* Correspondence, page 512. † Ibid. page 516.

‡ Ibid. page 515. § Ibid. page 528.

was fortified in this determination by reflecting that the fortress belonged to Ali Morad, who consented to its destruction. It is, however, by no means clear that it belonged either to Ali Morad or to the man whom he had manœuvred out of the turban; the real owner seems to have been Meer Mahomed Khan. But, waiving this point, how came it to belong to Ali Morad, if belong to him it did? This question it is unnecessary to answer here, for the reader will not have forgotten. Twenty thousand pounds of powder were found in the fortress. This was employed in its destruction; Emaun-ghur became a heap of ruins; and this was the act of an ally during a period of peace. During a period of peace did this same ally take forcible possession of the districts of Subzulcote and Bhoongbara, and give them over to the Nawaub of Bhaulpore, as long contemplated; and then came a conference between Major Outram and the Ameers, reported most dramatically in the Blue Book,* in which, though the commissioner maintained a bold front, relying on the army that was rapidly approaching, the Ameers had clearly the advantage in regard to fact and argument. They referred to the last treaty concluded with them, by which the British stood pledged never to covet any portion of the territory or property of the Ameers,—but in vain. Nusseer Khan denied the letters which formed the ground for one of the charges, and called for their production; but this too was vain—they were with the Governor-General. He referred to the ease with which seals are forged, and reminded the commissioner that he had himself called for the punishment of a person who had forged his. The commissioner answered that the handwriting had been identified. The Ameer repeated his disclaimer of any knowledge of the letter, and demanded, "Why was not the paper shewn to me?" Ay, why? Does he obtain a satisfactory

* Correspondence, pages 534, *et seq.*

answer? Yes—if the following be satisfactory. "These are points which it is not for me to discuss!" No, discussion was not the object, truth was not the object, right was not the object—but the wrenching from the Ameers of power and territory. Even this might perhaps have been accomplished at once, but for a false move on the part of Sir Charles Napier which it was now too late to retract. This was the treatment which Meer Roostum had received. "Why was he deposed?" demanded the Ameers, and the answer was, that he resigned of his own free will! What says "the poor old fool"* to this? "By the general's own direction I sought refuge with Ali Morad (here he produced the letter directing Meer Roostum to place himself under Meer Ali Morad's protection, and to be guided by his advice), who placed me under restraint, and made use of my seal, and compelled me to do as he thought proper. *Would I resign my birthright of* my own free will?"† Thus much we learn from the report of the British commissioner—much more we might know had we a report on the other side. This appears from his own statement—"Lest my memory should have failed me, I read the above to Captain Brown, who accompanied me. He says *it embraces every thing that was said on my part, but that much which was said by the Ameers in defence of themselves, and especially on behalf of Meer Roostum Khan, is omitted; that I did not consider necessary to enter more in detail.*"‡

Why should more than one side be heard—especially as the commissioner declined discussion, and told the Ameers—"The question is whether or not you accept the new treaty?"§

On the 9th Feb. they did accept the treaty, by allowing

* See Correspondence, page 103.

† Ibid. page 535.

‡ Ibid. page 536.

§ Ibid. page 535.

their seals to be affixed to a written pledge to that effect. On the 12th, the majority personally applied their seals to the treaty itself. On that day, Major Outram thus wrote to Sir Charles Napier:—"These fools are in the utmost alarm in consequence of the continued progress of your troops towards Hydrabad, notwithstanding their acceptance of the treaty, which they hoped would have caused you to stop. If you come beyond Halla (if so far) they will be impelled by their fears to assemble their rabble, with a view to defend themselves and their families, in the idea that we are determined to destroy them, notwithstanding their submission."* The event shewed that the Ameers were not such "fools" as Major Outram thought them. Sir Charles Napier answered, "I shall march to Syudabad tomorrow and next day to Halla, and attack every body of armed men I meet."† Major Outram, however, judged rightly as to the probability of resistance being offered, should the British general continue to advance. The scandalous wrong done to Meer Roostum was working like leaven in the mind of the Beloochees, and the Ameers expressed to the British commissioner their apprehensions that they should not be able to control them. On the 15th, the British Residency was attacked, and on the 18th, Sir Charles Napier achieved the brilliant victory of Meanee. It would be useless to pursue the subject further; the result is known; the Ameers became prisoners, and their territory the prize of the English, if that can be called prize which has hitherto been only a source of disease to our brave troops, and a heavy burden on the Indian finances.

Almost as useless would it be to discuss the conduct of the Governor-General and his chosen agent. The facts

* Supplementary Correspondence relative to Sinde, pages 35, 36.

† Ibid. page 40.

speak for themselves. Yet one or two questions must be asked. How far are the means by which Lord Ellenborough pursued the conquest of Sinde consistent with his vapouring declarations of desire for peace? And how far is the annexation of Sinde to the British territory consistent with his position, that the Indus was one of the natural boundaries of India?

Of the justice of the entire proceeding not a word need be said. The rulers of Sinde had always been suspicious of us; they seem to have had a presentiment that our alliance boded them no good. We forced our friendship—so called—upon them. We dragged from them one concession after another. We overran their country with our armies, and finally we took the greater part of their territories, and give the rest away. And then we talk of treachery and ill-feeling on their part. Could there be any other than ill-feeling? What says the Governor-General himself?—"That they may have had hostile feelings there can be no doubt; it would be impossible to believe that they could entertain friendly feelings."* It certainly would——we had injured them too deeply to confide in them—too deeply it seems to forgive them.

The cant about the misgovernment of the country under the Ameers, and the improvement which will attend our administration, is altogether beside the question. Supposing it all true in point of fact, what then? Are we to go about in the spirit of knight-errantry to redress the grievances and avenge the wrongs of all the oppressed people in the world?—and if not, why is Sinde selected? We might find employment in this way nearer home. What think they who thus talk of sending an army to Poland, to recover it from the yoke of the Emperor Nicholas? What say they

* Supplementary Correspondence, page 1.

to an attempt for delivering Austrian Italy from the foreign rule under which it has been brought without the consent of its people? Lord Ellenborough inferred that the Ameers suffered no wrong in being dethroned, because "Foreigners in Sinde, they had only held their power by the sword, and by the sword they have lost it."* Why not apply this in Europe? Is it because its advocates dare not, or because their sympathies are capricious—that haters of tyranny in Asia, especially when any thing is to be gained by putting it down, they care nothing for its existence in Europe?

And now that Europe has been mentioned, let us see how the acquisition of Sinde was regarded at home. The House of Lords passed highly complimentary resolutions, acknowledging the services of Sir Charles Napier in the military operations, and those of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, both European and Native, serving under him. The House of Commons passed similar resolutions. The Court of Directors and the East-India Company assembled in General Court, followed the example. But while the stream of laudation was thus flowing from every quarter upon the general and his troops, how was it, that not a single rill was directed to slake the Governor-General's burning thirst for fame? Do honour to the hands, and pass over the head! This is not usual. Lord Ellenborough, however ill he might deserve the compliment, was not passed over at the conclusion of the war in Affghanistan. He was thanked by Lords and Commons—coldly enough indeed, but still he was thanked—"for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire had been applied by him." It has been said, his lordship was entitled to the praise of a good

* Supplementary Correspondence, page 101.

commissary, and the parliamentary resolution in his favour amounts to this. To this extent too the Court of Directors and the Proprietors of East-India stock concurred in praising his lordship. But why are Lords and Commons, and Directors and Proprietors, alike silent with regard to Sinde? Above all, why are Lord Ellenborough's friends silent? Why do they not challenge that, which never was withheld before under similar circumstances? Alas! alas! his lordship's reputation "dies," and his friends "make no sign." Bitter, most bitter, must have been the duty imposed by Parliament upon his lordship of conveying to the army those thanks, in which he was not permitted to have even the smallest share.

Affghanistan and Sinde furnish the field upon which Lord Ellenborough's reputation is to be established, if established it can be. On his policy in minor matters there is not room to dwell, but his conduct in regard to the Mahratta state, subject to the House of Scindia, is too extraordinary to be altogether passed over. In 1803, the British Government concluded a treaty of peace with Scindia. In 1804 this measure was followed up by the conclusion of a treaty of alliance and mutual defence. This was near the close of the administration of the Marquis Wellesley. The Marquis Cornwallis, who succeeded to the administration of the government, disapproved of the latter treaty, which, indeed, had been virtually annulled by the conduct of Scindia himself, who, after it was concluded, had pursued a course of hostility against the British Government, in coalition with another Mahratta chief, Holkar, had held the officers and dependents of the British residency in durance, had plundered their camp, and committed many other acts of violence. A new defensive treaty of amity and alliance was concluded in 1805. By this treaty, the earlier of the

two treaties above referred to—the treaty of peace of 1803—was recognized, and every part of it not contravening the new treaty of 1805 was declared to be binding. But no notice was taken of the treaty of alliance and mutual defence of 1804; that was passed over, and was obviously regarded as defunct. In 1817, another treaty was concluded, the immediate object of which was the suppression of the Pindarrie freebooters. This treaty refers to the treaty of peace—that of 1803, and to the treaty of defence, amity, and alliance—that of 1805; and it is declared that the provisions of those two treaties, so far as they were not affected by the treaty of 1817, shall remain in full force. An engagement (not sufficiently important to be called a treaty) relating to the maintenance of a body of auxiliary horse, and their payment, was made in 1820, and thus matters rested till the year 1843, when Junkojee Rao Scindia died. That chief left no son, but his nearest male relative, a boy about eight years of age, was adopted by the Ranee (the widow of the deceased prince), and raised to the throne. The years of the Ranee, however, did not greatly outnumber those of her adopted son. She was under thirteen, and though this is a far riper age in Asia than in Europe, it was obviously necessary to commit the government to some one better qualified by age, as well as sex, for its management. A regent was accordingly appointed under the immediate influence of the British Government, but in the conflict of intrigues which prevailed at Gwalior, as at all native courts, he fell, after retaining his post only about three months—the authority which had set him up wanting resolution to maintain him. Every thing done by Lord Ellenborough was by fits, and, as might have been expected, the cold fit was succeeded by a hot one. After a time, a

military force was assembled, and the Governor-General accompanied its advance towards the river Chumbul. Here his lordship's usual obstinate wrongheadedness continued to govern him. He was desirous of enforcing the conclusion of a new treaty, and in all probability he might have effected his object without bloodshed, could he have been content to postpone crossing the Chumbul, a measure repeatedly pressed upon him by the British Resident at Gwalior, but to no purpose. His lordship resolved to cross the river, and he did cross it. The result, as is known, was, that the British army may almost be said to have been surprised by the enemy, and though the Governor-General's object was attained, it was not without some very severe fighting. It seems as though Lord Ellenborough's evil genius was always with him, and that whenever he did any thing not wrong in itself, he was sure to make it wrong by some adventitious absurdity. Passing over the minor follies of the Gwalior expedition—the wooing "golden opinions," by the personal distribution of golden mohurs on the field of battle, after the fashion of the hero of a Minerva press romance—passing over this and other pretty sentimentalities of the like nature—let us look at the ground taken for the proceedings in which these were interesting episodes. The interference of the British Government was rested on the "treaty of Boorhampoor"—the treaty of 1804—which had never been acted upon, which in fact was a nullity from the beginning, and all reference to which had been studiously excluded from the engagements subsequently formed. Yet, upon this obsolete treaty, which for thirty years had been looked upon, and justly, as a dead letter—which was a waste sheep-skin, and nothing more, does Lord Ellenborough ground his policy;* and in the

* See Proclamation, 20th Dec. 1843.

treaty concluded with Scindia on the 13th January, 1844, this said treaty of Boorhampoor, though it had been substantially disavowed by later engagements between the two states, is formally revived and declared to be binding. Either Lord Ellenborough was ignorant of the state of the engagements existing between the British Government and Scindia, or, knowing them, he, from mere wilfulness, recalled into active existence and operation a treaty long before consigned to the worms, and by the revival of which no good object could be attained, though some embarrassment might possibly result from it. Let Lord Ellenborough's friends choose on which horn his lordship shall be impaled. If they choose the latter, they will have another task before them—to reconcile Lord Ellenborough's disregard of treaties in Sinde, whenever they stood in his way, with his extreme reverence at Gwalior for every thing bearing the name of a treaty, whether in force or not in force, obsolete or operative, dead or alive.

We have now traced Lord Ellenborough through the more important acts of his government. We have seen him quailing before the difficulties which confronted him in Affghanistan, week after week, and month after month, calling on the generals to retire, leaving the prisoners to the tender mercies of the enemy, and the name of Great Britain to become a bye-word and a scoff. We have seen him, when prevailed upon, with great difficulty, to suffer the officers commanding to make an effort to avert these fearful results, meanly shaking off all responsibility, and like an adept in the science of betting, making up his book so as to have a chance of winning something, while he should be secure, as he supposed, from the possibility of loss—so shuffling his cards, that whichever might happen to turn up, he should be safe. We have seen, that for the final triumph which

crowned the British arms in Affghanistan, not one jot of praise is due to his lordship, except so much as may be claimed for affording the means, a quantum meted out both by Parliament and the East-India Company with a stinted precision, which places the honour on an equality with the noted Cambridge distinction of the "wooden spoon." We have seen his mad proclamation about the gates of Somnauth, and have glanced at the frightful consequences which might have followed this frenzied ebullition of vanity and folly. We have given a passing notice to the scarcely less foolish proclamation in which he reviled the policy of his predecessor; declared the Indus one of the natural boundaries of British India, and, as he had before done in England, pronounced peace to be the main object of his administration. We have observed how this limitation and this boast were illustrated by his lordship's conduct in regard to Sinde. We have seen him there intent not on peace but on conquest. We have followed him through the various steps of his aggressive policy, till we have found the reputation of the British nation for honour and good faith tarnished as deeply as would have been the military character of our country had the dictates of his lordship's judgment been allowed free scope in Affghanistan. We have seen him sometimes ordering, sometimes sanctioning and confirming by his after approbation, a series of measures utterly unjust in themselves, and calculated to render the British Government an object of hatred and suspicion to every native state throughout the East. Who shall trust to a British alliance while the memory of Sinde and Lord Ellenborough's policy there endures? When that great man, whose glory will be to future ages the landmark of our time—when the Duke of Wellington, then Sir Arthur Wellesley, during his distinguished service in India, was remonstrating against

what he conceived to be an undue extension of an article in a treaty which he had concluded with Scindia, he said, "I WOULD SACRIFICE GWALIOR, OR EVERY FRONTIER OF INDIA, TEN TIMES OVER, IN ORDER TO PRESERVE OUR CREDIT FOR SCRUPULOUS GOOD FAITH." Shortly afterwards he asks: "What brought me through many difficulties in the war and the negotiations for peace? THE BRITISH GOOD FAITH, AND NOTHING ELSE."* And where is that faith now? Wrecked on the sands of Sinde, by the recklessness of the man to whose keeping it was intrusted. Lord Ellenborough seems, indeed, to lay claim to some forbearance because he had no very definite instructions for his guidance;† but did he want instructions to induce him to act with common justice and honour? Was good faith in his eyes a thing to be maintained or not, according to circumstances, with reference to which he was to look for instructions? Instructions to observe good faith!! When a traveller, reputed to be an honest, respectable man, is about to proceed on a journey, would any one deem it necessary to say to him, "Now, mind how you conduct yourself; do not pick a fellow-passenger's pocket in the railway carriage, nor knock down and plunder any solitary traveller that you may meet in an evening walk." On matters of policy, his lordship might look for instructions—on matters where plain honesty was a sufficient guide, he surely might be expected to be "a law unto himself." We have seen that however reasonable this expectation, it was not fulfilled—but that pusillanimity inconceivable in an English nobleman in regard to Affghanistan was succeeded by a course of tyranny and oppression in Sinde,

* Letter to Major Malcolm, 17th March, 1804 (Wellington Despatches, Edition 1837, vol. iii. page 168).

† See Supplementary Correspondence, page 100.

from which the unsophisticated mind of an English labourer would recoil. Lastly, we have seen that even in a very ordinary matter, that of dealing with the affairs of Scindia, his lordship manifested so lamentable a degree of incompetency as evinced him to be utterly unfitted for the high office which he so unworthily filled. Here, as in Sinde, he had recourse to violence, when every object which he could lawfully seek might have been attained by skilful negotiation. Incompetency to an extent almost inconceivable—despondency under difficulties—braggadocio swaggering when there are none—cowering fear when danger seems to threaten—reckless disregard of justice and good faith when the feeble are to be coerced—indiscretion extreme and uncontrollable, with scarcely a lucid interval—indiscretion associated with, but not constrained by, a considerable portion of that low and unstatesmanlike quality, cunning—indiscretion so monstrous, that men lift up their hands in astonishment at its manifestations, and wonder whether he who has perpetrated such things can be in his right mind—these are the qualifications of Lord Ellenborough for the office of Governor-General of India, as developed throughout the period during which he abused that most important office, and they are crowned by arrogance so unbounded that it would be ludicrous even in a Cæsar or a Napoleon. Lord Ellenborough was recalled; shall we ask why? The only question will be, how was it that this step was not taken earlier? To this only a conjectural answer can be given. We may ascribe something to the forbearance of the Court of Directors, founded on a hope that their wild and wandering Governor-General might settle down into a state of mind better befitting his position—something to the fact that the more important political correspondence is known in the first instance to those Directors only who form the Secret

Committee, and that they are under the obligation of an oath of secrecy—something to the desire of the Court not to embarrass her Majesty's Government. But at least no one can fairly say that the step was taken too soon. The evidence before the public is amply, and more than amply, sufficient to justify it; there may be much more of which the public are ignorant; there may even be reasons for the recall of which they have no suspicion. But whether there be or not, the Court of Directors stand acquitted of having exercised their power capriciously or unjustly. Nor in the absence of all evidence ought it to be concluded that they exercised it violently or suddenly. We are not to suppose that the Court met one day, and passed a resolution of recall without any previous notice to her Majesty's ministers of their feeling towards the Governor-General. We are in perfect ignorance as to the fact in this respect; but as the Court of Directors are, and always have been, cautious, almost to a fault, we cannot believe that on so important an occasion they cast aside this their peculiar characteristic.

Lord Ellenborough was recalled, and the last scene of his varied performances was equal to any that preceded it. Some military officers belonging, it is understood, to both services—the Queen's and the Company's—thought fit to soothe his lordship's wounded feelings by inviting him to an entertainment given in his honour. What view military men may take of this step we know not; but it is yet within the memory of living men, how civilians regarded the design of some officers of the army to express an opinion favourable to their commander-in-chief, when his conduct had been subjected to accusation. What said the late Mr. Whitbread? He said—"Sir, general officers ought to know that they owe obedience to the state, and that they have no more right to assume the functions of a

deliberative body than the privates of the army or navy." * The Secretary-at-War, who was connected with the proceedings of the officers, came forward anxiously to declare that those proceedings "had no reference whatever to the circumstances of the present moment, or to what was now passing in that house."† Mr. Canning, a cabinet minister, spoke more directly to the point, admitting that the proceeding of the officers "could not be approved of,"‡ and that it was calculated to injure the illustrious individual whom it was intended to serve. On a subsequent day, the subject was again adverted to, and Mr. Canning, repeating his former expression of disapprobation, added that "if there did exist an attempt on the part of any military officers to protect the Duke of York against the House of Commons, a more culpable idea never entered into the head of man."§ No one ventured to defend the meditated proceedings. Ministerialists and oppositionists united in the opinion that it was most improper. Apply this universal judgment of the House of Commons to the conduct of the officers at Calcutta. The two cases are not precisely parallel, but the points of difference tell against the Indian admirers of the disconsolate Governor-General. The Duke of York was himself a soldier—Lord Ellenborough is none. The Duke of York's conduct was under inquiry by the House of Commons; the conduct of Lord Ellenborough had been inquired into by the Court of Directors, and condemned in a manner the most formal, authoritative, and severe. The officers who proposed to bear testimony to the merits of the Duke of York were not servants of the House of Commons; they were bound to respect both Houses of Parlia-

* Hansard's Debates, vol. xiii. page 700.

† Hansard, vol. xiii. page 707.

‡ Hansard, *ut supra.*

§ Hansard, vol. xiii. page 744.

ment, but they were servants of the Crown. A large portion of those who rushed forward to condole with Lord Ellenborough are directly and immediately servants of the Court of Directors, and all were acting under a Government which derives its authority from that Court.

Of the conduct of Lord Ellenborough's hosts, however, let military men judge; but what shall be said of that of his lordship in accepting the invitation? Is his appetite for flattery so inordinate that he cannot restrain it even under circumstances where a regard for others, if not a regard for his own dignity and consistency, might have been expected to induce him to forbear? So it appears; for, regardless of the embarrassment which he might possibly occasion to those whose cheers he was begging, his lordship, still writhing under the punishment which had just descended upon him, sought, amidst blazing lights, and smoking dishes, and flowing wines, and prolonged hurras, to assume an impotent air of defiance towards the authority whose just displeasure he had incurred. And there his lordship panegyrized the army, as if the army of India needed any praise from him; "I shall soon be far from you," said his lordship—according to the *Indian News*, 4th October, 1844—"I shall soon be far from you, but my heart remains with the army, and wherever I may be and as long as I live I shall be its friend"—as if it could be of the slightest consequence whether he were its friend or its enemy. He did not mention that he left part of the army in a state of mutiny—the crime having its origin in his measures. As his lordship is somewhat given to the sentimental, we must not criticise the declaration that his heart remained with the army—but why with the army alone? could he not spare one morsel of sentiment for the Indian millions whom he had been sent to govern, and who were now to lose him—

or did he think that they would benefit by the change? Then his lordship talked, it seems, of "two years of victories without a single check,"—so says the report, but surely it cannot be correct; where would have been part of those victories, if his lordship had not for once given up his own judgment to that of others? "Two years of victories without a single check," he says. He forgets—not without a single check; there was a check to the career of the armies in Affghanistan given at the outset, and by his lordship himself—something like what Malthus calls "a preventive check;" it was happily removed, and then began the course of victory of which his lordship boasts, as if all were owing to him. But the exhibition made by his lordship is so truly lamentable, that pity takes place of indignation in contemplating it. He had lost one of the highest and most honourable posts to which a British subject can aspire, but he had the satisfaction of being for one evening again a lion, of walking up a flight of steps bedizened with lamps and laurels to partake of a dinner where he was the "observed of all observers," of seeing a transparency representing a besieged town, and of reading the softly soothing sentence—"Ellenborough, farewell!" and let us hope that for three hours he was happy.

Yet, even for the sake of such a dinner, and such a transparency, and such an inscription, and such cheers, it is not to be imagined that any future Governor-General will follow the example of Lord Ellenborough. His name will be a beacon suggestive of danger. Should any of his successors be likely to fall into errors like his, the recollection of his fate may give timely warning to eschew them. In this respect, though rarely exercised, the power of recall by the Court of Directors is a most valuable security for the good government of India. The Court are never likely to exercise

it without very sufficient cause; their discretion and moderation have been shewn by the infrequency with which they have resorted to it, as have their firmness and sound judgment, by not shrinking from its use when justly called for.

As for the idle babble about depriving the Court of this power, it is not worth a moment's notice. The idea of committing a power of any kind to any person or number of persons, and then upon the first occasion of its being exercised turning round in great astonishment and great wrath, and depriving them of it, is too ludicrous for discussion; it can provoke nothing but laughter. To say that it is anomalous that the Court should possess this power, is nothing—the entire government of India is anomalous according to the notions of scholastic legislators. No philosopher in his closet would ever have framed such a plan of government as that to which India is subject, and under which it prospers. It has grown up under the pressure of circumstances, like that of Great Britain, and though widely different in construction, is equally well adapted to answer its purpose. The value of a form of government is to be determined with reference not to symmetrical proportion, but to practical utility. If the Court of Directors are fit to appoint a Governor-General, surely they are fit to decide upon his removal. The two powers seem in common sense to go together. The right of choosing an agent involves the right of dismissing him when he ceases to give satisfaction to his principal.

But there is another consideration. Under the Act 3rd and 4th William IV., cap. 85, the members of the East-India Company gave up a vast amount of property, and suffered another portion to remain at interest, chargeable on the revenues of India, on certain conditions. One of these conditions is, that they shall retain, through their representatives, the Court of Directors, the administration

of the government of India. The mode in which the government is to be carried on is laid down in the Act by which the respective rights of the various parties interested are defined, and the limitations under which they are to be exercised prescribed. Among the rights expressly recognized as appertaining to the Court of Directors, is that of recalling any Governor-General, or other officer in India (except appointed by the Crown), and this right is to be exercised without control of any kind. Here is a most important security for the proprietors of East-India stock. The safety of their dividends is involved in the prosperity of India, and the permanence of its connection with this country. They elect the persons through whom the government of India is carried on, and those elected are endowed with very large powers, among the most important of which is the right of removing any public servant in India, from the Governor-General downwards. This is the chief, the most efficient—the only efficient security which the Indian stockholder enjoys. So long as it is possessed, the instructions of his representatives, the Court of Directors, cannot be set at nought with impunity.

And does any one talk of taking this power away? What, get possession of people's property under a solemn agreement that they shall have a certain security, and then tear the security from them! Their dividends indeed may still be secured nominally upon the revenues of India, but their control over India through those who represent them is virtually at an end when you deprive the Court of Directors of the power of putting a stop to misgovernment in that country, and substantially the security is void.

> "You take my house when you do take the prop
> That doth sustain my house."

What would be said of a mortgagor who, after agreeing that the management of the mortgaged estate should be

vested in certain persons to be named by the mortgagee, should seek to get rid of the obligation, and at the same time to keep the money? The legislature indeed may do this—that is, they have the physical power of doing it, as they have of doing many other things which no one in his wildest imaginings ever supposes they will do. They may deprive the great Captain of our country of the estate bestowed on him by a nation's gratitude, and consign his honoured age to penury. They may apply the sponge to the national debt—burn the books, and shut up that part of the Bank of England devoted to its management. They may—all the estates of the realm concurring—abolish the two Houses of Parliament, and convert the Government into a despotic monarchy; or, the Crown consenting, they may establish a republic. Any of these things they *may* do—but no one expects that they will. Neither will they take away that power which is a security at once to the proprietors of East-India stock for their property, to the people of India for good government, and to those of England for the safety of England's noblest dependency. We are not inquiring what a repudiating legislature might do, but what the legislature of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland will do; and of this much we may rest assured—that having deliberately made a solemn compact, they will keep it.

SPEECH OF VISCOUNT JOCELYN, M.P.,

IN THE 2nd Ed.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

ON THE CASE OF THE

AMEERS OF UPPER SCINDE,

JUNE 23, 1852.

AN AUTHENTIC REPORT, PUBLISHED BY REQUEST.

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SPEECH OF VISCOUNT JOCELYN, M.P.,

ON THE CASE OF THE

AMEERS OF UPPER SCINDE.

In rising to move for the papers of which I have given notice, I shall venture to ask the permission of the House to trespass upon their attention, whilst I bring to their consideration certain facts to which those papers refer, bearing on the present state and condition of the ex-rulers of Scinde.

I am aware that I may be met by the objection that this question is one that has been considered some years ago, and that the policy that was then brought under the consideration of Parliament has had the sanction of the House; but it should be recollected that at that time grave doubts were entertained by many persons as to the justice of that policy. Since that period matters and facts have been brought to light bearing strongly upon those acts, which, I think, prove that the views that were taken at that time by those who were opposed to the policy of the annexation of Scinde were correct, and that I am now justified in again asking Parliament to reconsider the case of those unfortunate princes.

I could have wished that some individual of greater

weight than myself had undertaken their cause—some one whose abilities would have insured more ample justice being done to the case of these unfortunate princes; and when I recollect that my right honourable friend the member for the University of Oxford, only a short time since, has advocated so powerfully the cause of an oppressed people in a neighbouring country, I feel more than ever my own inadequacy to the task I have undertaken. I have a satisfaction, however, in believing that the ear of the House has never yet been deaf to the claim of justice; and the fact that the persons on whose behalf I plead were princes of India—once our faithful allies, now exiles from their native land—affords no reason why they should be thought undeserving of the sympathy and commiseration of a British House of Commons.

I believe I am justified in asking for those papers on the ground that, as matters of history, they should be given to this House. The documents connected with the affairs of Scinde, up to 1842, have been furnished to Parliament, and bring before us the proceedings by which the British Government came into the possession of that territory. Since the year 1842, various transactions of great political importance have taken place, together with great changes in the internal arrangements of that country, therefore it seems most desirable that the documents containing the additional information should also be laid before Parliament. When we consider more especially that an inquiry is going on up-stairs in reference to the future government of India, we

must feel that these are papers which bear peculiarly upon many points connected with that inquiry, and should be furnished to us without delay.

I concur in an opinion which I lately read in the work of an honourable and learned friend of mine, a member of this House, the hon. member for Sheffield—that "to form a just appreciation of the conduct of those who have taken part in the government of mankind, is one of the great purposes for which history is written," and that it is therefore right that the transactions in which they have been engaged should be fully and fairly laid before the public. With this view, I consider that it is necessary for the due appreciation of the characters of the public men who took part in the transactions in Scinde, that the House should be furnished with all the documents having reference to those transactions.

Perhaps the House is not aware that a few weeks since, a similar motion to that which I now make was brought forward by a noble earl in another place; but that noble earl, in moving for documents, moved only for a portion of the papers for which I now ask. That noble earl moved for a report of a commission appointed in India twelve months since, for the purpose of investigating certain charges of fraud and forgery that were laid against his highness Meer Ali Moorad, Ameer of Upper Scinde—a commission by which that prince was tried and convicted of the crimes for which he was arraigned; but the noble earl, though he moved for the papers, stated at the same time his own doubt as to the character for

fairness of that commission. Considering the high position of that noble earl, his knowledge of Indian matters, and his experience on this question, it seems to me that anything that has fallen from him is deserving of great weight; and that therefore we should have before us further documents to enable us to come to a more satisfactory conclusion with regard to the report of that commission.

The documents which I think I am justified in requesting are—first, the report of Sir George Clerk, late Governor of Bombay, one of the ablest servants of the Indian Government, on whose opinion it was that the commission was appointed; secondly, the minutes of the members of the Government of Bombay, to whom the report of that commission was submitted; thirdly, the minute of the Governor-General in council—the first authority in India—who is bound to see justice done between all persons, and to maintain the honour and dignity of the British name.

I think I am justified in asking for those documents, as they all bear on the question at issue. They are not in the secret department, but are furnished to the Court of Directors, and it is usual to give them to Parliament on questions of this nature. More than that, I firmly believe in my own mind that those documents, if produced, will do honour to the servants of the British Government in India by whom that investigation was conducted, and demonstrate the impartiality of the tribunal.

I ask for the documents at this moment, because

there are means at the disposal of the British Government by which reparation to some extent may be afforded. I may be asked,—why not leave the matter to the Governor-General of India? In reply, I would say, I feel confident no person could be found more willing to ameliorate the condition of those unfortunate princes than the noble marquis at the head of the Government of India; but at the same time it is my conviction that, in a case which has given rise to so much discussion, and concerning which there has been such diversity of opinion, an expression of sympathy on the part of the British House of Commons would aid the Governor-General of India in carrying out a just and righteous course of policy.

I would beseech the House to give me a patient hearing, whilst I attempt (but feebly I fear) to plead the cause of men who have now no other person in this House to speak in their behalf. I would recall to the recollection of the House the circumstances which took place on the first acquisition of Scinde; and I need not go farther back than the year 1838. That was the year, it will be recollected, which gave birth to that policy, for the carrying out of which, a British army was marched into Central Asia. It was considered necessary to secure the friendly feeling and cordial co-operation of the rulers of Scinde, to insure its success. A treaty was proposed by the British Government, and in that treaty the Ameers, after lengthened negotiations, concurred. In the

year 1838 the first intimate political connection was established between them and the British Government. There were treaties previously, but merely commercial. At this period, three brothers were rulers of Upper Scinde,—Meer Roostum Khan, Meer Mobarik Khan, and Meer Ali Moorad. Their father's name was Meer Sohrab Khan, a chief of the Talpoor dynasty. He died in 1830, dividing his territory into four portions, leaving to each son a portion as a patrimony, and attaching the fourth portion to the turban, or chiefship, which devolved upon Meer Roostum Khan, the eldest of the three brothers.

From 1838 to 1841 disputes at various times arose between Ali Moorad and the two eldest brothers, in reference to territory. Those disputes were decided by the British resident under an agreement made by the treaty of 1838. In 1842, Ali Moorad placed himself at the head of an army, attacked the forces of his brother, defeated him, and forced him to sign a treaty, called the treaty of Nounahar, by which Roostum Khan agreed to make over to him certain villages belonging to himself and Meer Nusseer, son of Meer Mobarik Khan. Those villages formed the subject matter of inquiry under the commission issued in 1850 by the British Government.

From an early period Ali Moorad, who had been described, by those who knew him intimately, as a crafty and designing prince—commenced a series of intrigues against his eldest brother, Meer Roostum Khan: these intrigues were unfortunately too

successful. He placed in the hands of the British resident in Scinde certain letters, which he said he had intercepted—letters purporting to be hostile to the British Government, and which he alleged to have passed between Meer Roostum and the Court of Lahore.

Meer Roostum denied the authenticity of the letters, and asked for an opportunity of proving their fabrication. He also begged to be confronted with his accusers. But both those reasonable requests were refused. The letters were sent to certain officers of the British Government, who were supposed to be most competent to pronounce an opinion on documents of that description. Their authenticity was doubted at the time by those officers, one of whom was Sir George Clerk, who declared that he doubted, not only the authenticity of the documents, but more especially the seals attached to them. About this period, in the autumn of the year 1842, Sir Charles Napier made his appearance in Scinde, and soon after became the chief civil and military authority. Contrary to the opinion of the officers to whom reference had been made, and who had seen the letters in question, Sir Charles Napier declared, upon the opinion of Capt. Brown—who, according to Colonel Outram, and other evidence, knew nothing of Persian, (the language in which the letters were written)—that they were authentic, and immediately took possession of a large portion of the territory of Roostum Khan.

Another question had been raised between Roostum Khan and Ali Moorad, viz. the succession to the turban. Meer Roostum Khan, nearly eighty years

of age, was desirous of leaving the turban to his eldest son. But it was also claimed by Ali Moorad. Sir Charles Napier took part with Ali Moorad, with whom he had entered into close communication soon after his arrival in Upper Scinde. Meer Roostum Khan, with a view to escape from the intrigues of his unnatural brother, asked permission to enter the camp of Sir Charles Napier, and to place himself entirely in the hands of the British general. Sir Charles Napier, instead of eagerly taking advantage of such an opportunity of unravelling the tangled skein of Upper Scinde politics, refused at that time to receive him, but directed him to the camp of Ali Moorad, the very person who had probably forged the letters which were so derogatory to his brother's character, and the very person who was at that moment engaged in plots to compass the poor old chieftain's destruction. The House, perhaps, would scarcely believe that a British representative could have taken such a mistaken step, under the peculiar circumstances in which the unfortunate Meer Roostum was placed. But Sir Charles Napier himself records the remarkable fact. He writes to the Governor-General on 20th of December, 1842, that Meer Roostum was anxious to take refuge in the British camp, adding, " I did not like this, as it would have embarrassed me how to act; but the idea struck me at once that he might go to Ali Moorad, who might induce him, as a family arrangement, to resign the turban. I therefore secretly wrote to Roostum and Ali Moorad; and about ten

o'clock I had an express from Ali Moorad, to say, 'that his brother was safe with him.'" *

It appears that subsequently Meer Roostum Khan was prevailed upon to cede to Ali Moorad the turban; but the latter at the same time entered into an agreement, by which he promised to secure to Meer Roostum that portion of his territory which was left to him by his father as a patrimony. The treaty of cession reached the British general, but the agreement between the two brothers, which accompanied it, never came into that gallant officer's hands. Ali Moorad still continued his intrigues with a view to the ruin of his unfortunate brother, and led the British general to believe that Roostum Khan was about to raise troops to attack the British army. Hence the destruction of Emaumghur, the first commencement of hostilities. Sir Charles Napier marched a force to the point where he was told Roostum Khan was encamped; but on his arrival found there was no enemy to oppose him. He had, however, the satisfaction of blowing up the fortification without mischief to a single man. On the other hand, the unfortunate Meer Roostum, who had fled to the desert, alarmed by an intimation from his brother that the British general wished to make him a prisoner, was found by Colonel Outram surrounded by only a few followers, and his wives and children. Distracted and perplexed, in his agony he implored to be taken to the British general, for the purpose of throwing himself on his mercy; but the interview

* *Vide* "Supplementary Scinde Blue Book," and "Thornton's History of India," vol. vi., pp. 425 to 435.

was again prevented by the intrigues of Ali Moorad,* and subsequently Meer Roostum was directed to proceed to Hydrabad. In Lower Scinde, however, he found that sympathy which he had not met with at the hands of the British representative, or from his relatives in Upper Scinde. The Beloochees, who are always described as a wild and warlike race, stung to madness at the treachery experienced by the aged prince from his near kinsman, and the harsh treatment he had received from the British general, dashed into the field against the British troops at Meanee, under the walls of Hydrabad. There, however, they were defeated by the skill of the British general and the valour of our army; the result of this action was, that some of the Ameers were sent as captives to British India, while others were left under the control of Ali Moorad. Such was the first chapter in this painful history. I will now proceed to the second.

In 1846, Sir Charles Napier, who was about to leave Scinde, appeared to have changed his opinion in regard to the character of Ali Moorad. It seems the general left a memorandum in his office, stating that he had grave doubts of the honesty of Ali Moorad, and that he had reason to believe that he had possessed himself of certain lands which were not his of right, and which belonged to the British Government. Sir George Clerk, the Governor of Bombay, proceeded on a tour to Scinde in 1848, and instituted an investigation regarding this memorandum. He found on his arrival in Scinde, that there were two

* *Vide* "The Conquest of Scinde, a Commentary," sect. 9.

individuals, named Sheik Ali Hassan, and Peer Gohur, one of whom had been Prime Minister to Ali Moorad, and the other his confidential adviser, who were prepared to give evidence against Ali Moorad to the effect that the leaf of the Koran on which the treaty of Nounahar was written had been torn from the volume, and that another leaf had been inserted, in which the word "districts" had been substituted for "villages," and that, therefore, property of considerable value, to which the British Government was entitled by right of conquest, had been wrongfully held by Ali Moorad. Although the characters of these witnesses were doubtful, there was such corroborating evidence of the circumstance, that Sir George Clerk was induced to consider it the duty of the Government to appoint a commission to inquire into the whole case. A commission was appointed, consisting of Mr. Pringle, a man of judgment and ability, and Major Jacob and Major Lang, both officers of great political experience and high reputation, before whom Ali Moorad was cited to appear. He appeared accordingly, and was allowed to examine and cross-examine witnesses, but was unable to rebut the charges brought against him. The very leaf on which the treaty of Nounahar had been written was produced; the chief was convicted of fraud and forgery; and has since been compelled to relinquish the territory of which he had wrongfully held possession, and the turban which he had so disgraced.

Now I wish to point out to the House the bearing which this inquiry had on the charges originally

brought against the Ameers of Scinde. It will be recollected that one of the first charges made against those princes had reference to the letters said to be intercepted, which were furnished to the British resident by Ali Moorad, who alleged that those documents had passed between Roostum Khan and the Court of Lahore. Roostum Khan asked to be confronted with his accusers, and to be shown the documents, but both requests were refused him. It has now been proved that Ali Moorad was, from the commencement, plotting to effect his brother's destruction; in which he unfortunately succeeded: and this very Ali Moorad, who furnished the letters on which his brother was condemned, has since been convicted of fraud and forgery against the British Government, to which he had such abundant reason for showing the greatest gratitude.

But there is another fact—a most important one—namely, that when that commission was sitting, Ameer Mahomed Houssein, the eldest son of Roostum Khan, who, since the conquest of Scinde, had been living on the bounty of the Mahomedan chiefs on the banks of the Indus—for he would never deign to ask or accept a favour from the British Government, so long as a stigma rested on his name and family—at the risk of his life and liberty, appeared before that commission, saying:—The British Government is about to institute an inquiry into the iniquities of my uncle Ali Moorad: I wish to vindicate the honour and good faith of my father, and to wipe away the stain which now rests on my family, and I have

brought evidence to prove that every one of the charges against my family is false. The commissioners said they regretted not to be able to enter into that inquiry, and that they were obliged to confine themselves to the matters to which they were restricted by the instructions they had received from the British Government. But I believe there was not a man, from the first commissioner down to the humblest individual present at that inquiry, who was not convinced that the family of Meer Roostum Khan were wholly guiltless of the charges originally brought against them.

Another charge brought against Meer Roostum was that of stopping and robbing the Dawk; on which, it will be recollected, Sir Charles Napier laid such stress. Roostum Khan declared at the time that he and his family were innocent of that charge; and proof has since been tendered that the man who caused the Dawk to be intercepted was Ali Moorad himself, for the purpose of laying the crime at the door of his unfortunate brother; to this point the Ameer Mahomed Houssein was ready to give evidence.

The next scene in this painful drama was the cession of the turban, and that was proved to have been forced from Roostum Khan when in confinement; and whilst the treaty ratifying the cession was duly conveyed to the British general, another messenger, who bore the other agreement, by which Meer Roostum's patrimony was secured to his family, was stopped on his way by a horseman of Ali Moorad, and the document taken from him.

Another most important fact was elicited by the commission: that the principal moonshees, or native clerks, in the office of the Government of Scinde, through whom the information was furnished on which the whole of the proceedings was based, were bribed by Ali Moorad. There is one more point to which I must allude — namely, the attack of the Beloochees on the British forces at Hydrabad. Considering that the feelings of the people had been greatly exasperated by the treatment which Roostum Khan had received at the hands of the British representative, I find no fault with brave soldiers seeking with their lives to vindicate the honour of their ancient rulers, and dashing into the field to their support.

I would now wish to point out to the House the claims which I think those princes have to the consideration of the British House of Commons and of the British Government. At the time of the invasion of Affghanistan, it was stated by the military authorities that Sciude being the base for the operations of our army, it was a matter of the greatest importance to obtain possession of the strong fort of Bukkur, on the Indus. At our request, Meer Roostum Khan, contrary to the wishes of his family and of the Beloochee soldiery, surrendered the fort of Bukkur to the British Government, although it was considered the heart of his country. So important was the cession of that fort thought to be, that Lord Auckland and Sir Henry Pottinger declared that the gratitude of the British Government was due to Meer Roostum Khan;

and Sir Alexander Burnes wrote about the same time in these words:—"I have never doubted their (the Ameers') sincere desire to serve us, but, in their weak state, I did not expect such firmness in the day of need." Again, the British envoy writes to the Governor-General—"*Meer Roostum has shown in the day of trial what he professed at all times, that he was the sincere and devoted friend of the British nation.*"

Such were the services that were performed by the family of Meer Roostum in 1838, and such were the opinions expressed with regard to those services. No Englishman can forget the year 1841, when clouds arose which seemed to threaten the annihilation of the British rule in India; but at that moment the Ameers of Scinde, deaf to entreaties and to the religious cry that was then raised by the Mahomedans from one end of India to the other—regardless of all personal considerations—remained true to British interests. So valuable were the services they rendered at that time, that it was said by the highest military authorities, that if it had not been for those services, and especially the supplies they furnished to the army of Brigadier England, that army could never have advanced or retired, and British honour could never have been retrieved under the walls of Cabool.*

In smaller matters also they showed their anxiety

* It is very important to bear in mind that these services were rendered *after the treaty of* 1839. Previous to that treaty, the conduct of the Ameers was undoubtedly hostile; but subsequently they saw the hopelessness of contending with British power, and, according to Captain Postans, "fully made up for their former hollow professions, and want of faith, *by a cordial co-operation.*"

to assist the British forces: Colonel Outram, acknowledging the services of the Ameers in remitting all customs on supplies furnished to the British troops, wrote in these terms on the 24th of June 1841:—"That he was instructed by the Governor-General to acknowledge the satisfaction with which he had received this additional mark of their friendly disposition, and of the liberal policy with which their administration is conducted."

Such was the letter addressed to Meer Roostum in June 1841. Let us now read the account given of the same prince a few months subsequent, when, branded and hunted by his unnatural relative, assisted by the forces of Sir C. Napier, he was found a fugitive in the desert: Colonel Outram writes, "I beheld the sovereign of Upper Scinde, whose important services a Governor-General had deemed fitting to acknowledge, become a houseless wanderer; one who, nursed in the lap of luxury, had not known what an ungratified wish might mean. I met him in the jungle, surrounded by his faithful retainers, unprovided with the decencies of life. A tent with a single awning, not ten feet square, afforded the sole protection from the weather enjoyed by the party during heavy and long-continued rains; and is it to be wondered at, that I felt intensely for the poor old man?"

I should not do justice to the true character of the Ameers if I did not allude to the charges which have been heaped on them by the first military historian of this country. I could have wished, for the honour of the British army, that those accusations

had never been penned; for there was no language to be found which was not used to asperse those princes, and no crimes of which they were not said to be guilty. It must be recollected that the historian had never been in Scinde, and had no personal knowledge of the circumstances he relates; whereas, in direct contradiction to his statements, there is the evidence of British officers,* who had lived in daily intercourse with these calumniated princes in the days of their prosperity, who, one and all, repudiate the charges against them, and bear the strongest testimony to their conduct and character. I have perused letters from many of these gentlemen, but I will select only one to read to the House, because the writer is well known in India, and because he was for a considerable time in constant intercourse with those princes—I mean Captain Postans. That gentleman, who was many years political agent in Scinde, pronounced them to be "merciful to a fault, and just, where they judged for themselves. As men (he added) I consider them exemplary characters; and the devotion and respect evinced towards them by their children and all around them, was a conclusive proof of the domestic harmony which reigned in this singularly-constituted family."

Now, I would ask the House to allow me to advert to the condition in which the Ameers have been ever since our occupation of their territory. After the battle of Hydrabad, some of these princes were despatched to British India, and others of them were

* *Vide* Appendix.

left to the tender mercies of Ali Moorad. Among the princes sent to India was the aged Meer Roostum Khan, who shortly afterwards sunk under the weight of years and anxiety, and, to use his own touching language, descended into the tomb "with his face blackened in the sight of his countrymen, and his grey hairs dishonoured." He left behind him a son and a nephew, who are still prisoners in India. Besides these princes, there were the members of the families of the Lower Scinde Ameers, against some of whom, there was no charge save that of defending their country, and against others not even that charge. One, Meer Shadad, after four years close confinement in the fort of Surat on certain charges, of which, I understand, he was acquitted after investigation, and released by order of the Governor-General of India, still remains a prisoner in Hindostan.

With reference to the other members of their family, there were some eighteen sons and nephews of Roostum Khan, who were left to the tender mercies of Ali Moorad, at whose hands they experienced treatment which is not to be described. On that subject I will read to the House an extract from a very graphic and painfully-interesting work called "Dry Leaves from Young Egypt," the author of which held political office in Scinde, and writes of what he himself saw and knew. It is as follows:—

"The younger Ameers, the children of Meer Roostum and Meer Mobarik, were handed over by Sir C. Napier to Meer Ali Moorad, who has inflicted on them every cruelty and insult that malice and hatred

can suggest. Born princes, hunger, cold, and nakedness have been their portion. In their memorial to Sir C. Napier they stated that death would be preferable to their condition. In 1848, the resident at Khyrpore reported that not one of Ali Moorad's shikarees was not better off than they. They had been reduced by want to the sale of their wives' ornaments and their own wearing apparel, and it was a well-known fact, that the fourth son of the late Meer Roostum appeared as a suppliant for assistance before the door, and is now living on the bounty of her, who was in his father's lifetime a low courtezan in the Khyrpore bazaar." Such was the state of some of the Ameers of Upper Scinde, whose fathers had earned the commendation of the Governor-General, who had proved themselves our faithful allies, and stood by us in the day of adversity and trial.

Although at the risk of wearying the House, there is one more fact to which I must allude, and it is a painful one. After the battle of Hydrabad, the ladies of the captive Ameers remained in Scinde. Those who know anything of the Eastern character, know that the religious feelings and the habits of the people are such, that it is almost impossible for ladies of that high rank to take long journeys, more especially across the seas. It will be recollected, on a former discussion on this question, we were horrified with details of the brutal conduct on the part of the Ameers towards their wives, which were then told with every air of authenticity; but the extract I am

about to quote is the best reply to these monstrous assertions.

The extract I hold in my hand is from a letter written by the wife of a British officer in Scinde, in reference to the condition of those unhappy ladies, which I will read to the House. She said:—"They looked and acted like what they were, the ladies of the land, and very different from the native women we were in the habit of seeing; not that they were particularly beautiful—on the contrary, there were few of them who had any claims to youth or good looks, but, as I said before, there was a bearing which stamped them at once of a superior class. There they were—whose bare feet had previously never pressed the ground uncovered by the richest carpets, with every luxury around them—living in a place without even a mat to the floor; common bazaar charpoys to sleep upon, and the roof leaking every shower of rain that fell. I thought at the time that the prize agents might have spared the carpets and other little luxuries from the thousands we had taken from them. They were too proud to ask for them, nor did I even hear them complain of this, though they did of having their clothes sold. They said,—'Our jewels and gold we consider as forfeited; but we did not expect to be stripped: it is our fate.' It appeared a day of great rejoicing when a letter arrived from the Meers (their absent lords). They generally sent me a request that I would come and see them, and hear all about the Meers. It appeared as if they thought I could enter into all their little

joys, as well as feel for their misfortunes; which in truth I did, although I always avoided touching on a subject so painful to them."*

It appears to me that this is one of the most painful stories connected with the British rule in India, and one of the darkest pages in its history. A tale known not only in Scinde, but throughout Central Asia. A tale which has often been cited by the Mahomedans to the detriment of the honour and character of Christian and British rulers. Nor is it alone confined to Mahomedan Asia: Central Africa re-echoes this story of violence and wrong. I find the following passage in a work of Dr. Richardson, a traveller in Central Africa:—"The conversation was stopped by the entrance of a remarkable personage—the quasi Sultan of Ben Walid. Having heard that I was present, he said,—'Christian, do you know Scinde?' 'Yes,' I said. He then turned and said something to the people in the Ghadamsi language. I afterwards learned it was,—'You see these Christians are eating up all the Mussulman countries.' He then abruptly turned to me,—'Why do the English go there and eat up all the Mussulmen? afterwards you will come here.' . . . . . I replied,—'The Ameers were foolish, and engaged in conspiracy against the English in India, but the Mussulmen in Scinde enjoyed the same privileges as the English themselves.' 'That is what

* The *Times* in its report erroneously mentions Lady Macnaghten's name as the writer of the letter. No name was mentioned in the House. The *Morning Chronicle* states, "The reading of this touching account produced a deep impression on the whole House."

you say,' he rejoined; and then continued,—'Why do you go so far from home to take other people's countries from them?' I replied,—'The Turks do the same; they come to the desert.' 'Ay, you wish to be such oppressors as the Turks.' He then told me not to talk any more, and a painful silence continued for some time."

I would ask the House if this is not a question worthy the consideration of Parliament, one in which British honour, British justice, and British humanity are so deeply involved. It is painful to think, whilst we express sympathy for the oppressed people of Hungary, whilst we receive the Poles with open arms, whilst a right honourable friend of mine, only a few weeks' since, made a powerful appeal on behalf of the people of Naples, and whilst we blame our gallant neighbours for their want of faith towards Abdool Kader, that the British Government should sanction conduct equally unjust and oppressive. But here partial redress is in our own hands, and, after the facts that have been elicited, we shall be doubly culpable if we do not make all the reparation in our power to those we have so grievously injured. I have undertaken to bring the subject before the House from a sense of duty and a sense of justice, and I may truly say, I never recollect feeling a warmer interest in any case, or a more solemn conviction of the truth of the cause I advocate.

I have endeavoured—I fear very inadequately—to place before the House—first, the charges that were originally made against these princes; next, the

bearing which the late Commission of Inquiry had in reference to those charges; then to point out the intrigues and machinations of Ali Moorad; and, lastly, to compare the condition of that felon prince, still in the enjoyment of his patrimony, with that of the unfortunate princes, the victims of his treachery.

I know well there is great difficulty in retracing our steps, and that there is an idea that, where civilization and barbarism come into contact, it is a proof of weakness in the former to recede. I am aware that, in a country which has been for some years under our rule, new ties are formed, and new interests are created, which cannot be disturbed without the hazard of committing a second injustice on the people whom we have taken under our protection; but I do not ask on behalf of the Ameers of Scinde that they should be replaced as rulers of their country; they do not ask it for themselves: in their own touching language they make known the earnest desire of their hearts—"A tree in our own land is better than a palace in a foreign country"; they ask merely to be allowed to return to their native land. The Government has it now in their power to grant that boon; and I cannot conceive it possible that it will be refused. At the same time it would ill become a private individual to point out the exact mode in which reparation should be afforded; I am therefore prepared to leave it in the hands of the Government of India, confident in its integrity and in its humanity. But this I may be permitted to say, that little injury is to be feared when honour and character

are to be maintained, in a Government, like that of India, firm and united, acknowledging to the Hindoo and Mahomedan nations under its sway, that unwittingly a grave error has been committed, and showing their desire to remedy that error, as far as possible, in a magnanimous and generous spirit. On behalf, therefore, of the Ameers of Scinde, once honoured, powerful, and wealthy, now fallen, crushed, and poverty-stricken, long our faithful friends and allies, I implore the sympathy of this House, and ask for the papers which bear out the statements I have felt it my duty to make; satisfied that the facts have only to be thoroughly understood, to obtain for these unfortunate princes, not all that justice demands, but all that it is now left in the power of the British Government to bestow.

[The noble lord then moved for Copies of the Evidence and Report of a Commission appointed to inquire into a charge preferred against his Highness Meer Ali Moorad, Ameer of Upper Scinde, of having made fraudulent alterations in the treaty of Nounahar, concluded between his Highness and the late Meer Roostum Khan, and of all Minutes and Correspondence on the Indian records connected with the charge, and of the Report on Scinde of Sir George Clerk, K.C.B., late Governor of Bombay, dated 24th day of April, 1848.]

The documents moved for, with the exception of the report on Scinde, by Sir George Clerk, K.C.B., were granted.

APPENDIX.

The following statements, with respect to the characters of the Ameers, by British officers—many of whom held high and responsible political situations in Scinde, and all of whom were personally acquainted with those injured princes—were published some years ago, and have never been refuted.

Extract from a Letter from CAPTAIN FRENCH, Political Agent, Nimaur, late Assistant Political Agent, Upper Scinde.

It is very deplorable that General William Napier should have published to the world such charges against the ex-Ameers of Scinde. As far as my observations will enable me to speak, they are totally unfounded. I was in Scinde and Cutchee from the 6th September 1840 to the 7th December 1842, when I left for Ferozepoor, and during that period, or in fact until the appearance of the "Conquest of Scinde," on my word I never, as far as my memory will enable me to speak, heard of such doings by the Meers. Had such horrible atrocities ever been perpetrated, I think you will allow I must have heard of them; first, because, as you know, I amused myself by gathering some notes on Scinde; and, secondly, because the Ameers and their Rule was a daily subject of conversation for many months of the above period, while I was at Sukkur, in every house there. Many officers had Scinde Moonshees; I had one, and some

of the others, like myself, employed them probably more with a view of acquiring local knowledge than aught else. I have but to repeat, that until the appearance of the 'Conquest of Scinde,' I do not recollect ever having heard of these abominations; I don't believe a word of them, but they will be all believed at home.

(Signed) P. T. FRENCH.

From MAJOR WOODHOUSE, Commanding the 6th Regt. N. I.

Sattarah, 16th Sept. 1845.

In the latter end of 1820, Captain Sadlier, of H. M.'s Service, was sent by the Bombay Government as an Envoy to the Court of the Ameers of Hydrabad. The other members of the mission were W. Simson, Esq., and Dr. Hall, and I had the command of the escort. The mission disembarked at Kurrachee, and from thence went to Hydrabad, where it remained about two months, and then returned to Bombay by the way of Luckput Bunder. During that time I did not hear anything which indicated any want of humanity on the part of the Ameers, or called in question their characters as rulers for justness and moderation. Had anything existed to militate against a favourable impression of their characters in these respects, it would in all probability have become known to the mission; and I think I do not err in saying that every member of it left Scinde with a good opinion of the Ameers as men and rulers; and during the late field service in Scinde, no facts came to my knowledge to lead me to assign to them a lower standard of character than I was formerly ready to accede to them.

(Signed) F. R. WOODHOUSE.

From Dr. Hawthorn, Surgeon, 3rd Regt., Light Cavalry.

17th August, 1845.

Sir,—I have much satisfaction in bearing testimony to the gentlemanly demeanour, and strictly sober habits of the Ameers of Hydrabad when they were in power in 1835-1836.

I resided at Hydrabad for a period of seven months, during which I was in professional attendance on His Highness the late Meer Noor Mahommed Khan. I had almost daily an opportunity of seeing the other Ameers, either in durbar or in their private dwellings, and frequently accompanied them on their hunting excursions. I never had any reason to suppose they were in the slightest degree addicted to intemperance: on the contrary, they had the greatest horror of any intoxicating liquor or drug, and would never take medicine without an assurance from me that it did not contain opium.

(Signed) H. P. Hawthorn.

From Captain Leckie, late Assistant Political Agent in Lower Scinde.

Sattarah, 2nd October, 1845.

My first introduction to the durbars of Upper and Lower Scinde was in the year 1830, when I accompanied the late Sir Alexander Burnes on a mission to Lahore. Subsequently I went to Hydrabad in October 1838, and remained there until September 1842, as assistant to Sir Henry Pottinger and yourself. During this time, I was frequently with the

Ameers, both in open durbar and at private interviews, on business and in a friendly way. With one solitary exception, I never knew them deviate from their style and bearing, which was always frank and gentlemanly.

In their habits they were temperate, and I never saw them in any way excited. As parents they were kind, and took a pride in the education of their sons. They were beloved by their chiefs and dependents who were at Hydrabad, and in constant attendance on them.

(Signed) J. D. LECKIE.

From CAPTAIN HART, 2nd Grenadier Regiment.

CAPTAIN HART'S* OPINION OF THE AMEERS AND THEIR GOVERNMENT.

A residence of three years in Scinde (1839-40-41) led me to the conclusion that the government of its Ameers had been judged by too high a standard. Compared with the rule of despotic states in Europe during the past century, their sway was mild; and although unrestrained in the exercise of absolute power, their people were not subjected to harsher measures than are common to native governments in India. The aversion of the Ameers to shed blood was notorious. Property was generally secure, notwithstanding the absence of any regular police. Even the jealousy evinced for the preservation of their shikargahs never carried them the length of the extreme punishments once authorized by the forest laws of Britain.

The acknowledged fact, that crimes of any magnitude were rarely committed, spoke of itself for the condition of

* Author of the Article on Slavery in Scinde in the *United Service Magazine* for January 1844.

the lower classes; of food they had sufficient in quantity, and of clothing in quality, to satisfy their wants. Limited in Scinde, as in other eastern countries, to securing a bare subsistence, the cultivators endured no hardships to which their Indian brethren are not liable; while the simplicity of the form of assessment freed them from numerous petty extortions of subordinates to which the latter are often exposed. The almost exclusive monopoly by the Hindoo population of the management of the revenue, proved that they did not consider the bigotry of their rulers as an intolerable burden. That trade was not, in all instances, depressed or obstructed, was shown by the transit of opium through Scinde to the coast in preference to the route of the British provinces, as well as by the encouragement afforded to merchants by the remission of customs duties in proportion to the extent of their traffic.

Of the private characters of their rulers, the Scindians spoke favourably. They were said neither to indulge in spirituous liquors or to smoke; and violating the sanctity of a subject's dwelling in search of wealth, or tenants for their harems, were acts unheard of, &c. &c.

(Signed) S. HART.

From CAPTAIN GORDON, in charge of the Ex-Ameers of Hydrabad.

Dum-Dum, 27th July, 1845.

MY DEAR SIR,—I have to acknowledge your letter of the 14th instant, requesting my sentiments on certain charges preferred against the Ameers of Scinde, in the second volume of a work recently published, entitled the "Conquest of Scinde." I shall reply to your queries in the order in which they occur in your letter to my address, premising, that from

my almost constant daily intercourse with the Ameers since they arrived in India, in April 1843, I have had the best opportunities of judging of their character and habits.

I observe, therefore, in reply to your first query, that the Ameers are the most temperate of men, rigidly abstaining from wine, and every kind of liquor; while to smoking also they have a strong aversion, and cannot even endure the smell of tobacco, and it will not be supposed that their present habits of "total abstinence" in these respects are newly acquired, or different from those they have hitherto been accustomed to. In regard, therefore, to "*smoking*" and "*drinking*" the Ameers are examples to most of us who boast a higher civilization, and a more self-denying morality.

With regard to your second query, I am unable to conjecture on what grounds it has been asserted that the Ameers' memorials were written for them by persons at Bombay and not by the Ameers themselves. In my opinion, the memorials referred to are in no respect superior to the usual correspondence of the Ameers, who are quite as capable of representing their own case, and proposing and answering objections, as are educated men among ourselves; and this fact will not be disputed by any person who has had opportunities of observing their good sense and shrewd and pertinent remarks on men and things. I am aware that an opinion is abroad that the Ameers are a set of "illiterate barbarians;" but this is not the case, for with one or two exceptions they are well acquainted with, and appreciate, the best Persian authors (in prose and verse), and the knowledge thus acquired from books, improved by their own sagacity and experience, has made them no mean judges of the motives which ordinarily govern men in their actions. After these observations, I need not obtrude my opinion that the Ameers were fully equal to write the petitions alluded to,—that they did write them, is my most firm conviction, and on this point I can scarcely be mistaken.

The Ameers solemnly deny the allegations referred to in your third query, regarding the destruction of infants in their zenanas; and in justice to them I cannot withhold my testimony, that while was I employed in Scinde and the neighbouring countries, I never once heard that such a practice existed among the Ameers, and had it prevailed it is scarcely possible that it could have been concealed from you and others who resided constantly for several years at, I may say, the doors of the Ameers.

It was, I believe, the wish of the ex-Ameers that their ladies should not accompany them from Scinde; and since their arrival in India, they have always expressed the utmost repugnance to their removal, in the hope, no doubt, that they themselves would eventually be restored to their own country. This hope they still cherish, and while it lasts (although far less intensely than before) they will never sanction a proceeding which, as we are well aware, is so offensive to their ideas of female honour and decorum. The Ameers have always spoken to me of the removal of their ladies as a step to be resorted to only in the event of their "vakeels" returning unsuccessful from England, and they now perceive that their worst fears in this regard are likely to be realised.

(Signed) FORBES M. GORDON.

From CAPTAIN WHITELOCK, late Assistant Political Agent, Lower Scinde.

Seroor, 10th Sept. 1845.

It would be absurd to draw any line of comparison between any of the princes of Asia and the enlightened and accomplished rulers of the more civilized parts of Europe.

Among Eastern ones, however, the Ameers deservedly ranked high in the estimation of all the Europeans who had been on terms of intimacy with them. The Ameers, in common with all mankind, had faults and weaknesses, but in many respects their conduct was most exemplary. They religiously abstained from drinking wine, or intoxicating liquors of every description; nor did they use tobacco, with the solitary exception of taking snuff; and, moreover, they were not addicted to that almost universal practice among Mahommedans, of smoking tobacco. Their manners were mild and gentlemanly, their dispositions humane; and, as far as I could judge, their deportment towards their children, relations, and dependents, was invariably kind and affectionate.

I have felt great surprise at the reports that have been circulated of the Ameers' ill-treatment of their wives and females, and I can conscientiously aver, that, during my residence in Scinde, I never heard such a thing hinted at, although it is well known that there was an influential clique among the Hindoos, who were ever too ready to prejudice the European officers against the rulers of Scinde. I feel, however, thoroughly convinced that the Ameers were incapable of acting in so cowardly and despicable a manner. It it true that, with regard to women, there were amongst them one or two sensualists, and they of all persons were not likely to have acted towards them with harshness; yet, one of these, the late Meer Nusseer Khan, has been more particularly accused of treating them with great cruelty.

(Signed) C. R. WHITELOCK,

Captain, late Assistant Political Agent, Lower Scinde.

From CAPTAIN POSTANS, 15th Regt. N. I., late Assistant Political Agent, Upper Scinde.

I had the strongest personal regard for all the late Ameers of Scinde. In my personal intercourse with them, they always left the most favourable impressions from their urbanity, amiability, and desire to please. As rulers, though I could point out many faults in their mode of government, these were the consequences of their confined views as to civil polity, but, on the whole, the bulk of their subjects were probably as happy and contented under their rule as could be desired. Their great failing was profusion, on the one hand, and avarice on the other, but they were merciful to a *fault*, and *just*, where they judged for themselves. As men, I consider them exemplary characters (taking into the case their education, and prejudices of birth and religion), and the devotion and respect evinced towards them, by their children and all about them, was a conclusive proof of the domestic harmony which reigned in their singularly-constituted families. I really doubt if it were possible to find in our own country so many families, each and every member of which had his own interests to support, living together so peaceably and affectionately.

They have, I hear, borne their reverses like *men*, patient under many misfortunes; and this is an additional proof that their minds were well regulated in prosperity.

(Signed) T. POSTANS,

Late Assistant Political Agent, Upper Scinde.

From Dr. Winchester, Civil Surgeon, Rutnagherry, late Residency Surgeon at Hydrabad.

Bombay, 27th Sept. 1845.

During the two years I passed at the Residency in Lower Scinde, I had, as you are aware, daily intercourse with the different Ameers of Hydrabad. Previous to my nomination to Scinde I had been much associated with officers who had a personal knowledge of their Highnesses, from their official situation, and I was never prepared, from their conversation, to expect any thing unfavourable to the Ameers. Nor do I think from the latter end of 1834, when I first went to the province of Cutch, that I ever heard attributed to them, with one rumoured exception, and that regarding only one prince, any of those vices which have since been made so notorious. I most assuredly never heard any act of cruelty mentioned; on the contrary, I always thought the Ameers were lenient as rulers, and dispensers of criminal justice; and however oppressive their system of taxation might have been, it never was enforced by cruelty. The condition of the villages and inhabitants did not mark that the population of Scinde was worse treated than the generality of Eastern countries. I have passed repeatedly, alone, unarmed, through great portions of Lower Scinde in 1839-40 and 41, and never met with insult; but, on the contrary, with civility and kindness. * * *

In their habits, the Ameers were exceedingly simple, and in manners unaffected. Their food was plain; their drink was water, and except in the use of snuff, I never heard, or saw, any of them using tobacco or ardent spirits. They were free from the prejudices Mussulmans generally have towards Christians, and I never heard them affect to despise any other religion than the Hindoo, of which they had every contempt, on account of its idolatry.

No one ever hinted to me that the Ameers ill-treated their women. I repeatedly asked natives the manner in which women are obtained for their zenanas. I never heard of force being used; but that the women were very reconciled to their lot, being enriched by valuable presents of jewels, and insured a competence for life. When I have been within the precincts of the harem, I never beheld anything that could lead to the supposition of tyranny. H. H. Meer Nusseer Khan often solicited medicine for his females, as did the other Ameers, evincing, in the detail of their complaints, anxiety for their welfare; and I on one occasion was much struck with the conduct of Nusseer Khan towards a lady of his harem who was dangerously ill.

(Signed) JAMES W. WINCHESTER,
Civil Surgeon, Rutnagherry.

From DR. LEITH, Assistant Presidency Civil Surgeon, late Surgeon to the Political Agency in Lower Scinde.

From December 1841, to November of the following year, I resided at Hydrabad in medical charge of the Lower Scinde Political Agency; and it being the chief part of my duty to give medical attendance to the Ameers, or to any member of their families that might require it, I had, during that time, almost daily opportunities of seeing them either in Durbar or in private. And being again appointed medical attendant to the Ameers, in April 1843, when they were brought in captivity to Bombay, and from thence sent to Sassoor, I saw them during nearly two months under very greatly altered circumstances.

During my acquaintance with the Ameers, I remarked their great freedom from the vices usually prominent among Indian Mussulmans, and I was pleased with their affable and gentle manners and domestic habits, and also with the mild exercise of their power as rulers. The people generally seemed to love them; and from what I saw during my stay at Hydrabad, I could have expected the devotion they displayed a few months afterwards, in supporting their chiefs when fighting for their honour, their independence, and their territory. I never saw anything to give me the least suspicion that any of the Ameers used any intoxicating thing; nor did I ever, while in Scinde, hear even a rumour that they did so; and I think I must have known it if they had. The use of intoxicating substances I have heard several of them openly condemn: most of them used snuff, but none of them ever smoked tobacco or anything else. During the many opportunities of observation that my visits to the sick afforded me, I never saw or heard of any conduct towards the members of their households but what was marked with kindness. During my residence at Hydrabad, I heard of but one severe punishment being inflicted; the criminal was a murderer, and the usual penalty of having his hands cut off by the executioner was inflicted; and in this case the Ameers showed great anxiety for the safety of the man's life after the amputation.

(Signed) A. H. LEITH.

Bombay, 20th Sept. 1845.

From Dr. Peart, Civil Surgeon, Poonah, and in charge of the ex-Ameers of Khyrpoor.

Poonah, 17th July, 1845.

Ex-Ameer Roostum Khan of Khyrpoor, with his youngest son, Ali Buksh, and his nephew, ex-Ameer Nusseer Khan, have been under my care since March 1844, and I feel the greatest satisfaction in being able to bear testimony to their noble bearing under their misfortunes; and I can safely say, that since I have had the pleasure of knowing them, I have never observed anything whereby even the slightest shadow of a suspicion of intemperance or debauchery could be attributed to them; and I have had ample opportunities of judging, visiting them at all times. Ex-Ameer Meer Roostum Khan, now upwards of eighty years of age, is in full possession of his faculties—his memory is good, and he is most strict in his religious observances; his mode of living is abstemious, eating meat only once a day, and his sole beverage water or milk.

Respecting the memorials which have been forwarded to England since the ex-Ameers have been under my care, I can assure you most positively that they have never had the most trifling assistance in framing them, neither were they seen by, or their contents known to, any European, until after they had been placed in my hands for transmission to Government.

(Signed) J. H. Peart.

From CAPTAIN MYLNE, 6th Regiment, N.I., late Political Agent, Hydrabad.

Bombay, 18th January, 1846.

I hasten to reply as briefly as possible to your questions regarding the private character of the ex-Ameers of Lower Scinde, and most truly can I say that, as far as my own observation went, and as far as I could learn from others, very few indeed of the native Princes of India could so well stand the test of inquiry into their domestic life.

I had, as you know, many opportunities of seeing them: they had, in general, very short notice of my intention of waiting upon them, and my visits not being confined to mere formal interviews at the Durbar, I had the better means of remarking the total absence of all marks of debauchery and symptoms of excess. I cannot recall to my recollection having ever heard, during the seven months of my being in charge of the agency, any accusation against them as being addicted to the common Mussulman vice of intemperance; and, kept informed as I was, through several sources, of their every day life, it could hardly have failed of coming to my ears had there been anything approaching want of kindness or affection displayed by them to their families. But the manner in which they invariably alluded to their households, and the grief expressed when any member of their families was in distress, convinced me that much attachment existed between them.

Need I say, that if there are any other points on which my opinion of the unhappy Ameers can be of any service, it will afford me much pleasure to give it?

CHAS. D. MYLNE.

Extract from "The Conquest of Scinde, a Commentary,"* by LIEUT-COL. OUTRAM, C.B., Resident at Sattarah.

To these convincing testimonies, I would add that of an officer long resident in Scinde, and intimately acquainted with its people. "My own knowledge," he writes, "that is, from personal intercourse, is nothing, but the unanimous testimony of all the natives who were in a position to know, shows that, with the sole exception, I believe, of Ali Moorad, the Meers of Scinde were sober and temperate to an extraordinary degree,—not only not drinking or using intoxicating liquors or drugs, but not even smoking a hookah."

On Sir Henry Pottinger I call to confirm the testimony thus rendered in their favour by every British officer who has had an opportunity of intimately knowing the Ameers. *He* can inform his countrymen that the documents now submitted to the reader are sober and literal statements of undeniable facts. * * * * * Sir Alexander Burnes's eulogies of Meer Roostum, "the good old man," I have already placed before the reader.† And if, as I confidently

* "The Conquest of Scinde, a Commentary," by LIEUT-COL. OUTRAM, C.B., Resident at Sattarah. Wm. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1846.

† I deeply regret that I have it not in my power to refer to Captain Del'Hoste's Journal, written in 1832, which, though buried in the records of Government, I believe contains sketches of the characters of the Ameers. The following passage, extracted from Dr. James Burnes's book will show how innocent were the preceding generation of Ameers of the foul charges brought against their sons:—

"The Ameers of Scinde are less sunk in sensuality and indulgence than Mahommedan princes in general. Meer Moorad Ali Khan asked me on one occasion whether I had any objection to his taking daroo, a word which I understood in its usual acceptation of ardent spirits; and I was proceeding to explain that it would be better to avoid all stimulants, and particularly wine, for the present, when he abruptly interrupted me, by begging that I would not use the name of the forbidden juice of the grape in the presence of a true believer. I found afterwards that his Highness only meant a pomegranate; and although this anecdote may give an impression of display before a large assembly, still I believe it is well ascertained that the Ameers never indulge in intoxicating drugs or liquors. They have been known to dismiss persons

expect, I have satisfied my reader of the utter groundlessness of this charge of debauchery and drunkenness against the Ameers generally, and against the venerable Meer Roostum in particular, I may safely leave it to his judgment to determine what degree of credit is due to the monstrous and incredible stories narrated on the same authority as that which I have just proved to be so worthless. The Ameers have been accused of committing deeds exceeding in iniquity those ever invented in the most fabulous romance of ancient or modern days; such as, *chopping their own "offspring to pieces with their own hands, immediately after birth; but more frequently placing them under cushions, smoking, drinking, and jesting with each other about their hellish work while the children were being suffocated beneath them;" chastising their wives with "whips of twisted brass wires," for "what they deemed the*

with disgrace from their presence, who have appeared before them redolent of wine; and Bahadoor Khan Cokur, a Beloochee chief of high birth, in the service of Meer Moorad Ali Khan, was suspended from his employments for a considerable time, from having been once seen in a state of intoxication. The Ameers universally objected to take medicine in the shape of tinctures, from the spirits they contained. There is not a hookah to be seen at their court, nor do any of the family ever eat opium. It were to be hoped that this temperance on the part of the rulers had had a proportionate effect on their subjects; but experience obliges me to declare that most of the soldiery, and many of the courtiers, are addicted to every species of indulgence that can either enervate the mind, or debilitate the body. The eating of opium is as common in Scinde as in Cutch; and I found no present more acceptable than a few bottles of brandy, and no annoyance more intolerable than incessant indirect applications to repair the ravages of unlawful disease, or to renew the powers wasted in luxury and debauch. The Ameers commence business about two hours before daybreak, when each holds a private levee to listen to complaints, and adjust the affairs relative to his peculiar province. It is on this occasion only that they wear turbans. About sunrise, they repair to their apartments to dress, and appear shortly afterwards in durbar, where the whole family regularly assemble, and where all State proceedings are transacted. The letters which have arrived during the night or preceding day, are then thrown before them in a heap, and the time is passed in reading or giving orders regarding them, and in conversation till ten or eleven o'clock, when they withdraw to their morning repast. At two o'clock they again show themselves abroad, and remain together till dark, when they separate for the night to their respective places of abode."

*poor women's offences, such, perhaps, as weeping over their slaughtered children;" "hellish deeds, which rendered them objects for horror rather than sympathy."** Such are the

* "Conquest of Scinde," page 348:—"Nusseer Khan of Hydrabad, depicted the most noble and generous of the Ameers, the most humane of the pernicious brood, had in his zenana a whip expressly to correct the women; the last is composed of two lengths of twisted brass wires! It is no fable! the usage is certain, &c." That the romancist who palmed off on his too credulous countrymen the arrant nonsense (out-Heroding the famed Munchausen) of Fitzgerald of the "tempestuous hand," should write such trash, excites but little wonder. But it is surprising, and derogates not a little from the respect due to the collective wisdom of the nation, that the absurd fable should have been listened to in Parliament.

It must have astonished all English gentlemen in India conversant with the mild ways of Mahommedan gentlemen towards the inmates of their harems—(subjected to no other hardships than that of voluntary seclusion, which they themselves consider as disgraceful to infringe as would an English female regard a reflection cast on her chastity)—to see so wantonly libellous and utterly absurd an accusation gravely uttered by a British Senator in the presence of the Parliament of England. The report of the debate given by Hansard states, that *sensation* was caused by this climax to all the misrepresentation and mystification palmed on the House on that occasion, but the nature of that sensation is not described: for the honour of my countrymen I trust that it was the sensation of *indignation* at the unblushing assurance of Mr. Roebuck in presuming to attempt to impose such trash on the representatives of our nation. Of all the Ameers, Nusseer—the courteous, refined, and even chivalrous Nusseer—was the last on whom the romancist should have attempted to cast this stigma. Nusseer! who would as soon have given pain to a woman as would Mr. Roebuck or General Napier dream of inflicting the same barbarous cruelty on their own daughters. Poor Nusseer is now no more. It has pleased God to summon him whither the malice of his persecutors can no longer pursue him; where the wicked cease from troubling, and the weary are at rest. He was mercifully removed ere the atrocious calumnies of General William Napier could add another drop of bitterness to the overflowing cup of his misfortunes. *Requiescat in pace.* His nephew, Meer Hoossein Ali, indignantly replied as follows to the charges, as preposterous as they are malignant, of the historian:—"*Whatever stories the General has written concerning our ladies, we could reply to them by as bad and worse words about him; but it is not our custom to write evil about any one, or call him bad names, agreeably to the saying, the man of wisdom will not call him a respectable man who uses the names of respectable men with disdain.* (Persian proverb.) *Sir Charles Napier has described the killing of children by the Ameers; but in reply we say, thousands of woes to him who wrote such a thing, for we are neither guilty of that, nor know any thing about it. This is only an unfounded charge and a false*

statements put forth as *History*, and as worthy of the belief of the most civilized portion of the globe! They can only

calumny. Let it be asked, how can a man be so inhuman as to cut to pieces a young child, and in consequence expose himself to the fire of hell and the curse of God? Regarding the brass whip which the General has written about, it is all a lie, like the rest of his accusations; because a whip is for horses and not for women. There is no matter if the General has got it (the whip with which it was alleged Meer Nusseer chastised his women) *in his possession to show to the people, for we also can produce not only a brass whip but hundreds of iron whips.*" And thus the young Ameer concludes his humble attempt to defend the memory of his father, and to uphold the character of his brethren, all that remained to them:—" Sir Charles Napier calumniates the Ameers, because he knows that he has injured them very sadly; and, by calling the Ameers monsters, he hopes to draw off the sympathy of people from their sorrowful misfortunes; but he will fail in his design even in this world; and on the day of judgment, when the Beloochees, who were innocently murdered by the General in the battles of Meeanee and Douba, shall rise against him,—on such a day, where will he find refuge from the accusations and complaints of those whose characters he has blackened by his calumnies?"

A brass whip—by no means a great rarity in the East—is found in the women's apartments, and the logical inference is, that *it was designed for their backs!* By a parity of reasoning, the valuable firearms, swords, jewels, and treasures, found in the zenanas, may be concluded to have been collected by the ladies, who, addicted like their lords to intrigue, were meditating a " revolt of the *Harem!*" Alas, poor England! If your senators are at the mercy of Mr. Roebuck, and your rising generation are dependent for Eastern *facts* on the imagination of General William Napier! England of all nations is most interested in obtaining correct information regarding India; Englishmen are of all Europeans the most ignorant, and the most easily imposed on, in all that concerns it!

To prove how cruelly the Ameers treated their ladies, the historian tells us, that " *when the Ameers fell, not one woman, old or young, mother, wife, or concubine, would follow them to Bombay, so much were they detested;*" and we are told that they " sought and obtained leave to return to the homes of their childhood." The reader of the foregoing pages will not be surprised when I tell him that THIS IS A PURE UNMITIGATED FICTION; though he will probably be amused at the hardihood of the fabrication. The ladies did not accompany their lords, because to have done so would have been an acknowledgment that all hope of the return of the Ameers was abandoned. The treatment of the captive Ameers, the indignities to which they were exposed, the undefined horror entertained by all Asiatics of transportation across the " black water" (sea), and the incertitude as to the final disposal of the captive princes when in the country of those who had evinced such a recklessness of justice, truth, and mercy,—were enough to deter even affectionate wives from voluntarily accompanying their husbands at first. But it was not their husbands' wish that their wives should accompany them.

be accounted for, by some heartless wag having practised on the credulity and too ready ear of Sir Charles Napier (to

UP TO MY LAST ACCOUNTS—JULY 1845—THE AMEERS' LADIES, SO FAR FROM HAVING "RETURNED TO THE HOMES OF THEIR CHILDHOOD," WERE STILL LIVING IN A TANDA (A WALLED VILLAGE) ABOUT THREE MILES FROM HYDRABAD! What say Dr. Peart, in charge of the Khyrpoor Ameers, and Captain Gordon, in charge of those of Lower Scinde, on this subject? The former writes:—

"In reply to the last part of your letter, from frequent conversations I have had with the ex-Ameers upon the subject, I am enabled to state that their disinclination to have their families sent to them from Scinde is quite insurmountable, and when I have proposed it to them, their reply has always been, '*As long as we are prisoners, this is no place for our wives and children, to make them prisoners also.*' I trust you will excuse my refraining from informing the ex-Ameers of the allegations that have been made against them, as I am sure, by so doing, I should be adding fresh causes of sorrow."

The latter, thus:—"The Ameers solemnly deny the allegation referred to in your second query, regarding the destruction of infants in their zenanas, and in justice I cannot withhold my testimony, that while I was employed in Scinde and the neighbouring countries, I never heard that such a practice existed among the Ameers, and *had it prevailed, it is scarcely possible that it could have been concealed* from you and others who resided constantly for several years at, I may say, the doors of the Ameers. IT WAS, I BELIEVE, THE WISH OF THE EX-AMEERS, THAT THEIR LADIES SHOULD NOT ACCOMPANY THEM FROM SCINDE, AND SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL IN INDIA, THEY HAVE ALWAYS EXPRESSED THE GREATEST REPUGNANCE TO THEIR REMOVAL, IN THE HOPE, NO DOUBT, THAT THEY THEMSELVES WOULD EVENTUALLY BE RESTORED TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY. THIS HOPE THEY STILL CHERISH, AND WHILE IT LASTS (ALTHOUGH FAR LESS INTENSELY THAN BEFORE) THEY WILL NEVER SANCTION A PROCEEDING WHICH, AS WE ARE WELL AWARE, IS SO OFFENSIVE TO THEIR IDEAS OF FEMALE HONOUR AND DECORUM. THE AMEERS HAVE ALWAYS SPOKEN TO ME OF THE REMOVAL OF THEIR LADIES, AS A STEP TO BE RESORTED TO ONLY IN THE EVENT OF THEIR VAKEELS RETURNING UNSUCCESSFUL FROM ENGLAND, AND THEY WILL NOW PERCEIVE THAT THEIR WORST FEARS IN THIS REGARD ARE LIKELY TO BE REALIZED." This, be it remembered, is the testimony of two high-minded English gentlemen, writing simultaneously from the eastern and western extremities of India, daily associating with the Ameers, and acquainted with all their thoughts. They cannot be supposed to be discontented "at being by Lord Ellenborough debarred from plundering the Scinde revenues, under the names of collectors," &c. They are gentlemen whose words have never been doubted, nor their honour called in question; with no interest in the matter save that of Englishmen jealous for the honour of their country. And what is opposed to them? The assertions of one whom I have proved to be as reckless of *truth* as he is ignorant of what he pretends to discuss—the champion of a brother whose policy is unjustifiable, and only to be extenuated by proving its victims monsters more horrible than it hath hitherto entered into the mind of man to conceive!

hear any thing to the disadvantage of his victims), who forthwith transmitted what may have been intended as a bad joke and fiction, to him who was to become the annalist of the Conquest of Scinde.

Translation of the PETITION of the Wives of the dethroned Ameers of Scinde, transmitted through their accredited Envoys, to Her Majesty QUEEN VICTORIA.

May the shadow of Queen Victoria increase, the pure, and the magnificent as Balkis (Queen of Sheba).

It is almost two years since Sir Charles Napier came to Hydrabad, in Scinde, with an army and artillery, and plundered our habitations of all our money, ornaments, jewels, and of every thing of value. And at the same time he took from us the Ameers and our children, and sent them to Hindostan as captives. We helpless women, devoid of power, were, when Sir Charles Napier arrived, seated in our houses. What manner of custom is this, that he should enter our dwellings, and plunder us of our valuables, leaving us not sufficient for our support? Two years have elapsed since he tore us from our houses, and native city, and compelled us to dwell outside the town of Hydrabad, in huts, like the destitute. God knows the hardships we suffer for our food and raiment; and through our separation from the Ameers, we endure such distress and despair, that life is distasteful to us. That one should die when God wills it, is no calamity; but we endure with each successive day the torment of a new death; wherefore we cherish the hope, that you yourself being a Queen, as we were once, will

sympathise with us, and will take compassion upon us, and cause restoration of those things of which Sir Charles Napier has robbed us; and since our hearts are lacerated with grief at being separated from the Ameers, and from our sons—by which, indeed, we are brought to the brink of despair—you will remove this cause of distress, otherwise we should reckon it the greatest favour to put an end to our existence. May your days be lengthened!

Signatures of the Begums of—

MEER KURM ALI KHAN.
MEER NOOR MAHOMED KHAN.
MEER MAHOMED NUSSEER KHAN.
MEER SOBDAR KHAN.
MEER MEER MAHOMED KHAN.

Written on the 27th of the month Shuwal, 1260,
at Hydrabad, in Scinde.

Translation of a Paper given to LORD ASHLEY by the VAKEELS of the Ameers of Scinde.

August, 1845.

We, AKHUND HABIBULLAH, DIWAN MITHARAM, and DIWAN DYARAM, the accredited Envoys of the Amírs of Sindh, solemnly declare that we have never, on any occasion, acquiesced in the truth of the charges against our masters the Amírs. We believe, and we affirm it in the most solemn manner, that the letter said to have been written to Bibarak Bugti by Mir Muhammad Nasir Khan,

was a forgery. We believe, before God, that the Amírs are wholly innocent of the charges brought against them.

Signatures of

AKHUND HABIBULLAH.
DIWAN MITHARAM.
DIWAN DYARAM.

19, Harley Street, 15th August 1845.

Extract of a Letter from LIEUT.-COL. OUTRAM, C.B., formerly Commissioner in Scinde, to LIEUT.-GEN. SIR CHARLES NAPIER, G.C.B., dated 26th January 1843 (a few weeks previous to the battle of Meanee).

"It grieves me to say that my heart, and that judgment which God has given me, unite in condemning the course we are carrying out for his Lordship, as most tyrannical, positive robbery. I consider that every life that may hereafter be lost in consequence, will be a *murder*."*

Extract of a letter from the Right Honourable SIR HENRY POTTINGER, Bart., G.C.B., formerly Resident in Scinde, read in the House of Commons by Lord Ashley, in Feb. 1844.

"Your letter brought our happy and merry days in Scinde vividly to my mind, and I lamented, on reading it, if possible more deeply than I had done, over the 'fallen estate' of my old friends the Ameers, of whose case I have all along said, and ever shall say, under all circumstances, and in all society

* *Vide* "The Conquest of Scinde, a Commentary," page 290, Part 1st.

and places where I may hear it alluded to, that it is the *most unprincipled and disgraceful that has ever stamped the annals of our empire in India.* No explanation or reasoning can, in my opinion, remove the foul stain it has left on our good faith and honour, and as I know more than any other man living of previous events and measures connected with that *devoted* country, I feel that I have a full right to exercise my judgment and express my sentiments on the subject. I was in hopes that some influential voice would have been raised in England against the tyranny and spoliation that had taken place, but the intelligence by the last mail—that of July—holds forth no such prospect, and all that I can now hope is, that the author of all this cruelty and misery may meet with his deserts hereafter. I shall only add, that I shall esteem it a favour if you will let my opinions be known wherever you hear the affair mentioned, and that you cannot use too strong language in expressing my disgust and sorrow on the occasion."

THE END.

London: Printed by STEWART and MURRAY, Old Bailey.

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SUMMARY

OF

MR. B. H. HODGSON'S

DISPUTE

WITH

LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

ON AFFAIRS IN INDIA.

WITH EIGHTEEN DOCUMENTS IN PROOF.

CANTERBURY:
HENRY WARD, 8, MERCERY LANE.

1845.

Phl-3

INTRODUCTION.

In the beginning of 1842, Lord E. came out from England, and presently set off for the Upper Provinces, unattended by any of his coadjutors in the Government. Ere he could reach Allahabad, I was obliged to report a violent interference on the part of the Rajah with the usual course of business. This was in April, 1842, and though the occurrence was a trifle in itself, it was rendered important by the time of its taking place,* and the Durbar's apparent wish to make a quarrel out of it. My long struggle with the Durbar (1837-42) had just been closed, and the cautionary force sent to the frontier to support me in the later stages of that struggle, had just been withdrawn. Meanwhile, the Cabool catastrophe was still unavenged, and our unaccountable delay in that matter was causing our enemies throughout India again to bestir themselves, under the impression that we were exhausted. What wonder, then, that Nipal should once more misbehave? She did, indeed, conduct herself outrageously, but it was an expiring and futile effort, and called only for

* The face of affairs was not changed in Cabool or China till the following October.

patience on Lord E.'s part, and on mine for a steady continuation merely of those measures which, under Lord Auckland's administration, had carried me successfully through so many previous and greater perplexities at Cathmandu. I told Lord E. so privately, without delay, and I bade him only be still and I would rectify all. He had just come out; he was away from his council; he could have no knowledge of *recent* events in Nipal, for they had not yet reached England through the usual channels; what, then, did Lord E. do? *was* he patient? did he rely on me who had, in the past four years, conquered so many and far greater difficulties? (see No. 2) Why no! Lord E. got in a passion; he pushed aside his secretary, who sought to inform him of the res gestæ of that period in Nipal, and, seizing the pen himself, he wrote off a despatch in answer to mine, on the instant (six hours after receipt exactly) and yet implying and involving a *total* and *violent bouleversement* of the policy of his predecessor towards Nipal!!! I was ill, but as fast as I *could*, I prepared a summary resume of the past; (see No. 2) and at the same time I took such steps as occurred to me for getting rid of the dispute with the Durbar. Meanwhile, and at once, I told Lord E. privately what I was about, and I reiterated my request for patience merely, telling him that this dispute was other than it seemed, and that those proceedings of the time of Lord Auckland, with which it was complicated, could not, whether they had been wisely or foolishly established, be got rid of *on the instant*, (as must be the effect of his order) without breach of solemn pledges and the risk of bringing about that

very rupture with Nipal which Lord E. professed himself anxious to avoid. But Lord E. persisted in his own course, and proceeded to a direct and open censure of Lord A.'s policy, (No. 1) whereupon he reiterated his order to me to do as he had bade me. I *could not*, however, do so without, as I have said, precipitating a rupture, and besides, I had now sent in my explanation (No. 2) and had nearly, by my own measure, got rid of the contre tems with the Durbar. Lord E., however, would not wait either for my explanation to himself, or for the result of my remedy for the Durbar's aggression. The latter he denounced as calculated to bring on a rupture with the Durbar. His own measure had been designed, he said, to prevent a rupture; and because I had postponed his measure to mine, he ejected me at once from my place. However, it was impossible for me then to quit Nipal, because of my ill health and of the periodical Malaria, and Lord E. was therefore *compelled* to patience. And long before, by the change of season, I *could* quit Nipal, my measure had succeeded, and my explanation had been received, when his Lordship's censures were very handsomely retracted. My friends rejoiced at this, and so did I, for I wished to stay in Nipal, and I admired Lord E.'s talents and disinterested distribution of his patronage. Nevertheless, when the Malaria subsided, and I could quit the hills, I voluntarily offered to resign my appointment, but expressed my readiness and desire to stay, if Lord E. were content, adding that I much wished to complete my researches into the institutions, resources, and condition of Nipal, to do which I asked for another year. The Governor-

General very handsomely consented, and another year passed away without any further fracas with him or with the Durbar. I was engaged in seeking occasion to do away with Lord Auckland's policy, and to introduce Lord E.'s; and this delicate and difficult measure I accomplished to Lord E.'s complete satisfaction. I had told him all along that I was wedded to no course of policy, and only asked for opportunity to drop Lord A.'s without compromising our honor and the safety of the Nipalese Chiefs, who were allied with us. (See App. No. 1 of No. 6.) And when Lord E.'s passion subsided, he had agreed, and that great change had been effected, beyond all expectation, speedily and happily. Nevertheless, when I again asked for another year, and told Lord E. that politics had occupied the past year so that I had not been able to go on with my other researches, he reverted to his old quarrel with me in the rudest manner, and told me I must and should quit Nipal. He even bade me give notice *beforehand* of my intention to go, either to make sure of me, or because he believed that my long opposition to the Rajah, under Lord A.'s administration, had necessarily made me unpopular at Cathmandu. [See No. 10.] Accordingly I *did* give notice to the Durbar, whereupon I was pressed by the Rajah and Chiefs to stay, if but for a season! I refused again and again, and again and again I was urged to refer the point to Lord E. I would not do so, because on a private reference to his Lordship, to whom I confidentially related every step of this extraordinary movement as it occurred, [see No. 7,] I found that Lord E. was averse to my stay. The Durbar, upon my refusal to forward

its appeal, applied to Lord E., through its own vakeel, at the Presidency, expressing, by letter to his Lordship, the utmost regard for me as the Saviour of Nipal during the past crisis of 1837-42. [See No. 8.] But his Lordship, though he had previously alleged, in 1842, my unpopularity with the Rajah as the only ground of my removal, [see No. 10,] nevertheless refused even to listen to these signal proofs of his error, and acting as usual in haste and anger, he put an end to the appeal by a public and anticipative supercession of of me in September, though I could not depart until December, and though every hour till December was pregnant with fresh proofs of his error. [No. 7 and 8.] In the midst of this state of things, my successor having arrived, I departed on the 5th of December amid such manifestations of regard and gratitude from the Nipalese, as I suppose no British functionary at a foreign court ever experienced ! !

Such is the story of my fracas with Lord E., the particulars of which may be seen in the annexed correspondence, [Nos. 1 to 18,] and in the other letters made up with those.

As for any remarks on the merits of this dispute, I would rather refer to the opinions of the many able men whom I consulted than dilate on the topic myself. When, indeed, Lord E. so wantonly assaulted me, I was amazed, for I knew him not. Since then he has, however, similarly assailed so many others, and is so well known for the creature of impulse and slave of prejudice, that I have long ceased to wonder at my own lot, though, alas ! I shall never cease to *regret* it, because, having been so long tied to Nipal by ill health, I

had set my whole heart upon solving, completely, every difficulty connected with her in the way of politics, and also upon such a literary identification of myself with her as would have done me credit and my country benefit.*

One year more, one little year more, and I could certainly have accomplished the second of these projects if not the 1st also; for, in politics the unparalelled difficulties of the late crisis 1837-42, had wholly passed away; and whatever my official opposition to the Durbar of Nipal, pending that crisis, it now appeared that I had contrived so completely to retain the regard and esteem of all those whom I had opposed, that, in respect to me they were just beginning to lay aside their habitual Chinese jealousy, and to permit and even to aid those literary researches they had so long, (according to their invariable maxims,) silently nullified. In fact at this moment the last cycle of events, [1837-42] at home and abroad was finding its natural completion, and as the revolution of the wheel became complete, all parties in the divided Durbar of Nipal, but more especially the Rajah, were vieing with each other in testimonies of regard for the warning voice and helping hand that had been with them from the beginning of the crisis. [See Nos. 7, 8, and 12.] *This was the moment I had waited for for years;*

* I crave pardon for thus speaking of my literary powers, but let it be remembered that I am resisting gross injustice and oppression, and that I had spent 20 years in Nipal, always enquiring and observing, and desiring nothing in this world but the opportunity and means fully to illustrate the history, institutions and resources of the country and people I loved so well, notwithstanding all the faults and follies of the Government for the time being.

and just when my patience alike and my toils were to have their reward, Lord E. thrusts me aside, and sends another reaper to gather *my* harvest ! ! ! *Sic vos non nobis* indeed.

All this and more I privately told to Lord E., who I at first thought was magnanimous and just, though proud and impetuous, and indeed his Lordship at first [see Nos. 3, 4, and 13] did seem to behave nobly, though he afterwards so poorly reverted to his grudge against "the Lord Auckland's man," and "the civilian in political employ;" for these attributes I am told, by the highest authorities, [see No. 11,] were and are the head and front of my offending in Lord E.'s eyes. I sincerely and calmly believe this to be the truth and the whole truth, for the oftener I recur to his dispute with me, the less able am I to find any valid excuse for his vehement Lordship, who indeed is too hot and confident to be able long to conceal any real sentiment, and who has, before and since, misused several others of prime note even worse than he did me. It may indeed be that in his first assault on me, Lord E. designed to stab Lord Auckland through my side, but that, in the second, he meant *also* to avenge himself on me for the advantage I had gained over him in the first collision; or, both motives may have operated towards the revival, after a year, of his pique against me, in defiance as it were of the whole current of intervening events that had gone so completely to vindicate and justify me. Certain it is, however, that I can hear of no one who thinks it worth while even to attempt a justification of Lord

E.'s conduct towards me; and indeed that conduct bears such evident marks of some foregone conclusion, (whether prejudice against Lord A. or me,) that he who runs may read them.

In the whole of Lord E.'s conduct, there is nothing but haste and anger: for example, circumstanced as he was in May, 1842, he *could not possibly* know anything of the recent affairs of Nipal; yet, no sooner is a case brought before him in the common routine of business, than he rushes in *medias res* without an hour's pause. And when he is told by me, privately and quietly, that the summary order he had issued must produce, not prevent uproar, he, without waiting for my reasons, or for the issue, at once ejects me from office. Again, accidental circumstances compel Lord E. to leave me in Nipal for six months longer, and in this short period I not only get triumphantly rid of the dispute with the Durbar, but I succeed in completely changing the policy of my government towards Nipal, in ticklish times, without incurring a single inconvenience or reproach, and so as to constrain even Lord E.'s reluctant applause, not to mention the far more valuable testimony of the Hon. H. T. Prinsep who, in his letter of the 28th September, 1842, (No. 16,) says that my proceedings in this important matter were "admirable," and that "nothing could have been better." Nevertheless, Lord E. recurs to his grudge a year after its birth; and notwithstanding that the Durbar has, in the interim, expressed such regard for me, [see No. and 7,] that Lord E. could no longer pretend to consider me unpopular, and not-

withstanding, also, that in looking coolly over the past he must have felt that I, so far from having erred, had, by my firmness, "*saved* HIM *from the tremendous blunder of precipitating a rupture with Nipal* in the spring of 1842." Such, at all events, was the persuasion of one of the most experienced men in India; [see No. 9] and so obviously did this impression arise out of the facts of the case, [No. 2 and 6] that so acute a man as Lord E. can hardly be supposed to have missed it.

For the rest, and reverting to our original dispute, I do not blame Lord E. for his ignorance of what he could not know, viz., the events of the last five years in Nipal; but I *do* ask why he could not wait for my explanation of them, [22nd June] and why, before its arrival, he must push a misunderstanding with me, who had been 20 years in Nipal, to extremity in times so ticklish? The pith of our dispute was, what effect a given order would probably produce on the temper of the Durbar; I held that Lord E.'s order would produce the very rupture he sought to avoid, and therefore I postponed its execution presently, after substituting another remedy which Lord E. instantly retorted on me by saying was calculated to create a rupture, though, in fact, the lapse of but one little month sufficed to prove the perfect success of *my* measure. But, not to speak of results, what sane man could suppose Lord E. likely to be right, and me to be wrong, where the question was essentially such as I have just stated, viz., the probable effect of a given measure at a given moment on the temper and conduct of Nipal?

Let it be remembered that I had spent half my life in the study and practice of Nipalese politics, and that Lord E. had just come to India and was away from his council! Oh! but Lord E. had mustered the whole politics of India before his departure from England. Perhaps so, speaking generally, but certainly not in regard to Nipal, of which kingdom he was then so utterly ignorant as not to know the primary footing on which our relations with that state stood, for, in June, 1842, he actually ordered me to send him a "monthly report of that part of the Nipal army which was subject to my control"!!! This is Lord E.'s official language to me, a language implying total ignorance of the A. B. C. of the subject.* Yet this is the man who scornfully, and at once ejects me from office, because I venture to differ with him as to the probable effect of a given measure on the temper of Nipal! The fact I have just stated shews that Lord E. had not only no special knowledge of Nipal, but not even such knowledge as *was general and accessible.* Yet was he so eager to censure all the doings of Lord Auckland, that he no sooner casually gathered, in the course of a business correspondence that Lord A. had resorted to the unpopular measure of "interference," than he pounced on *this* solitary feature of the case, without staying a moment to learn the nature or degree of the said interference, or the circumstances

* N.B. Nepal, I need hardly say, is a completely independent kingdom, with which we have not, nor ever had, any but merely diplomatic relations. Most of the other States of India are dependant, and a part of their armies is under our control.

under which it had been resorted to! This eagerness to censure Lord Auckland is the whole and sole meaning of Lord E.'s extraordinary official despatch to me of the 5th of June, 1842, (No. 1.) And this too is the whole and sole meaning of his prior order, which I had neglected to execute, because therein the censure was only implied, not expressed, so that I had room to assume that Lord E. was not, and could not be, aware of the effect of that order *in Nipal.*

For an explanation of the true state of the case quoad Lord Auckland's interference with the Government of Nipal, I need only refer to my despatch of 22nd June, 1842, (No. 2.) But those who would have yet further light upon the true and complete state of the case, must consult my despatch of the 30th June, (No. 6,) in the second appendix to which they will see the pledges Lord A. had exchanged with those chiefs of Nipal whom it was the necessary effect of Lord E's. order to me to *deliver up, bound hand and foot, to one of the most fierce mannered courts in Asia,* and which court these chiefs had openly braved for OUR sake not less than for their own. That their sacrifice would have been the consequence of my execution of Lord E's order to me, I am as certain as that I breathe; and if Lord E. was not bound, nor likely to take *my* word for this, why not listen to others whom he *was* bound to attend to? (Mr. Robertson, Governor of Agru, and Mr. Prinsep, Member of Council,) and who pressed *this* view of the subject upon him, not to dwell upon the obviousness with which this consequence resulted from the circumstances

to the case, and the fate of Bhim Sen.,* as known to Lord E. I repeat then, that honour and humanity, not less than policy, required that these chiefs should not be openly and instantly abandoned, as Lord E. for six weeks insisted with blind or savage indifference. Lord E. became convinced of this as soon as he would allow himself to listen, and accordingly he left the time and mode of dissolving the connexion between the Resident and these chiefs to my discretion. Nor when, so authorised, I *had* dissolved it in *less than four months, and without one evil or cavil of any sort arising*, could Lord E. withhold the official expression of his "perfect satisfaction", with my proceedings. But, it will be asked, if this important measure was so successfully achieved; and if no fresh and further difficulty arose, what did or could Lord E. *eventually* object to me? for he had certainly retracted his first violence and made me a very handsome amends, by his public letter of the 8th August, 1842, (No. 3,) and by his private one of the 26th July; (No. 4) whilst the course of events in the past year had left him not one inch of ground to rest his former objection on, (see No. 10,) viz., that I was too much mixed up with a party to be able to inchoate his new policy. *This* pretext, or the *other* if my unpopularity with the Rajah, Lord E. might plausibly urge in 1842, but in 1843 decisive facts had annihilated all such pretences, for rejecting me; and when therefore Lord E. in June, 1843, (see his letter of the 2nd, in No. 7,) resumed his grudge of the former year, nor would listen to the

* He had been Minister and was cruelly butchered in 1837.

Durbar or to me, I am forced to account for this unfairness by his prejudices or his wounded pride, unless I must refer it to his impatience to get hold of my rich appointment for one of his military pets! For how NOW stood the case? In the original quarrel, not I, but he had been in error, and not merely so, but *I* by my firmness had warded off from HIM the extremest risk of great public inconvenience arising out of his impetuosity and hardness of character. I had likewise fulfilled his wishes for a change of policy, with unexpected rapidity and success, whilst the Rajah was now coming forward to prove my popularity with the court. What does, or can Lord E. oppose to these titles to his confidence and protection, unless it be an occasional folly of the heir apparent, for which I could not be accountable, and which was of no moment to my Government? And what right had Lord E. to revert to his old quarrel with me in the style and spirit of the letter just adverted to? Never was a falser or crueler letter penned than that,* nor can I conceive how even Lord E's. effrontery could be guilty of so shameless a violation of truth and decency as this letter exhibits. Lord E. cooly makes a favour of having recalled his recal of me, (No. 5.) Just as if *he* had never himself offered me a *voluntary* atonement for that injustice, (see Nos. 3, 4, and 13); and just as if some of the ablest men in India (Prinsep & Robertson,)

* N. B.—Compare it with No. 13, as well as Nos. 3 and 4!! Was ever such contrariety in one man? and such blind acting according to the impulse of the moment? Lord E. offers me the fullest atonement, expresses the highest opinion of my ability, and knowledge, and character, and then turns round and treats me like a dog. Alas! the injured may forgive, but the injurer never!

had not opened his eyes to the imminent public risk my firmness had protected him from (see No 9, &c.,) in that matter!! Lord E. himself tendered to me the recal of the ejection *letter*, with many flattering speeches, (see No. 13,) and I answered by saying that I cared not for the recal of the *letter*, provided my answer to it were left on record with it! Certainly if Lord E. had had the public interests alone in view in his treatment of me in 1843, the Durbar's unexpected and emphatic declarations of esteem and regard, when I, by his orders, announced to it my intention of going away, must have decided Lord E. in my favour; for, as he had said in the year before, [No. 10,] and as all appearances THEN might warrant, there was *at that time* room to suppose my long opposition to the Rajah in carrying out Lord A.'s policy, had rendered any such declaration of the Durbar's in my behalf impossible. *

Now when the Durbar itself came forward so unexpectedly to gainsay this presumption, why did not Lord E. await the result? why not in common justice to me, hear what the Durbar purposed, instead of cutting off the *possibility* of a fair and deliberate judgment by an *anticipative* supercession of me in public orders four months before I could quit the country, by reason of the Malaria?

Oh! but Lord E.'s acknowledged abilities must need prevent such repeated and gross instances of in-

* For further proofs how much Lord E. wronged me in assuming that I was an eager advocate for the policy of interference, or for opposition to the Rajah, I beg to refer to Nos. 17 and 18, being letters of mine prior to the crisis of 1837-42, and there also will be found much to illustrate the genius and character of the Nipalese, and the causes of all our troubles during that crisis in our connexion with Nipal.

discretion as these! No doubt provided Lord E. would give his talents the least room to operate in. But of what use are talents to him, who, the slave of prejudices, obeys them upon the impulse of the moment instead of following the dictates of his judgment, as instructed either by enquiry or by event.

Lord E. will listen to no one but his own pets, [see No. 14,] nor will he wait the course of events, and thus he falls from blunder to blunder, too fast for ever superhuman ability to avail him.

In his quarrel with me in 1842, he acted wisely and well, *so soon as* he *could be got to listen, and to let events run.* And in the revival of that quarrel in 1843, if, when the Durbar came forward so signally to express its regard for me, [No. 7 and 8,] Lord E. could have been again induced to listen and to let events speak for themselves, his decision would again have been just and wise. Instead of attending however silently to the course of events in this instance, (in the former he had no option) he cut the matter short as I have stated, by the instant public nomination of a new Resident, in Sept. The Durbar, however, still would not believe that Lord E. could seriously purpose to eject an officer at once popular with it, and efficient as respected his own Government, and in order to give the Governor-General the strongest possible proof of its regard for me, and of the benefits his Government might derive from its confidence in me as his representative, in Nov. 1843, the Maha Rajah actually laid the whole forces of his kingdom at Lord E.'s absolute disposal. [No. 12.] But mark the sequel; before this signal and decisive proof of Nipal's good-will could

become known to Lord E. in the course of post, Oude having made a shameful aggression on Nipal, and Nipal having very naturally and properly taken fire at this aggression, Lord E. exhibited himself in his true colours, (prejudice and passion,) by actually detaching a force of five regiments to watch the Nipal frontier, at a moment when he had not a soldier to spare from his operations elsewhere, and yet *without even consulting me as to the necessity of this precaution.*

General Nott, Lord E.'s representative in Oude, was his Lordship's presumed adviser in that step; and tho' in truth the General knew no more of the temper of Nipal than the man in the moon, yet prejudice suggested to Lord E. that this military pet* should be exclusively attended to, while passion could not wait for Npal's own expression of that temper! Thus five regiments were actually put in orders to watch Nipal, at the very moment when Nipal was tendering to our Government, through me, the absolute disposal of her whole armies, and of course was *not* doing what General Nott and Lord E. presumed she *was* doing with reference to the aggression of Oude.* These which I have just related, were the very last public events that occurred ere I quitted Nipal, and I pray all men of candour to consider how far Lord E. can be

* I ask pardon for thus speaking of an old and distinguished soldier, who however has himself told me that he knew only what the King of Oude had told him, viz, that 30,000 Nipalese were about to invade Oude! Oude might well be alarmed, for one of her Chuckladars having missed seizing a Zumundar, whom oppression had driven across the frontier, crossed it in arms and plundered the public and private property of Nipal! Nipal was indignant of course, but she submitted her wrongs to me and I quieted her.

assumed to be either knowing or impartial in regard to the affairs of Nipal, when facts of public import and but obliquely touching me and my wrongs, thus cry against the hastiness and the partiality of his *Lordship's* views.

There is one important circumstance connected with the above affair which I have only alluded to, because it belongs rather to Lord Auckland's administration than to Lord E.'s, because I cannot well advert to it without the imputation of egotism. Nevertheless cruelly as I have been wronged by Lord E., it seems fit that I should advert distinctly to whatever may tend to set me right in the judgment of my friends, and the more especially since Lord E.'s precipitation compelled me to make reference to this leading circumstance in the course of my debate with him.

In order then rightly to judge between Lord E. and myself, let it be remembered, that when Lord E. came to India as Governor-General I had been for four years engaged in a perpetual struggle with the Durbar, which at the very beginning of the great political crisis of the time [1837-42] had determined to come to a rupture with us ; and that, whatever the wisdom or otherwise of the policy of Lord A. towards Nipal, the execution of his Lordship's measures, which alone devolved on me, had obtained for me before Lord E.'s arrival "the highest and most unequivocal testimonies ever paid to the merit of a public man." These testimonies [see No. 6, App. 1,] are both public and private, from the Government abroad and at home, as well as from all the men of prime note in political

employ in India at that day; and they refer to a long series of transactions, as involved and protracted as they were *successful*, both *seriatim* and in their ultimate and general effect, which was to control Nipal pending the crisis above adverted to. It is true that Lord E., when he arrived, was uninformed as to these transactions; but when in fear lest his impetuosity should precipitate that very rupture I had so long striven to prevent, I, in June, 1842, felt myself obliged to submit Lord E. these testimonies, and to urge upon him the irresistible query, 'how could he suppose I would be the suicide of my own reputation?' was it, let me ask, common sense or common justice on Lord E's part to refuse the testimonies, to scorn the inference, and to persist in acting towards me as though I were stupid enough at the eleventh hour, and for a ridiculous trifle [Cashinath's case,] to mar my own great labour of the past four toilsome years? yet such literally was Lord E.'s conduct to me in 1842, whilst in 1843 there was the crowning injustice of refusing the DURBAR'S testimony in my favor, a testimony as emphatic as that of my own Government, and much more surprising since, in executing the orders of my own Government through four contentious years, I had necessarily been perpetually opposed to the Durbar! What then was wanting in 1843 to satisfy Lord E.? the crisis was THEN

* See the separate paper indorsed 'Testimonials official, 1837-42.' I had many more of these testimonies, but alas! my hurried departure from Nipal left me no opportunity to transcribe them, but let G. Clerk, and T. C. Robertson, and Colonel John Low, and Colonel Sutherland, and Messrs. Maddock, and Bushby, and Prinsep be consulted, and they will bear me out I know.

OVER, and Nipal HAD been withheld *throughout it* from joining the host of our other enemies, whilst Nipal, so far from resenting my "Interference," either the measure or my mode of executing it now came forward to hail me as her saviour!* No one I think after hearing these unquestionable facts, facts involving the entire merits, and leaving all lesser points of the case between Lord E. and me, matters of mere indifference, will deny that Lord E. has much to answer for in his treatment of me from first to last. Nor must I, in justice to myself and others, omit to add, [this I speak confidentially and rely on discretion] that Lord E. stands absolutely alone in his persevering and causeless misusage of me; for, it having become known at Calcutta, just before I sailed for England, that Sir C. Wade was about to retire, the President of the Council of India with the unanimous assent of his colleagues in Council, proposed that Lord E. should be written to and solicited to confer the Indore Residency on me as a mark of the Government's sense of my public merits and services.

B. H. HODGSON.

On board the Hardwicke
at Sea.

March, 1844.

* When I came away I had the Rajah's autographic attestation of this. I sent it to the new Resident begging him to take copy and return it, but he neglected to return it.

CORRESPONDENCE.

No. I..

LORD ELLENBOROUGH'S ATTACK ON LORD AUCKLAND'S POLICY TOWARDS NEPAUL.

[No. 331 of 1842.

From the Secretary to Government of India with the Governor General to B. H. Hodgson, Esq. Resident, Nipal.

Allahabad, 5th June, 1842.

(SECRET DEPARTMENT.)

SIR,—The Governor-general cannot but infer, from your letter of the 25th ult., that you attach a degree of importance to the continuance in office of the present ministers of Nipal, which the circumstances of the case, as made known to his Lordship, do not appear to justify.

2. The Governor-general desires that the government of Nipal should maintain peace, for war in itself is necessarily a calamity, and no success in a war with Nipal would compensate the charge it would impose.*

3. The Rajah of Nipal must still more desire peace, for he must know that the result of war would be to him utter defeat and ruin.†

4. To the British Government it is a matter of indifference who are the ministers of Nipal,‡ unless in so far as the

* (*Notes, private.*) If this be so, really so, which even Lord A. doubted, Lord E.'s precipitate interference was utterly wrong in every view.

† Every page of Indian history especially, and every leaf of the great volume of human nature generally, afford an absolute refutation of this solemn dictum.

‡ These "wise saws and modern instances" are strange follies, and may be had at sixpence a score!

influence of the ministers might affect the question of peace or war, in which alone we are interested.*

5. But the present ministers of Nipal appear to have no influence whatever of any sort. They seem to be in a state of perpetual terror, always apprehending some danger to their own persons from the violence of the Rajah and the heir apparent. Influence *cannot* co-exist with pusillanimity and fear.† It is calm firmness alone which can control the violence of ill-regulated minds, and of this quality the ministers of Nipal are avowedly destitute.

6. The interests of the British Government are represented to be identified with those of these ministers. Yet it would appear, from your letter, that their influence is not such as to preserve a British subject from oppression and the representative of the British Government from insult. Neither would it preserve the British Government from a war if it suited the purposes of the Rajah to make war upon us.‡

7. The British Government, when it makes its first object the maintenance in office of certain ministers in Nipal, places

* Granted at once: that "unless" is the only thing ever thought of or contended for, viz. to maintain peace at an unexampled crisis of our affairs (1837 to 1842).

† Granted again: but if the sovereign himself rush into affairs with blind fury, the *only* remedy available is clearly a perilous resort to measures of that stamp that at once renders further temporising impossible; and for our Government alike as for themselves the pear was not ripe, and therefore I and they agreed to bend to the storm, and the Rajah was allowed to have his fling for the moment. But thence to infer that the ministers were powerless, or cowards, was a monstrous *nonsequitur*, disproved *priorly* by the fact that these ministers had openly headed a noble band of ninety-two chiefs in pledging themselves, in January 1840, to the Governor-general to maintain good faith and peace, exacting the Rajah's consent and seal to the bond, and *subsequently* by the resistance of 1842 (December), when, *all unaided by me*, they headed a national movement to repair their own wrongs and restore the laws and constitution, as energetically as forbearingly! Lord E. himself allowed that the movement was worthy of the best days of British opposition to tyranny. In fact the pear *was* then (December) ripe, and the "powerless, pusillanimous" ministers plucked it with a noble steadiness of bearing. All my alleged complaints related to *trifles*, from which, true or false, only trivial inferences ought to have been drawn, because a hundred could not weigh against the weighty decisive facts on record when Lord E., scorning to consult record or Resident, or any person or thing, rushed into this summary damnation of his predecessor's policy.

‡ They certainly *had* prevented war in October 1839, and before and after, when it *did* suit the Rajah's purpose.

itself in a false position. We do not desire to give advice to a Nipaulese minister; but certainly there is nothing in our situation which should lead us to receive advice from him, and to move forward our troops and regulate our language to vakeels according as such movement or such language may be deemed by him to be conducive to his maintenance in office,* and his personal security.

8. The British Government loses a portion of its power when it departs from its dignity, and places itself in a state of subordinate co-operation with the ministers of Nipal.

I have the honour, &c. &c.

(Signed) T. H. MADDOCK,
Secretary to Government of India
with Governor-General.

Allahabad, 5th June, 1842.

(True Copy. T. SMITH, Lt. Assist.)

* And yet we *had* so moved and so spoken for that sole end, and to uphold a solemn public pledge of which honour and policy then alike forbade the breach attempted by Lord E. on the spur of the moment. *Au reste,* the abstract maxims propounded are just *vox et præt. nihil:* specialities are the soul of affairs.

No. II.

DEFENCE OF LORD AUCKLAND'S POLICY TOWARDS NEPAL PENDING THE CRISIS OF 1837-42.

[No. 26 of 1842.

The Resident Nepal to T. H. Maddock, Esq., Secretary Government India, with Governor-General.

(SECRET DEPARTMENT.)

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, No. 331, dated the 15th instant, intimating to me that in the judgment of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, the special connexion now existing between a party in this Durbar and the Resident is so radically faulty, that nothing in the peculiar circumstance of the case as known to his Lordship can justify further adhesion to it.

2. As the connexion in question has grown up under the express sanction of Government, as it has now stood for some time, and as its sudden dissolution may be productive of very material effects, it appears to be my duty to tender some explanation upon these points; after doing which I beg to add that, whatever may be the determination of the Governor-General in regard to the future, I shall be found ready to endeavour to fulfil his Lordship's views with zeal and promptitude.

3. All our recent troubles in relation to this Durbar having proceeded from a party professing to uphold "the good old Gorkha policy," it may be convenient to advert to the origin and character of that policy which the whole nation, until very lately, was united enthusiastically in support of.

4. The Gorkhas are a recent energetic nation of exclusive successful soldiers, who, void of taste for arts, commerce, or literature, have no idea of profit, pleasure, or occupation, save in arms. Having overrun all the Hill States around

them, they bent their whole faculties to discover how they could safely encroach on the rich plains lying below the hills. From open, single-handed attack on us in the plains, they were deterred by a just appreciation of our resources in wealth and military skill; but they deemed their strong mountains a defensible barrier against us; they thought that at least we should be reluctant to cope with them *there*, however provoked to it; and they imagined that, as the deadly malaria of the Tarai must exclude our approach for eight to nine months of every twelve, they might, by pretended negotiations relative to their aggressions during the short period available to us, contrive to put off the day of reckoning indefinitely.

5. They considered, moreover, that, though unable to contend with us below in all our strength, they might, by intrigues there, raise us up enemies, and that, whenever we were embarrassed by such enemies, their own commanding position, overlooking our best and most vital possessions, would give them advantages for attack, or for selling their neutrality, such as they must be dull, indeed, not to draw profit from, *provided always* that they *kept the secrets of their own fastnesses unspied into by us;* and to do this was declared, therefore, to be the cardinal maxim of their government.

6. Thus originated the good old Gorkha policy, consisting of fraudful encroachment on the plains at all times; more open assault in, for us, troubled times; the fomentation of disquiet, and the strict avoidance, above all things, of any responsible international intercourse. This policy was matured so early as 1787; and its success was as complete as its operation against us was incessant, until we were absolutely compelled into that mountain warfare, our disinclination to which had been all along so accurately anticipated.*

7. The war with us was a sad blow, and our successes in arms elsewhere long continued to deepen the impression of it. Responsible intercourse was *forced* on the Durbar by

* See Prinsep, two first chapters, and Narrative of Political Relations.

the war;* and, in the course of years, many of the more intelligent chiefs were led practically to perceive that there were no necessary disadvantages in that intercourse such as to warrant Nepal in tempting destruction by the resumption of her old favourite policy, the further prosecution of which was, moreover, seen to be no longer practicable with any chance for invasion.

8. But it was the chiefs trained to business since the war, and in connexion with the British President, who argued and reflected thus wisely: and, unfortunately, there existed all this while another small class of chiefs formerly of great influence, but since the war under banishment,† who had no vocation in their exile save that of nursing in their memory the scenes and maxims of the olden time. They despised and hated the new doctrine of the indispensableness of responsible intercourse, friendship, and good faith with the British Government; of which doctrine, indeed, in exile they could know no more than that it was propagated and upheld by those who had thrust them out in 1805.

9. In 1837, just as the rajah had reached to years of discretion, this party reappeared on the stage; and, as it contrived to make itself instrumental in the downfall of the Thappas,‡ it soon was enabled to gain the entire confidence of the palace by pandering to the national prejudices and nascent vanity of a youthful sovereign who was perpetually reminded that every one of his royal ancestors had been a soldier and a conqueror; and that, if he himself would resume the good old maxims of those ancestors, he also might be so.

10. Besides their real ignorance and hate of the new,

* N.B. There have been four residents in Nepal, two before the war (Kirkpatrick and Knox) and two since: the two former were ignominiously ejected, pretty much as our resident at Amerapura was; the third was supported by the prestige of the war; the fourth was myself, who had no such support, the beating having been forgotten. Such is the habitual temper of the court of Nepal!

† Originating with the barbarous internal struggles of 1805, when the Kala Pandeys or chiefs in question were thrust out, that is, all who survived the struggle and massacre.

‡ Name of the tribe of which Bhim Seu was the head.

and real attachment to the old polity of the state, the Kala Pandeys (for so these chiefs are styled here)* had the wit to perceive that they must delude the nation as well as the sovereign ere they could hope to regain their former pre-eminence; and to a people devoted to arms, therefore, they held out perpetually the promise of renewed turbulence. They saw that they must be war-ministers or no ministers at all, for their long exile had stripped them of all legitimate weight among their fellow-nobles, and they were besides known to meditate the exaction of that fearful debt of revenge which the savage old manners of Nepal make a certain inheritance in the families of highest rank.

11. Thus all circumstances of their character and position conspired to make the Kala Pandeys determined opponents of responsible intercourse with our Government at Cathmandoo, and of that peace and good neighbourhood which could by such means only be secured to us; and it happened most unfortunately that the very period of their reappearance at Cathmandoo (from a thirty years' banishment to their hill estates) was synchronous with a most disturbed state of the political relations of all the Indian world. By the basest pandering to the prejudices and passions of their young and weak sovereign they got possession of the symbol of power, and their administration of three years (1837 to 1840) was distinguished by ferocious barbarity at home and by incessant wrongs and injuries, which were recanted only to be resumed, towards us, or abroad.

12. There was no talk but that the English, however formidable, were over-matched in their contests with China, Affghanistan, and Persia; and, according to the old policy of the state, intrigues throughout India were commenced by the Kala Pandey administration preparatory to declared rupture, whilst affronts and intimidation were employed to get rid of the Residency in order that the favourite system

* Ranjang Pandy Karbeer, do. Koolraj do. Jagut bum do. Dulbahadoor do. The Raj gooroo or Misr gooroo, Koolch, and Sahi Amer Sahi, are all the noticeable persons of this party.

of stealthful encroachment might, at all events, have room to revive, even if open invasion should prove unadviseable.

13. Throughout 1837, 1838, 1839, and 1840, our trading subjects were oppressed with unusual taxes on transit,* and by delays and denials of justice, emanating directly from the hand of power, which was unscrupulously employed to browbeat the judges into iniquity and to silence appeals to the Resident by noon-day violence.† Dacoits and Thugs were harboured by authority to be let loose on our provinces; emissaries of intrigue were spread over all parts of India and its vicinity, from Lassa and Ava to Scinde and Herat, to breed discontent among our more influential subjects, hostile combination among our protected allies, and assault upon us from our independent allies and neighbours.‡ In April 1838 the Resident received a written demand, "What he was doing here?"§ In June 1840 a factitious meeting was got up among the troops (who were taught that the Resident had advised the wrong of which the soldiery complained) in order that their instigated assault on the Residency might be covered by the pretence of inability to restrain troops in open revolt.‖ Throughout several months a perpetual series of authorised placards directed popular license and fury against the Residency; and, lastly, the old system of inch by inch encroachment on our dominions below was again put in action and prosecuted until ninety-seven of our villages had been usurped by Nepal.¶

14. These proceedings were challenged from time to time during their progress, were detected and exposed over

* Resident's Despatch of 12th November, 1839.

† Case of Shew Dyal, and Misr Gooroo's confession. See Resident's Despatch, 22d September, 1840; App. A, No. 3; Depositions of the Merchants Jaganath and Kishen Jevan, August 14th, 1840, repeated in App. 5 of Despatch, 29th April, 1842; Government to Resident, 26th October, 1840, with annexed kharitah.

‡ See Resident's Reports to Government throughout 1837-8-9-40. For some months there was a guarda costa all along the frontier.

§ Resident's Despatch of 12th April, 1838.

‖ Resident's Despatch, Nov. 30th, 1840, App. 2 and 4, being notes to and from the Maha Rajah.

¶ See Magistrate Chumparun's Reports to Government and Resident, between March and September, 1840, and for Durbar's surrender thereof in Resident's Despatches of September and October, 1840.

and over again, and their formal recantation exacted from the Durbar* in November 1839, and again in September and October 1840, besides several minor renunciations. But, though satisfaction of all our specific grievances was thus had and a seemingly inevitable war thus prevented, it was impossible to survey the character and position of the wrong doers as above portrayed, or to couple that survey with due advertence to the excessive evasions and delays that had marked every step of their concessions† to us, and not remain convinced that for even our immediate prospective security against the recurrence of these evils, a change in the men, as well as the measures, of the Gorkha cabinet was indispensable.

15. Accordingly, in October 1840 I was commanded to inchoate measures having such a change for their object;‡ and from that date up to February 1842, when my long series of negotiations with the Durbar closed, and the cautionary force, which had been called to support the latter stages of them, was removed, I was exclusively engaged, under the continued express instructions of Government,§ in perfecting and maintaining the change.

16. To this sole end Colonel Oliver's brigade was brought to the frontier—to this sole end it was retained there; no idea of the physical protection of our provinces being in fact or in reason connectable with the movement,‖ and all our specific past wrongs having been remedied ere it marched

* Resident's Despatches, 12th November, 1839, and 6th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 25th, and 28th September, and 3d, 5th, 6th, 9th, and 14th October, 1840.

† Government Despatch, 22d December, 1841.

‡ Despatch of 26th October, 1840.

§ Despatches of 25th January, 1841, and 28th February, 1842.

‖ The notion of defending 500 miles of frontier by a fixed camp of 3000 bayonets needs but be thus clearly stated to shew its absurdity. For myself, I have always carefully endeavoured to guard against any such supposition when I have advised the movement of British troops, and have always expressly stated that the object of such movement was merely to impress this durbar with a conviction of the serious light in which her conduct was regarded. The presence of Colonel Oliver's small force on the border immediately opposite Cathmandu unquestionably produced that conviction, and also encouraged and supported the party favourable to us in the Durbar. This measure, therefore, fully answered its purpose; and those only who overlook its purpose

there. We had chosen to spare Nepal notwithstanding her multiplied offences and breaches of her word, and having done so, we deemed ourselves fully entitled by the laws of self-defence to exact such security for the future as was to be had without war, the more especially seeing that a large proportion of the nobles of the country of prime station and mark were willing and anxious to co-operate with us in vindicating, on our behalf and their own, the eternal claims of mercy, justice, peace, and good faith, all which had been so recklessly trampled upon by the Kala Pandey, or Palace faction, in their domestic and foreign administration.

17. But it was not merely necessary for us to obtain some guarantee against the immediate recurrence of a state of things, making war almost inevitable, at a very inconvenient season; it was further expedient, in case Nepal, as was too probable, should continue her faithless and unneighbourly conduct, under the secret prevalence of Kala Pandey instigation, to be enabled, at a fitting period, to place our relations on a firmer enduring basis, without the vast outlay of a protracted contest in the mountains;* and, whilst the character of the Maha Rajah appeared to the Governor-general in council,† to be totally unworthy of our reliance, from its weakness and duplicity, it was foreseen that the very numerous distinguished chiefs,‡ whom we had suffered to pledge themselves to us, would be willing, if their wrongs and ours continued unabated, notwithstanding the admission of the heads of their body to office, to unite with us in effecting the paramount object adverted to.§

18. Under these most peculiar circumstances, and with these unique purposes in view, was the existing coalition between the Resident and the peace party in this Durbar,

can censure its expediency. Its necessity in January, 1841, was alike obvious; for, in a long course of remonstrance with the Durbar, words, mere words, had lost their virtue.

* Government Despatch, 25th January, 1841, par. 2.

† Despatch of 15th February, 1841; also that of 26th October, 1840, and its kharitah; also Despatch of 22d December, 1841.

‡ Resident's Despatch, January 4th, 1841, the 3 Append. for the tender, and Government Despatch, 25th January, 1841, for the acceptance of that tender; also Governor-general's kharitah to Rajah, of 22d December, 1841.

§ Despatch of 25th January, 1841.

introduced and maintained by the express and continued instructions to government. It was confessed by a *pis aller*, a temporary measure of urgent expediency, in order to maintain our position here and elsewhere, against fraudful or forceful encroachment, that might precipitate a premature rupture, and in order likewise to obtain the means of cheap and rapid coercion of Nepal, should continued ill-will necessitate it.*

19. If we look at the *fruits* of this alliance, we can hardly deny that its current value has fully realised expectation; for, whilst in the three years *preceding* the change of ministry,† Dacoits had been authoritatively harboured all along the frontier, hostile intrigues carried on against us throughout India‡ and its confines, our territory largely encroached on, and our subjects cruelly oppressed; in the eighteen months that have *followed the change*, no one instance of these grievances (not originating with the earlier epoch) can be quoted. If, again, we look at the condition of the Residency, though affronts have been sustained since the change, they are neither so numerous nor so dangerous in kind as those which went before it. Nor, I think, should it on this head be forgotten, in extenuation of the ministerial slackness in the Resident's defence, that, on the recent occasions, the Rajah's personal interference in so furious a manner could hardly have been successfully and directly opposed at the moment, nor indeed without the risk of inducing a crisis which they and I alike thought had better be postponed.

20. Had, indeed, the Rajah proceeded to extremities against the Residency, I think that the ministry would and could have interfered with effect; and, whatever their apparent pusillanimity, in personal opposition to their sovereign under circumstances so completely without parallel, I am thoroughly convinced that, under the continuance till Octo-

* Government Despatch of 25th January, 1841, par. 2.

† Captain Hollings' statements and reports to Resident throughout 1839 and 1840.

‡ See Resident's correspondence with Benares, Ludhiana, Sciende, Rajpootana, Hydrabad, Assam, and also Murshidabad, Rampoor, Tirhoot, Patna, &c., all through the period in question, with the numerous arrests of Gorkha emissaries by Government's own orders, upon information furnished by Resident.

ber, of the present system of wanton insult and injury towards them, through the agency of the heir-apparent, they will then be prepared fully to redeem, if called on, their pledge of effectual co-operation with us.*

21. We may thus be saved thirty or forty lakhs of rupees at a period when such saving will have double its ordinary value; and (by subsidising or otherwise) we may thereby accomplish our end in relation to this kingdom as advantageously as by its conquest.†

22. My recent despatch detailing the tragedy of Bhim Seu‡ must clearly indicate to the Governor-general what the friends of peace and good faith have to apprehend at this place, where, as I have already mentioned, the symbol of the central administration is struggled for by two parties advocating the old and new polity of the Gorkhas, with a hate embittered by hereditary wrongs.§ One, and eventually both parties, may thus be led to acquiesce in a modified national independence, in order to find repose under the ægis of British suzerainty.

23. It is difficult to contemplate the character of the present ruler of Nepal‖ and his son, and entertain a hope that satisfactory relations with Nepal will be maintainable in their time upon the present footing; for, if relieved from their present councillors, they will speedily fall back into the arms of the Kala Pandeys, whose views and sentiments, as already explained, cannot, it will be seen, well admit of change, pledged as they are to the ancient polity of the kingdom, a policy more grievous to us than any ordinary war, and necessarily, too, leading to one.¶

* N.B. *private.* In December they did actually and alone gloriously realise my anticipations—nay, far surpass them, in the manner elsewhere noted.—B. H. H.

† Resident to private secretary, 28th September, 1842.

‡ Dated 25th May, 1842. Bhim Seu was minister prior to the Kala Pandeys coming into office, and they began their work by a dreadful sacrifice of him.

§ *Private.* It has been noted that in 1837 the Kala Pandeys destroyed Bhim Seu with merciless severity. In 1843 Bhim Seu's nephew recovered the helm of affairs, and then the Kala Pandeys met with terrible retaliation. Such are the manners of Nepal!

‖ Government Despatches to Resident, dated 26th October, 1840, 22d December, 1841, and 15th February, 1841.

¶ See Prinsep and Political Relations, as already cited.

24. We should therefore, I apprehend, be still prepared for the worst by upholding our friends here, who, besides, in quieter times abroad might possibly successfully inoculate their sovereign or his son with their own just opinions as to the ruinous unsuitableness to the new position of Nepal since the war of her ancient and cherished maxims of polity.

25. At all events, it is most desirable that the change from our existing policy towards Nepal to another, should, if possible, be quiet and gradual, and be deferred until our affairs are adjusted with Affghanistan and China, but especially the latter, where, if we be finally and effectively victorious, I should not wholly despair of seeing the Maha Rajah eventually subside into a preference for the maxims of the new school, and contentedly acquiesce in the future guidance (for guided he must be) of his present councillors.

26. Otherwise, those councillors should be allowed, on their resignation, an asylum, if need be,* in our provinces: but, short of this, their resignation, if voluntary and not too long deferred, may probably suffice for their protection *here;* and, indeed, if it be the Governor-general's decided determination, that their peculiar connexion with me do forthwith cease, I think I could so communicate that intelligence to them, as to lead to their safe resignation, retaining, at the same time, their good will and voluntary unofficial† good offices — a consummation surely that is greatly to be desiderated in the event supposed; for every where and always they must be men of great influence;‡ and, were their

* *Private.* See preceding note, at par. 22, and think of Lord E. seeking to deliver up the friendly chiefs to so savage a court, because they had joined us at a critical moment in a joint effort to enforce mercy and good faith at home and abroad, for their engagement to us and ours to them, and upon which solely they rested for safety, till times should mend. See App. 2 of Despatch of 30th June, No. 6.

† N.B. *private.* The Governor-general assented, and far more than I had promised him was effected: the friendly ministry stood, and I got quit of them without offence; and they, unaided by me, made an effort in December "worthy," said the Governor-general, "of the best ages of our own constitution."

‡ Four of the ministers, or Rangnath, Kishna, Ram-Futeh Jang, and Gooroo Persad, are in every respect the most considered men in Nepal.

official link to me kindly and carefully dissolved, they would thereafter be found ready to rejoin our banner, in case of the inevitable recurrence of rupture.

27. In the foregone despatch, I trust I have satisfied the Right Honourable the Governor-general, that there has been nothing whatever in my recent proceedings more than the natural, and necessary, and consistent sequel of what had gone before, under the direct repeated sanction and instructions of the Governor-general in council, to whom every step of my proceedings was submitted at the moment it was made; and from whose wisdom, therefore, I might have expected the correction of any unintentional error, whether in Casinath's case or in that alone which made Casinath's case* a bone of contention with the Durbar, viz. its identification with the all-important question of the ascendancy of one of the two parties in this Durbar.

29. The statement in par. 19 will, I doubt not, satisfy the Governor-general, that the ministers are neither powerless nor pusillanimous, though they deemed it inexpedient, on the recent as on former occasions of the sort, directly to cross their sovereign in his fits of intemperance. Nor, I trust, will it, upon re-consideration of the whole case, be held that there is any subordination on my part to that ministry whose best hopes rest entirely on *my* superiors; nor that there is in the coalition with them any possibility of entanglement, such as forms the bane of residential ministerial administrations of native states in the plains, because *here*

* N.B. *private.* Casinath's case was the one that led the Governor-general so suddenly and violently to attack Lord A.'s whole scheme of policy towards Nepal. It was a mere matter of business seized on by the Durbar in the spring of 1842 (when our delays in avenging the Cabul catastrophe were causing *all* our enemies to bestir themselves afresh), in order to make fresh disturbance. I told this to Lord E., necessarily adverting, in brief terms, to Lord A.'s policy; and the Governor-general thereupon, without waiting for this full explanation, denounced Lord A.'s whole proceedings, and insisted directly on its abandonment, which of course would have led to the *sacrifice* of the friendly chiefs. Lord E. cared not for that, but, on the contrary, he called these chiefs a set of fools and cowards!! I stood between the lion and his wrath, and he thereupon turned his whole wrath upon *me*, and ejected me. See Despatch of June 30th (No. 6), for the sequel of this most strange and indecent affair.

we have no earthly concern with the internal affairs of the kingdom.* But the connexion has, nevertheless, its evils; so that I shall be glad indeed to learn, that the wisdom of government has devised any substitute for it; and I beg leave to repeat, that whatever that substitute may be, or whether any be found or not, I shall, having offered the above explanation, be henceforth intent only on the prompt and zealous fulfilment of the Governor-general's commands and wishes, whatever they may be.

In conclusion, I have the honour to report to you, that I have just received from the Maha Rajah a karitah, addressed to the Governor-general, in which his highness amply apologises for the constraint lately laid upon his lordship's representative.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient Servant,

(Signed) B. H. HODGSON, Resident.

Nepal Residency, June 22, 1842.

(True Copy.)

* This is a point which should ever be kept present to the mind in all attempts to estimate with accuracy the proceedings of the Resident, whose insulated position, owing to the *plusquam Sinica* jealousy of Nepal, so forcibly struck Lords Wellesley and Cornwallis, that both these able statesmen, though of general views so different, yet agreed in the desirableness of supporting the Resident by some such alliance with the friendly chiefs as the emergency of 1841 induced Lord Auckland actually to adopt for the nonce. See instructions to Colonels Kirkpatrick and Knox. The Resident's position is still precisely what it was in those days; nor is it by any means now clear that Lords W. and C. misjudged the difficulty *or its remedy.*

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH

No. III.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH'S RECANTATION IN AUGUST OF THE ATTACK OF JUNE 5TH, NO. I, IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE DEFENCE, NO. II.

[No. 661.

From the Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-General, to B. H. Hodgson, Esq., Resident in Nepal.

(SECRET DEPARTMENT.)

SIR,—The Governor-General has again had under his consideration your letter of the 22d of June, and your several other letters respecting the existing connexion between you as the British minister at the court of Nipaul and the ministers of that state.

2. His Lordship cannot doubt that, however temporary circumstances may have seemed to render expedient that connexion, it is fraught with future evil,* and should, at the earliest practicable period, be suffered to expire.

3. You have been already made acquainted with the Governor-general's sentiments upon this subject.

4. The Governor-general leaves it to your discretion to decide in what manner your conduct should be regulated so as gradually to withdraw the British Government from a

* *Private notes.* Lord E. retires under cover of a general doctrine that I have no wish to dispute. Lord A. interfered upon *most special* grounds, and I defended his policy (or mine if you will) on those *most special* grounds. It had been wise, perhaps, to have nailed Nepal when we had her fast in autumn, 1839; but, having let her off, it had been madness to have taken no security for her prospective conduct till our affairs elsewhere were set in order; and the only possible security was that actually taken, viz. the coalition denounced. When war and peace trembled in the balance, I could have brought the matter to the gross issue of force, and we certainly then had a *casus belli.* But Lord A. decided for peace, and I was his servant. I told him the risks till Cabool and China were got rid of, if he let off Nepal; and I told him he would not get another opportunity, perhaps, of punishing Nepal: but he decreed for peace, with rights and honour redeemed,

false position without injury to the persons who may rely upon its support, a support really inefficacious for their protection, although its open and abrupt withdrawal might possibly involve them in new and serious danger.

It is obviously impossible to give from hence precise and absolute directions as to the conduct which should be pursued with respect to a sovereign who has more of insanity than of reason, and an heir-apparent who is altogether insane. You must be guided by your own judgment, assisted by your long and intimate knowledge of the people of Nepaul, in gradually bringing back the policy of your mission to the only safe and legitimate course, or that of abstaining from interference in the internal affairs of the state to which you are deputed, and relying for the due protection of British interests upon the knowledge entertained of British power.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed) T. H. MADDOCK,
Secretary to Government of India
with Governor-General.

Allahabad, the 8th August, 1842.

(True Copy. T. SMITH, Assistant.)

and I redeemed them against hope, but NOT without having necessarily caused much soreness and sense of humiliation in the Nepal cabinet, to add to all our prior risks. So I told Lord A., and that therefore he *must* have fresh men in that cabinet; and, *mirabile dictu*, I achieved the ejection of our enemies and the nomination and confirmation of our friends. Thus was Nepal saved, and our interests in the maintenance of peace, for the nonce, were thus secured; and when our affairs in Cabool and China had taken a turn, I contrived to drop the now denounced connexion so quietly, that my allies of the new ministry continued not only safe, but predominant. How different had the case been, had Lord E.'s instant fiat of open desertion of our allies in the cabinet been put into practice! Assuredly we should in that case have lost our honour, and our interests could hardly have sustained such a shock at *that time* (May, 1842).

No. IV.

LORD E.'S PRIVATE RECANTATION OF HIS ATTACK ON ME.

Allahabad, July 26, 1842.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your private letter of the 16th instant.

I have much reliance upon your ability, and upon the extensive knowledge you possess of the Maha Rajah and his people; and I can have no doubt that you will, to the utmost, exert your ability and use your knowledge, for the purpose of maintaining the existing relations of amity between the British Government and Nepal.

I have the honour to remain,

SIR,

Your very faithful Servant,

ELLENBOROUGH.

B. H. HODGSON, *Esq. Katmandhoo.*

No. V.

RESIDENT EJECTED.

Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General, to B. H. Hodgson, Esq., Resident in Nepal.

(SECRET DEPARTMENT.)

SIR,—I am directed by the Governor-general to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th of this month, whereby you notify the presentation to the minister of Nipal of the note whereof you enclosed a copy in your letter of the 8th instant.

That note so presented to the Rajah of Nipal appears to have been previously submitted to, and approved by, both leading sections of the Nipalese ministry; but it was not submitted to the Governor-general in time to make it possible for his Lordship to express an opinion with respect to it.

You received my letter of the 8th of May on the 16th of May. That letter you were directed to communicate *in extenso** to the minister of Nipal.

You not only abstained from acting upon that instruction, but on the 12th instant you presented a note of a very different tenor, yet purporting to be presented by the Governor-general's commands.

The tenor of the note you actually presented was such as to precipitate the crisis the Governor-general was desirous to avoid, by representing the conduct of the Rajah, in what you term the deforcement of the Residency, to have been rash and unjustifiable, and by requiring an apology from his highness previous to the admission to his Lordship's presence of the envoy from Nipal, who is already at Allahabad.

The obvious object of the letter you were directed to deliver was, by affording the opportunity of mutual explanation, to postpone the period of coming to a hostile decision, should such eventually be necessary; while, in the meantime, the dignity of the Government was preserved.

The step you have taken is not only in direct disobedience of the instructions you received, but it may tend to produce

* N. B. Said letter was an undisguised attack on Lord A.'s policy, and had it been delivered to the Rajah, as required, that very crisis would have been precipitated which Lord E. accuses *me* of risking.

That my note caused no evil, but much good, the result soon left beyond cavil; that Lord E.'s note, if delivered, would have brought on the very uproar he sought to avoid, I am as certain as that I live, and therefore I would not deliver it. Whether I, who had spent twenty years in Nepal, or Lord E., who was utterly ignorant of it, were the more likely person to divine the probable effect of a given measure on the temper and proceedings of the Durbar, let men of experience judge and say.

Lord E. allows that he was *afraid* to ask for an apology: I knew better; I sounded, and found I might safely ask for and have it, the Court having got over and become ashamed of its violence of *the moment*. And that the apology was needful for our credit and influence I had also ascertained and assured myself.

the most serious embarrassment to the Government, by compelling it to adopt an extreme course with respect to the Rajah of Nipal at a time when it is certainly not desirable to create a division of the British, and to impose new burdens on the finances.

But, even if the step you have adopted should be followed by the tender on the part of the Rajah of the apology which has been demanded from his highness for the alleged deforcement of the Residency, the Governor-general would not regard your conduct as free from blame.*

The Governor-general does not think that he should perform his duty to the Government, were he to continue in high diplomatic situation, as his own personal representative, an officer upon whose obedience to his instructions he feels it to be impossible hereafter to depend. Those instructions have been departed from in a matter affecting the question of peace or war with a considerable state at a period of peculiar difficulty in the affairs of India; and the Governor-General cannot consent to be responsible for measures which he does not wholly guide.

I am directed, therefore, to inform you, that you will be relieved in your situation of Resident at the court of Nipal at the earliest period at which the season, and the exigencies of the public service, may permit such relief to take place.

It will be effected in the manner least inconvenient to you; and I am instructed to inform you, that the Governor-general, while he considers that no other course is open to him than that which has now been intimated to you, sees no

* In fact, I *was* speedily and completely successful in the measures I took: but here I am told that success shall be no test of right judgment, just as priorly I am told that the experience of half of my life spent in Nepal is of no use in forecasting probabilities, and so deciding prospectively on the effect of a given line of procedure! Lord E. is a heaven-born genius, and knows intuitively the effect of all or any measures on the temper of all or any Indian people or durbar. Was I, who had been twenty years in Nepal, and knew that Lord E.'s orders would produce the very evil he imputes to me, nevertheless to carry out these suicidal orders? In fact, I succeeded; and, in all human probability, my immense local experience must insure that success!! Was I to let Lord E. blindly create the war he imputes to me? or was I to adhere to the substance, while evading the form, of his commands?

reason to suppose that you were actuated in what you have done otherwise than by zeal for the success of your mission.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

T. H. MADDOCK,
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General.

Allahabad, 21st June, 1842.

N. B. This is in the Secretary's own handwriting. Lord E. never told his council of this act of summary ejection of a servant of twenty-five years' standing.

No. VI.

RESIDENT'S DEFENCE AND EXPLANATION IN COMPLEMENT OF DESPATCH OF 22D INST., AND IN ANSWER TO THAT OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF 21ST INST.*

[No. 31 of 1842.

The Resident Nepal to T. H. Maddock, Esq. Secretary Government of India with the Governor-General.

(SECRET DEPARTMENT.)

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 21st instant, conveying to me the expression

* N.B. This despatch has been withdrawn with that it answered, and even the council-chamber have never seen either. When the Governor-general's despatch was privately offered to be withdrawn, I said I had rather it and this answer remained on record, if either did.

N.B. Lord E., by his private letter of 26th July, and public one of 8th August (see them), afterwards revoked his recall of me, and made me the *amende honorable* for his violent and useless attack. Nevertheless he recurred to the grudge a year after, and had the coolness to assume that I had been wrong and he right in this *fracas.*

of the Governor-general's extreme disapproval in relation to his Lordship's instructions of the 8th May. His Lordship equally censures the non-delivery of your letter to me of that date to the minister, and the delivery to him instead thereof of the note which was forwarded to you on the 9th instant, observing that the former procedure was obviously intended to evade or defer that crisis, which the latter procedure was calculated to elicit; and remarking further, that such a note as that delivered by me ought to have had the prior sanction of the Governor-general, in as much as the issue of war or peace depended upon it.

2. It is with the profoundest regret, that I find myself thus exposed to the censures of the Governor-general, at the conclusion of a long period of service and indirect connexion, and sequel of a protracted series of negotiations with this government, every material step of which had been crowned with success and applause,* though not without such occasional *ad interim* doubts and disapprovals, on the part of my own government, as are, I suppose, nearly inseparable from the actual course of intricate and difficult political transactions, and into an instance of which merely, I would fain hope, that the larger explanations relative to, and proven success of, my late proceedings now before Lord Ellenborough,† may convert his Lordship's severe censures, censures which else must precede me to Europe, to blight the fruits of my official life.

3. I have now laid before his Lordship (22d instant) the general grounds both of reason and of authority, upon which the whole of my proceedings up to this hour have been systematically and connectedly governed; and whilst I regret extremely, that that statement could not be sooner sent in, cannot but hope that a due consideration of it will convince the Governor-general, that the strong presumption I acted under, in temporarily deferring, and afterwards modifying, his Lordship's instructions in my execution of them, had more than common excuse; since, until the receipt on the

* See App. No. 1.

† Desp. of 22d and 23d inst.

18th instant, of your despatch of the 5th instant, announcing to me the fact, I could have no idea that the policy prescribed to my observance, for two years previously, had ceased to be highly valued.

4. I believed that the literal execution of your orders of the 8th ult. threatened immediately and suddenly to destroy the whole fabric of that policy; perhaps also to bury in its ruins numerous distinguished chiefs, whose pledges of co-operation had been as solemnly tendered to, as accepted by my government,* and the services of the principal of whom in the capacity of ministers of this state, had just received the highest applause† from the Governor-general in Council; and lastly, to propitiate that very crisis which Lord Ellenborough sought to avoid, as well as to strip us of all the means to meet it when it came.

5. I believed, moreover, that these far-reaching effects enveloped, as to their sources and quality in the transactions of the four years just passed, could scarcely have been at all present to the mind of the Governor-general, by reason of his Lordship's so recent arrival, when the instructions in question were issued; and that it was my duty therefore, to pause and explain them,‡ carefully in the meantime studying to ward off all risk of crisis during his Lordship's deliberation, and endeavouring, if possible, to accomplish the end and object of his orders, so that it might be done in sure exemption from that risk.§

6. Whilst intent upon the realisation of these essential points, I considered myself as virtually accomplishing my instructions; and, as your first *peremptory* orders to obey according to the letter bearing date the 12th instant, and only reached me on the 19th, when I had nearly completed the affair with success.‖ I must yet hope and trust that the

* App. Nos. 2 and 3, for tender and acceptance.
† App. No. 4, being letter of Governor-general to Rajah.
‡ Demi-officials of 16th and 17th of May, and official of 22d inst.
§ Desp. demi-official, dated 19th inst.
‖ Desp. of 23d inst. for the close, and those of 9th and 12th for beginning. Your letter of the 3d, received on the 12th, also reverts to primary order, but scarcely peremptorily; and you are aware that before its receipt I had delivered my note to premier.

absence of every thing peremptory in the tenor of my first instructions, and the too late arrival of the second instructions, together with the caution and the success of my own proceedings, will serve to convince the Governor-general that I am utterly incapable of deliberate culpable disobedience, or of contravening the dictates of that high discretion which must teach every diplomatic functionary of my experience, that the issues of war and peace appertain absolutely and exclusively to his superiors.

7. It was not till by repeated soundings, I had ascertained failure to be out of the question, that I determined to demand satisfaction for the deforcement of the Residency. Peace might thus be honourably secured: war, the Governor-general had declared against; and the interval that had elapsed without bringing me positive instructions seemed to warrant the conclusion, that if success crowned a judicious exercise of discretionary power, it would not want the pardon of the Governor-general.

8. The affectionate zeal with which I have executed my instructions in the past will, I trust, satisfy the Governor-general on reconsideration that I must be equally obedient for the future; and this, whether it suits his Lordship's views that I should give some scope to discretion according to the spirit of the policy prescribed to me, or I should confine myself to the letter of my instructions.

9. The stigma of culpable disobedience in violation of that discrimination and practical prudence, demanded alike from my services and station, I trust, may at all events, be removed, so that the credit I have painfully earned in the past three years may remain with me untarnished. Wherefore it is my humble prayer, that the Right Honourable the Governor-general will be graciously pleased to reconsider an order, which in regard to me especially, whose whole service has been here, cannot but infer singular discredit; and such discredit as can be effectually neutralised solely by the generosity of his Lordship, whose ultimate fiat I may not hope, and do not desire to question.

10. Some months must elapse ere it will be possible for me to obey his Lordship's summons to his presence; and if

his Lordship will now be pleased, with reference to my despatch of the 22d instant, to define the course I am to pursue, whether of temporisation simply, or of temporisation mixed with preparedness for rupture, if it may not be avoided, or of ameliorative exertion of any kind, or of letting events as they concern exclusively British interests take their course, whilst the party coalition heretofore employed as a means to support those interests is gradually abandoned. I think I can confidently assure the Governor-general, that whatever the highest zeal and local knowledge may hope to achieve, shall be effected to his Lordship's satisfaction.

I have, &c.

B. H. HODGSON, Res.

Nepal Residency, June 30, 1842.

N.B. The Governor-general has virtually recalled his recall and censures, by private letters of 22d June, through Mr. Secretary Maddock, and by another under his own hand of 26th July. For the rest, the Council and the Home Government must take care of my name and of the interests of Government; for Lord E., I suspect, will not eat his own words, and submission is my duty, though he withheld official recantation.

August 4, 1842. (Signed) B. H.

N.B. continued. Lord E., soon after this endorsement was penned, officially revoked his decretum, and left all "to my discretion"—a rare and signal triumph for me!

September 1, 1842.

APPENDIX No 1, OF NEPAL DESPATCH,

Of June 30th, 1842.

[Testimonials, inferring all along that Resident acted with Government sanction throughout.]

Extract of Despatch from Government of India to Resident, dated October 26th, 1840.

Par. 9.—"The Governor-general in Council, in reviewing these transactions, has to thank you for the marked ability, firmness, and judgment, with which you have met a long course of

adverse and evasive negotiation on the part of the Nepalese government, and he begs you to accept the expression of his cordial acknowledgment and approbation of your services on this occasion."

Extract of Letter, dated October 26th, 1840, from Lieut. Torrens, Secretary to Government of India.

"Lord Auckland said, whilst sanctioning the cautionary force on your frontier, that it was due to you to send it, meaning that you had shewn yourself so right on all your judgments appertaining to Nepal policy, that your recommendations ought to meet with attention on personal as well as political grounds."

Extract of Despatch of Secretary to Government India, to address of Resident, dated January 25th, 1841.

2. "The Governor-general, I have honour to inform you, has been pleased to express his entire approval of your proceedings, during the anxious period of these (second) negotiations,* by which it may be hoped you have effected, if not all that could be desired, yet much that is most valuable, whether for the permanent preservation of peace between the British Government and that of Nepal, or for increasing the facilities of compelling, in case of necessity, the court of Cathmandoo to submit to the just demands of the Governor-General in Council."

Extract of Despatch from Secret Committee of Honourable Court of Directors to the Governor-General in Council, dated January 29th, 1841 (relative to first negotiation).

Par. 7.—"We entirely concur in the praises you have bestowed on Mr. Hodgson."

Extract of Letter from Mr. Secretary Maddock to Resident, dated August 12th, 1841.

"Lord Auckland, in a note just come from him, says, 'Mr. Hodgson has done extremely well again (third negotiation),† and I would not interfere with him by any peremptory instructions, but leave him to follow his own sound judgment. He is quite right in assuming that I am not desirous of war with Nepal.'"

* Viz. for a change of ministry.—B. H. H.

† Viz. for maintaining the new ministry in power.—B. H. H.

Extract of Letter from Private Secretary to Governor-General to address of Resident, dated September 17th, 1841.

"The satisfactory aspect which under your consistent and well-informed management our relations with Nepal are now beginning to assume, renders the purport of my present inquiry one chiefly of speculation; but it is right you should have an opportunity of offering your remarks on an opinion vitally affecting the whole course of our *permanent* policy towards Nepal, and I therefore now send an extract from a confidential letter of the late Chair of the Directors to Lord Auckland. A memoir of your sentiments on the comparative advantages of retaining Nepal (after subjection) as a state virtually dependent, or of assuming the entire government of the territory, will be very acceptable to Lord Auckland."

Extract of a Letter from Lord Auckland to Mr. Hodgson, dated Calcutta, November 14th, 1841.

"I have received your letter of the 4th, and congratulate you upon the honourable results of your well-directed and most persevering labours; but no question of policy is ever terminated in this world, and you may yet have difficulties to deal with, and a nice course to steer amid the wayward tempers by which you are surrounded.

"With regard to the force at Segowlee, if it can be withdrawn without disadvantage, and still more if it can be withdrawn as an act of grace and reconciliation,* I should not hesitate to bring it back to its cantonments. The time and manner must rest with you after you have seen the premier."†

* *Note.* It was so withdrawn eventually, but with extreme hesitation, in the middle of February. See Resident's Despatch of 17th February, 1842—a document full of meaning at present.—B. H. H.

† *Note.* Such references to the position and opinions of the ministry occur throughout my instructions; as, for instance, Government Despatch of 15th February, 1841, par. 5, where the Governor-general declares he will not withdraw the force, "lest it might place in peril the chiefs who have been willing to come forward in support of the British alliance, and be injurious thereby to our character and interests." See also Government Despatch to Resident, do. 22d December, 1841: "If the premier have consolidated his power, and can thus answer for the conduct of the Durbar," the force might be removed.—B. H. H.

Extract of a Letter of 12th December, 1841, from Lord Auckland to Mr. Hodgson.

"I congratulate you heartily upon the results of your diplomatic labours, and will for a time act upon the course laid down in your despatch, assuming that those with whom you have to deal have virtues, though they have them not; we may thus possibly in the end produce a good state of relations between the two states."

Extract of Despatch from Government to Resident, dated December 22d, 1841.

"2. His Lordship would leave to your discretion and final decision the immediate refusal or otherwise of the force now stationed on the frontier, and his Lordship agrees with you, that, if it be not expedient to withdraw the whole force, it would answer no useful purpose to diminish it.

"3. In conclusion I am desired to convey to you the high approbation of Government of the great ability, judgment, and perseverance, which you have manifested in your late tedious and difficult negotiations (third series) with the Court."

Extract of a Letter from Lord Auckland, dated February 24th, 1842.

"I congratulate you upon the good terms upon which you have so ably and well accomplished our wish that you should place yourself with the Rajah of Nepaul. Once more I congratulate you on the successful results of your negotiations, and am, &c.

"AUCKLAND."

Extract of Letter from Lieut.-Governor of Agra, dated February 24th, 1842.

"If you can continue with the same success as heretofore to divert the Durbar from war, you will indeed have accomplished a most important diversion in our favour."

Extract of Despatch of Mr. Secretary Maddock, dated February 28th, 1842.

"The Governor-general in Council has perused with much satisfaction your despatch of the 17th instant, relative to the with-

holding his Lordship's letter to the Rajah of Nepal,* and he directs me to inform you that your explanation for your conduct on that occasion is sufficient, and that the issue of your late proceedings has been so successful as to prove that you have acted throughout these transactions (all three negotiations) with a thorough knowledge of the native character, and with a degree of skill, prudence, and forbearance, that is highly creditable to you. His Lordship in Council begs to congratulate you on the favourable termination of your late struggle."

Extract of a Letter from Lord Auckland to Mr. Hodgson, dated March 7th, 1842.

"I write these few hasty lines to you to take leave of you, and to wish you such good health as may enable you to complete your labours at Cathmandoo, and afterwards to enjoy many years of comfort in England. It is most satisfactory to me, on the eve of my departure from India, and where there is so much gloom and danger in one portion of our political horizon, that the prospects with regard to Nepal are better and more promising * than they have long been. Once more I thank you for all you have done for us, and I wish you well."

(True Extracts.)

B. H. HODGSON, Resident.

* *Note.* Dated 22d December, but not delivered nor the force withdrawn till middle of February. See Despatch of 17th February, 1842, to which this is the answer.—B. H. H.

* The reserve, with which alone this could be admitted—with reference to Government's own judgment of the Rajah's character (Despatch of 26th October, 1840, 22d December, 1841, and 15th February, 1841) —was immediately pointed out to Lord Auckland. The importance of a right understanding on this point induces me here to transcribe part of par. 2 of the latter despatch:—"The fickleness and insincerity of that prince's character, and the hostile influence by which his public conduct towards this Government has long been swayed, forbid the supposition that his late professions are the result of conviction, or his late concessions a proof of good-will. They have evidently been extorted from his fears, and the Governor-general regrets he can see no sufficient grounds for relying on them." The fact is, that the rajah's name is the symbol for which the war and peace parties contend. Himself, as unstable as water, can in no respect be relied on by friend or foe, though his inclinations lie with his pandering flatterers of the war party.—B. H. H.

APPENDIX No. II. OF NEPAL DESPATCH.

* June, 30th 1842.

Being three Appendices of a despatch of 4th January, 1841.

APPENDIX No. 1 OF DESPATCH.

Of 4th January, 1841.

[Tender of Coalition by the Chiefs, with Rajah's assent.]

Translation of a Yaddasht from the Maha Rajah of Nepal, to the address of the Resident, dated Saturday 9th, Poos Soodi Sumbut, 1817, *or Saturday, 2d January,* 1841.

The Governor-General, Lord Auckland, has written, stating that it was necessary and proper to dismiss from office the individuals who had disturbed the friendly feeling existing between the British and Nepaul Governments, and to appoint in their places others who had the good of the two Sirkars at heart, and that until the individuals who had so behaved had been dismissed, there could be no real friendship on the part of my government.

According, therefore, to the note received from you, I have inquired into the matter, and have decided upon dismissing those persons who have disturbed the good understanding existing between the two governments, according to the subjoined list. In their places I have selected and appointed Futeh Gang Chountra, as my prime minister, associating with him the Goorroo and chiefs, whose names are written below to assist him in executing his various duties. I have made the above-mentioned changes in order that the friendship of the two Sirkars may continue as formerly, and whatever the prime minister and his colleagues now appointed may see fit to do in order to strengthen the bonds of real friendship between the two Sirkars, will meet with my approval. There will be no change made by me in the above appointments, unless the persons holding them shall commit any great crime. I have made and confirmed the above-mentioned arrangements, and they shall always remain so.

Individuals appointed.	*Individuals discharged.*
Chountra Futeh Jang.	Gooroo Krishnaram Misr.
Gooroo Rungnath Pundit.	Chountra Koolchunder Sah.
Gooroo Krishen Pundit.	Kaji Karbir Pandey.
Chountra Pushker Sah.	Kuperdar Koolraj Pande.
Chountralooroo Persad Sah.	Captain Runbum Thapa.
Kaji Dulbhunjun Pandey.	Captan Indrabeer Sahi.
Kaji Kaloo Sahi.	Koomedan Umer Sahi.

N.B. The right-hand men, or *my* ministry, whom Lord E. stigmatised as pusillanimous imbeciles, in December, 1842, and two months after my alliance with them had *ceased*, compelled Lord E., by their public measures on a most weighty occasion, to award them the highest praise! Again, the left-hand men, or Kala Pandey faction, thus ejected by me in 1841, with the aid of the chiefs, in September 1843 (when the cycle of events at home and abroad had found its natural completion), perished on the scaffold, by the just judgment of the Durbar upon their manifold offences, though I had long ceased to oppose, and would fain have saved them. Their fall was the exclusive act of the Durbar, when the Rajah's eyes had been opened to all their iniquities, and two years after I had been disconnected with the new ministry. This, I trust, is pretty good proof that the after course of events entirely confirmed my opinions of men and things, as formed at the moment.

APPENDIX, No. 2.

January 4th, 1841.

[Chiefs pledge themselves to the British Government.]

Translation of an Ikhrar Nameh, signed by the Gooroos, Chountras, Chiefs, &c. &c., of Nepal, dated Saturday, Poos Soodi, 9th, 1897, *or 2d January*, 1841.

We the undersigned Gooroos, Chountras, agree to uphold the sentiments as written below, viz:—

That it is most desirable and proper, that a firm and steady friendship should exist, and be daily increased, between the British and Nepal Governments. That to this end, every means should be taken to increase the friendly relations with the company, and the welfare of the Nepaul Government. That the Resident should ever, and always be, treated in an honourable and friendly manner; that if, nevertheless, any unforeseen circumstance, or unjust or senseless proceeding should at any time arise to shake the friendly understanding which ought to exist between the two Sirkars, or to cause uproar and mischief at Cathmandoo, we should be responsible for it.

Names of Chiefs.

Gooroo Rungnath Pundit.
Gooroo Krishen Pundit.
Chountra Beerbind Prakram Sah.
do. Pushker Sah.
do. Futeh Jang Sah.
do. Gooroo Persad Sah.
Chountra Dutch Sah.
do. Baber Jang Sah.
Káji Gopersad Sah.
do. Dulbhunjun Pandey.
do. Jangheer Pandey.
do. Sungbeer Pandey.

Chountra Runjore Thapa.
do. Jeetman Sing Basniat.
do. Run Deep Sing Basniat.
do. Persad Sing Basniat.
do. Koolman Sing Kooer.
do. Kali Sahi.
do. Abhiman Sing Rana.
do. Nur Sing Thapa.
do. Runyumbeer Thapa.
do. Dulkesur Thapa.
do. Kriteedoje Thapa.
Khazanchee Taranath Urjeal.
Surdar Budribun Sahi.
do. Bulbuderjee.
do. Bulbhunjun Pandey.
do. Dulbahadoor Pandey.
do. Bulkt Sing Basniat.
do. Daraoo Sing Basniat.
do. Runbudr Basniat.
do. Rundoj.
do. Buss Sing.
do. Runjung Karkee.
Captain Beer Budr Kooer.
do. Jugut Bun Pandey.
do. Mohunbeer Sahi.
do. Kuru Sing Booktee.
do. Soorut Sing Thapa.
do. Soorut Sing Punt.
do. Sunman Sing Punt.
do. Deerg Sing Bundari.
do. Surbjeet Bundari.
do. Bukhtwar Bundari.
do. Pulhad Thapa.
do. Aheeburn Basniat.
do. Gungun Sing.
Soobha Luchmidas Punt.
do. Kalidas Punt.
do. Nowal Sing Bookti.
Turghur Bageerut Pandey.
do. Jaedeo Punt.
do. Hurkoo Urjeal.
Turghur Deodut Kunal.
do. Murdun Sing Rana.
do. Hureebuns Bhoora.
Capt. Shumsheer Jang Pandey.
do. Chuker Dooj Pandey.
Khazanchee Oomakant Oopudya
Captain Runbikram Sah.
do. Gunh Perkas Sah.
do. Rung Murdan Sah.
do. Run Seor Sah.
do. Jun Rungum Sahi.
do. Runbeer Sing Basniat.
do. Bukan Sing Basniat.
do. Bulbhadoor Pandey.
do. Meegraj Pandey.
do. Kunuck Sing Pandey.
do. Sutrodbhunjun Sahi.
do. Bowhan Sing Sahi.
do. Bhowanee Bugut Sahi.
do. Gujeraj Karkee.
do. Kirteebeer Karkee.
do. Bubeedooje Undeharee.
do. Jaman Sing Khutree.
do. Ujeer Sing Thapa.
do. Kirteebeer Thapa.
do. Futeh Sing.
do. Indrbeer Khutree.
do. Bhowanee Sing Khutree
do. Gujkesr Khutree.
do. Heemdul Thapa.
do. Bhotoo Sing Basniat.
Soobha Hira Sal Jha.
do. Chuturbhoj Mul.
Ditha Omanath Oopudya.
do. Maya Nath Oopudya.
do. Ram Nath Oopudya.
do. Soomet Sing Kooer.
do. Kunut Sing Busniat.
Kureedar Kasheenath Oopudya.
Moonshee Luchmi Das.

No. 3. OF DESPATCH.

January 4th, 1841.*

Translation of a Kharita from the Rajah of Nepaul, to the Right Honourable the Governor-General, dated 25th Poos, 1897.

After compliments,—Your Lordship's three letters of dates 7th of August, 26th October, and 2d November, have been duly forwarded to me by the Resident, Mr. Hodgson, the receipt of which has afforded me great satisfaction and pleasure, and what your Lordship, from a friendly feeling, has written in each letter concerning the expediency and propriety of upholding and increasing the friendly relation between the two governments, has been thoroughly understood and appreciated by me.

Although misunderstandings have arisen of late, between the the two Sirkars, owing to the bad advice given me by my late councillors, so much so as to disturb the ancient friendship of the two States, yet your Lordship in your letters has now kindly shewed me, how that ancient friendship may be again reinstated,* and the welfare of my country preserved.

I beg to inform your Lordship, that I take great shame to myself for the various misunderstandings which have taken place, owing to the wicked advice of my late councillors, and that I am determined to take measures for the prevention of such a state of things in future. I therefore, hope and trust, that your Lordship will kindly pardon and overlook the past.

According to your Lordship's advice, I have dismissed from office the several individuals who tried to make mischief between the two States, and have selected and appointed Chountra Futeh Jangsah, an individual of high rank and consideration, as my prime minister, in order that he may clear up all unfriendly feeling between the two Sirkars. I have also, associated with him other prudent and wise councillors, the names of whom, as well as my answer to the Yaddasht, sent to me by the Resident, according to your Lordship's desire, have been transmitted to the Resident, by whom they will be forwarded to your Lordship; I therefore hope, being as you are aware, an old friend of the British Government, and the descendant of Raja Prithee Narrain, who first sowed the seeds of friendship with the Company, that

* Viz. by a change of ministry.—B. H. H.

your Lordship will kindly overlook the late unlucky misunderstandings, foolishly allowed by me, and that you will wash the recollection of them accordingly from your mind, so that in future the friendship of the two governments may daily increase and my honour remain.

Your Lordship may, also, be assured, that I will in future be most happy to attend to any thing the Resident may propose tending to the good of the two governments; I, also, hope and trust, that your Lordship will often write, informing of your welfare, the honour of which will always make me happy.

(True Translations.)

(Signed) R. CHRISTIE,
Officiating Assistant.

(True Copies. B. H. HODGSON.)

APPENDIX 3. OF NEPAL DESPATCH,.

June 30th, 1842.

[Government Acceptance of Tender of Chiefs. (See also the letter to Rajah of Governor-general, App. 4. par. 2.)]

To B. H. Hodgson, Esq., Resident in Nepal.

(SECRET DEPARTMENT.)

Sir;—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, dated the 4th instant, in which you have submitted a detailed statement of your recent proceedings in your negotiation with the Nepaul Durbar, with translations of a note from the Rajah, that may be considered as a concession of the demands preferred by you, of an agreement entered into by several influential chiefs, and other individuals to maintain the alliance between the two governments, and of a letter from the Rajah of Nepal, to the Governor-general, apologising for past misconduct, and begging that it may be forgiven.

2. The Governor-general in Council, I have the honour to inform you, has been pleased to express his entire approval of your proceedings, during the anxious period of these negotiations,* by which it may be hoped, that you have effected, if not all that could

* Viz. for a change of ministry.—B. H. H.

be desired, yet much that is most valuable, whether for the permanent preservation of peace between the British Government, and that of Nipal, or for increasing the facilities of compelling, in case of necessity, the Court of Cathmandoo, to submit to the just demands of the Governor-general in Council.

3. The Governor-general would have been prepared, but for the recommendation which you have offered to reply to the letter, which has been addressed to him by the Rajah in cautious terms of acceptance of his apology, and of his professions of a desire to pursue a different course in future, in so far only as these verbal declarations may be borne out by the actions of the Rajah. But you have omitted to transmit with your despatch the Rajah's letter, and you are now requested to forward it with any remarks that may occur to you, as to the time and terms in which it may best be replied to.

I have, &c. &c.

(Signed) T. H. MADDOCK,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Fort William,
25th January, 1841.

(True Copy. B. H. Hodgson, Resident.)

APPENDIX 4. OF NEPAL DESPATCH,

June 30th, 1842.

[No. 1893.

Part I.

[Government makes removal of frontier force dependent on position and opinions of new ministry, and expresses total distrust of Rajah.]

To B. H. Hodgson, Esq. Resident at Nepaul.

(Secret Department.)

Sir,—Your despatch of the 30th ultimo has now been for some time under the consideration of the Governor-general in Council. Since its receipt, circumstances have occurred beyond the north-west frontier of India which were calculated to make Government pause ere it proceeded to carry into effect the measure which you now recommend, of the entire withdrawal of the brigade which has been for some time stationed on the Nepal frontier.

It is satisfactory, however, to his Lordship in council to perceive, that since the date when intelligence must have reached

Catmandoo of the difficulties with which our troops were environed at Cabul and other points in Affghanistan, no reports have been received from you to indicate that the Rajah will swerve from his late engagements.

Still, as it would be vain for the British Government, after the repeated instances of intrigue and treachery which have been brought home to the Rajah, to trust implicitly to his professions of penitence for past misconduct, or of better resolutions for the future, it thence becomes a matter for grave consideration whether it may be prudent at once to comply with his request for the withdrawal of Colonel Oliver's brigade. This is a point which his Lordship in council would leave for your deliberation and final decision. In the interval which will have elapsed between the date of your despatch, now acknowledged, and the receipt of this reply, you will, in all probability, have had indications, not to be mistaken, of the effect produced on the councils of the Rajah by the intelligence of late events. It is possible, that ere any resolution has been formed on the news of an unfavourable nature from the north-west, it may have been, in some measure, counteracted by the late intelligence of the continued successes of her Majesty's arms on the coast of China and in the east; and in the event of the present minister having succeeded in consolidating his power and influence, and his still thinking that he can be answerable for the pacific conduct of the Durbar even for the space of a few months, and, more particularly, as you may have distinctly held out expectations to this effect, you are authorised to direct Colonel Oliver to withdraw his force to such stations as may be pointed out to him by the military authorities. In the reply which the Governor-general has written to the Rajah, it has been necessary to make this compliance with his request entirely discretional with you; but this will not, it is hoped, tend in any way to diminishing your influence, or that of the Chountra Futeh Jung Sah; and you are authorised so to qualify your instructions to Colonel Oliver, that his movements from the frontier may be sufficiently slow to admit of his speedy recall should any change of circumstances lead to the necessity of that measure. The Governor-General in council agrees with you in opinion, that if it is not expedient to withdraw the whole of the frontier force, it would not answer any useful purpose merely to diminish it.

3. In conclusion, I am desired to communicate to you the high approbation of Government of the great ability, judgment, and perseverance, which you have manifested in your late tedious and

difficult negotiations with the Court, and his Lordship in Council will be happy to find that the minister is enabled to act with such vigour and determination as may render the principles and policy of his party predominate for the future in the councils of his sovereign.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed) T. H. MADDOCK,
Secretary to the Government
of India.

Fort William,
22d December, 1841.

(True Copy. B. H. Hodgson, Resident.)

APPENDIX No. 4, NEPAL DESPATCH.

June 30th, 1842.

Part II.

[Special praise of new Ministry, and mark of confidence, conferred by Governor-general.]

From the Right Honourable the General-Governor of India to his Highness the Rajah of Nepal, dated December 22d, 1841 (*not delivered till February 10th,* 1842).

After compliments. It is a source of sincere satisfaction to me to find by your Highness' last letter, that you have admitted to your confidence, and intrusted with the administration of the affairs of your kingdom, the estimable and distinguished minister Chountra Futeh Jung Sah, and his able coadjutors Rugunath Punditjee, Kishna Ram Punditjee, the Chountra Guru, Pursh and Kajee, Dulbunjun Pandee, and Kajee Kaloo Sahi, for I regard this as an assurance that the ancient cordial union between the two states will now be renewed, and that I shall have the gratification of again numbering your Highness among the trusty and faithful friends of the British Government.

Circumstances of an unpleasant nature, which it would pain me now to recall to your recollection, had compelled me to make a commencement of such military arrangements on the Tirhoot frontier as were called for by considerations of the dignity of this Government; these, I understand, have caused uneasiness to your

Highness, and I learn from my resident at your court, that your responsible adviser, Chountra Futeh Jung Sah, has advised and urged that a request should be preferred to me for the removal of the frontier brigade, and this request has been earnestly seconded by Mr. Hodgson; and, as a proof of my restored confidence in your Highness, and as a mark of my respect for the wisdom and other good qualities of your minister, and out of consideration to the personal friendship existing between the Resident and your Highness, I am disposed to attend to this application, and I have, accordingly, empowered Mr. Hodgson to select the fitting time for obliging your Highness in this respect, and the commanding officer at Segoulie has been directed to obey his instruction.

I accept with perfect cordiality your Highness's request for the restoration of our former amicable relations, and I am ready to return with joy and pleasure to the observance of all those reciprocal courtesies which mark the good feeling existing between neighbouring states, and tend to strengthen and improve their friendly union. With this view it is my intention to ask your acceptance of some presents as tokens of my regard, which will be submitted to your Highness by my Resident, and you will permit me, as a mark of my friendship to your Highness, to confer also a suitable token of my regard on your esteemed minister Futteh Jung Sah.* And for the future I hope most sincerely that the connexion between the two states may be one only of mutual good offices, calculated to improve the prosperity of each, and to exhibit to the world an union of interests based upon friendship, which knows no separation, and will admit of no decay.

(Signed) AUCKLAND.

(True Translation.)

(Signed) T. H. Maddock,
Secretary to the Government
of India.

In Despatch of 22d December, 1841.

(True Copy. B. H. Hodgson, Resident.)

* N.B. Owing to accidents, these presents for the premier, marking the Governor-general's special confidence and approval of him, had actually not been delivered, and were still in my hands, when Lord E., upon the grounds of one single transaction, the bearings of which he would not give himself a moment to examine or understand (he *himself* answered *at sight* a despatch of fifty pars., though just come out away

No. VII.

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD ELLENBOROUGH CONSEQUENT ON THE DURBAR'S DESIRE TO PREVENT MY DEPARTURE.*

Nepal, July 17th, 1843.

My Lord,—I have the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's letter of the 30th ult. from Chunar, and hasten to assure your Lordship that the idea of placing myself under any obligation to the sovereign, minister, or chiefs of Nepal, is as repugnant to my own sense of right and expediency as to those of your Lordship. But, my Lord, the Durbar's proposition, in all reason, must surely be understood to imply, not a favour conferred on me, but a favour conferred by me. The Durbar, wholly unaware of the peculiar grounds of my wish to remain another year, or of the wish itself, must needs take for granted the sincerity of my declaration of a desire to retire and go home, founded on my long absence therefrom, and on my feeble and broken

from council, and rejecting his secretary's opinion), denounced this very minister for an imbecile coward, and ordered me instantly to abandon him, in breach of the solemn compact above given, and at a time (May, 1842) when to have done so would have been as ruinously impolitic as it was grossly dishonourable. The minister and his compeers had been our sole stay for peace ever since the crisis of 1837–42 commenced: out of and in office, they, and the great body of nobles united with them, had successfully backed me in opposition to the vain young rajah and his war faction, whom they had compelled to recognise the solemn compact adverted to. Who that knows the loyalty of the Gorkhas can doubt that that single important act (ninety-two chiefs pledging themselves openly to the British Government) proves their political influence and moral courage to be high and indisputable? But all this and every thing done for three busy years was waste paper to Lord E., who, with a single insulated trifle before him whereby to judge, condemned the men and the policy *in toto;* and but for my resistance, the noble friends whose faith had been so solemnly accepted and so severely proved would have been given up to the tender mercies of the incarnate fiends who perpetrated the Bhim Seu tragedy! and the war faction would at once have seized the helm of affairs! Yet it was *I* whose obstinacy threatened to precipitate a rupture with Nepal, and was disposed blindly to quarrel for a Bania's sake!!!

* When Lord E. in a passion ejected me, in 1842, he pretended that I must be unpopular as the agent of Lord A.'s interfering policy; yet when the Durbar comes forward to express the highest esteem for me, Lord E. will not hear them, and again gets in a passion, and ejects me!!!

state of health, which last is too apparent to admit of doubt. Home is dear to the highlanders themselves, and why not to me? Health is dear to every one, and why not to me? This is all the Durbar has to judge by, and surely the Durbar must feel that he who incurs the peril of irrecoverable infirmity of health and defers the pleasure of returning to his own friends and country merely to gratify their wishes is their creditor, not their debtor, and would always be entitled to say to them, in case of future misconduct, "Now you are forfeiting the implied promise under which I agreed to stay among you." There is little in the situation of Resident of Cathmandu that can seem to the Rajah, the minister, or the chiefs, any longer desirable in my eyes now that I am known to be able to go home, while no one knows better, than the Durbar the great extent of the vexations it has caused me to endure, or the small extent of pleasures it has suffered me to enjoy for years past. Let the Durbar's conceit, therefore, be what it will, the Durbar can hardly suppose me other than a willing departer; and if, after its very long experience of my services and character, it be really anxious to stay me awhile, or to proclaim its sense of my general conduct, the circumstance would seem to be at least as creditable to the Durbar as to me—to be as much the concern of my government as of myself. Let your Lordship consider the extent of official opposition to the whole external policy of Nepal made by me under the express instructions of the Governor-general in Council between 1837 and 1841, and your Lordship will, I think, perceive in the Durbar's present motion something like a practical solution of the important question, How far can the exact discharge of the most stringent diplomatic duties be reconciled with the preservation of the kindliest feelings on the part of a proud and independent nation? And does it not likewise appear to your Lordship that the Durbar in soliciting your Lordship to let me remain is really offering to your Lordship sureties for its future good behavour? Your Lordship, however, appears to desire that no such manifestation of the Durbar's esteem should have place. I will do what I can to prevent it, and have already once evaded

and once declined the Kharitah. I may, however, be yet obliged to give way to the compliment; but your Lordship can easily answer it by referring to the state of my health and consequent necessity of returning to Europe. Your Lordship may, in all events, be well assured that I could only be induced really to prolong my stay (whatever my reception of compliments and kindness) by discerning some small prospect of utility to arise out of the good-will and confidence of both governments honourably and kindly expressed to me.

That the Durbar is prepared so to express itself with unequivocal tokens of sincerity, of which your Lordship would to the last be the judge, I incline to believe. That your Lordship is not disposed to sanction the Durbar's movement I shall not soon cease to regret, having remained over the passing year chiefly in the hope of conquering your Lordship's esteem and confidence, as I told your Lordship this time last year.

If your Lordship had not expressly commanded me to signify beforehand to the Durbar my intention of retirement all discussion would have been prevented by the plan of silence till the time of my departure came. As it is, though the kindliness I am experiencing be grateful to me, it may look very ungracious at last to reject it, if earnestly and honourably adhered to. My plea, however, of ill health is likely to prove all-sufficient, and, at all events, and whatever course the Durbar may take in regard to your Lordship, your Lordship may be satisfied that my own honour, and that of my country, so far as intrusted to me, will remain in my hands unimpeachable and unimpeached. I might consent, with your Lordship's leave, to confer an obligation on the Durbar, but I am incapable of subjecting myself to the reality or semblance of obligation received from it, or from any of its chiefs.

B. H. Hodgson, *Esq. Resident, &c. &c.*

Nepal, July 24, 1843.

My Lord,—Yesterday evening I waited on the Maha-Raja at his repeated request, attended by Messrs. Smith and

Christie. His Highness received me in a fuller durbar of distinguished men than I have seen collected these five years, and he spoke to me with such extreme and genuine kindness that I confess myself to have been moved. The chiefs of all parties seconded his Highness, and altogether the scene was most remarkable, as both the gents who were with me can testify. The Maha-Raja, reverting to the two visits already made to the Residence, pressed me to remain by every argument and consideration that good taste and kindness could suggest. I told him that my health was broken and strength decayed, and desired him to look at me for the proof of it. I urged that the principles and proceedings of my government were well known to be so steady that no change of functionaries could affect the Resident's conduct, and that my successor would certainly be a considerate and conciliatory person, the Governor-general being entirely desirous of peace and friendship with Nepal. His Highness responded that he was aware of the steadiness of the Company's maxims of government, nor doubted the Governor-general's good feeling, but asked me what could compensate to him for so familiar and severely tried a friend whom he had known since his childhood? I urged, at last, my apprehension lest some *contretems* should convert the compliment into a stigma, and his Highness emphatically declared that he took upon himself to say that nothing of the kind should occur. "Neither wrong nor affront shall come near your government," said his Highness, and his allegation met with a murmur of applause. Still I adhered steadily to the declaration that I had neither hope in my heart nor strength in my limbs, and said that, though I should never forget the events of this meeting, in which his Highness's flattering graciousness was so handsomely sustained by the presence of the nobles and gentlemen of the land, yet that I must, and did again and again entreat his Highness to desist from his requisition relative to the forwarding of the Kharitah, and to suffer me to keep it as a treasured memento of this day. His Highness would not be so silenced. He said that himself, his son, the queen, the chiefs (as I might see), were all of one mind, and that if I

did not forward the kharitah, he should, nevertheless, send it through another channel, for that he and all were thoroughly in earnest.

The heir-apparent reiterated his father's request more briefly, but courteously, and at length I was suffered to depart, as much affected as a man of my years and conversancy with Indian courts could be.

Your Lordship will smile at the above narrative. I cannot help it, for the kind words and looks of that immense room-full of gallant chiefs of all parties and opinions—some of whom not even the recent royal wedding could bring together—demand at least this record of my gratitude. Other and official record I do not purpose to make of it till I have heard from your Lordship in reply to this. I am absolutely at your Lordship's disposal; but I cannot well eventually avoid forwarding the kharitah, and am afraid (if I can read Parbattiah faces) that, were I even to do so, your Lordship would hardly so be rid of my kind and honest-hearted mountaineers—and such they *are* in themselves and apart from their detestable politics.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's faithful Servant,

B. H. HODGSON.

The Right Hon. Lord Ellenborough.

Nepal, July 29, 1843.

My Lord,—Yesterday evening the Maha-Rajah came past the Residency on horseback, and sending in to me to join him, took me to the magazine. Not a soul was with him save menials. He said to me that he was sure, from my manner rather than words, at our recent interview, that I had not forwarded his kharitah: I acknowledged it, pleading that the state of my health rendering the thing a compliment merely, I must confess my fear lest the compliment, however prized by me, might be purchased too

dearly, owing to the unsteadiness of the Durbar's course of conduct. His Highness protested, again and again, that I might be at ease on that score; that the Durbar's public conduct should and would square, in future, with his personal expressions of good will; and that, in fine, I must forward the kharitah, or that he certainly would do so himself; I put off the Maha-Rajah as best I could, and am obliged to refrain from repeating the courteous things he said to me. But it seems proper that I should mention to your Lordship the fact of his Highness having shewn so much spirit and independence of action, as well as so much semblable insincerity of good will to me, as this private and direct seeking of me indicates. His Highness was long ago told of my readiness, at all times, to attend to his own summons; but he has had the good sense and taste to seek me in this way, on rare and solemn occasions.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's faithful Servant,

B. H. HODGSON.

The Right Hon. Lord Ellenborough,
&c. &c.

Nepal, August 5, 1843.

My Lord,—I have again waited on the Maha-Rajah, attended by his prime nobles, as I was, by the gentlemen of my suite. His highness was, to all appearance, most earnest in his application; and when, with the hope of checking him, I stated very strongly my apprehension of the instability of the Durbar's proceedings, the Maha-Rajah gave me the most solemn assurances of regret for the past, and of amendment for the future, calling upon his prime chiefs to bear him out, which they did, separately and emphatically.

So far as I can judge, I am convinced that his Highness is not merely sincere in his good-will towards myself, but is anxious to convey to your Lordship an impression of his contrition and purposed reform. What store your Lordship

may be disposed to set by these tokens of the Durbar's improved feeling, I know not; but, certainly, the Durbar has pledged itself very strongly, and your Lordship might, if you pleased, hold it to this pledge in formal terms and writing. For myself, I only wish I could succeed in conveying to your Lordship a right feeling of my anxiety to do precisely and solely that which may best suit with your Lordship's views and purposes in regard to Nepal. Your Lordship has assured me, and authorised me to assure the Durbar, that those views are entirely friendly; and it is my conviction that the Maha-Rajah's earnest wish to reciprocate such feeling is at the bottom of his earnest courtesy towards me personally. He seeks thus, publicly, to disclaim and put away the errors of the past; and the most influential men about him appear eager to share this promising disclaimer. What may come of this sentiment in the way of consistent practical amendment, God knows: I do but state the apparent fact, and am ready and anxious to do whatever your Lordship may desire upon perusal of the information I have lately sent you. There is the utmost disposition on the Durbar's part to comply with your Lordship's wishes; so that, at any time, I shall need but to intimate to the Durbar that usage and expediency probably disincline your Lordship from the acceptance of any such token, however kindly and sincerely intended towards me, in order to get pardon for any little dissimulation I may, meanwhile, use, as to the non-transmission of the kharitah; and send it, I will *not*, without your Lordship's prior sanction.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's faithful Servant,

B. H. HODGSON.

The Right Hon. Lord Ellenborough,
&c. &c.

Nepal, Oct. 1, 1843.

My Lord, — This instant, your secretary's despatch, No. 721, of the 16th ult. reached me, I communicated

Major Laurence's appointment to the Durbar. A mission to your Lordship, headed by the son of the minister, had been contemplated; but I opposed it, and I believe, with success, in like manner, as I had refused to forward the Durbar's application to your Lordship by letter. I likewise had told your Lordship that unless I were expressly reassured of possessing the confidence and good-will of your Lordship, I had no wish or intention to remain longer at Cathmandu. It was not, therefore, necessary to drive me out of Nepal; and I trust your Lordship will be pleased to do me the justice to make it known, in such way as may seem fittest, that the "Calcutta Gazette," of the 16th ult. is not meant to cast any obloquy on me. My Lord, it is a hard thing, at the end of twenty-six years' service, not merely to hear that one has lived in vain, but, worse even than that, to find one's self become a byword, and not to know why! If I have erred, my Lord, I entreat you to let me know wherein; and if I have not erred, I entreat you to protect my character. Since the unfortunate misunderstanding of the spring of last year, I have received from yourself and your secretary handsome testimonials of your esteem and confidence, whilst the conduct of the single affair that has occurred subsequently (the replacing of our relations with Nepal on the old footing), your Lordship has officially recorded your "entire approval." All is now going well here; nor has any *contretems* occurred since the one above adverted to, and which was but the last of a series of acts on the Durbar's part, indicative of the national restlessness and desire to avail itself of the late unparalleled crisis in our affairs. In the Eastern world such indications are apt to be puerile in their outward form and semblance; nor can any degree of diplomatic energy prevent Asiatic princes from sometimes committing themselves during such crisis to incredible follies. Your Lordship was pleased to declare so yourself when you reviewed my explanation of the events of May, 1842; and since then, up to this hour, all has gone well, notwithstanding the extraordinary position and character of the heir apparent of this Guddee. Your Lordship would seem to have conceived umbrage at the

Durbar's manifestation in my favour; but, my Lord, I have surely behaved with perfect propriety in that matter, placing the whole issue in your Lordship's hands, and steadfastly resisting the Durbar's flattering importunities, in regard to which I would entreat your Lordship to pause and consider, for one moment, what the Maha-Rajah himself said: I asked His Highness, when I had been importuned four times to send the kharitah, why, he could deem it worth the while to be so urgent with me? His reply was striking: he answered, "Because, during the past three years, you have several times been treated most unworthily: I ask your forgiveness, and am anxious to prove to you that I ask it sincerely; for, during all our political differences, you never gave me a moment's cause of personal offence." Your Lordship not unnaturally presumed the contrary of all this from appearances sheerly; and if your Lordship will be pleased to revert to the stern directness with which I was officially ordered in June, 1842, to confess MY *aggressions on the Rajah*, your Lordship, I am sure, is too magnanimous not to recognise the painful self-control neccessarily attendant on my recent steady refusal of the kharitah. (This kharitah was like a godsend to vindicate my innocence: yet, prizing it above all things, I put it away.) I appeal confidently to your Lordship's sense of justice, and am,

MY LORD,

Your obedient Servant,

B. H. HODGSON.

To LORD ELLENBOROUGH,
&c. &c.

Nepal, Oct. 5, 1843.

MY LORD,—A kharitah, disguised as a parcel, has been transmitted, through the Residency duk, to its vakeel at Calcutta, by the Durbar. A mission, to be headed by the son of the late Dhim Sen, or by Kasi Jang Bahadar, was lately resolved on; but I having been consulted, and having opposed it, the Durbar has desisted from referring to me, and determined to reach your Lordship through its own vakeel.

Should my conjecture be right as to the parcel, and a kharitah be delivered by the vakeel at the Residency, let me trust your Lordship will be pleased to return a gracious answer, though one of compliments merely. Your Lordship can easily ascribe my purpose of going home, and retiring, to long and severe illness having undermined my constitution. The Durbar will seek to know no further; and, while your Lordship will hardly begrudge me a testimony of regard from those I have known so long, your Lordship may be assured, that nothing would induce me to send my peace and reputation upon such "forlorn hope" as would be the remaining any longer here without your Lordship's full and free sanction and support.

Alas! I have staid a year too long; but God is my witness, that it was in the trust and resolve to convince your lordship, as well as the Durbar, that I have all along, to the best of my judgment, endeavoured to fulfil my duty.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's faithful Servant,

B. H. HODGSON.

The Right Hon. Lord Ellenborough.

N. B. Altered and softened in transcription.

Nepal, Oct. 7, 1843.

My Lord,—Though I did not consider myself authorised to challenge the Durbar's parcel at the moment, yet, having ascertained beyond a doubt what it contained, I have deemed it best to prevent the possibility of construction in regard to myself, and of umbrage in regard to the Durbar, by procuring a prohibition to be issued to the vakeel against the delivery of the kharitah, unless your lordship invite it.

Accordingly, a prohibition to that effect, and with that proviso, has been this day despatched by the Durbar to its vakeel.

From what has passed on this occasion, I feel fully con-

vinced that the Durbar has all along been actuated in this matter by the sole motive of evincing its gratitude beyond a question to the Resident, as Resident, acting throughout (in its belief) with the sanction and approval of his superiors. The Durbar thinks that, in refusing to forward its kharitah, I have been governed by feelings which would not have governed me in any other case, and which your Lordship might and would overrule, at least, as far forth as the mere expression of its gratitude to me is concerned.

I have, &c.

B. H. HODGSON.

The Right Hon. LORD ELLENBOROUGH.

Aiout, June 2, 1843.

SIR,—I received here to-day your letter of the 22d ult., intimating your wish to remain still longer at Katmandhoor.

I have already twice, against my own better judgment, acquiesced in your remaining there; first, when I consented that the public letter of animadversion upon your conduct should not be placed upon the public records, it being then distinctly understood by me that you would retire during the last cold weather; secondly, when I was further induced to consent to your remaining till the ensuing cold weather.

I do not think it desirable that you should remain beyond that period, and I shall then appoint your successor. If you desire to remain on service in India, I will endeavour to find some other fit situation for you; but you ought to leave Nepaul.

I remain,

SIR,

Your faithful Servant,

ELLENBOROUGH.

B. H. HODGSON, *Esq. Katmandhoo.*

N.B. See and compare with this false and cruel letter Lord Ellenborough's official letter of 8th August, 1842, and his private one of 26th July, 1842. Lord Ellenborough had been in error, not I, and he had acknowledged and recanted: yet here he lays the whole onus on me, and says he pardoned me!!! I never asked nor wanted pardon.

[Lord Ellenborough's answer to my first private announcement of the Durbar's move in my favour. Lord E. ordered me to apprise the Durbar I was going away; and when the Durbar so warmly took up the matter I privately stated that fact to Lord E., in order to shew him that my official opposition to the Durbar had not diminished its kindly feeling towards me.]

Chunar, June 30, 1843.

SIR,—I received here this morning your letter of the 20th instant.

It is my wish that all the representatives of the Government should make themselves personally acceptable to the sovereigns to whom they may be accredited, wherever this can be done consistently with their duty to their own country, and with their own characters as honourable and respectable men; but no British minister ought to place himself, or even to appear to place himself, under any obligation whatever to the sovereign at whose court he resides, or to the ministers and chiefs of that sovereign.

I need hardly inform you, therefore, that I could pay no attention to any wish expressed by the Rajah of Nepaul, that you should remain as the representative of the British Government at Katmandhoo. I must add, that I do not think any wish to that effect ought to be expressed by the Rajah.

His Highness may be assured that, being sincerely anxious of remaining on terms of friendship with Nepaul, the Government of India will always select as its representatives at his court gentlemen who will endeavour to perform their duties in a conciliatory manner.

I remain,

SIR,

Your obedient Servant,

ELLENBOROUGH.

BRIAN HODGSON, *Esq. Katmandhoo.*

Barrackpoor, October 12, 1843.

SIR,—Since, although you had long been aware of the intention of relieving you during the ensuing cold season at the court of Nepaul, you take no steps for the purpose of obtaining leave, and there was no other situation to which you could at the present time be appointed, the Government had no alternative, and it became necessary at once to appoint your successor.

The manner in which Major Lawrence has been appointed is that in which every officer of the civil service under the crown is appointed, directly to the situation he is intended to fill, without the grant of any leave to his predecessor, or any mention of him in the *Gazette*.

I have the honour to remain,

SIR,

Your obedient Servant,

ELLENBOROUGH.

B. H. HODGSON, *Esq. Katmandhoo.*

N.B. In September, and three months before the subsidence of the malaria would allow me to quit Nepal, Lord Ellenborough superseded me in public orders, contrary alike to usage and to courtesy. I ask him for an explanation, and this is his answer—false and cruel, too; and thus he puts an end to the Durbar's warm appeal to him in my behalf!

No. VIII.

TOKENS OF REGARD FROM THE NEPALESE.

THE DURBAR'S APPEAL TO LORD ELLENBOROUGH AND HIS ANSWER THERETO.

Translation of a Kharitah of the Maha-Rajah of Nepal to the Right Honourable Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General of India. Dated 7th Savan, 1900 *Sambat.*

After compliments,—Mr. Hodgson has recently mentioned to me his intention to retire from the service and return to Europe in the coming cold season. Since that day I have been perpetually reflecting upon Mr. Hodgson's perfect knowledge of the institutions and manners of my kingdom, and of the

Parbattiah language; and likewise upon his long and zealous, kind and patient, labours in the late troubled times, whereby the designs of evil men inimical to both governments were foiled, and friendship with your state preserved. The more I think of these valuable qualifications and exertions of Mr. Hodgson, the more am I pained at the idea of his departure. It is, therefore, my earnest request and hope, for the benefit of my kingdom, that Mr. Hodgson may be persuaded by your Lordship to remain awhile longer with me. Let me constantly hear of your Lordship's welfare.

(True Translation. B. H. HODGSON.)

N.B. So soon as my intention to retire was made known to the court of Nepal (by Lord E.'s desire, in May, 1843), I was pressed on all hands to stay, if but for a year; and when I refused, I was required to forward this letter to the Governor-general. I declined, but the court persisted, and sent it through its own channel, and the Governor-general's answer to it is annexed. I was pressed incessantly, from May till October, not to go away; and then the court applied to Lord E., in whose hands delicacy forced me to leave the whole issue.

(Copy.)

ANSWER TO THE KHARITAH WHICH THE DURBAR SENT THROUGH ITS OWN VAKEEL AFTER MY REFUSAL TO FORWARD IT.

From the Right Honourable the Governor-General to his Highness the Maha Rajah of Nepal, the 27th October, 1843.

After compliments,—Your Highness may be assured that it will be the object of any officer who may be appointed by the British Government as its representative at your Highness's Court to evince on all occasions the utmost consideration and respect for your Highness and your family, and to adopt and concert every measure which may seem best adapted to maintain the cordial good understanding which has now so long subsisted between the two states. He would otherwise ill represent the sentiments of the British Government.

Major Lawrence, who will now proceed to your Highness's Court, has been on many occasions engaged in the

field, and latterly in the victorious advance of the British armies to Cabool, and he well knows how to estimate the good qualities of soldiers, possessed by none more highly than by the brave men, your Highness's subjects. He will assure your Highness of the sincere friendship with which your Highness is regarded by the British Government, and of its earnest desire to improve and preserve for ever the amicable relations now subsisting.

(Signed) ELLENBOROUGH.

(True Translation.)

(Signed) W. EDWARDS, Under-Secretary to Gov. of India.

No. VIII.

THE RAJAH'S FAREWELL LETTER TO ME, DELIVERED PUBLICLY AT MY LAST AUDIENCE, AND SENT AFTER ME BY THE PRESENT RESIDENT.

Translation of the Maha Rajah of Nepal's Valedictory Letter to the Resident BRIAN HOUGHTON HODGSON, *Esq., dated Cathmandu, the 12th day of May, in the year of Sambat* 1900.

It is notorious to all the world how General Bhim Sen,* by his sagacity and fidelity, for many years caused the affairs

* Prime Minister of Nepal from 1805 to 1838, when he fell a sacrifice to party violence.

of my kingdom to prosper, and the friendships between the two governments to be sustained without interruption; and that after you were nominated Resident, this happy state of things was improved. Nevertheless, in the year of Sambat, 1898 (A.D. 1838), ignorant and wicked counsellors caused the entire ruin of the said Bhim Sen; and, moreover, gave so much umbrage and offence to the Governor-general, that not a hope remained of peace being preserved with the British Government. In this extremity, however, you, who had been so long amongst us, were still forthcoming as Resident; and it was solely and entirely through your far-seeing and benevolent exertions that I was at length brought to a right understanding, and the displeasure of the Governor-general was appeased. On this account you are now every way as happy and prosperous as you deserve to be; and it is my fervent prayer to the Almighty, that wherever you go, and howsoever you be employed, the same good fortune and good name as you have reaped in Nepal may continue to reward your virtues.

(True Translation.)

From B. H. Hodgson, Esq., late Resident, Nepal, to Major Lawrence, Resident, Nepal.

(SECRET.)

Bisoulecah, Dec. 11, 1843.

SIR,—I have the honour to inform you, that I have this day parted with my kind conductors and their detachment of regular troops from the capital, having experienced, all the way down, the same eminent kindness and courtesy as you were witness of at Cathmandu.

2. Though I crossed the ridge of Chandragiri the first day, this did not prevent several of the chiefs from sending me their farewells to Chikong. The people, as I passed the several villages, came out to pay me their respects; detachments of the troops from Cheesapany, and from Muckwau-

poor (the latter place ten miles off my route), came to wait on me, and have accompanied me to this place, notwithstanding the presence of my Cathmandoo escort; and, of course, by the express orders of the Durbar. And, lastly, that escort has two captains attached to it, besides the Koomedan in command. I should add, that the present is the first occasion on which any such attentions have been conceded by the court of Nepal, or on which the escort itself has proceeded beyond Hitoundu.

3. What occurred at Cathmandu, of much more striking character, it is not for me to speak of, since you were present;* but I may safely say, I shall never forget the gracious and generous conduct of the Maha-Rajah and his family in the Durbar, nor the kindly greetings of the thousands of his subjects and soldiery, who accompanied me for a mile from the city, a procedure wholly unheard of before in Nepal.

4. On my way down, I received from the Maha-Rajah a long and most kind letter of thanks and regrets at parting, written by his Highness's own hand, and which I replied to with my own hand. These letters have been submitted to you, and it is sufficient that you have seen them. I request they may not be recorded, since the language of feeling between persons who have known each other for half their lives, is not fit for official handling.

5. Considering how long and often, during the past five troubled years, my duty had called me to place myself in opposition to the Durbar; considering also, that in the usual course of official correspondence, it is the tricasseries alone of political intrigue, and not the court's or the nation's more generous sentiments (or character) which are brought under the notice of the Right Honourable the Governor-general, I deem it right and proper (and have no doubt you also will deem it so) thus to submit to my superiors the truly generous and handsome behaviour of the Nepalese court, and people, and soldiery, towards a departing British minister, who has resided so many years among them.

6. The Durbar has not permitted me to pay for my Hill

* N. B. Major Lawrence's report was asked for by me *and refused!*

porters; but I have given them and the soldiers a present of 450 rupees; and I have not a doubt that Government will be pleased to reimburse me this sum.

7. I take the liberty, likewise, to suggest, that you be permitted to present, on the part of Government a rifle, or a sword to each of the three sirdars who have accompanied me to this place, and who are, Captains Futeh Sing, and Ahibaon Basniat, and Koomedan Fonj Sing.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient Servant,

B. H. HODGSON, late Resident.

(True Copy. B. H. HODGSON.)

No. IX.

HONOURABLE T. C. ROBERTSON, GOVERNOR OF AGRA.

[Expresses conviction that Lord Ellenborough had been prevented from precipitating a rupture with Nepal by Mr. H.'s firmness, and that Lord Ellenborough was sensible of this. Mark this from the most experienced man in India!!—B. H. H.]

Agra, 22d July, 1842.

MY DEAR SIR,—Agreeably to your instructions I have sent the public despatch that came with your note of the 4th on to Low, without shewing it even to Hamilton.

Believe me, that you attach more weight and importance to the pettish effusion that has caused you so much uneasiness than it deserves. One of the most unpleasant reflections to those who, like myself, really long to see the Governor-general commence his administration well, is, that he has contrived at starting, to make men careless of his praise, and heedless of his censure. *Haud inexpertus loquor*, for I, too, have come in for my share of his rebuffs; and if I were much in love with dignity, I should feel very much out of humour. As it is, though the absurdity irritates me

for a moment, it always amuses; and I find myself often constrained to laugh, even when persuaded that I ought to be angry. I am satisfied that he *now* sees that he was on the verge of falling into the tremendous blunder of provoking a war with Nepal, and will be glad enough to find that nothing more is said of the despatch intimating his displeasure at your course of policy, although his stubborn pride will not admit of his acknowledging any mistake. His prepossessions against our service are intense, and lead him into much that is unfair and foolish.

I cannot extort a line of commendation from him on behalf of Captain Fraser, who has passed the whole hot winds in tents, moving about with the troops, and exerting himself in every way to restore tranquillity, although denied the means of effectually accomplishing the end. The less, therefore, that you write the better; and the more you adhere to concise, dry narrative, the less risk will you run of being misunderstood or wilfully misconstrued. I like all of your secret despatches much, though, in this last one, I would almost wish away the "*illustrium virorum judicia et testimonia,*" appended to it. Your character enables you to dispense with such support; and a general appeal to the records of Government during the two last years is quite sufficient, without any specifications of approbation. However, you probably know best what is likely to have effect as regards your immediate prospects, and my counsel looks only to the future.

I am busily engaged in getting together an army of mules to send to Pollock; and hope to have at least 2500 on their way across the Punjaub, by the end of the first week of August.

Believe me to remain,

Yours very faithfully,

T. C. ROBERTSON.

No. X.

[Lord Ellenborough writes flatteringly after our *fracas*, and shews a wish to compromise that quarrel and to make me the *amende*. In fact, the *amende* WAS made soon after: see Lord E.'s private letter of 26th July, and public of 6th August.]

Allahabad, July 6th, 1842.

SIR,—I had the honour of receiving to-day your letter of the 27th ultimo.

No testimony is, I assure you, required to satisfy me that you are a most zealous and a very able servant of the Government; but I am certainly of opinion, that if a change of system should be adopted in treating with the Nepaul Government, you are so much mixed up with a party there, that you would be unable to act efficiently in carrying out such new system.* It would succeed better in other, even if much less able hands.

You must have understood from Mr. Maddock's letter, that it was my wish to evince every consideration for a distinguished officer of the Government, whose services it seemed to be impossible to continue to employ on the same field.

I shall much regret the circumstance, if your health should compel you to return to England. I received Kurbeer Sen on the 5th. He seems to be a quiet, respectable man. I think, the tone and manner in which I expressed my regret that I had been unable to receive him before, and my satisfaction with the Rajah's letter, and in which I declared that the past was now forgotten, and that I hoped nothing would occur to revive the recollection of it, will have impressed him with the idea that a new extravagance might be treated very seriously.

* This was reasonable at the time, beyond a doubt, but was belied by events demonstrating my efficiency as the executor of the new system. Lord E. having directed the change to be made so soon as might be without sacrifice of our friends and allies, I in less than three months from this time completed the change so as to produce nor danger nor cavil nor evil of any kind; whereupon all parties joined soon after in a warm appeal to Lord E. in my behalf; so that I was as *popular* as *efficient*, and Lord E. was deprived of the least shadow of excuse for his subsequent ill-usage of me.

Mr. Smith is gone to Benares, where, I hope, he will be able to make arrangements for the withdrawal of the power of attorney, and so, ultimately, for the withdrawal of Casinnath himself.

I have the honour to remain,

SIR,

Your very faithful Servant,

ELLENBOROUGH.

BRIAN HOUGHTON HODGSON, *Esq. &c. &c.*
Katmandhoo.

No. XI.

Simla, 8th October, 1843.

MY DEAR HODGSON,—I have just now received your letters of the 24th ult., with the accompanying letters to Lord E., herewith returned.

It would have surprised me had the Nepal Court failed to manifest its reluctance to part with you, but I am not nowadays surprised at slight or insult offered by Lord E. to any member of our class.

I am glad to see a civilian leave the country (I used, for the people's sake to regret it), for I feel that he, his untiring zeal, his honest application, his liver-rotting labours, are no longer known or appreciated.

I embark (*Deo volente*) at Bombay 1st February; and rejoice at the prospect of our meeting next spring.

I have forwarded to Lawrence at Amhala all that you wished communicated to him from your separate letters also now received.

Talk of civilians! Here are two politico soldiers for you—Richmond talking of "resigning," being worn out with over-work!! and Lawrence writing, that he would rather have been appointed here (i. e. "Sub-Commisioner of Simla" parish) than President in Nipal!! Did you ever?!!

There is a lull now at Lahore, but Government cannot

hold together there much longer; though its duration will of course depend a good deal on the kind of advice and admonition that the remains of the Court may receive from the G. G. A.

Believe me ever yours,*

GEORGE CLERK.

No. XII.

THE DURBAR, IN ORDER TO PROPITIATE LORD E. TO MR. H.'S STAY, LAYS ITS WHOLE RESOURCES AT HIS FEET.

(Copy.)

Translation of Kharitah of Maha-Rajah of Nepal, to the Right Honourable Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General of India, dated 3d Aghan, 1900 Sumbut.

YOUR Lordship is well aware that the ancient friendship between the two states had been seriously disturbed by the proceedings of certain evil advisers of mine, of whom I will say no more at present; and that, by means of Mr. Hodgson's far-seeing and benevolent exertions, the evil consequences to myself of those proceedings were prevented.

From the time when, through these good offices of Mr. Hodgson, a right understanding between the two states was restored, I have entertained the anxious wish and desire to demonstrate my friendly feelings towards your Lordship's Government, in case of any fitting occasion presenting itself to me.

I now learn from the newspapers that troops are assembling towards Bundlecund and Gwalior, and I, therefore, tender to you the services of my soldiery and commanders, to co-operate with the British armies in any manner your Lordship may be pleased to indicate.

I am persuaded that my admission to participate, like a friend, in the Company's affairs would be conducive to my advantage and to the stability of my kingdom; and I, therefore, make the present tender of the services of my troops

to you, with the concurrence of my heir apparent. Let me constantly hear of your welfare.

(True Translation.)

B. H. HODGSON, Resident.

(True Copy. B. H. H.)

No. XIII.

LORD E. RELENTS, AND HALF RECALLS HIS LETTER OF RECALL.

Allahabad, 22d June, 1842.

MY DEAR HODGSON,—Lord Ellenborough has been speaking to-day about you, expressing, in the kindest terms, his sense of your merits, services, and abilities;* saying that he hoped an opportunity would occur of employing you to your liking in some other field, and suggesting that the letter of yesterday† being kept a profound secret, you should act on the former summons, and consider yourself as only waiting for a favourable season to obey it; and to come and pay your respects to his Lordship, and explain to him the state of affairs in Nepal.

I am awaiting a further report from you before disposing of Kurbeeren and his presents. I fancy Smith will be dismissed soon.

We shall have a pretty strong force ready to move on your frontier in the cold season, unless the present clouds are in the meantime entirely cleared away.

Be of good cheer, and believe me,

Ever yours affectionately,

T. H. MADDOCK.‡

* Credat Judæus, non ego, quoad Lord E.—B. H. H.

† Viz. The letter of recall, or ejection rather, which is as insolent as this is gracious. Never was so complete a man of mere impulse as Lord Ellenborough.

‡ Answered July 1st, saying, that if Lord Ellenborough had disgraced me openly, he should openly undo the act, and desiring that if his official of the 21st were not withdrawn, my official answer of the 30th might stand. See also Nos. 3 and 4. Here is full pardon and *amende*, and the removal made to rest upon a plausible basis, viz. that I might be, and probably was, unpopular with the Rajah, &c. When, then, the contrary was demonstrated by the Rajah, why did not Lord Ellenborough act justly and consistently? Why, indeed?

No. XIV.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH'S STYLE OF CONDUCT AND HIS CHARACTER.

Calcutta, 4th April, 1843.

My dear Hodgson,—Thank you for your letter of the 5th ultimo. I should have replied to it sooner, but that one thing or other has constantly occupied my time since I returned to Calcutta.

I cannot pretend to account for the actions or policy of my late master, Lord Ellenborough. His course is too self-willed and eccentric to be guided, or explained, or reasoned with. His own way he will have as long as he rules over this country, and no other human being will be responsible for the acts of his government, for he will allow no one to share the responsibility in any degree with him. Political offences are the objects of his special aversion, and they can only do as they are bid, and that is the only way in which they can avoid his displeasure. However, I cannot bring myself to believe that his reign over us will be of much longer duration, for all the ministers, except the Duke of Wellington, are said to be perfectly disgusted with his arrogance and alarmed at his insanity.

I do not understand why your old friend, Matuben Sing, is so timid in his advance. He has a fine course open to him, but if he does not hasten up, the malaria may effectually frustrate his designs. His arrival ought to lead to some decisive measures, to get rid of your weak, vacillating premier, for I take it for granted that the general will attach himself in earnest to the party of the Rance; and if he places himself at its head, and keeps the army with him, he ought soon to have it all his own way.

I hope your health keeps good, though, from the accounts Lieutenant Smith gave me of you, I fear you are not half the man you were when I was at Catmandhoo. There is nothing like the climate of England for renovating the broken constitutions of us old Indians. I hope I may hold out for three years, at the expiration of which I meditate my flight to the west.

Do you know, that I have in my charge a will of yours, which I received charge of from Macfarlane when he was going home? What would you have done with it?

With kindest regards believe me,

Yours most sincerely,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. XV.

PRINSEP APPLAUDS FIRST NEGOTIATIONS, AND THINKS CHANGE OF MEN NEEDFUL.*

My dear Hodgson,—I return your sketch of the country between the valley of Nepaul and Dumja, having taken a tracing and introduced it into my general map. I have now got your routes forwarded to Colven, all of which, with some alterations of *direction*, I have found the means of introducing. I think I have now got a pretty accurate map of the approaches to the valley from the east, west, and south, but I am still at fault for one or two things. Wilkins, for instance, from Rumnugur, gives me the following route into Nepaul:—1. Chitawur, 2. Oopudrung, 3. Jozimara, 4. Gujari, 5. Kishna Bubar, 6. Mohesh Kela. Now you give in the same, but put 5. Keshen Bebar before 4. Gujari, instead of after it. I have followed your route. Wilkins, also, gives me the following line of forts:—1. Kurbilas, 2. Oopudrung, 3. Kuliari, 4. Subapoor Chungoo, 5. Neragur. You make no mention of any of them but Oopudrung. Kandrang, too, he places about midway between Chitawur and Cheesapani. Is this the same as your Kangrang Gush and Khola, or different? These, after all, are minor matters, if we get the mountains; rivers, and routes, pretty correct, as I think we have. But there is still a great desideratum, viz. a route over the hills from Chondunde to Seedbe Gusher. If you could get me that, it would enable me to lay in the continuation of the

* N. B. The above change of men, what Lord Ellenborough afterwards so furiously objected to!!!

Mohalbarut or Lama Dangra range and the sources of the rivers that run into the plains.

I have had more trouble in putting into my map the Company's territory below the surveyed boundary than with the upper, and believe there will be more errors in that part of the map. I congratulate you personally on the issue of your late troublesome negotiations. They are all you could wish, and will give you great and justly earned credit here and in Europe; but I do not congratulate the governor, for I think we lose greatly by their playing the jackall to us instead of the wolf. Their crouching is worse than their bite, unless a change of men, as well as of measures, is superinduced.*

Do you know that Buchanan has given a route south of the Sunkooja from Dootal Ghut to Bijapoor, and that he says the river is navigable thence to a villa above Chakra. The valley must be flat, therefore, and without rivers to cross on the south side.

Yours, very sincerely,

H. PRINSEP.

No. XVI.

PRINSEP—HIS OPINION THAT MY MODE OF INTRODUCING THE NEW POLICY PRESCRIBED BY LORD E. WAS "ADMIRABLE; THAT NOTHING COULD BE BETTER;" AND THIS CHANGE WAS EFFECTED IN LESS THAN FOUR MONTHS, COMPLETE AND PERILOUS THOUGH IT WAS: THE FRIENDLY CHIEFS WERE SAVED, UPROAR PREVENTED, AND OUR INTERESTS AND HONOUR PROTECTED.

September 28th, 1842.

My dear Hodgson,—Your second of 18th instant, just received, demands reply. I did not answer its predecessor, because you asked specifically about Cashi Nath's case, and I wanted to see how Lieutenant Smith's proceedings at Benares might affect it. I don't yet see clearly

* N. B. This change was made in the January following.—B. H. H.

how you will get rid of that case. The Benares' firm disavowal of their agent and preference of the courts of Benares for settlement of their case, is no matter for diplomatic discussion, but should, according to European notions, be pleaded in court, and so made a ground for dismissal of the case. It is only because the Durbar has admitted their active interference in the Court proceedings, that you have a right to say any thing about the case. Our answer here would be, you must go to the superior court, which judges of its own jurisdiction; but the part the Durbar has taken entitles you to demand that justice shall be done to Kashamatt, not that his case shall not be heard. However, if they have admitted that justice will best be done at Benares, you may, of course, press that.*

With respect to your initiation of the withdrawn policy, I think your proceedings in the conference, &c. admirable; nothing could be better; but not so your report. There is too much allusion to the change of system, as if you wanted to point attention to it as a new thing you are acting upon rather against your own judgment. Then you write in a quaint, unusual style, using new words, such as biune, which is just the sort of thing Lord E. will be likely to take hold of, and make a subject of ridicule. He, I think, very handsomely made the *amende* to you, and told you he had full confidence in you to carry on things as he wished. I should have accepted this as complete and entire as if I had no doubt that what I was doing was consistent with his views and intentions. It is rather perceptible from your letter that you have misgivings on that score which you should not have let be seen, even though you felt it. As it is, Lord E. cannot but approve what you have done; but he will do so dryly, because he will not like your letter.

With respect to the fate and prospects of Nepal. If Affghanistan and China be quickly settled, it will be nothing but a madman like him of Koorgh that can embroil us.

* N.B. All this relates to the paltry matter of business which was the mere pretext for the Durbar's aggression of 23d April, 1842. See on for the important opinion of Prinsep touching my proceedings to effect a change of policy.

The heir-apparent may be the fated Belshazzar to deliver over the country; and I think it a thing to be wished rather than feared that he may give us cause to annex the states to Hindostan. While Nepal exists in independence and proclaimed defiance of us, though in real fear, there will be dreams of Hindoo feasts in all the tracts where Hindoos only have had sway, as in Keeva, Bundulkhund, and the Mahratta country. The degree in which intrigue and disaffection have been propagating amongst all the rent-eating classes of this sect is quite astonishing, and they work with twice the ingenuity and cunning that the Moslems do. Scindia is on the point of death, and there is no fear this will extend the disquiets of Bundulkhund over all the country to the Chambaus; and if we do not interfere with a very strong hand, the Haras and other Rajpoots will join the Chambaus I would treat all these petty Rajas, &c. as the Romans did those of Greece and Asia Minor, and make the East India Company bear in all doubtful cases in despite of Mr. Thompson's oratory and Sir Charles Forbes' intrigues; but our Governor-generals, since Lord Wellesley, have too much fear of the mobocracy. I am afraid there is no chance of a rupture with Nepal in my time. I would stay a year to two to see it through, if there were. As it is, I have serious thoughts of going home this season, but have promised Lord E. not to make up my mind finally till I see the turn things take by November.

I want the Society to publish an arranged set of all inscriptions which have been collected and translated. I find I do not know Sanscrit enough to do this myself, nor even to write the preliminary essay. Will you give us an arrangement and essay? You will see a full list of the Journal inscriptions in a late "Royal Asiatic Society Journal" by Colonel Sykes, and those of the researches may easily be added. We shall thus have the whole in a volume arranged by date or character for information. It is time they should be collected.

Believe me, yours very sincerely,

H. PRINSEP.

No. XVII

STATE OF NEPAL JUST BEFORE THE CRISIS OF 1837–42.

Nepal, June 24th, 1842.

My dear Sir,—I have not forgotten the wishes of Lord Auckland, in respect to a narrative of affairs here; but there are many reasons against doing over again just now what Dr. Campbell has recently done with my sanction; amongst which, I may specify, 1st. That things are in a state of perfect change as to parties, precluding judgment thereon till the issue be seen. 2d. That a great many documents relative to Nepal are not recorded in my office. 3d. That sound statistical and general information relating to the country cannot be procured, except by piecemeal, without the hazard of creating jealousy and alarm.* If I had means to exhibit with tolerable accuracy the sources and amount of revenue, and to place the general state of the kingdom authentically on record,—if I had before me the complete series of our transactions with Nepal, so that I might trace their scope and tendency from beginning to end,—and if the *Ego et Rex meus* state of the Durbar would issue in something positive; then, indeed, I might hope to give a narration worthy of his Lordship's acceptance. But, under all the circumstances of the actual case, I cannot help thinking, that 'twere vain to make the attempt. His Lordship is already aware that the Gorkhas are eminently national and united; that their union is recent; illustrated by splendid success in arms, and supported by the unsophisticated simplicity of the Highland character. Their idol is Mars, and they worship with all the energy of a sect, having nothing else to divide their thoughts or affections. They have neither arts, nor literature, nor commerce, nor a rich soil, to draw off their attention from arms; and they have that

* Note of 1844. The times were full of trouble and political change, and they continued so with increase till the end of 1842. In such times my political responsibility bound me to look solely to the main chance, and to eschew whatever at Catmandoo might create embarrassment. The Nepal Government is ever most jealous of statistical inquiries by us, and therefore I forbore to make any, awaiting for quieter times. They came at last, but, *alas! not for me.*

lusty hardihood of character, and contempt of drudgery, which make war especially congenial.

This character they *began with;* and seventy years of unbroken success gradually made habit in individuals an exclusive national institution, and that institution, again, the passion of all. In 1826, when presenting a memoir on the Gorkha army, I was asked if *time* would not wear out the love of arms? I answered by asking *how much* time, and what in the *interim?* pointing to the character and career of the people, and the genius of their institutions, and drawing a parallel between them and the modern European races. Through how many centuries of wanton contest did *we* wade to our present vague conception of the advantages of peace? And, if it must be confessed, that the *vestigia ruris Teutonici* still may be traced in us, despite our unexampled achievements in commerce, in arts, and in sciences. 'How long, think you, those *vestigia* will last as the *primary* marks and symbols of character among a race as lusty and energetic as our own, and who have yet to receive a *single opposite bias?* I have often said, and now repeat, that when, in 1816, we drew a line round the territory of these men, leaving them no outlet save upon ourselves, we should either have crippled them effectually, or have insisted on a change in their institutions, giving the surplus soldiery employment in our own armies. We did neither: we did nothing then, or subsequently; and we now see the fruits of our mistakes or indifference. Rulers are too apt to fancy that when they make a great effort, the crowning work has been achieved, *once* and *for all:* and calmly and justly, as Lord Hastings characterised the people and the war, before and pending its progress, no sooner was it over, than he insensibly stole to *that* conclusion. We were told that the Gorkhas had had their spirit broken and their resources crippled! But was it reasonable to suppose that the spirit created by a thousand victories could be broken by one reverse, amongst a lusty race still in the prime youth of their national career, and having neither profession nor occupation but arms? I think not; and that advertence either to the character and career of these Highlanders, or to our experience of them

during the war, might have satisfied us of the utter fallacy of any such presumption. Oh! but we crippled their resources? Did we, indeed? We took from them the Western Hills, which never yielded 8 lakhs of rupees per annum; and we gave them back the Tarai, then yielding but 2 lakhs, but which already affords 13 lakhs, and is capable of affording double that sum! The Tarai, when we gave it back, was wasted by 500 years of border war: we saw only the ostensible desert, blind to all those facts demonstrative of its ancient fertility, and of its capacity for ready and splendid resuscitation.

We rated it at 2 lakhs, and gave it up as so much worth, and no more. I grant you, that in the resuscitation of the Tarai we have a sort of hold on the Gorkhas; but, so long as they are ignorant and fierce as bull-dogs, and have their impenetrable hills to retire on, so long will they be ready to stake the Tarai with a rashness defying all sober calculation on our side. Then, as to cutting off the Gorkhas from all communion with the west by contiguity of territory, of what earthly use was or is that? If there be serious turmoil in the north-west, the Gorkhas can communicate with whom they will there, just as effectually as they please; and, as for co-operation against us, they could strike no blow so fearful by joining disturbers *there*, as by letting our armies pass up, and then assailing our naked, best, and most critical possessions. It is their command of Patna and the Ganges, the key of the eastern and western provinces, that a man of sense must object to; and the more I advert to their actual means of harm-doing, and to the presumption (inseparable from a knowledge of their career and character) that the mischief cannot and will not *speedily* abate, the more am I fixed in the opinion that, though we should not make, yet we should not forego, an occasion of reckoning with them.

This is my general and preponderant sentiment, to be received, however practically, with a good deal of qualification, dependent on considerations to be mentioned presently. Meanwhile, I may observe that, though the revival of the Nipalese military means was to be expected under the circumstances, yet that the rapid and complete revival

is the casual consequence of the administrative vigour and unity, with the bitter though sage spirit of enmity to us which have presided over this Durbar since the war. In all that time, there has been no Major Prince, no Durbar, no expenditure on trifles, or on any thing but arms: a single vigorous mind has presided over the helm; ancient gifts of land *in pios usus* have been gradually, and to a vast extent, absorbed for military purposes; and the Tarai has yearly poured into the treasury new and peculiarly available funds. As the general consequence, the finances and army of Nipal are now in a more palmy state than at any previous period of her history: the soldiery are as numerous as ever they were, and they are far more completely trained and equipped. In the twenty years we have been here since the war, we have seen nothing but drills and parades, heard nothing but the roar of cannon or the clink of the hammer in arsenal or magazine. Soldiers have been and are heads of the law and finance at Cathmandu, and administrators of the interior: soldiers have been and are every thing, and they are and have been headed by a plenary viceroy (Bhem Sen) of that old stamp which must support its habitual aggression *at home*, by pandering to the soldiery, and teaching them to look to aggression *abroad*.

It is a remarkable fact, however, distinctly deducible from the career and history of this people, that since we had first to do with this Durbar in '92, we have had to deal exclusively with a military mayor of the palace, in other words, with a man having, by the essential tenure of his station, one hand against his prince, and the other against his neighbours.

Again and again, we have been told by the well-wishers of both States to look to the status and consequent necessary views of these domineering mayors; and, again and again, we have slid into the convenient doctrine that the *soi-disant* authority is sufficient for us. But all things are, perhaps, ordered for the best; and looking on may prove so at last in this case; for time, peace, experience of ministerial politics, and the existence of a Major-Prince apparently prudent and well-meaning,*

* 1843. The Rajah, then a minor, but coming of age, gave good promise, and I desired to draw him out and attach him; but in the sequel he was neglected by us, proved infirm of purpose, fell into the

seem now to be working together to put an end to this succession of usurping and aggressive dictators. Let this succession cease, and the first and greatest obstacle to the gradual operation of time and quiet, in letting down the military fervour of this nation, will cease with it. There will be no longer a perpetual *interested* striving against the great current of events, and very many circumstances may even speed that current, notwithstanding the national propensity. Amongst these circumstances I may mention :—

1. The extent of past suffering on the part of all others but the military party by the exclusive preponderance of that party. There has been no fair sharing of the loaves and fishes, nor of the consideration due to every order, including the highest.

2. The Raja, or head of the *Outs*, is young himself, has two young wives, and seven young children. Reasonable indulgence and addiction to pleasure of various kinds may be expected from them, though not from their old and iron-minded opposite. And if a young court once gave way to recreation, there would soon be a diversion of funds inconsistent with the past existing sacrifice of *all* things to an inordinate and useless army.

3. The one party has grown fat by the army ; the other, grown miserably lean ; and by so much as the former has long been all powerful, by so much must the recollection of past, and the apprehension of future, feebleness, bias the new party towards the obvious *means* of security, or peaceful maxims and pursuits, though, of course, the general or national bias the other way, will long qualify the action of that bias. Speaking of the present state of parties, I have more doubt whether the expected change of administrative hands will take place, than whether it would be beneficial if it occurred. Of the latter I am certain ; of the former, not

hands of another and worse military mayor of the palace, who rid him of the incubus of the last, and then rode him harder, and with blind fury set all things agog for war. Luckily the new man (Kala Pandey) *disgusted the prime gentry ;* and thus I, by *gaining them*, was enabled to curb Nepal. Here, I hope, is proof enough that I was well disposed to the Rajah, and in the end the Rajah was satisfied of that. But if the Kala Pandeys had not disgusted the nobles, war must have ensued, owing to the national bias and the Rajah's infatuation.

so; but a month or two will, it is thought, suffice to determine the question of change or no change.*

But, is there no probability of contest between the parties, and would not their cutting each other's throats, in a civil war, be a sufficient security of us? I do not expect any strife in the shape of civil war, though the chiefs may, *more majorum*, draw their swords on each other. Nor do I deem it a sound presumption that a civil war, if it occurred, would benefit us. Civil wars have rather a tendency to feed than to quench martial spirit and power; and if one broke out here, I should expect it to be diverted, *per fas et nefas*, *upon us*, before it had raged three months. But there is no probability of its occurrence: the unsophisticated character and eminent nationality of the Nipalese soldiery, as they have ever stayed domestic war in past times, so they doubtless will in future: there is no instance of it in the turbulent history of the people: and, cipher as the Rajah has been and still seems to be, and omnipotent as the minister has been and still seems to be, no one here doubts that if the former willed the death of the latter, the minister's head would be as speedily off as was that of Damader (the Bhim Sen of his day) in 1802.† I, therefore, neither expect civil war, nor think it could possibly advantage us, if it occurred. In all human probability it would speedily afford occasion for the turbulent and reckless to assault us, come what might of the struggle.

So long as order prevails, so long I think we could, if we deemed it expedient, by coming forward distinctly to countenance the weaker party at present, give it the preponderance,

* Note of 1843. The change took place soon after; but the Rajah proved weak, and we suffered him to fall into the hands of another and a worse mayor of the palace, who gave us infinite trouble by arraying the military propensity of the nation against us, and drawing the young Rajah into his views. Hence the difficulties of the subsequent era of 1837-42.

† Note of 1843. This proved prophetically true, Bhim Sen, the then minister, having actually perished a few months after, when there was row enough at *our expense*, but *no* civil war—another correct anticipation of events! Damoder's son, in 1838, destroyed Bhim Sen, in revenge for the death of his father, and perished himself in due course by the hands of Bhim Sen's son. Such are the family feuds of these fierce nobles!

But I would not advise such a proceeding, *except* the minister were clearly seeking to drive things to *extremity with us*, because he felt that quiet must undo him at home.* This sort of crisis excepted, I would, just now, continue looking on merely, as heretofore, until the expected change occur, or, until having occurred, it produce no amendment, or promise of amendment. If the change come not soon, or come without improvement, I would take the first fair occasion of a reckoning with Nepal. If the change seem to tremble in the balance, wanting but a simple manifestation on our part, in favour of the legitimate head of the state, that manifestation should be made by and by, and under a distincter probability of quiet efficacy than now exists. In the mode, there need be no interference properly so called; for we are certainly entitled to have our general views and purposes fairly stated in Durbar, and a civil letter from the Governor-general to the Rajah, saying that his Lordship had for some time past expected the agreeable news of his Highness's *majority*, would, under many probable phases of party, suffice.

In regard to the general effect (under ordinary circumstances)† of the anticipated change, my view is this: it would increase small and controllable evils, but would diminish great uncontrollable ones. The former have reference to the current duties of neighbourhood: the latter to the hazards arising to us out of the institutions and habits of this nation, with its undue extant means of offence.

Quoad the former, we have an enduring and sufficient remedy under all circumstances in our presence here. The

* Note of 1844. Bhim Sen, the then minister, had been plenary viceroy for years under several minorities, and had become too great for a subject. A Rajah, however, was now forthcoming, and expecting his royal rights, withheld by Bhim Sen, who could not or would not resign them. Hence my impression that Bhim Sen might plunge into war by way of ridding himself of his embarrassments at home.

† Note of 1843. Ordinary circumstances, mind you, and not the very extraordinary crisis which soon after occurred and led to all the rows with us, all things having by Bhim Sen been prepared for row with us. There was then a good chance that the Rajah would prove peacefully inclined; and if we had countenanced him ere he fell into the war faction, he might have done so perhaps: as it was, he became the tool of that faction, under a new and blind leader.

Durbar, however administered, *cannot* resume with effect that fraudulent system of injustice which it played off upon us without a moment's pause, until we had means of direct explanation with it at Cathmundu. But, no doubt, the signal and extraordinary *completeness* of the exemption which we have enjoyed, under this head, since 1816, must be, in part, assigned to the unity and vigour of the administration. And, as we can scarcely expect a like degree of vigour from future administrations, why we shall have more to do, but shall always be able to accomplish it.

True, the minister's administrative vigour has been, and is, of value to us, in maintaining order along our extensive frontier. But there can be no doubt, that the advantage has arisen *contingently*, and that it has come with more than a counterpoise of mischief; for, the precise measure and object of this administrative energy has been, is, and will be (if he continue in power) the *hostile strength* of *this state*.* Now, though I am quite sensible of the old evils (see Cornwallis's Instructions to Knox—a most curious and instructive document), and am quite certain that they would arise again to-morrow, in the absence of the appropriate check, yet as I know that that check (our presence here)† cannot be deprived of its essential efficacy, be the administration more or less weak, I look chiefly now to the new and uncontrollable evil of persistency by this state in its exclusively martial policy, in defiance of its situation. And, as for the reasons above stated, I feel sure that that policy would not be pushed with the present vehement and interested perseverance by the new party.‡ I make my choice, and from it calcu-

* 1844. This is the answer to those who laud Bhim Sen and blame me for not having supported him against the Rajah, with reference to the turbulent scenes after Bhim Sen fell. But, in the first place, I had no warrant to interfere; and, in the second, what is stated in this letter, and truly stated, is sufficient to prove that interference would have been as unwise as unjust. The Rajah was Rajah, and, besides, was then untried. We ought to have sustained him, perhaps, and kept him out of bad hands, but certainly *not* to have *then* taken part with Bhim Sen against him. If the Rajah proved unfriendly in the sequel, who but Bhim Sen had inspired him with unfriendly feelings towards us?

† N.B. There was no Resident in Nepal till 1816.

‡ Note of 1848. That is, the peace party, afterwards headed by me with such success, and to which it was then probable the young Rajah would adhere.

late a gradual relief in regard to what I have called and consider the great evils of the present day, the other or peculiar evils of past times being considered by me of no consequence, because now subject to specific and express control through the Residency.

There is one more general remark which it may not be out of place to make; and it is this. Experience *elsewhere* has led frequently to the apprehension of interference at *this* place, and has, perhaps, sometimes scared Government from the manifestation of sufficient firmness in regard to Nepal.

Now, I think it is desirable always to remember that there is no sort of parallel between this Residency and any other. Elsewhere, our connexion with foreign states is hampered with all sorts of illegitimate occasion and necessity for interference; here, there is not a shadow of a pretext or opportunity to interfere.*

Elsewhere, chiefs and people have an aptitude or indifference for foreign intervention; here, both are but too fiercely independent.†

Elsewhere, administration is rendered difficult by the vices of rulers and of subjects; here, there is an unsophisticated nationality, rendering administration a comparatively easy task; we have no popular commotions, no getting into debt by the government, nor any deferring of pay due to its servants, so that the administrative clock moves on almost without the touch of the Durbar's hand.

We have nothing, therefore, to apprehend here from that Residential interference which may have done harm elsewhere, because such interference *cannot be wanted*, and *would not be endured* here.‡

Believe me, yours very sincerely,

B. H. HODGSON.

J. COLVIN, *Esq. &c. &c.*

* Note of 1843. Interference is a vague word: we "interfered" in the sequel, but *not* with the *internal* affairs of Nepal *in any respect*, as was by Lord E. so ignorantly supposed. For the facts, see Despatch of June 22d, 1842.

† What is here urged is perfectly correct, and only shews the difficulties that were afterwards overcome in effecting the sort of interference then resorted to amid so independent a nation.

‡ N.B. of A.D. 1843. This letter, I trust, will afford satisfactory proof that I am no advocate, generally or particularly, for the policy of

No. XVIII.

PROSPECTS JUST BEFORE THE TURMOIL OF 1837-42.*

(PRIVATE.)

Nepal, July 15th, 1837.

MY DEAR SIR,—I trust no apology is requisite to the Governor-general or to yourself for forwarding you the enclosed.† Should the troubles I anticipate as possible or probable actually arise, I am persuaded the Governor-general would eagerly seek your counsel, as I am deeply

"interference;" though when Lord Auckland, at an unexampled crisis in *our* affairs (1837-42), decided in favour of that measure, as one of temporary necessity, I, as his agent, *contrived to make it work our object* for the nonce.[1] For the rest, this letter bears little or no relation to the specific and minute aspect of Nipalese politics during that crisis and up to 1842, but only points generally to the *root of all our troubles.* Bhim Sen fell soon after; and the weak Rajah proved too infirm of purpose to govern himself or his kingdom, in the total absence of that countenance which I would *indirectly* have afforded him, and, wanting which, he fell into the hands of the Kala Pandeys, another war party, and a vile set of ignorant savage ruffians, who perverted the dawning character of the Rajah, and would have destroyed his kingdom, but for Lord A.'s intervention, with the aid of his exasperated nobles. These, in 1840, when driven to extremity by the Kala Pandeys, joined the Resident; and they, together, prevented the Rajah from precipitating a war with us throughout the crisis of the next five years. Bhim Sen's merit was small in relation to *us*, save that he was an able minister and a wise enemy; for he it was who first put that false bias on the Rajah's character, which the Kala Pandeys availed themselves of; and he it was who accumulated those means of hostility which the Kala Pandeys would have directed against us. In this letter is likewise proof that if, in 1840, when we had a *casus belli* against Nepal, we struck *not*, there were grave and good reasons for it. For me, I merely obeyed my master, Lord Auckland, in the policy adopted; but I did so *heartily*, though I knew and FORETOLD that, whereas war would be a sure and easy way to fame for *myself*, "interference" must prove a most difficult and perilous work *for myself.* Alas! when Lord A. retired and Lord E. arrived, this very "interference," so onerous to me as the agent, caused MY *undoing, though it accomplished fully my Government's object.*

* Note of 1843. The Rajah in the sequel was unsupported by us, and he proved totally infirm of character owing to Bhim Sen's too severe coercion of him. Thus he fell into other and worse hands; and the troubles I had anticipated began with the crisis of 1837-42.

† Letter of 24th June, 1837, addressed to Private Secretary of Governor-general.

[1] See Despatch of 22d June, 1842: No. 2 of recent papers.

convinced his Lordship could obtain none comparable with yours elsewhere.

The first object of the letter is, by linking current transactions to the history, institutions, and habits of this country, to shew the bearing and true character of the former. If it be a great evil that Nepal should impend over our best and rudest provinces with a large and increasing mass of hostile means, it is pretty certain that this evil will not and cannot *speedily abate.* What in the *interim?*

The real object of this letter is, by exhibiting the essential positions and views of the ministerial and royal parties, to shew their probable relative merits in our regard. A change is expected in the Durbar; will it probably benefit us? I think so; arguing on the grounds stated, if the Rajah himself assume and retain an effective voice in the conduct of affairs.*

True, *both* parties are sadly infected with the natural propensity to perceive no possible honour or advantage to the nation, save by the old and so long successful way of aggression. True, both parties are sufficiently wroth with us, because we stand across this old way and bar it; bar it especially by our presence here, in that chosen and obvious mode of its prosecution, which answered so long and so well before our coming, I mean the plan of inch by inch encroachment, wherever and whenever, along our vast frontier, attention is relaxed, or is jaded by ineffectual appeals to an inaccessible Durbar.

It is a very striking and peculiar fact, that since 1816 the frontier has caused us no anxiety whatever, either on the score of stolen villages, or of harboured plunderers; *but that* this complete exemption has resulted *contingently* from a sage, but profound ENMITY; the minister felt that he must

* Note of 1843. The Rajah proved to be totally devoid of firmness and we let him fall passively into other and worse hands than Bhim Sen's: the Kala Pandeys seized the helm and urged the war policy; and the peace party, aghast with its violence, looked on, till I, by Lord A.'s orders, joined it, united and inspirited it, curbed the Kala Pandevs, and stayed an otherwise inevitable war. But for the *domestic* violence of the Kala Pandys war must have ensued, for otherwise no peace party could have been rallied round me, and as it was, 'tis wonderful that war was prevented from 1837 to 1842.

husband all his resources to recruit the losses of the war, and must avoid quarrels in the meanwhile, lest he should be again involved ere he had had time to recruit them.

He *has* now recruited them; and the problem is, what use he, or the other party here, which now seems likely to supersede him, will make of them? Both, as I have said, are sufficiently prone to mischief: but there is room for distinction upon essential grounds. And I cannot help thinking that, unless we mean to wait upon Providence, and quickly expect another war, we ought, if need be, to insist on effectual access to the legitimate head of the state,* who has, for many reasons, by far the greatest interest in peace and quiet. All others, scrambling for distinction and advancement, *must* gain them by and through the army, which is the beginning, the middle, the end! Hence the perpetual interested striving of these soldier-ministers to strengthen and increase the army. The Rajah has suffered as much as us by this system: and the Rajah is obviously the only man here who has enough of his own, if he hold it, and has, consequently, no interested perpetual craving for *personal advancement* in the *only* or *military line.* All others are *cupidi novarum rerum:* the Rajah, alone, may rest as he is; and he is just now one of the most prudent and intelligent men in Nepal. But, having been sadly restrained till lately, he wants firmness of purpose; and what I fear is, either that Bhim Sen, in his domestic straits, may draw the Rajah into quarrel with us, heedless of the result, so that it cover his own shame at home;† or that, if this minister recede before his master, another minister, like unto Bhim Sen, may usurp and abuse the Rajah's confidence.‡

Should either of these contingencies seem almost certain

* Note of 1844. That is, the Rajah whom we, from first to last, allowed Bhim Sen, the minister, to shut out from us, and make a cipher of: and thus the Rajah's character and views became perverted, whence followed all the evils of the subsequent crisis.

† He has been virtual ruler for thirty years, and cannot endure to be less; nor, perhaps, safely be so. (He spoilt the Rajah by too severe coercion, and his feeble master soon after fell into other and worse hands, and gave him up to the block when the row of 1837-42 began. 1843.)

‡ Note of 1844. So it proved in the event.

to arise, ought we to look on, when, by claiming our right of effectual discussion with the head of the state (in Asia, *Rex est* LEX) in open Durbar, we might indirectly, but successfully, sustain his Highness's own views and wishes, as to the external policy of the state; in other words, cause his superior sense of, and interest in, *quiet* to prevail there? And, again, should a dubious middle term of Rajah-Minister, or Minister-Rajah, presently result from the existing state of things, and Rajah turn me over to Minister, and Minister to Rajah (a very possible case), should we look on and let things go to wreck?*

And, again, should Bhim Sen retire, and new hands take the helm, without amendment, or promise of amendment, should we not, without reference to *parties*, at length express our sense of the hostile policy and unfriendly temper of the Durbar? In a word, I think that as risk cannot be avoided, the first risk would be the least;† and, that if we shewed our teeth firmly, yet civilly, the insolent, fraudulent, and overwhelming Gorkha, might yet be redeemed, though, if he be left a little longer "to sway it to the mood of what he likes and loathes," he will pass all chances of correction, save by the sword.†

Any suggestions and remarks with which you might deem yourself at liberty to favour me (so that I might thus the better do my duty), would be prized beyond measure, though I do not presume to expect any—far from it.

Yours very sincerely,

B. H. HODGSON.

Sir C. METCALF, *&c. &c.*

* This proved so, we looked on, the Rajah proved weak and fell into worse hands, and then came the crisis of 1837-42, and we had trouble enough with Nepal. 1843.

† So it proved soon after: there was a chance to have gained the Rajah ere the Kala Pandeys got hold of him: we neglected him and he fell into their hands.

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THE

OPINIONS

OF

LORDS WELLESLEY AND GRENVILLE,

ON THE

Pht-L

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,

COMPARED AND EXAMINED.

LONDON:
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THE OPINIONS, &c.

THE minister for India having declared in his place, that the momentous question relative to the future administration and commerce of India would not be brought under the consideration of Parliament in the present session, the time that is thus afforded us cannot be misapplied in taking a retrospective view of the opinions that were delivered by two of the distinguished statesmen who took part in the debates when the question was discussed in the year 1813, namely, Lords Wellesley and Grenville. The opposite views which were taken of the subject by these eminent men was the more remarkable, as upon all other questions, whether of Asiatic or of European policy, their opinions had been in strict accordance,

while a close degree of personal friendship was known to have subsisted between them from early life.

Lord Wellesley, whose brilliant career in the government of India, had given to his opinions a just claim to the attentive consideration of the legislature, proposed to vest in the East India Company, by a fresh legislative grant, all its former monopolies, in order to preserve that Company as the organ for the government of India. "It was his decided opinion that there "never was an organ of government in the world "so administered, as to demand more of estima- "tion, than that of the East India Company." —"If their Lordships looked at the general "state of our empire in India, if they examined "it on those heads on which the grandeur of "an empire rested, if they looked at the re- "moval of all foreign influence and intrigue, "at the suppression of all great dangers in that "country, at the regular consolidation of insti- "tutions and authorities, by which all were "brought into a common mass for the benefit "of the empire at large; if they adverted to the "state of solid peace in which countries were "now placed, that had at previous times been "constantly exposed to war and devastation, "they would see that the success of the admi- "nistration of the government of the East India

"Company had been productive of strength, "tranquillity, and happiness."—"No govern- "ment," he said, "had ever better fulfilled its "duties towards the people whom it governed, "than that of India."—"The existing system "operated most beneficially for the advantage "not only of the Company, but for that of the "empire at large." Lord Wellesley, therefore, deprecated any changes in that system, which should in the most remote degree operate to deprive the Company of those powers which were requisite to enable it to perform its functions effectually, as the organ of the government of India. He declared most solemnly that it appeared to him, from all the knowledge and experience which he had been enabled to acquire on the subject, that the trade to India was vital to the Company in their political character; he therefore dissented from the proposition which was then before the House for throwing open that trade to the enterprize and capital of the private merchant.*

These opinions were the more calculated to make a strong impression, because Lord Wellesley advocated the continuance of that system of government, under the mistaken direction of which, he had only a few years before been superseded in the government

* Parliamentary Debates, Vol. xxv. p. 675.

general; by which act all the advantages of his administration, and of the unexampled success which the energy of his character had given to his measures, were suddenly put to the hazard.

When a public man of such a character, of such high pretensions, and so wounded in his feelings, declared in Parliament that he considered the East India Company as the fittest instrument for conducting the government and commerce of India, it required the talents and authority of so distinguished a statesman as Lord Grenville to take up and sustain an opinion at variance with that of Lord Wellesley.

Lord Grenville prefaced his speech by informing the House that his attention had been called to the subject of India, upon his first entrance into public life. "Party violence then "raged with unusual fury, and the course of "events directed it particularly to this ques- "tion. It was on this very ground that the "government of the empire was disputed "between the greatest statemen of the age."*

His first acquaintance with it was improved by a lengthened experience as a member of the first Board of Control, which was established in 1784. And in after life, his freedom for many years from official avocations had enabled him to qualify himself "for the

* Parliamentary Debates, Vol. xxv. p. 722.

" awful duty, which had devolved upon Par-
" liament, by study and reflection; so that
" imperfect as my notions may be," said his lordship, " they are not brought before the
" House without long, diligent, and repeated
" consideration.*

" Other questions more deeply interesting to
" our own domestic concerns, affecting more
" nearly the prosperity or the safety of these
" Islands, may have occupied the deliberations
" of Parliament—one of such large, and almost
" boundless extent has certainly never yet
" been brought before us."—" My noble friend," he observed, adverting to the opinions of Lord Wellesley, " is anxious to determine it by a
" compendious and summary proceeding. It
" is his opinion that we should re-establish the
" now expiring system under which these
" great interests have been administered. He
" thinks, extraordinary as it may appear, that
" the Company is the only instrument through
" which the King and Parliament of Great
" Britain can safely administer their Indian
" empire. So strange, in his view of it, is the
" necessity of this unprecedented case, that
" we must carry on our commerce at a loss, in
" order to govern our empire to advantage.

" He compels me then to ask, what is in

* Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxv. p. 752.

" truth this practical and experienced good, to
" which all speculative wisdom must give way.
" For nearly twenty years after the acquisition
" of the Dewanny, the East India Company
" did really administer the political government
" of India. During that period, scarce five
" years—scarce three years can be found, in
" which the inherent vices of that form of ad-
" ministration did not forcibly compel the in-
" terposition of Parliament. Accordingly the
" law which passed in 1784, the very line of
" demarcation from which commences the
" good government of India—did actually com-
" mit the whole authority of the government
" to commissioners appointed by the crown."
" If therefore praise be justly due, as I trust it
" is, to those who for the last thirty years have
" administered those high interests, to the
" servants of the state, both here and in India,
" that praise is due."

" It was true, indeed," continued Lord Grenville, " that the government, during that " time, had been exercised in the name and " on behalf of the Company, as the Company " also has used the name of the Asiatic powers " whose misrule it superseded. But much " evil has arisen from this anomalous sys-
" tem—much evil to the natives of India—
" still more to the British interests in that

"country. Governments of mixed and am-
" biguous origin; executive and judicial func-
" tions, flowing from different sources; military
" and civil powers not subjected to the same
" control; and armies joined in the same ser-
" vice, but recognizing distinct command—have
" already too much distracted our Indian em-
" pire—they have repeatedly led to confusion
" and civil discord; and if I am not greatly
" deceived, their continuance menaces the ex-
" istence of our empire with dangers yet more
" formidable.

" Far from wishing to perpetuate these ano-
" malous arrangements, my judgment is en-
" tirely opposed to the continuance, under any
" form, of a system in which the character of
" sovereign and merchant are blended: they
" are characters every where incompatible in a
" cabinet, as in a trading company; as repug-
" nant to each other at Whitehall, as experi-
" ence has proved them to be in Leadenhall
" Street, and at Calcutta. Our former mea-
" sures would be deceitful guides: they were
" experiments never meant for permanence;
" to the extent and condition of our present
" Asiatic empire, they appear to me utterly
" inapplicable."

Lord Grenville begged the House to bear in

mind, that the administration of which he had been a member, "saw ample reason, during the "continuance of the last charter, to regret that "they had placed out of the hands of Par-"liament so considerable a portion of the "national interests."

The act of 1784, which Lord Grenville considered to be a new epoch in the government of India, had hardly began to operate, when the two authorities who, under it, were vested with the government at home, came into open collision, and as the circumstances which led to that contest, are strongly illustrative of the working of the present system, it may be advisable to state them somewhat in detail.

By a clause of that statute, the *Court of Directors* were specially directed to institute an inquiry into the origin and justice of certain debts which had been contracted by the nabobs of the Carnatic, as far as the materials in their possession enabled them to proceed, and these failing, they were further directed to order the government of Madras to complete the inquiry.

In conformity with this enactment, the Court of Directors prepared instructions for the government of Madras, directing them to institute a minute examination of the several claims;

declaring, at the same time, such an inquiry to be an *indispensable preliminary* to any orders for their payment.

The Board of Control, however, to whom these instructions had been communicated, set them aside, and framed others upon a directly opposite principle—namely, that of payment *without previous inquiry;* and ordered the assignment of a particular fund for the purpose.

By another section of the same act, the Court of Directors were ordered to decide upon the conflicting claims of the Nabobs of the Carnatic, and the Rajah of Tanjore; the Rajah having complained, that the orders issued by the Company in 1775, for the complete restoration of his territories and property, had only partially been fulfilled by the Nabob; while the Nabob himself refused to relinquish his claims upon the Tanjore territory.

The Directors, in fulfilment of the duty which the act had devolved upon them, decided that a portion of the territory claimed by the Rajah should be restored to him. The Board of Control overruled this decision, refused the restoration of the territory, and ordered the Rajah of Tanjore to pay a large sum as arrears of tribute due to the Nabob.

The instructions so framed at the Board of Control, of which Board Lord Grenville was

then a member, were transmitted through the Court of Directors to the government of Madras, notwithstanding the solemn protest of that Court.

This was the first instance in which, under the system of government introduced in 1784, the Court of Directors were compelled to set their hands to orders, which were in direct *opposition* to their own recorded sentiments.*

Another remarkable instance occurred in 1788, when the same Board of Control converted a sentence of *censure*,† which the Court of Directors, in a dispatch to the government of Madras, had passed upon the conduct of Mr. Petrie, then a member of that government, into one of *approbation*.

In 1793, Lord Grenville, as a minister, and a member of the Board of Control, was a party in the contest which took place between that Board and the Court of Directors, preparatory to the renewal of the charter, when the Directors, declaring that there were "unconquerable obstacles to prevent any increase in the consumption of the manufactures of Great Britain, except through the medium of the Company,"‡ resisted, for a time, the

* Burke's Works, vol. ii. p. 367.

† Asiatic Register, vol. xii. p. 249.

‡ Report of Select Committee of the Directors, 1st September 1791, p. 17.

proposals made by Mr. Dundas, then President of the Board of Control, for a partial opening of the trade to and from India. When they also resisted his proposition for permitting British merchants to export (under proper restrictions) British manufactures on freight in the Company's ships, to any cessions that might be obtained by the crown, under treaty with the Emperor of China, distinct and separate from the continent of China,* stating it as their unanimous opinion that any interference with the exclusive trade to China would be attended with the most injurious consequences, and ought, therefore, to be most strenuously resisted. The Court at the same time expressed an opinion that no British agent should be suffered to lend money for the "benefit of foreigners engaged in trade, or to trade themselves to any place whatsoever on this side the Cape except to Great Britain; and that such agents should not be permitted to interfere at the Company's factories in the purchase of piece goods."†

Lord Grenville was also engaged in the renewed discussions which took place between

* Papers relative to negociations for renewal of the Charter, 1793, part 7, p. 19.

† Papers respecting negociations for the renewal of the Charter, No. 3, p. 54.

the Board of Control and the Court of Directors in 1794-5-6, relative to the payment of the private creditors of the Nabobs of the Carnatic; the result of which was the compulsory transmission, by the Court, of orders prepared at the Board, of a tenor directly at variance with the Court's recorded opinions.*

He also took part in the more serious discussions which occurred between the two Boards in 1799 and 1800, when it was proposed to the Directors to admit of an extension of the export trade from India, and the admission of India-built ships to that trade; discussions which ended in an open collision between the two authorities, and in the enforcement of the orders of the Board of Control.

Finally, Lord Grenville as minister, in 1806, felt himself compelled to advise the crown to exercise the power vested in it by law, and to recal Sir George Barlow from the government of India, the Court of Directors having refused to nominate Lord Lauderdale, who had been selected for the office of Governor-General by ministers. After a tedious and protracted negociation, the question was compromised by the appointment of Lord Minto to the government-general, and by the nomination of Sir George Barlow to the government of Madras.

* Papers printed by the Company in 1797.

With this experience of the system of government, as established in 1784, we cannot be surprised that Lord Grenville should have had the conviction forced upon his mind, that its continuance was fraught with danger to our Indian empire, and that the only measure by which such danger could be averted was to give to the British crown that sovereignty over India in name, the essential attributes of which it already possessed.

Lord Wellesley, indeed, although professedly anxious, as we have seen, to preserve the Company as the organ of government, was yet constrained to admit, that the existing system would be materially improved by giving to the crown a more direct influence in the government of India.* "I have always thought," said his lordship, "that the power of the "executive government at home, over the exe- "cutive government of the Company, was de- "ficient both in strength and promptitude, and "that the Company's administrative power "would derive strength and dignity from the "influence of the crown."

In illustration of this opinion he alluded to "the serious evils which had arisen in India, "and which might arise again from a collision

* Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxv. p. 694, 695.

" between two bodies who share the powers of " government at home."

" A most essential point," he said, " was, " that the local government should know to " whom they were to be responsible. When " they had received instructions such as they " had formerly received, as to the most im- " portant system of policy which had ever been " applied to our eastern empire, such instruc- " tions might be *disavowed at pleasure*, as in the " important case in question *they had been.** The " local governments, as well as the Company, " should be controlled, but not by an amphi- " bious authority."

Lord Wellesley had experienced, during his own administration of the government of India, the mischievous effects of such a distribution of power; and if his lordship had been aware that the Court of Directors had framed a dispatch† expressive of their strong disapprobation of that system of policy which he had pursued, " a system," to use his own words, " founded " on a principle which, as experience had " proved, had diffused peace over regions which " were before all ruin and devastation, and " which had extended British dominion where " Christian voice had never been heard before;"

* Asiatic Annual Register, vol. vii. p. 293, 294.

† Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxvi. p. 927.

if, we say, he had been aware that the Court of Directors had censured that policy, and that the Board of Control had refused their sanction to such censure, he would not probably have expressed a doubt how far the "benefits which "had accrued from the existing system of the "Indian government were to be ascribed pre-"ferably to the power *of the crown*, or *to that* "*of the Company*." The fact demonstrates, that there could be no difficulty, as his lordship supposes there would be, in ascertaining accurately "the effect of each of these authori-"ties independent of the other, and the degree "of merit which belonged to each respectively "in the home government of India."

It is true, indeed, that the unceasing efforts of the Court of Directors did at length make such an impression upon the Controlling Board as to induce that authority to concur in the supercession of Lord Wellesley in 1805, at the moment when he was expecting to reap the substantial fruits of his enlarged and liberal policy, by the extension of British influence and the consolidation of our Indian empire, upon the basis which Lord Hastings, under a renewal of the same system of policy, was enabled to place it in 1818.

If Lord Wellesley had recurred to these facts, and had adverted at the same time to the strenuous opposition offered by the Court of

Directors to the liberal system of commercial policy which he had repeatedly and earnestly pressed upon their attention, he would hardly have hazarded the opinion that, "whether in a "political or a commercial character, the *Com-* "*pany's* government had been distinguished by "benefits conferred upon the people of India."

That system of commercial policy had for its main object the free admission of British subjects, native as well as European, to the trade between India and Europe, a privilege which had heretofore been enjoyed exclusively by foreigners. "Under the beneficial influence of "the British government in India," said Lord Wellesley, in recommending that measure to the Court of Directors, "the produce and manu- "factures of the British territories in India "have increased to an extent far exceeding the "amount which the capital applicable to the "purchase of the Company's investments can "embrace."

"The wise policy, the just pretensions, and "the increasing commercial resources and po- "litical power of Great Britain in India claim "for her subjects the largest attainable share "in the valuable and extensive commerce of "such articles of Indian produce and manufac- "ture as are necessarily excluded from the "Company's investment."

"The interests of the Company and of the

" British nation are undivided and inseparable,
" with relation to this important question.
" Every principle of justice and policy demands
" the extension of the utmost practicable faci-
" lity to the British merchants in India, for the
" export from India to the port of London, of the
" largest possible portion of the manufactures
" and produce of India," " so that the British
" merchants shall be enabled to enter into com-
" petition in the markets of Europe, with mer-
" chants trading in goods of a similar produce
" or manufacture, provided by foreign capital."

" Beneficial consequences of the utmost im-
" portance would certainly result to the British
" empire in India, from any considerable in-
" crease of its active capital, which is known
" not to bear a just proportion to the productive
" powers of the country.

" The necessary effects of such an increase
" of capital in India would be to augment the
" produce and manufactures of your dominions
" to the full extent of any possible demand.
" The high rate of interest on money applied
" to mercantile purposes, and the charge of the
" public debt, would in consequence be dimi-
" nished in India, while every source, both of
" public and private credit, would be propor-
" tionably improved."

" I shall await," said Lord Wellesley in conclusion, " the result of this reference with a " respectful but confident hope, that your " liberality will confirm, to all the interests af- " fected by this important measure, the lasting " enjoyment of those commercial and political " advantages which it has been my constant " endeavour, under your countenance and fa- " vour, to cultivate, to improve, and to extend."

In this expectation Lord Wellesley was disappointed; the Directors, upon the receipt of his letter, came to resolutions expressive of their entire disapprobation of the policy which he advocated, censuring at the same time the measures he had taken for its practical adoption, and signifying their determination to subvert it. Paragraphs of a dispatch, founded upon these resolutions, were in the usual routine of business transmitted for the sanction of the Board of Control; they were disapproved by that authority, upon the ground that they embraced points of great political importance, which might in their consequences deeply affect the interest of the state.

The Directors replied—" If the Board meant " to prohibit the transmission of the paragraphs " to India—the Court took the liberty of re- " presenting that such prohibitions appeared

" to them not to be within the legal exercise of " the powers delegated to the Board by the act " of 1793."

The Commissioners answered, that as the immediate effect of the transmission of such orders to India, might be to " prevent the pub- " lic from enjoying the full advantages of the " immense resources which the forests of India " may afford to the maintenance, strength, and " commerce of Great Britain," and as the " question was one of great magnitude and na- " tional importance, they must persevere in " withholding their approbation."

The Directors continued to press the paragraphs upon the Board, and remarked, that it was absolutely necessary that instructions should be sent out to the Governor General to prohibit him from persevering in a line of conduct which operated in a manner hostile to the rights of the Company.

The Commissioners interposed to prevent this censure from reaching Lord Wellesley, observing, that " under existing circumstances " it would be unnecessary to send out any " paragraphs, the tendency of which might " be to occasion uneasiness in the mind of the " Governor General, who, no doubt, acted " upon this occasion in the manner which he

" conceived to be most conducive to the advan-
" tage of his employers."

The Court of Directors having, in reply to this communication, stated, that it " *was* their " intention to convey to the Governor Ge-
" neral their marked disapprobation of his " conduct," the Commissioners were induced to bring the controversy to a conclusion, in a letter to the Directors, from which the following is an extract:

" The Board think it necessary that the " Court of Directors should explicitly under-
" stand, that however much it may be their " wish that their ideas of the interests of the " East India Company and of the public (in-
" terests in their opinion inseparable) should " coincide with those of the Court of Directors, " they are by no means disposed, for the sake " of securing that coincidence, to relinquish any " points by which they think those interests " may be promoted. They dare not show a " marked contempt for what may be the opinion " of the legislature—they dare not risk the adop-
" tion of measures which may counteract the " regulations of Parliament in a matter of great " political importance." *

* State Papers in Asiatic Annual Register, vol. iii. p. 1—138 ; vol. iv. p. 1—94.

The Directors, in consequence of this interference of the Board of Control, withdrew the obnoxious dispatch, and entered into a negociation with Ministers upon the great national question to which it related.

Lord Sidmouth, then Mr. Addington, in laying before Parliament the result of this conference, "expressed his regret at being compelled to say, that the Directors had not extended those facilities to the private merchants to which they were bound by the act of 1793, and if they had continued to show the disposition they had hitherto shown, he thought it would have become incumbent for Parliament to have interfered; but he had the satisfaction to state, that the Directors had declared their willingness to permit the employment of the India shipping in the present trade during the two next seasons, in order that a *fair experiment* might be made of its alleged advantages, or of the evils that were likely to result from it."*

The Minister stated to the House, that the propositions which had been agreed to were to serve as the basis of a *future arrangement*, to be modified according to the result of the pro-

* Proceedings in Parliament. Asiatic Annual Register, vol. iv. p. 336.

posed experiment, but the Court of Directors construing it into a final determination of the points in dispute, prepared drafts of orders to that effect to the governments in India, which rekindled the controversy between the Court and the Board of Control.

Lord Dartmouth, the President of that Board, upon the receipt of these drafts observed,— "I find most unexpectedly what I had con- "sidered as a matter of experiment, upon the "result of which the future regulations of the "private trade was to be formed, is in these "orders treated as a fixed and final determina- "tion, as a permanent system, not hereafter to "be departed from, as a regular code not in "future to be infringed, by which in every cir- "cumstance, and under all contingencies, that "trade is to be regulated." He in consequence altered the proposed dispatch in such a manner as made it conformable with the engagement into which the Directors had entered with the public.

Upon the receipt of the amended dispatch, the Court came to the following resolution:— "That the letter received this morning from the "Board, together with the commercial para- "graphs to be transmitted to India, when taken "together, demonstrate a decided and unequi-

" vocal intention of invading and destroying the " commercial rights and privileges of the East " India Company." *

No impression having been made upon the Board of Control by this resolution, the Court of Proprietors were called upon to applaud the conduct of their executive, and by implication to condemn that of the King's Ministers. This was accordingly done in a resolution which was prepared by Mr. Twining, then a candidate for the direction, and carried by a large majority.†

The respective parts which the Board of Control and the Court of Directors took in this important question, important as it related to the interests both of India and England, are to be traced with sufficient clearness in the correspondence from which we have quoted. The strenuous opposition given by the Court of Directors to a plan which professed to have the benefit of both countries for its object, probably led Lord Grenville to express the apprehension that " no trading company had ever ad- " ministered government for the happiness of its " subjects ; and to express at the same time his " invincible repugnance to the continued union " in any shape of the discordant characters of " merchant and sovereign."

* Asiatic Annual Register, vol. iv. p. 344

† Ibid. p. 393.

The serious conflict between the two authorities, to which our attention has just been directed, ostensibly arose out of that provision of the act of 1793, which exempted the commercial affairs of the Company from the jurisdiction of the Controlling Board. With the view of preventing a repetition of such disputes, the *commercial* department was by the act of 1813 placed under the superintendence of the King's Commissioners.

That act, however, had hardly passed, when the two Boards again came to an open rupture upon another point with relation to their respective powers.

In 1801, the Court of Directors had come to the resolution of dismissing one of their officers from the service of the Company; and in 1803, they directed the Governor of Madras to make him a reimbursement for certain articles with which he had supplied the army, when serving with it as commissary; that government, not understanding the instructions, wrote home for an explanation, which was given by the Directors in a dispatch, dated the 27th August 1807. The explanatory dispatch was, in the usual course of business, submitted to the Board of Control, who, on the 30th of May, 1808, returned it to the Directors amended. On the 11th of February, 1809,

the Court of Directors remonstrated against the proposed amendments, and upon the Board's signifying their adherence to them, the Court, under the advice of their law officers, which was given on the 4th of March, 1809, refused to send out the dispatch as altered, upon the plea, that the Commissioners had no legal authority to make the alteration which they had introduced.

No further steps appear to have been taken in the business for *three years*, when the Court of Directors, on the 12th of June 1812, were reminded by the Board of Control that the dispatch had not been sent out. No notice having been taken of this, the attention of the Directors was, after another interval of two years, in June 1814, recalled to the subject, upon which occasion the Court of Directors again questioned the right of the Commissioners to interfere, and declined to forward the dispatch. This resistance to their authority led the Commissioners to apply to the King's Bench for a mandamus, commanding the Directors to transmit the dispatch. The Directors upon this appealed to the King in Council, and that tribunal having determined in favour of the Commissioners, a writ issued from the King's Bench commanding obedience on the part of the Directors.

This was at length yielded, not however until another strong protest had been recorded by the Directors, in which the Board of Commissioners were formally charged with having usurped powers which the law did not recognize, and the Privy Council was accused of having acted with partiality.*

The subject was then brought before the Court of Proprietors, where, in the course of debate, it was observed, that not the smallest ground existed on which his Majesty in Council could call on the Court of Directors to obey the order of the Board of Control in relation to this dispatch; that Ministers ought not to be permitted to act contrary to the fair meaning of the legislature; that even the King in Council ought in every instance to act up to the spirit of the law; that the decision of the King in Council proceeded on a misrepresentation of the act of Parliament; that it assumed a jurisdiction dangerous to the Company; and no less dangerous to the empire, and gave the Board of Control an authority which they ought not to possess; that the Court of King's Bench had no right to be guided by the decision of the King in Council; that they ought to have looked at the act of Parliament, and to have given its just interpretation. The Proprietors

* Asiatic Journal, vol. i. p. 389—404.

were called upon strenuously to resist the dangerous encroachments of the King's government, which it was said threatened the very existence of the Company. They were reminded of the victory which the Directors had formerly gained when the Court of Directors contested the right of the Board of Control to insert the word "commercial" in a dispatch. The Proprietors, it was said, had, upon that occasion, rallied round the executive body, and had completely succeeded in *putting down the Ministers*, and arresting the baneful effects that must inevitably have been produced by their interference.*

May it not have been from the use of such language, that Lord Grenville was led to question the propriety of maintaining "within our "own government, and in the very heart of "its metropolis, *another government* of more ex- "tended influence?"

This contest between the two authorities had scarcely ended, when another commenced, which arose out of an alteration made by the Board of Commissioners, in a dispatch which the Directors prepared to send to India, on the subject of the restoration of one of their servants to an office from which he had been suspended by the government of Madras. After warm debates, and much altercation

* Asiatic Journal, vol. i. p. 388.

in the Court itself, a dispatch was agreed to, and submitted to the Board.—"That dis-" patch," said the Chairman, in detailing the proceedings to the Court of Proprietors, "was " altered in such a way by the Board, that the " Court could not agree to send it out in that " shape, and they thought it necessary to con-" sult the law authorities upon the question; " that proceeding of course occupied some time, " and the result of such reference to the law " authorities was the communication of that " result to the Board of Control. The Board " had now, as he had already mentioned, re-" turned their opinion; but the Court had not " yet found time to consider that opinion. " After all these proceedings, he hoped the " matter would now arrive at its ultimate " stage, when the Court of Directors would " come to a *definitive resolution*."

The Court of Proprietors, however, claimed a right to alter any dispatch upon this subject that might be framed by the Directors, although approved by the Commissioners, and suggested that the Directors should suspend the transmission of such a dispatch, until they had received the directions of their constituents. This claim was resisted by the Directors, with what success is no where stated.*

It is impossible to read the history of these con-

* Asiatic Journal, vol. i. p. 85.

tests without being reminded of the prediction uttered by Burke, when the present system for governing India was first proposed in 1784. "This scheme," he observed upon that occasion, "of reconciling a direction really and truly de- "liberative with an office really and substan- "tially controlling, is a sort of machinery that "can be kept in order only a short time. "Either the Directors will dwindle into clerks, "or the Secretary of State, as has hitherto been "the case, will leave every thing to them. If "both should *affect activity*, collision, procras- "tination and delay, and in the end, *utter con-* "*fusion* must ensue."* Sir John Malcolm, who quotes this prediction, acknowledges that its entire accomplishment has only been prevented by the temper, moderation, and knowledge of those who have been at the head of the separate branches of the Indian government.

The instances which have been adduced in the preceding pages, show too clearly that it contains within itself the elements of collision, delay, and confusion, and that when called into action, as they frequently are, harmony must be restored by an enforcement of the plenary powers which the law has vested in the Board of Commissioners. It is evidently a mistake, therefore, to represent the existing system as

* Sir John Malcolm's Political History of India, vol. ii. p. 97.

one of checks and balances, or to state, that the instructions for the government of India, which originate *pro formâ* with the Court of Directors, are generally acquiesced in by the Board of Control, without material alteration. The whole power of the government is in fact with that Board, and is exercised by them at their discretion: the only privilege left to the Directors, is that of offering suggestions, and of protesting when those suggestions are not adopted.

If, therefore, the government of India under the present system has, on the whole, been attended with successful results, that success has not been the consequence of the united management of the Board of Commissioners and the Court of Directors, but in consequence of the interposition of the Board in many questions of importance, when the Directors would have taken a course which would seem to have been at variance with the national interests.

The successful results of our administration in India, must, however, in fairness, be ascribed to the servants of the state in that country. It would be quite as irrelevant to the subject under discussion, to adduce the great achievements of Lawrence, Clive, Coote, and Warren Hastings, as proofs that the Court of Directors, under whose auspices they were achieved, was

an adequate organ for the Government of India, as it would be to quote the services rendered to the nation, since the establishment of the Board of Control, by Cornwallis, Wellesley, and Hastings, as affording satisfactory evidence of the excellence of the present system. The authorities in this country did indeed take an active part in establishing a permanent settlement of the revenue, and a system of judicature in India, and they are entitled to claim a fair share of any merit that may belong to those innovations upon the ancient usages of the country; but these measures can with no propriety be ascribed to a system which gives to one authority the name, and to the other all the attributes of government.

The question now to be determined is, whether the business of the India department is advanced or impeded by the double agency which is employed in conducting it? If, after considering the facts which have been detailed in the preceding pages, any doubt should remain on the subject, the selections from the India records which have recently been printed for the information of Parliament, may be referred to with advantage.

The first volume of these selections opens with a dispatch from the Bengal government, dated the 28th of October, 1808:—"Deeming

" the subject of your letter," says the Court of Directors in reply, " to be one of considerable " importance, both in itself and its collateral " bearings, we think it requisite to put you in " full possession of our sentiments upon their " contents." Nearly *three years* were nevertheless permitted to elapse, before the Court conveyed their opinions upon this important subject; for their answer to the letter is dated February 1811, and could not possibly have reached India before July of that year.

The next document in the selection is an extract of a letter addressed by the Court of Directors, dated the 27th of November 1811, the object of which was to caution the government against extending the principles adopted by Lord Cornwallis for the settlement of the revenue in the lower provinces, to the upper provinces of Bengal.

" We have perused," say the Court, " with " attention the report of the Commissioners in " the upper provinces, dated the 30th April " 1808, which only reached us in September " 1811, and the impression we have received " from it is, that the proposed final settlement " of the province would be premature, sup- " posing the arrangement otherwise to be com- " pletely unexceptionable."

In a dispatch dated the 5th September,

1808, the Bengal government informed the Court of Directors that the permanent settlement of the upper provinces was placed under the superintendence of the Board of Commissioners. The controlling authorities replied, that without the concurrence and direction of the Court, the permanent settlement was on no account to be concluded.

The Court of Directors having, for the first time, in a letter dated February 1810, noticed with disapprobation certain revenue arrangements which had been in progress since 1803, were informed, that the Bengal government had construed the *long silence* of the Court into an *approval* of their arrangements, and that to cancel them at that late period, if not an actual breach of faith, would occasion great discontent, and place the public tranquillity in jeopardy.*

In this correspondence may be traced the fruits of that system, which requires that before orders can be transmitted to India, they should be submitted, in the first instance, to a committee of the Directors. Having been discussed in that committee, they are sent to the Board of Control for revision; the amendments made at the Board of Control are again discussed in the committee of correspondence, and occasionally by the whole Court of Directors. If

* Selections from the East India Records, vol. i. p. 1—5, 134.

these alterations are acquiesced in, the process ends; but if disputed, the dispatch is again remitted to the Board of Control, with the reasons of the Court for objecting to it; and the Board, after having taken these objections into consideration, are empowered to issue their final instructions, which are imperative upon the Court. Every dispatch that goes to India is liable to this elaborate process, and the majority of them probably undergo it. Years are frequently consumed in controversies which have but one result—namely, that the Directors are eventually compelled to put their hands to orders which are known to be at direct variance with their own recorded opinions.

When we consider that the Directors, by whom this correspondence is conducted, are not brought together because there is any general agreement of opinion amongst them, or on account of any peculiar qualification for the important duties which they have to perform, but merely because they stand high on the list of the Court; when it is considered, moreover, that the whole agency employed in the transaction of this business is in a constant state of fluctuation; the president, members, and secretary to the Board of Control being renewed with every successive administration, whilst the chairman, the deputy, and a portion of the committee of correspondence, hold their respective

offices upon an annual tenure; that from this agency, persons of practical experience in the affairs of India are in a great measure excluded; and lastly, when we consider that Parliament is left in complete ignorance of every thing connected with the Indian administration, we shall be constrained to acknowledge, without imputing blame in any quarter, that a more defective system for managing the affairs of a great empire could not have been devised.

Except when at distant intervals public attention is called to some exploit of the Indian army, the affairs of India are scarcely mentioned in Parliament from one session to another; the consequence of this is, that when the subject is forced upon the legislature, there is an entire want of preparation among public men for the discussion of the momentous interests involved in it.

Nearly twenty-five years have elapsed since the financial state of India, with all the important questions connected with it, was submitted to the consideration of the House of Commons; Parliament is, in consequence, ignorant perhaps of the fact, certainly of the causes, which have gradually led to, and at length produced, a complete revolution in our commercial relations with India.

Among the reasons assigned by Lord Wellesley, in 1813, for not disturbing the system

of government and commerce which then existed, was the injury which he thought the manufactures of this country would sustain from an *inundation of the fabrics of India;** Mr. Francis had, only a few years before, predicted the most serious consequences to the mother country from the continued drain of specie from *England* for the supply of *India.*† But it is now well known that *India is inundated* with fabrics, the produce of the *British loom,* while a considerable portion of her territorial revenue is annually transmitted *from India in specie,* to meet the demands of the home treasury.

"Such remittances," observed Lord Grenville in 1813, "in whatever mode made, must "be detrimental in some degree to the pros- "perity of India. It is a drain for which no "return is made, but in protection and good "government; yet if conducted through the "channel of an open trade, and limited most "scrupulously in their amount, by a due con- "sideration of the country which supplies "them, I see no reason to believe them incon- "sistent with its rapid and permanent improve- "ment. The fortunes realized by all who "govern, and by almost all who trade, are at "no distant period remitted also to the metro- "polis. It is, indeed, this last circumstance

* Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxv. p. 680.

† Asiatic Annual Register, vol. vi. p. 360.

" which, in my judgment, is by far the most " alarming, in the nature of our own connexion " with India. How the pressure which this " produces *can ever be resisted, is a fearful consi-* " *deration.*" *

The pressure has greatly increased since Lord Grenville expressed this apprehension, not only in the amount remitted, but by the medium employed in remittance, which is in a great measure *bullion.* Whether these remittances have been regulated with a due regard for the country which supplies them, or what effect this continued and annually increasing drain of the precious metals must have upon the public revenue of India, and upon the great mass of the people who pay it, are questions which must necessarily engage the attention of the legislature.

We are bound, in the mean time, to consider without delay how that pressure is to be alleviated—" how," to use the words of Lord Grenville, " we may draw from India, without " injury to its prosperity, a just proportion of " revenue; in what manner we shall enrich the " metropolis without impoverishing the pro- " vince:" for the province must inevitably be impoverished unless we diminish the demands for remittance, by reducing the expenditure of the home treasury.

* Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxv. p 733.

If no other objection existed to the maintenance of a double agency for conducting the affairs of the Indian government at home, the expense attending it would alone be an adequate motive for inquiring into the expediency of a change.

The establishment of the Board of Control is annually submitted to Parliament, but of the much larger establishment kept up at the India-house no public return is made; that it must be very large is obvious from the duty imposed upon it, which is to make a digest of the voluminous records received from India, to prepare drafts of the answers to the dispatches referred to in them, and to transmit copies of these records, with the drafts, to the Board of Control; a labour rendered particularly onerous, because it is obligatory upon the governments abroad to make every transaction, however insignificant, a matter of written record.

Sir John Malcolm informs us, that "patronage forms the principal object of persons "who seek the direction, and their chief reward after having attained it."* The only check upon its exercise is the Court of Proprietors, over which the Directors, for reasons not necessary to state here, have for many years past exercised a preponderating influence. Is there not, therefore, good ground for appre-

* Political History of India, vol. ii. p. 119.

hending that the establishment at the India-house may be larger than is necessary for the performance even of those laborious duties?

The home, or "commercial patronage, is," as Lord Grenville informs us, "by far the most "considerable source of that great political in-"fluence which the Company exercise in this "country."* A very large portion of it is maintained for political purposes—that is, to enable the Directors to perform that share which the legislature has assigned to them in the government of India. A reduction of this establishment would be one means of lessening the demands of the home treasury, and would diminish in the same proportion the calls for remittances from India.

"It is well known," said Lord Grenville in 1813, "how great the influence of the King's "Ministers already is in the appointment of "those who are to exercise the supreme autho-"rities in India, whether civil or military."† That influence was much increased by the act of 1813, which gave the crown a direct negative in such appointments. Sir John Malcolm spoke from a thorough knowledge of the subject when he said that the act of 1813 "com-"pels agreement between Ministers and Di-"rectors, with regard to the persons selected

* Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxv. p. 723.

† Ibid. 724.

" for these offices;"* that is, the Directors are compelled eventually to accept a ministerial nominee—they may refuse Lord Lauderdale, but they must accept Lord Minto—they may reject Mr. Wallace, the alternative is Mr. Elliot —they may go so far as to nominate Sir John Malcolm, but the crown refusing its sanction to that nomination, they must consent to the substitution of Mr. Lushington.

As the form of nomination, however, remains with the Court of Directors, and as that body still possesses the means of obstructing the measures of the governors abroad, and even of proposing their recal, candidates for such offices find it politic in the first instance to canvass the Directors, and when their object has been gained, to propitiate that body by attending to the interests of their connexions in the India service.

Those connexions are numerous, because, as Sir John Malcolm has remarked, a seat in the Direction is chiefly sought for, as affording the means of providing for friends and relations. The Directors are, we learn from the same authority, paid in fact in patronage, and any curtailment of that patronage is sure to be looked upon as a deduction from their established wages.†

* Political History of India, vol. ii. p. 67.

† Ibid. vol. ii. p. 119, 120.

A portion of those wages must be paid to those friends who have been mainly instrumental in procuring the seat; namely, to the great houses of agency, who, it is well known, by coalescing, are able to insure the return of any candidate for the Direction. This demand must be satisfied before the Directors can find an opportunity of providing for their own connexions.

With these heavy calls upon them for appointments, it is not surprising that the Directors should be desirous of keeping up their patronage to the highest practicable standard. It is not, as Sir John Malcolm has justly observed, the fault of individuals, but of the system.

The Governors, on the other hand, from motives of personal gratification, as well as of political interest, are anxious to provide for the candidates who are sent to India. Hence, a multiplication of offices, and frequently the premature advancement of those who have the good fortune to have Directors or Ministers for their patrons—for Ministers, we must remember, bear their share in this initiatory patronage.

The motives which operate with the Directors, to allow of this ministerial participation, are stated with sufficient distinctness in the following extract of a speech delivered by their chairman, in the Court of Directors in 1809, when Lord Castlereagh was charged, in the

House of Commons, with having made this patronage subservient to his parliamentary interests.

"As to the point," observed the chairman, "which had been stated of their (the Directors) "violating the law, in allowing some patronage "to the President of the Board of Control, and "others of his Majesty's Ministers, he con-"sidered that minor sacrifices of this sort "might sometimes be essentially necessary to "the interest of a corporation like the East "India Company." *

It cannot be doubted but that the possession of this share of patronage, for a long period, as in the case of the late Lord Melville, might be made powerfully instrumental in aiding the parliamentary influence of Ministers. The same remark applies to members of the Direction, who are also members of Parliament; more particularly to those members who, from seniority, or other pretensions, are usually called upon to preside in the Court.

To that community of interest which exists, with regard to patronage, between Ministers and the Directors under the present system, and to the avowed necessity of propitiating the controlling authority, we must ascribe the establishment, in 1805, of an independent government in Prince of Wales's Island, and the

* Asiatic Annual Register, vol. ii. p. 232.

simultaneous appointment of a governor, commander-in chief, an admiral, a recorder, a chief secretary, and various subordinate functionaries.* After the exercise of this patronage for twenty-seven years, it was acknowledged that such an expensive apparatus for managing the affairs of a small island is not necessary, all the functions of the state being now united in the person of a single commissioner.

If India had been looked upon as a national concern, Parliament would probably have questioned the propriety of burthening the people of India with the expense of *three* supreme courts of judicature, consisting, as they do, of *three* judges in each, and a number of lucrative ministerial offices: such costly apparatus was obviously not necessary for administering English law to a few hundred Europeans, and it would hardly have sanctioned, deliberately, the means employed to give business to those tribunals, namely, the compulsory subjection of four or five hundred thousand natives to their jurisdiction.

If, again, the attention of Parliament had been habitually directed to India affairs, it seems probable that strong constitutional objections would have been urged to the grant, by the *Company*, of pensions to public men, in re-

* Asiatic Annual Register, vol. vii. p. 277. 308.

ward for services rendered to the state in India; because such men might be expected to take a conspicuous share in parliamentary discussions in which the Company would have a direct interest. The Lords Melville had both of them been so circumstanced. Lord Wellesley was actually in this predicament in 1813, and so would Lord Buckinghamshire have been, if he had not, upon his appointment to the India department in the preceding year, by his own act, placed in abeyance his pension during the time that he should preside at the Board of Control.

Four-and-twenty years have elapsed since the appointment of Commissioners both in India and in England, for adjusting the claims of private creditors upon the revenues of the Carnatic and Tanjore. What amount has been expended upon these commissions — and whether so many members are still required for investigating those claims—are questions which would long since have been thoroughly sifted by the Parliamentary Committee of Finance, if the salaries of the Commissioners, instead of being paid by the people of India, had been defrayed from the English treasury.

The patronage of these lucrative offices is in the Directors; but "it may be beneficial some-"times," to use the language of the chairman, in the speech before quoted, "to the Company,

" by placing such an appointment at the dispo-
" sal of a Minister, to show, that though there
" may be differences of opinion between the
" Court of Directors and the President of the
" Board of Control, there is no personal hos-
" tility between the parties."

The President of the Board of Control, actuated by the same motives, may, in return, bestow upon the chairman of the Court of Directors some mark of ministerial favour, or assist his views in obtaining a seat in Parliament.

A consideration of these circumstances, and of the important fact, that the Court of Directors has the power of conferring pensions to the extent of two hundred pounds per annum, without the sanction either of the Board of Control or of the Court of Proprietors, may have led Lord Grenville to state that the manner in which the India patronage is now exercised " contributes nothing to the security of the " British constitution."

" Far more constitutional would it be, in my " judgment," he proceeds to say, " that the re-
" sponsibility of the nomination of those who
" are to exercise the supreme authorities in
" India, whether civil or military, should openly
" attach on those who have, in almost every

* Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxv. 782.

" instance, for thirty years, discharged the duty " of selection."*

Although Lord Grenville expressed his conviction that the patronage of office *in India* should remain in the hands of the local government, he yet appeared to think that some additional checks might be necessary to prevent its abuse. It does seem extraordinary indeed, that while just suspicions have always been entertained, of any attempt on the part of the crown to appropriate this patronage, so little jealousy should be felt at leaving it in the hands of the local governors; for this patronage, enormous as it is in the amount of the salaries attached to the different offices, and of vast extent from the constant occurrence of vacancies arising from deaths and retirements, is not vested, as Lord Grenville supposed, in the government as a body, but is exclusively enjoyed by the governors.

When it is considered that each new governor has a new set of friends to provide for, personal and political, and when it is considered that the subjects of this patronage are entirely dependent upon the governors for appointments in the first instance, and for promotion afterwards, some provision of the legislature seems to be necessary for placing those who have not the advantage of special patrons out of the reach of

* Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxv. p. 724, 725.

favouritism, and to prevent at the same time the violation of the rule established by the acts of 1784 and 1793, of succession by seniority.

An adequate check might be found for the too frequent violation of this rule, if the Minister for India was obliged, with his annual budget, to submit to Parliament a return of all promotions and appointments made by the governors abroad within the year; and if the governors were enjoined to remit a brief extract of the services of each individual at the time of nomination, such a list might be referred to a Committee of the House, with instructions to make a special report on the subject.

Another effectual check would be the adoption of a suggestion made by the Court of Directors in 1820,* that the higher offices under the government should be eligible only to those who have served a certain number of years in the revenue administration of the provinces.

Such checks would prevent any serious abuses of the patronage of promotion in India; but abuse more or less must continue to prevail, unless an entire change be effected in the system under which the right of the initiatory patronage is exercised.

That there should be now nearly *one thousand Europeans* employed in the civil administration

* Life of Sir Thomas Munro, vol. ii. p. 14.

of India, is certainly no proof of our disinterested regard for the natives of that country. It is indeed only to be accounted for by the fact before adverted to, that the executive at home are paid in patronage, and have, therefore, a direct interest in multiplying appointments for the India service.

To the same cause we must trace the intricate and costly machinery by which the business of the government is conducted in India, where we have a board of revenue to manage one branch of the finance, a board of customs to manage another, an accountant-general to administer a third, and a finance secretary to conduct the correspondence between these subordinate boards, and the superior board, or board of council.

For the military department we have a military board, with a military secretary, and another military secretary for the medium of communication between the military board and the council board. A commercial secretary is maintained to answer the letters which are written by the secretary to the board of trade, which board has the superintendence of every thing connected with commerce.*

These boards, although fixed at the several presidencies, are supposed to control a host

* Returns of East India Civil Offices, printed by order of the House of Commons.

of European local administrators, who, under the name of commissioners, collectors, magistrates, judges, salt agents, opium agents, commercial residents, &c., administer affairs in the provinces. Of the proceedings of these nominally dependent, but really independent authorities, the government know nothing until they are officially advised of them by the respective boards, and then they know only as much as these boards may think it advisable to communicate.

As the communication between the different boards and the government is conducted in writing, this system of double agency multiplies records to a degree that is almost indefinite. If the government requires information upon any particular subject from the provinces, the ordinary course is, that the secretary to the government should write to the secretary of the board, the secretary of the board is to write to the provincial commissioner, and the commissioner is to write to the district officer; and travelling round the same circle, the information required at length reaches the local government; it is by the local government transmitted to the Court of Directors, and in due time finds its way to the controlling authority at Westminster.

The first page of those selections from the India records, from which we have already quoted, shows us at once the effects of this costly and intricate machinery upon the public interests. The Court of Directors are informed, in a letter from the Bengal government, dated the 28th October 1808, that the Board of Revenue and the Collector had been instructed in 1807, to carry into effect a regulation passed in that year for settling the revenue of the province of Cuttack for four years; but that as very little progress had been made by those authorities in preparing the information which was indispensably necessary for the due discharge of the duty in question, the government had been compelled to adopt another plan, and, with a view of guarding against the recurrence of the disappointment, to appoint a special commission to see it carried into execution.*

There must be something very faulty in a system, under which the Government can, as in the instance here recited, be left in ignorance of public events, deeply affecting the interests of the state; and that measures of importance directed by that government, should be defeated through the negligence of its subordinate officers.

In a despatch to the Bengal government,

* Printed Selections, vol. i. p. 1.

dated the 22d April 1818, the Court of Directors observe, " We cannot refrain from ex- " pressing our surprise that you should have " suffered three months to elapse after the fact " of the insurrection (in Cuttack) had come to " your knowledge, without making any com- " munication to us upon an occurrence so " deeply and painfully interesting; we repeat " our positive injunctions that we may not thus " be kept in ignorance by our local govern- " ments of transactions well known to the pub- " lic of this country from private letters and " public journals."

" We take this occasion of mentioning the " disappointment we have experienced at not " having received the report of the commission " which you appointed so long ago as the 24th " April 1816, for the purpose of obtaining full " and accurate information regarding the origin " and causes of the disturbances in Bareilly."*

But a still stronger instance of the pernicious consequences of an administration by a number of authorities, subordinate only in name to the government, is given in a dispatch to the Madras government, dated 16th December 1812, in which the Court of Directors express the regret they had felt " at the deficiency of the " information conveyed in the last letter of the

* Printed Selections, vol. i. p. 348.

" Madras government respecting the general " state of their revenues. We naturally ex- " pected, that after suffering an interval of " more than two years from the date of your " preceding letter, you would have made a " point of transmitting the most ample intel- " ligence that could be procured down to the " latest possible period. Whereas, in the dis- " patch lately arrived, we find no information " that might not, and ought not to have been " communicated much more fully at an early " period of 1811. The intention announced by " you of concluding a settlement of the land " revenue in the valuable and extensive pro- " vinces under the administration of your " government, involves considerations of so " much importance with respect to the future " resources of the state, as well as the pros- " perity and security of the actual proprietors " and cultivators of the soil, that we must ex- " press to you our surprise that you should " have determined to adopt an arrangement of " this kind, without having first informed us of " the success that had attended the experiment " you had already made of leases upon the " principle of three years, and thereby have " enabled us to convey to you our final orders. " If any thing could add to our surprise, it " would be the very extraordinary and unwar-

" rantable discretion assumed *by the Board of* " *Revenue*, as appears by their report of the " 30th January 1812, but which you pass over in " silence in the dispatch before us, of having, of " *their own accord*, issued instructions to the " collectors of several districts to form village " leases for the term we have described, to be- " come at the expiration of such term perpe- " tual, and this subject to no reservation what- " ever, rendering the permanency of such leases " conditional with respect to the eventual ap- " probation of the government at home."

The Directors concluded by ordering the Madras government to suspend the proceedings of the Board of Revenue, and to retrace their steps in every practicable case. These orders having been evaded, the Court of Directors again reproved the authorities at Madras, and express a hope that their reasons " may admit " of a satisfactory explanation, and that they " are not attributable to so reprehensible a " cause as a disposition on the part either of " the board or of the collectors, to defeat the " wishes and intentions of their superiors."*

This further reproof is thus noticed by the government of Madras: " The attention of the " *Board of Revenue* has been drawn to those " observations of your honourable Court."

* Printed Selections, vol. i. pp. 525. 536.

An example equally striking is given in a dispatch from the Bengal government dated the 7th of October, 1815, in which the Directors are informed that a copy of the Court's dispatch dated the 7th of November 1814, ordering a reform in the judicial system at that presidency, has been transmitted to "the Board "of Revenue and Commissioners, with in- "structions to report their sentiments generally "on the arrangement suggested by your ho- "nourable Court.

"We have left at the discretion of the "Nizamut Udalut, and the Board of Reve- "nue, and Commissioners, to call for the sen- "timents of the most able and experienced "officers respectively on the points noticed by "your honourable Court.

"On the receipt of the required information, "we shall have the honour to submit our sen- "timents in detail on the important questions "which form the subject of your dispatch of "the 9th of November 1814."*

One positive instruction of that dispatch of 1814, was to reduce the expense, and increase the efficiency, of the judicial departments, by substituting *native* for European agency to the greatest possible extent. Instead of obeying

* Parliamentary Papers, July 1, 1819, East India affairs, p. 65.

this instruction, and of furnishing the promised information, the Bengal government urged upon the Court of Directors the necessity of sending out *more Europeans* to be employed in the internal administration. In a dispatch dated February, 1824, the government of Bengal was reminded that up to that period *no one part of the instructions of* 1814 *had been carried into execution.*

For information respecting the general effect of our system of government upon the character, happiness, and prosperity of the people, we may refer with confidence to the unimpeachable testimony of Lord Hastings :—

" The present state of landed property in " Bengal," he observes, " may be brought under " review, as connected with the judicial admi- " nistration, since it appears to have originated " more from the practical operations of legal " decisions, than from the fiscal regulations of " this government. The powers which have " been assumed by the auction purchasers, " and probably by the original proprietors also, " as in the instance of the Rajah of Burdwan, " under the cover of summary suits, and the " still more summary process of ejectment, " have *completely destroyed every shadow of a* " *right in the tenants, and reduced a happy and*

" *comparatively rich peasantry to the lowest stage*
" *of indigence and penury.*

" We seem to have accomplished a revolution
" in the state of society, which has, by some un-
" expected fatality, proved detrimental to gene-
" ral morals, and by no means conducive to the
" convenience of our government. Since the
" first establishment of a Zilla Court in the
" year 1780, and from the regular organiza-
" tion of them in the year 1793, a new progeny
" has grown up under our hand, and the prin-
" cipal features which show themselves in a
" generation thus formed beneath the shade of
" our regulations, are a spirit of litigation which
" our judicial establishments cannot meet, and
" a morality certainly much deteriorated.

" If in the system, or the practical execution
" of it, we should be found to have relaxed
" many ties of moral or religious restraint on
" the conduct of individuals—to have destroyed
" the influence of former institutions without
" substituting any check in their place—to have
" given loose to the most froward passions of
" human nature, and dissolved the wholesome
" control of public opinion and private censure,
" we shall be forced to acknowledge, that our
" regulations have been productive of a state of
" things which imperiously calls on us to pro-

"vide an immediate remedy for so serious a "mischief."*

With a view of arresting the further progress of this mischief, the controlling authorities had in 1814 instructed the Bengal Government to introduce many important modifications into the system, pointing out at the same time the impolicy of attempting to extend it to countries which had recently come under our rule. The Commissioners who had been sent to inquire into an insurrectionary movement of a very serious character, which broke out in Barilly in 1816, frankly informed the government "that "our mode of managing the revenue, and ad- "ministering justice, was far from popular in "Hindostan—that our courts of judicature were "viewed as grievances by the higher classes, "and not considered a blessing by the lower.". They therefore recommended to the government to consult the people themselves, before any measures "solely intended for the pro- "tection and benefit of the natives should be "carried into effect."

But neither this wise counsel of the Commissioners, nor the energetic representations of the Governor-General, or the orders of the controlling authorities in England, made any impression upon the Vice President in council, who,

* Parliamentary Papers, East India Affairs, p. 157.

in the absence of Lord Hastings, then with the army in the field, caused the whole code to be established in the territories ceded to us in 1817, by the Rajah of Nepaul; and this measure was followed up by an application to the Court of Directors for an additional number of writers.

Upon these proceedings of the provisional government of Bengal the controlling authorities recorded the following opinion in a dispatch dated February 1819.

"After the anxiety which we have shown of "late years in our correspondence with your "government, particularly in our dispatch of "the 9th of November 1814, for a reform in "the administration of justice and police in "the territories subject to your presidency, "we cannot but view with astonishment the "sudden and unqualified extension of the ex-"isting system over new countries. With "the evidence which that dispatch afforded, of "the probability of its being shortly found ad-"visable to introduce many changes and cor-"rections into our system of jurisprudence, "before your eyes; its precipitate and unqua-"lified introduction into the '*Deria Doon*,' is "the more extraordinary."*

* Parliamentary Papers, p. 283

When we consider that the members of council owe their appointments exclusively to the Directors, and that many of them aspire to a seat in the Direction, upon their retirement from the service in India—an object chiefly dependent on the influence of the members of the direction for the time being,—when we consider, moreover, that the Directors are a permanent body, they being so in fact, though not nominated such for life, while the members of the Board of Control are liable to be changed with every revolution in the ministry, and that with a change of men may come a change of opinion,—we shall be constrained to admit, that under the present system, strong inducements are offered to persons so situated, to consult rather the known opinions of the Directors than their formal orders, particularly when those orders may, as in the case under consideration, go to prevent the increase of establishments.

That there is in the present system a tendency to such a result, appears obvious from a remark of Sir John Malcolm, who says, that although "the Court of Directors have not a "legal right to delay the transmission of the "Board's dispatches, still their condition as "the head of a branch of the Indian govern- "ment, and the means which they must pos- "sess as such, of *aiding* or *obstructing* the

" minor measures connected with any im-
" portant resolution which the Board of Control
" may adopt, must always make it a matter of
" solicitude and importance for the Board to
" carry this committee along with them :"* and in another place he justly remarks, that the Court of Directors, who cannot claim political power in the administration of British India, " should be debarred from seeking it through
" the means of their influence or patronage."

" From all experience," we continue to borrow the words of Sir John Malcolm, " since the
" first introduction of the present form of
" government, it appears unlikely that the Board
" of Control and the Court of Directors should
" ever cordially agree regarding the political
" administration of India ; and as their frequent
" disagreement must produce the worst of con-
" sequences, some means will probably be de-
" vised of making the authority which is actu-
" ally to direct and control the political affairs
" of India more efficient to its large functions,
" and of avoiding a collision at the very source
" of authority, which must, while it continues,
" spread weakness and distraction among all
" who are subject to it."

This opinion was given to the public in 1811, and all the experience of the last twenty years

* Political History of India, vol. ii. p. 95.

has tended to confirm the soundness of it. To what extent collision has occurred between the superintending authorities—to what height disputes have been carried between parties contending in the Direction; and what has been the result of such contests upon the public interests, can only be known by a careful examination of the records of the two departments since the renewal of the charter which is about to expire.

Such an examination would appear to be a primary duty of the committee which is now sitting upon India affairs; for it is impossible that Parliament should be able to determine whether the existing system shall be maintained, or another substituted, unless they have adequate information before them of the practical operation of the former.

It is, indeed, admitted by those who are still anxious to preserve the present system in its main features, that without considerable alterations it cannot go on, and that nothing but the temper and moderation of those who have been placed at the head of its separate departments has hitherto prevented the entire derangement of its functions.

By curtailing the powers now vested in the Board of Control, and adding to those of the Directors, as has been proposed by some, we

should undoubtedly aggravate the existing evils, for the two departments being then somewhat upon an equality, would be more disposed to contest than they now are, when the power is, in fact, all on one side. Such a proposition, moreover, pre-supposes the continuance of a double agency for the government, with the complicated machinery which belongs to it; and this would appear to be one chief cause of what is pernicious in the system.

The distance of India from England, the constant changes which take place, and which under every system must continue to take place amongst the European agents who are employed in the administration abroad, render it imperatively necessary that the organ of government at home should be more simple, more efficient, and at the same time of a more permanent character than it now is; that the instruments employed in directing it should, to a certain extent at least, be persons of extensive local knowledge, so that those who hold the reins at home may be rendered more competent to direct and restrain those, who in rapid succession, administer its affairs abroad.

In order to provide such an organ we must either re-establish the COMPANY's government, giving to the Court of Directors the plenary powers which they enjoyed previous to the act

of 1784, and reconstitute the Court of Proprietors as the Parliament for India affairs; or, to use the more emphatic words of Lord Grenville, "if we really wish the Company to re-
" assume the political government of India, we
" must repeal, not continue, the present laws;
" we must replace them, not by the successive
" improvement of new provisions, in principle
" still more liberal, in operation still more be-
" neficial, but by a recurrence to exploded
" errors, by the re-establishment of that fruitful
" source of all the former evil, by the re-enact-
" ment of that ruinous and oppressive system
" which, thirty years ago, was unanimously
" annulled by Parliament;" * or we must go one step in advance of the present laws, and administer the government of India in the name of the authority in which Parliament has already vested the power and the responsibility.

Although ministers were prevented, by the critical state of Europe in 1813, from proposing those changes which would have been necessary if they had determined to apply the remedy to the defects of the existing system which Lord Grenville had suggested—namely, to place the government of India under the direct authority of the crown; yet the intimate knowledge which Lords Buckinghamshire and Castlereagh, then the ministerial organs in

* Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxv. p. 723.

Parliament, had acquired in every branch of the subject, enabled them to state with confidence that there could be no difficulty in making the necessary arrangements for the transfer, should circumstances render it advisable to do so.*

Lord Buckinghamshire, indeed, distinctly stated, that "if the Company should reject the "propositions which would be made to them, he "was satisfied there could be no difficulty in "substituting the *name* of the crown for that of "the Company; and that means might be "easily adopted for placing the appointments "in India under that species of management, "which would not tend in any degree to injure "the principles of the constitution by increasing "the influence of the crown."†

His lordship's experience of the manner in which the correspondence with India was conducted, must have satisfied him that in order to render the Board of Commissioners, over which he presided, an adequate instrument for the government of India, all that was necessary was, that one of those Commissioners should be permanently attached as a member of the Board; that others of the Commissioners (supposing them to be duly qualified) should be made effective heads of the great departments into which the Indian government is divided - namely, the political, the military, the revenue, and the judicial.

* Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxv. p. 25.

† Ibid. vol. xxvi. p. 786.

The establishments now maintained by the Board of Commissioners, with such additions as might be found necessary from the establishments at the India-house, would, it is presumed, render that Board perfectly competent to the conduct of the correspondence with India, without the complicated machinery which now more than doubles the labour and the charge of the administration for India. The President of the Board, as a cabinet minister, would under such an arrangement still go out with his party, while the permanently attached member, with one or two other Commissioners who might be declared ineligible to vote in Parliament, would remain in office, by which means the serious inconvenience which is now felt from frequent changes at the Board would be avoided.

This is not the place for entering into details, but there would certainly be no difficulty in providing effectually for every branch of the Indian administration, by uniting to a certain extent the separate establishments which are now maintained at Westminster and in Leadenhall-street, while every objection on the score of patronage might be obviated by specific regulations.

While such a change would be one rather of form than principle, it would produce at once the inestimable advantage of a full and regular

discussion of Indian affairs in Parliament. Public men are now ill informed upon these affairs, because their attention is seldom drawn to them: there is, in fact, a national indifference to what has not hitherto been considered a national concern.

But if the President of the Board of Commissioners was in name and ostensible responsibility what he is in reality, the King's minister for the Indian department; and if, as an ordinary part of his duty, he was obliged to bring the affairs of that department periodically before the legislature, the subject would excite as much interest, and awaken as much intelligence as any other question, foreign or domestic.

Public men would prepare themselves for it by an attentive study of India and its affairs, the opponents of ministers would naturally provoke debates on questions connected with that country, and individuals would be brought forward to explain such details as might not be easily apprehended by persons destitute of local knowledge.

The public servants in India would feel that their conduct was under the inspection, and their interests under the guardianship, of the national legislature.

The pay of the army being first regulated by act of parliament, that body would be relieved from all apprehension of losing what they con-

sider to be their undoubted right, an apprehension prevailing now to an extent that threatens a repetition of those scenes which broke out at Madras in 1809, and which terminated, as Lord Grenville remarked, "in civil "discord, military resistance, and bloodshed."

India questions, as connected with the discussions in Parliament, would be taken up and brought prominently forward by the public press: information would in this way be elicited, and the affairs of India, which comprehend the policy, finances, commerce, and resources of a vast empire, and the interests of sixty millions of peaceful and industrious subjects, would gradually become familiar to Parliament, and the attention of the public mind be habitually turned to them.

A change in the system would seem to be advisable, not because it abounds in theoretic defects and anomalies, but because it contains within itself the elements of collision and delay —elements which are constantly called into action. This appears to be abundantly proved from the examples which have been given in this sketch of the practical effects of that system since its first establishment in 1784.

Referring to the discussions which took place in 1793, on the rights of sovereignty in India, Lord Grenville in 1813 expressed his opinion, that "a manly and distinct avowal of the so-

" vereignty of the British crown in India, is
" a point of the highest and most pressing im-
" portance, an indispensable preliminary in-
" deed, to the direct assumption of the govern-
" ment by the crown."

Mr. Canning concurred in opinion with Lord Grenville, and observed that " he could not see " the delicacy of the proposition, that whenever " British subjects acquire dominion, it was not " to be subject to the permanent dominion of " the empire."—" We had advanced little in this " business if it were now a doubt whether we " should be guided merely by expediency, or " acknowledge a right to take away the hands " of Parliament from touching the East India " territory."—" Fortunately, the right and power " of interference did exist in Parliament, who " would consider the whole question in all its " bearings, without heeding the exaggerated " pretensions of these lords of Asia, to domi-
" nions acquired by British enterprize, pur-
" chased by British sacrifices, and yet held by
" British arms."*

The revival of such pretensions, Lord Grenville said, could only be prevented by the establishment, without delay, of " the king's autho-
" rity, both civil and military, over India, as
" over every other part of his dominions, but
" with such strict and scrupulous limitation of

* Parliamentary Debates, vol. 26, p. 473, 474.

" patronage, as we know by experience, or may " conclude by reason, to be effectual against " abuse." *

The Ministers of the crown would then become responsible to the public for the effective superintendence which they now exercise over every branch of the Indian administration. " This check," as Sir John Malcolm observes, " has been found sufficient to the management " of the affairs of the empire of Great Britain, " and would appear equal to the conduct of the " political government of the possessions of that " power in India."

Having placed the government at home on the only " sure foundation on which it can " stand, the only solid principle on which we " can either discharge our duties, or maintain " our rights, we may proceed to inquire, " What system of British government *in India*, " shall carry to its highest pitch of attainable " advantage, our connexion with these vast " dominions."†

Such an inquiry, however, can lead to no satisfactory results, unless we acknowledge it to be our imperative duty to " consult in the " first instance the welfare of the country for " which we undertake to legislate."—" In a

* Lord Grenville, Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxv. p. 74.

† Ibid. 713.

"British House of Lords, I trust," continued Lord Grenville, "we are not deliberating on "the means of ruling sixty millions of men in "sole subserviency to our own advantage."— "Are we not bound, above all other consi- "deration to legislate for the moral improve- "ment of the people, for the security of their "property and personal freedom, for the undis- "turbed enjoyment of the fruits of their in- "dustry, for the protection and extension of "their agriculture, manufactures and commerce, "the peace and good order of their provinces, "and the impartial administration of their laws?"

How little progress has hitherto been made towards the accomplishment of these great objects, is shown but too clearly in the minute of Lord Hastings, from which we have already quoted. What has led to the great revolution, which he describes as having been effected in the condition and character of the great mass of the people under our rule, is a question which we must endeavour to solve, before any thing effectual can be done towards the introduction of a better order of things.

Lord Hastings has furnished us with a clue to this inquiry, by ascribing these melancholy results generally to our regulations; and if we look through those regulations to the machinery by which they are dispensed, we shall probably arrive at the root of the evil.

The urgent necessities of the government, arising mainly from the costly agency through which it is administered, has compelled us, from our first acquisition of territory in India, to keep up our demands upon the people for revenue to the high standard to which it had attained under the native governments. This has effectually prevented any improvement from being made in their condition, while the whole system of our rule has had a direct tendency to debase their character.

"The main evil of that system," said Sir Thomas Munro, who to the qualities of a great statesman united an enlarged experience of every branch of Indian affairs, "is the de-
"graded state in which we hold the natives.
"We suppose them to be superstitious, igno-
"rant, prone to falsehood, and corrupt; we
"exclude them from every situation of trust
"and emolument; we confine them to the
"lowest offices, with scarcely a bare sub-
"sistence; we treat them as an inferior
"race of beings. Those who under a native
"government might have held the first dignities
"of the state, who, but for us, might have
"been governors of provinces, are regarded as
"little better than menial servants, are often no
"better paid, and scarcely permitted to sit in
"our presence. We reduce them to this ab-

"ject state, and then look down upon them as "men unworthy of high station."*

Acting upon this opinion of our native subjects, we have engrossed every office of trust and emolument, and instead of employing the resources of newly-acquired territories as a means of alleviating the burthens which press so severely on the people, our first object has been to make provision for European functionaries, and for this purpose, we have gone on multiplying establishments, regardless of the lowness of our treasury, and of the just rights of the natives. Debts and difficulties have in consequence increased with the extension of our territory, until at length it is declared that a much larger revenue than was collected by Aurungzebe, is insufficient of itself to defray the charges of the empire.

Can we wonder at this, when we find that the salaries of the one thousand Europeans employed solely in the civil administration, amount annually to more than £2,000,000?

If the people from whom this large sum is drawn, had purchased with it a more efficient administration of justice, a more lenient system of revenue, and a better qualified agency for conducting public business, than their ancestors enjoyed; there might have been some compen-

* Life of Sir Thomas Munro, vol. ii. p. 184.

sation for the heavy expense which our establishments have entailed upon them, and for their exclusion from those offices of trust, which they alone filled under the native governments.

But Lord Hastings has informed us that the combined effect of our financial and judicial regulations has been to produce a complete revolution in the state of society, detrimental to general morals, destructive to property, and inconvenient to the government; and in order to form a judgment of the fitness of the agency employed in dispensing these laws, we must consult the opinions of those whose extensive personal experience enabled them to speak of it with confidence.

"Europeans," says Sir H. Strachey, "are "necessarily ill qualified in many respects to "perform the duties required of them as judges "and magistrates. I am fully convinced that "a native of common capacity will, after a "little practice, examine witnesses, and inves- "tigate the most intricate case, with more tem- "per and perseverance, with more ability and "effect than almost any European."

"I cannot think," observes Mr. E. Strachey, "an Indian would confide more in a European "than in a countryman of his own, if their cir- "cumstances were the same; but in this in-

" stance their circumstances are perfectly op-
" posite. Every thing combines to make the
" European honest and independent, and the
" native the contrary: reverse these circum-
" stances and I have no doubt their conduct
" would be reversed. As it is now, the Euro
" pean judicial officer may, I think, be justly
" charged with want of ability; things which
" relate to the ordinary transactions of life can
" be well understood only by those who are
" familiar with concerns of the same sort."

Mr. Ernst remarks, " that the natives have
" now more reliance upon the uprightness of
" European judges, than of judges appointed
" from their own people; but this distinction is
" chiefly to be ascribed, I think, to the une-
" qual footing on which the natives are placed
" in all official situations compared with Eu-
" ropeans. The remuneration of the native
" judges consists of a miserable pittance, sel-
" dom amounting to more than fifty pounds a
" year, and sometimes to less than half that
" sum; yet, with few exceptions, I have found
" reason to be satisfied with their conduct, and
" in point of diligence and capacity for the trial
" of such causes as come before them, I believe
" them to be quite on a par with most of the
" European judges. They get through more
" business, and in general I have found their

" decisions fair and satisfactory. If they re-
" ceived the TENTH PART OF THE SALARIES
" which are assigned to European judges, I
" have no doubt that their conduct would be
" so exemplary as to inspire the natives with
" confidence in their integrity."

Mr. Cox—" Judges appointed from the peo-
" ple would be more congenial to the natives
" from similarity of language and custom, often
" from professing the same religion, and enter-
" taining the same respect for the same laws
" and institutes.

" The natives view with jealousy all power
" and authority centering in Europeans, and it
" would be highly gratifying in them to parti-
" cipate in it."

Colonel Wilkes—" I conscientiously be-
" lieve that for the purpose of discriminating
" the motives of action, and the chances of
" truth in the evidence of the Hindoos, the
" entire life of the most acute and able Eu-
" ropean judge, devoted to that single object,
" would not place him upon the level with an
" intelligent Hindoo puneboyet."

" Colonel Walker—" The natives are of the
" same nature as ourselves; they have the
" same notions of right and wrong; and if they
" do not always act up to these fundamental
" tenets, the failure is more to be ascribed to

" the force of temptation, and the absence of " restraint, than to any want of principle : they " may, in respect of integrity, be trusted with " the administration of justice. Of their di- " ligence, talents, and capacity for business, " every person must have had many proofs, " who has ever transacted any considerable " affairs in this country. It is moreover a con- " sideration of the highest importance, that the " expense, even of the imperfect European " agency, exceeds what the public finances are " able to afford.

" In a civilized and populous country like " India, justice can be well dispensed only " through the agency of the natives themselves. " Should additional courts be necessary, the " increase ought to be made, not by employing " additional Europeans, but by establishing a " native court under a native judge. Such a " man would decide more causes than any " three European judges, and at least in as " satisfactory a manner."

Sir H. Strachey.—" Nothing is more com- " mon, even after a minute and laborious inves- " tigation of evidence on both sides, than for " the judge to be left in doubt respecting the " points at issue.

" It is my opinion that all the judicial func- " tions of Bengal might gradually be thrown

" into the hands of the natives, and that the " business would be as well conducted, under " our regulations, by the natives, as by Eu- " ropeans, perhaps better, and at one tenth the " expense.

" I am afraid that the Ryots, who compose " the great mass of the population, are *in all* " *respects*, but their exemption from personal " violence, in as bad a state as ever, and that " of late years they have suffered more from " exaction than they ever did before. Our " judicial system has failed in the most impor- " tant object of all law, the securing the great " body of the people from oppression." *

Twenty years have elapsed since the Court of Directors obtained the almost unanimous opinion of some of the most distinguished of their servants, civil and military, that justice might be as well, if not better, administered by natives than Europeans, and at one tenth the expense.

In the very year that opinion was given—namely, in 1813—the Bengal government made application to the Court of Directors for sixty Europeans, to be employed chiefly in judicial functions. In 1823 they made a further application for eighty, assigning " the flourishing " state of their finances " as one reason why

* Printed Selections, vol. ii. p. 1—121.

the demand should be complied with. They were upon that occasion reminded, that "when "the revenues of a state were more than "sufficient to defray the necessary expenses "incurred on account of its government and "defence, the people are entitled to look for "relief from part of the burthen." "We shall "nevertheless," the dispatch went on to say, "use every endeavour to comply with your "application to the full extent of the means "we possess, and we hope to be able to add "considerably to your usual annual supply." That hope was realized, and the Ryots of Bengal continue to pay a tax equivalent to half the gross produce of their lands.

With these facts before us, can we be surprised that the people of India should question our motives, in not only keeping up these costly European establishments where they have long had root, but in extending them to newly-acquired territories? can we be surprised that "the bulk of the people should attribute the "establishment of the system to national cus-"tom, while a few of the more reflecting ascribe "it to the desire of augmenting European pa-"tronage?"

If we turn from the civil to the military department, we shall find the same systematic depression of the natives. In our first despe-

rate struggles for empire, under Lawrence, Clive, Calliaud, and Coote—when the sepoy was constantly liable to come into collision with the European soldier, he fought our battles manfully under his own native officers, who were instructed and encouraged by an European commandant and one or two subalterns; we have gradually increased the number of European officers as our enemies have become less formidable, until at last, although natives have now only natives to contend with, we have rendered it utterly impossible for them ever to rise to command.

It must be obvious that by persevering in this system, while we continue to exact from the natives a high revenue for the payment of expensive establishments, we "shall not consult "the welfare of the country for which we un- "dertake to legislate, or do any thing towards "the moral improvement of its people." *

"That work of improvement," says Sir Thomas Munro,† in whatever way it may be at- "tempted, must be very slow, but it will be in "proportion to the degree of confidence which "we repose in them, and to the share which "we give them in the administration of public "affairs. While their prospects are so bounded, "every project for bettering their characters

* Lord Grenville, Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxv. p.

† Life of Sir Thomas Munro, vol. ii. p. 184.

" must fail; and no such projects can have the " smallest chance of success unless some of " these objects are placed within their reach, " for the sake of which they are urged to exer- " tion in other countries."

To natives of rank and liberal education no temptation is now held out which can induce them to engage in the service of our government; not only are the emoluments offered scanty, but the want of confidence in them, the general light in which they are viewed, cannot fail to inspire them with dissatisfaction and disgust. A very little consideration will be sufficient to show that no circumstance can tend more strongly than this to impair the efficiency of our government, and to render its duration precarious.

" This admission of natives to offices of " honour and profit is the only mode by which " they can be effectually conciliated." By the higher classes of society their exclusion from the paths of honourable ambition must ever be considered a severe injustice, and the lower orders, taking their tone from their natural superiors, will in time be taught to consider it as a hardship that all their affairs are administered by strangers. At present there is no organ by which government can communicate with the people, can act upon their minds, or claim their co-operation in any public measure.

" The question here is not one which relates " to the integrity or the capacity of the natives, " it relates to the unerring laws and feelings " of human nature." The Romans, whose business was conquest, may be safely taken as guides in the art of holding nations in subjection; that wise people always left a great share of the administration of the countries they subdued in the hands of the natives. The Mussulmans followed their example, for under most of the Mahomedan governments of Hindostan the higher offices in the civil administration, particularly in the departments of finance, were frequently filled by Hindoos, who in society maintained a perfect equality with their conquerors.

We have followed a policy directly the reverse; the consequence has been the gradual extinction of the officers of the old government, the decay of many of the most respectable native families, and a general deterioration in the native character. In return we have given them a judicial system ruinously expensive, and utterly unsuited to their character and usages, and a settlement of the revenue under which the Ryot is burthened in perpetuity with a tax equal to half the gross produce of his lands.

Under such a rate of tax it is impossible that capital should accumulate, and without

capital the native of India can never become a consumer, to any extent, of British manufactures. The people of England have therefore a common interest with the people of India in introducing a more economical, and at the same time a more efficient government into the territories of that vast empire.

The practical statesman, who desires to deal with this great question of Indian government with a view to its settlement upon such a basis as shall be conducive to the interests of both countries, will see the necessity of ascertaining, in the first place, under what system of government the empire was administered before we obtained possession of it, and what were the results of that government upon the great mass of the people.

Instructed by history that Hindostan, before the Mahomedan invasion, had reached to a higher pitch of order, riches, and population, than it has since attained—that vestiges of public works, both of utility and ornament, are to be found throughout India, which afford indisputable evidence of the existence, at former periods, of tranquil and prosperous governments, both under the Hindoo and Mussulman dynasties—instructed by the same authority that violations of person and property were frequent, if not habitual, under those governments—that

gross corruption often prevailed—that a high revenue was exacted, if necessary, with the aid of the rack and the thumb-screw—he will set himself diligently to inquire into the causes which led to prosperous results on the one hand, and to odious abuse on the other.

If, in the course of such inquiry, he should be led to conclude, that it was not *owing* to the laws, institutions, and usages of civil government, under which the natives of India had lived from a remote antiquity; but from a *violation* of those laws, both by the Hindoo princes and their Mussulman conquerors, that every vice of the native governments is to be traced—he will, perhaps, see reason to regret, that instead of endeavouring to provide against a recurrence of this abuse, we should have broken the whole machine to pieces, for the purpose of constructing another, after the models of our own country.

If he should find, that under the Mussulman government of Suja Khan, and of Saadut Oola Khan, and recently under the Hindoo governments of Poorneah and Allia Blye, in Mysore and Malwa, person and property were better protected, and justice more speedily and effectually dispensed than in the territories of the British government—if he should find, at the same time,

that the introduction of our regulations produced a serious insurrection, in Cuttack, where the internal administration was so good, even under the notoriously bad government of the Mahrattas, that little or no business was found for our judges, when they first visited the province;—the statesman upon whom the arduous task of proposing a plan for the future government of India has devolved, may question the propriety of maintaining the costly and intricate machinery of our present system, which by delegating the powers of government to subordinate boards, cuts off the executive from all communication with the people, and which, without reference to their opinions, habits, and circumstances, compels them to pay large salaries to two European functionaries, for doing very imperfectly the duties, which under former governments was done, for a small stipend, by one native.

One thing is certain, that no amelioration can be made in the condition of the people, until the administration is placed upon a more economical and, at the same time, a more efficient footing. The foundation, therefore, of improvement must be laid in a self-denying ordinance, by which those in whom the patronage of India is vested, shall be restricted from

exercising it, until there shall be an absolute necessity for a further supply of Europeans for the civil and military administration of India. Our object should be to give to the natives as large a share in that administration as may be consistent with our own ascendancy. —" All real military power must be kept in " our own hands; but they might, with ad- " vantage hereafter, be made eligible to every " civil office, under that of a member of the " government:* the change should be gradual, " because they are not yet fit to discharge " properly the duties of a high civil employ- " ment, according to our rules and ideas; but " the sphere of their employment should be " extended in proportion as we find that they " become capable of filling properly higher " situations."

The first step towards improvement in the constitution of the government in India would appear to be to free the Governor-General from all details of administration, and thereby enable him to exercise with effect his high functions of superintendence and control over every part, and over every department, of the empire.

We might then proceed to provide a remedy for the frequent abuses which are found to prevail in the provincial administration, under the

* Life of Sir Thomas Munro, vol. iii. p. 58.

present system of Boards, which interfere between the government and the executive officers; placing all departments, within a certain range, under a deputy of the Governor-General, exercising such powers as were formerly vested in Lord Cowley, when, as Mr. Wellesley, he was Lieutenant-Governor of Oude; and more recently by Sir John Malcolm in Malwa, by Mr. Elphinstone in the Deckan, and at this moment, it is believed, by the Resident at Dehli.

One Deputy Governor for Bengal Proper; another for the upper provinces of Bengal; a third for Central India; a fourth for Bombay, the Konkan Poonah, and the southern Mahratta states; a fifth for the territory extending from Aurungabad to the Kishna; a sixth, for the central provinces of Madras; a seventh for the southern and western; and an eighth for the northern provinces and Cuttack;—would be sufficient for the supervision of the whole administration, civil and military, within their respective circles, and these officers should form the only direct channels of communication with the Governor-General.

All the details of the revenue, judicial, and commercial departments might be left with natives, subject to the effective control of a European superintendent for each district, aided

by native assessors as a council, not of control but of advice.

The superintendent and his native assistants might, at the same time, exercise the functions of a court of appeal. And in order to provide an adequate tribunal for the trial of cases between Europeans residing in the provinces, the superintendents of districts might be authorized to call in military officers as assessors.

The deputy-governors should be required to prepare, in a prescribed form, and in duplicate, periodical reports of the principal transactions, within their respective jurisdictions, one to be transmitted to the Governor-General, the other direct to the authorities in this country.

Such reports, drawn up in a shape that would admit of easy reference to the different subjects contained in them, would not only facilitate correspondence, but would enable the authorities in this country to exercise a wholesome check on the proceedings of the Governor-General; while that great functionary might be further controlled by a Privy Council, to be composed of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Bishop, the Commander-in-Chief, and the principal officers of the government.

The ministerial officers now attached to the supreme government would continue with the Governor-General; while a secretary, with deputies, would be an establishment sufficient

to enable the lieutenant-governors to keep up their correspondence with the district-officers, and with the Governor-General.

If the principle of such an arrangement for the government of India should be approved, the establishments which were employed by Sir John Malcolm and Mr. Elphinstone, when they administered the governments of Malwa and of the Deckan, might be taken as a guide for those of the proposed subordinate jurisdictions.

As such an arrangement would involve an entire remodelling of the governments of Madras and Bombay, and the abolition of all subordinate boards and agencies, the expenses of the civil administration might, it is presumed, be reduced nearly one half; while the government itself would be made infinitely more efficient and more palatable to the natives than it now is.

The saving, indeed, would be still larger, if the legislature should see fit to release the natives from the compulsory jurisdiction of the supreme courts, for one supreme court at each of the presidencies would then be sufficient. There are now two—the King's Supreme Court, and the Company's, or Sudder Adawlet.

An increase would however be necessary in the military department, as in the event of intrusting natives with some degree of command

in regiments, it might be necessary to increase our European force, both in men and officers; so that upon occasions of emergency, officers might be drawn from the European regiments, to do duty with the Sepoy battalions.

An augmentation of the pay and allowances of the European commandants of those battalions would also be advisable; but the additional expense which this would occasion might be met, by employing the natives largely in the civil duties of the commissariat, and by exercising every possible degree of vigilance over the military contingent expenses, which always press with peculiar severity upon our finances.

The consolidation of the armies of the three presidencies into one body, placed under the King's immediate protection and command, appears to be indispensably necessary, in order to put a stop to the jealousies which prevail, not only between the King's and Company's officers, but between the officers of the three establishments. We should then hear no more complaints of the honours awarded to the Bengal army for a service of six months' duration at Bhurtpore, and the refusal of such honours to the Madras army, who were employed in three harassing campaigns in Ava.

"This army," says Lord Grenville, "might be

" taken as a distinct force, preserving to it all its
" local character and local advantages, securing
" to it a complete parity of rank and promotion
" with the King's general army, and blending
" only the staff of both into one body of gene-
" ral officers, qualified by commission as well
" as by merit and service, and called by habi-
" tual and indiscriminate appointment to exer-
" cise command over British troops in every
" quarter of the world. I regard the difficulty
" of settling the military establishment of India
" on any other secure or satisfactory footing,
" as most powerful recommendation of the
" arrangement I have suggested (namely, the
" establishment of the King's authority over
" the government of India), I might rather say,
" as a decisive argument for its adoption."

It may be asked, what provision is to be made for those who, under the contemplated arrangement of the government, would lose office in India? The answer is this, that it would be for the advantage of the people of that country to continue to pay *for a few years* the present amount of revenue, in order to make a provision for such functionaries as might be obliged to retire, provided a *future reduction was ensured to them*, as the consequence of a government more economical, and administered by their own countrymen. The accumulations of the retreat

funds, after providing for all valid claims upon them, might also be appropriated to this purpose, and there cannot be a doubt, that by an economical arrangement in the military contingent expenditure, means would be found for defraying this temporary charge, and when that shall cease, provide a fund that might be made applicable to the improvement of road and water communications, objects of the greatest importance, when the extent of the empire, and its distance from the mother country are considered.

It has been already stated, that without a reduction in the rate of assessment capital cannot accumulate, that without capital there can be no very considerable increase in the consumption of British manufactures in India; and that the people of England, therefore, have a common interest with the people of India in introducing every practical degree of economy into the government; because "there exists, "between them a close connexion, a necessary "and mutual dependence."*

Moreover, in proportion as the administration is confided to natives, in the same degree does the danger from colonization diminish, because the more the character of the native is elevated, the more capable does he become of resisting

* Lord Grenville.

oppression. When he feels himself in some degree upon a par with the European, he will be disposed to cultivate habits of social intimacy with him, and to receive, without jealousy at least, every effort that may be made to impart the arts and sciences of Christendom.

If, in the arrangement which is now about to be made for our eastern empire, the principle laid down by Lord Grenville should be adopted, that the natives of India, as "subjects of the same sovereign, members "of the same community, submitting themselves with equal obedience to the same "legislature, are entitled to receive from it "the same protection: varied, indeed, in form, "and adapting itself in its regulations to the "differences of local situation and moral character, but directed always with an *impartial* "*hand* to the same common object, that of "promoting the strength and greatness of the "whole, by carrying to the utmost practicable "height the prosperity of every part;"—then we may hope that what has been asked for them may be granted, under a conviction that there exists between England and India "a "close connexion, a necessary and mutual de"pendence;" and that, in consequence, what confers benefits upon the people of one country

must eventually prove advantageous to their fellow-subjects in the other. *

"There is one great question," said Sir Thomas Munro, "to which we should look "in all our arrangements,—what is to be "their final results on the character of the "people? Is it to be raised, or is it to be "lowered? Are we to be satisfied with merely "securing our power and protecting the inha- "bitants, leaving them to sink gradually in cha- "racter, lower than at present, or are we to "endeavour to raise their character, and to ren- "der them worthy of filling higher situations in "the management of their country, and of de- "vising plans for its improvement? It ought "undoubtedly to be our aim to raise the minds "of the natives, and to take care that when- "ever our connexion with India might cease, "it did not appear that the only fruit of our do- "minion there, had been to leave the people "more abject, and less able to govern them- "selves than when we found them.

"We should look upon India not as a tem- "porary possession, but as one which is to be "maintained permanently, until the natives "shall in some future age have abandoned "most of their superstitions and prejudices, "and become sufficiently enlightened to frame

* Life, vol. ii. p. 174.

" a regular government for themselves, and to " conduct and preserve it. Whenever such a " time shall arrive, it will probably be best for " both countries, that the British control over " India should be gradually withdrawn. That " the desirable change here contemplated may " in some after age be effected in India, there " is no cause to despair. Such a change was " at one time, in Britain itself, at least as hope- " less as it is here. When we reflect how " much the character of nations has always " been influenced by that of governments, and " that some, once the most cultivated, have sunk " into barbarism, while others, formerly the " rudest, have attained the highest point of " civilization, we shall see no reason to doubt, " that if we pursue steadily the proper mea- " sures, we shall in time so far improve the " character of our Indian subjects, as to enable " them to govern and protect themselves.

" With what grace can we talk of our pater- " nal government, if we exclude our native " subjects from every important office, and " say, as we did till very lately, that in a " country containing fifteen millions (under " the government of Madras) of inhabitants, no " man but an European shall be entrusted " with so much authority, as to order the pu- " nishment of a single stroke of a rattan?

" Such an interdiction is to pass a sentence of " degradation on a whole people, for which no " benefit can ever compensate. There is no " instance in the world of so humiliating a sen- " tence having ever been passed upon any " nation. We profess to seek their improve- " ment, but propose means the most adverse to " success. The advocates of improvement do " not seem to have perceived the great springs " on which it depends; they propose to place " no confidence in natives, to give them no " authority, and to exclude them from office as " much as possible; but they are ardent in their " zeal for enlightening them by the general dif- " fusion of knowledge.

" No conceit more wild and absurd than this " was ever engendered in the darkest ages; for " what is in every age, and every country, the " great stimulus to the pursuit of knowledge, " but the prospect of fame, or wealth, or power? " or, what is the use even of these great attain- " ments, if they are not to be devoted to their " noblest purpose, the service of the commu- " nity; by employing those who possess them " according to their respective qualifications in " the various duties of the public administra- " tion of the country?"—" Let Britain be sub- " jugated by a foreign power to-morrow; let " the people be excluded from all share in the

"government, from public honours, from every of-
"fice of high trust and emolument, and let them
"in every situation be considered as unworthy
"of trust. All their knowledge, and all their
"literature, sacred and profane, would not
"save them from becoming, in another genera-
"tion or two, a low-minded and deceitful race."

"In proportion as we exclude the natives
"from the higher offices, and from a share in the
"management of public affairs, we lessen their
"interest in the concerns of the community,
"and degrade their character. It would cer-
"tainly be more desirable that we should be ex-
"pelled from the country altogether, than that
"the result of our system of government should
"be such a debasement of a whole people."

THE END.

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A LETTER

TO

THE CHAIRMAN

OF

THE HONOURABLE COURT OF DIRECTORS

OF THE

Phl-5

East-India Company.

BY MAJOR-GENERAL LODWICK,

LATE RESIDENT AT SATTARA.

LONDON.

1840.

954.03

PELHAM RICHARDSON, PRINTER, 23, CORNHILL.

A LETTER,

ETC. ETC.

HONOURABLE SIR,

AMONG the papers contained in the numerous volumes relating to Sattara, which are lying on the table of the Court of Proprietors, I find the secretly recorded grounds of my supersession as Resident.

As these concealed reasons differ from the declared ones, and these papers impute to me disqualifications which are confessedly alike a reproach to me and to the Government that appointed me; I am constrained again to address you on this still open question, and to pray of the Honourable Court to bear with me whilst I vindicate myself, and to grant me such redress as my statements will justify, and the nature of the case admits of. Sir R. Grant's Minute, Mar. 30, 1836.

When I recollect that the author of my wrongs is in his grave, I enter upon this task of vindica-

tion with extreme reluctance, and had the allegations against me been left to slumber on the records of the India House, known only to the Honourable Court, of whose uniformly favourable opinion of my forty years' service I am assured, delicacy for the dead might have induced me to stand on my character as my best defence; but when I find these charges introduced to the notice of that society which takes most interest in Indian affairs, and may form its opinion of me and my administration at Sattara from assertions and insinuations, in the truth of which I cannot acquiesce; this consideration cannot hold me to silence, though it shall lay on me the obligation to say that only of which I possess the proofs, or which is otherwise beyond the reach of contradiction.

I commence with the unqualified admission of the Governor's right to remove political officers, with or without reason assigned; and no one would have laid down his power more cheerfully than I should have done, had Sir Robert Grant been ingenuous enough to say, that his policy and mine were so opposed, that it was impossible we could act together; and I shall the more readily be believed, when I add that it was my intention to have retired in six months, as I informed the Governor in my interview with him on the Hills in April, 1837.

The Sattara papers were seen by me for the

first time on the 22d of June, 1840, and I then, for the first time, became acquainted with the only specific act charged against me; and which, though the Governor recurs to it again and again, in justification of my removal, he studiously concealed from me. This is his language: "The "neglect of the Resident, Colonel Lodwick, to "report to Government the hostile feelings which "have for some time past evidently existed in the "mind of his Highness against the British Go- "vernment and himself, although, in November "1835, he saw sufficient grounds to warn the "Raja of the risk he incurred by indulging in "such feelings." And Sir Robert Grant adds, in another place: "Had it been known to Govern- "ment that the Raja was in the habit of in- "dulging in conversations the most hostile to "the British Government seven months before— "that there were rumours of his being invited "to join a conspiracy against us—and that in "the opinion of a highly respectable native, "devotedly attached to the British Government, "he might very possibly be flattered into an "acceptance of such invitation,—the effect might "have been to save his Highness from the cri- "tical predicament in which he is now placed."

Secret Consultations, 12th Dec. 1836.

Minute by Sir Robert Grant, dated 3d July, 1837.

As the above passages contain the most serious charge that Sir Robert Grant has ventured to record against me and to conceal from me, I

will subjoin, by way of answer, a narrative of the circumstance to which he alludes.

Resident's Letter to Government, dated August 18th, 1836.

In November 1835, Ballajee Punt Nattoo, a British and, as I then thought, faithful adherent, of whose influence I had availed myself in the settlement of the affairs of one of the Raja's feudal chiefs, visited the Raja of Sattara, and, in the course of a visit to me, observed that the Raja and his intimates were in the habit of conversing about the probable fall of the British Government. He then observed that there was some rumour of a plot formed by the neighbouring feudal chiefs subordinate to the British Government, and particularly by the Chief of Sanglee and the Raja of Colapoor, and that the Sattara Raja might be talked over to join in it; but that I should be enabled to establish the truth or falsehood of his report of the Raja's being about to join in such conspiracy, by his Highness intimating to me his intention to join a hunting party on the borders of those states, or his visiting those chiefs on his annual tour during the next four months.

I ascertained that this information came from the Raja's brother, and I attached proportionately less credit to it; but I employed a trusty spy, who accompanied the Raja's suite during his tour, from whom information was regularly sent me; and his Highness neither went upon the

hunting excursion nor visited either of the two chiefs alluded to; and this part of the report made no more impression until five months afterwards, when the attempt to seduce two native officers recalled it to my mind, and gave it some little importance.

With regard to the conversations, however, said to be held at the Palace amongst the Raja and his favourites, and after the evening durbars, (for such was the remark or information as given to me by Ballajee Punt Nattoo), I thought it right to speak to the Raja in confidence, and he positively denied the truth of what I had heard.

Having then applied to the report of the intended meeting, the very test by which my informant told me I should ascertain its truth or falsehood; and the result of that test being quite confirmatory of its utter falsehood, it would have been both premature and improperly distrustful to have given importance to a false report of a meeting which I ascertained never to have taken place; and a project which I then believed, and still believe, to have existed only in the malicious hearts of the Raja's enemies; for I then knew that there was a deadly personal animosity between the Raja and the Chief of Sanglee, which was of long standing, and had been exasperated by mutual insult, and embittered by a religious feud between their castes; that there was a lurking jealousy between the two Rajas of Sattara

and Colapoor, said to be then, for the first time, coalescing, that of Colapoor having under Lord Clare's government refused to receive a visit of ceremony from his brother Raja of Sattara; and that the Raja's brother, from whom the information came, was at enmity with his brother, because he discountenanced his vices, and as this brother and Ballajee Punt, my informant, afterwards became the prosecutors of the Raja in the proceedings which have led to his dethronement, and the one now reigns in the Ex-Raja's place, and his coadjutor, Ballajee Punt, is his Dewan or minister, it is clear I was right in receiving with extreme caution their information against the unfortunate prince, and in upholding the Raja until I could discern something tangible, or at the least credible.

I remarked on the conversations imputed to the Raja, in that friendly spirit which had guided all my predecessors in their intercourse with him; and which must exist towards a prince so helpless as the Raja of Sattara, from a power so vast as that of the British Government in India; and seeing how frequently I availed myself of my confidential interviews to offer him my advice and warning, I am not sure that I should have reported his indiscretion, even if he had confessed it; knowing as I do, and as every person who knows any thing of India, does also, that political speculation is the only subject of conversation

with native princes, besides their own immediate affairs—that they all watch with anxiety the result of every struggle between the British and themselves; and that the favourite topic throughout India now is, and then was, whether Russia shall ultimately assume that position there, which Great Britain now occupies. But when the Raja denied the language ascribed to him, and I had proved the falsehood of the corresponding actions imputed to him, it would have been puerile to have magnified into a conspiracy against the British Government, what was, in reality, a conspiracy against the Raja himself.

I cannot here avoid noticing the unfairness of Sir Robert Grant's Minute; in which he gives the substance of my Report of August 18th, 1836, so far as concerns the information I received, relative to the conversations at the Palace, and the supposed intention of the Raja to join a conspiracy; but studiously omits the remainder, *even of the paragraph*, of that Report which details the denial of the former by H. H., and the proofs above mentioned, that no conspiracy had been entered into by him, as follows:—"H. H. positively denied the truth of my information; and as he did not receive visits from the Colapoorkur, or Chiataman Rao during his tour through the districts, I concluded that my informant might have been mistaken."

Resident's Letter to Government, Aug. 18, 1836.

Minute by the Governor, dated 8th April, 1837.

The next charge in respect to importance stated by Sir Robert Grant to his colleagues against me, and concealed from me, is: "That I "had not afforded any proofs of my possessing "that tact, vigour, and dexterity necessary to "cope with the intrigues of a native Durbar."

Private Letter from the Earl of Clare, dated August 5th, 1840.

The only direct denial I can offer to this is the testimony of the Governor who appointed me. The Earl of Clare has stated his opinion, with permission to make use of it in my own behalf, as follows:—"I appointed you Resident at his "Highness's Court, because I believed you to be "well qualified for the situation; and during the "three years you held it under me, I was, and "had every reason to be perfectly satisfied with "your attention to your duty, and with the "manner in which you conducted yourself as "Resident." I have also received repeated letters in approbation of my proceedings from the Bombay Government, and even from that of Sir Robert Grant; and on no occasion one of reproof; and as these are on the records of the India House, to them, in disproof of this charge, I confidently refer the Honourable Court.

Sir Robert Grant in the same page in which he speaks of my want of "dexterity, &c.," has acknowledged my "zeal, quickness, and ad- "dress," and I must therefore conclude the real truth to be, that I was only wanting in "tact" to

countenance, and "dexterity" to execute, the particular measures proposed to me—and now that the embarrassment in which these measures ultimately involved both the British and Sattara Governments has been seen, it will be admitted that no tact, no dexterity, could have sufficed to uphold the Government of Sir Robert Grant in the estimation of the Raja, and to induce him to be restrained or guided by it. I proceed to give a hasty sketch of the treatment which provoked him to the contumacy and disaffection for which he has since been dethroned and exiled.

Soon after Sir Robert Grant's accession to the Bombay Government, your Honourable Court ordered that the Raja's claim to the reversion of the estates of the feudal chiefs, of whom by treaty he was the Sovereign, and who held their title-deeds from him under British guarantee, should be admitted.

Honourable Court's Public Letter to Bombay Government, dated September 25, 1834.

This claim had been rejected by the Bombay Government after a discussion that had irritated and distressed the Raja, but in which I had uniformly and strenuously advocated his cause; feeling satisfied that the terms of the treaty were not doubtful; and that the enlightened statesman, Mr. Elphinstone, who framed it, and to whose decision the Raja had specially appealed, would, on hearing that a doubt had arisen, declare that its words must in justice be interpreted in favour of the weaker state, to whom the

strong one had dictated its own terms, in its own language.

Your Honourable Court's orders, which reached the Raja in April, 1835, run: "In default of "heirs by birth or adoption, the obligation of our "guarantee ceases, and the Jageers must lapse to "the Raja;" and on the occasion of a visit that the Raja immediately afterwards paid to the new Governor, it was determined that he should submit a statement of the estates, the reversion to which, under the recent orders of your Honourable Court, he considered as his right; and which statement Sir Robert Grant promised to transmit without delay to your Honourable Court; the original decision of the Government being meanwhile enforced by the seizure of a Jageer, which had lapsed, and being situated within the Sattara boundary, the Raja claimed on an assurance said to be given by Mr. Elphinstone, that such small Jageers would lapse to him. In two months I submitted the statement in which the Raja claimed to have your orders executed, specifying the estates to which he considered them to refer.

Resident's Letter, dated July 3, 1835.

His Highness awaited the result with extreme anxiety, constantly inquiring of me when he might expect the decision that would have soothed the feelings which had now been excited four years, under the apprehension that his treaty would be violated by the Bombay Go-

vernment; and no pains should therefore have been spared to disabuse the Raja of his unfavourable impressions of the British authorities at Bombay.

At the expiration of a year the Raja repeated his visit to the Governor, in the hope of terminating his extreme anxiety in respect to the execution of his claim to these estates, by hearing that the decision of your Honourable Court had arrived, or was expected.

When his Highness put the question to the Governor, he, after considerable hesitation and consultation with his secretary, answered (in the language of that secretary which Sir Robert Grant has adopted as his own) that, "The question had "been referred home: it was impossible to specify "when a reply would be received, but that the "question would again be brought to the Court's "notice and an early answer requested;" intimating, however, that "it had not been accom- "panied by any discussion of its merits on the "part of the Government."

The Governor's Note to the Resident, dated Sept. 25, 1836, in my possession.

Minute by Sir Robert Grant, April 27, 1837.

The instant I saw the Raja after this interview, he said he perceived the reference to your Honourable Court had never been made at all; and exasperation against the Governor and that contempt for the Government of Bombay then commenced, which ultimately worked his ruin. The Raja never afterwards appealed to them, but

always from them, and spoke of them as having infringed his treaty and robbed him of his rights.

Your Honourable Court will find on these papers much labour lost to prove "the mistake "into which the Raja had fallen about the communication made to him with respect to the "non-transmission of his claim," for ever after that interview he spoke of his claim as having been kept back by the Governor in breach of his promise and of the treaty.

Sir R. Grant's Minutes and his Note to me, dated Sept. 26, 1836, in my possession.

But there was no mistake at all. The hesitation of the Governor in answering, or the knowledge the Raja had that no such paper had passed through the secretary's office, or perhaps both, satisfied him that his grievances had been neglected; and the result proves either the accuracy of his information or his penetration in detecting truth, under whatever disguise it is presented to him, for the Governor afterwards confessed to his colleagues, that by my *letter of July* 3*d*, 1835, submitting the Raja's complaints, "having been "unaccountably mislaid, it had not been so "referred;" "but I also found," he proceeds in extenuation, "that in the case already mentioned "of Sheik Khan Mahomed, the claim of the "Raja on which the merits of that case entirely "turned, had been distinctly referred to the "Court; and I have only to regret that I did "not add, which I might truly have done, that

Sir R. Grant's Minute, dated 27th April, 1837.

" the reference had taken place ten months pre-
" vious to our interview, and that an answer
" might be shortly expected."

For the credit of the British name I rejoice that this subterfuge did not occur to the mind of Sir Robert Grant in time to be used by him; for the Raja could not have failed to remember that his claim did not turn on the merits of the case of Sheik Khan Mahomed, which related to a distant estate held of the British Government and not of the Raja; and the Raja could not have given Sir Robert Grant credit for the unparalleled promptitude with which he regretted to his colleagues, he did not say he had transmitted the statement to your Honourable Court; for "ten months pre-
" vious to their interview" the claim had not even reached his hands.

It is vain, however, to speculate on the means which might have been resorted to in order to deceive the Raja. It is sufficient that, in point of fact, this—the most important case that Sir Robert Grant ever had before him—was forgotten and " unaccountably mislaid," and the Raja knew it; and that the Governor was indiscreet enough to fix in the prince's mind his previous impressions that he had been neglected; by the public declaration that he (Sir Robert Grant) " had not accompanied his claims by any dis-
" cussion of their merits," and by declining the Raja's repeated invitation to Sattara; the accept-

ance of which I assured the Governor would, at that particular time, go far to soften the Raja's embittered feelings, as noticed in my Memorial to your Honourable Court, dated July 20, 1837, such an omission being a departure from the policy of Lord Clare, Sir John Malcolm, and Mr. Elphinstone, whom Sir Robert Grant professed to have taken as his "pattern," Lord Clare having even thought it right to send an apology to the Raja when the exigences of the public service prevented his Lordship visiting him at Sattara as soon as he had wished; so important a part of the Governor's duty was attention to Asiatic etiquette considered by Sir Robert Grant's predecessors.

In proof that I have not exaggerated the effect that this sad interview had on the mind of the Raja, in irritating him and alienating him from the Government; I have but to mention that he only returned to his capital to appoint an agent of his own to convey his opinions to your Honourable Court; and that he openly avowed this violation of the 2d article of the treaty, and justified it on the plea, that the proper channel had been closed against him. I have appended my despatch to the Government, dated June 20th, 1836, announcing this the first breach of faith on the part of the Raja, and expressing my "hope that I might be honoured with early "instructions as to the line of conduct I was to

Appendix A. Letter from Resident, June 20th, 1836, with Yad from His Highness, and substance of a Conversation between the Raja and the Resident.

" adopt." It will be seen that on my demanding an explanation from the Raja, he said that—
" The subject had been a source of unhappiness
" to him for four years; that he was told, no
" representation had been made to your Honour-
" able Court: that his food was hateful to him,
" and he had no happiness; that he had entrusted
" an agent with his case; that the measure was
" not in violation of good faith, and there was
" no more impropriety in it than in the mission
" to England by Sir John Malcolm, when he
" had a dispute with the Supreme Court; and
" that to prevent the chance of future miscon-
" struction, he proposed to lay his claims before
" you; and eventually to bring them to the no-
" tice of his Majesty and Parliament; but that
" he should not carry his measures, which he
" did not wish to conceal from me, into effect
" for four months."

The Raja naturally thought that this open and insulting avowal of his determination to resent the British infraction of the treaty, by a movement of the same kind, would have awakened Sir Robert Grant to the danger; and the Raja tauntingly asked me, whenever I saw him afterwards, whether I had received any answer? But I never received an answer from my government—unless a simple acknowledgment of the despatch, nearly a year after, may stand for a reply—and in the mean time the Sattara state took the second

hostile step; and a man named Govind Rao, one of the Raja's favourites, (but not his dewan or minister,) made an attempt, by interviews with two native officers of the 23d regiment, to draw the British troops stationed at Sattara from their allegiance. This was detected and reported by me to the government on the 22d July, 1836, being more than a calendar month after I had urgently called on the government to vindicate their insulted dignity.

Resident's Letter to Government, July 22, 1836.

Sir R. Grant's Note to me, Sept. 26, 1836.

The Governor excused this second instance of neglect to me, by the expression that the Raja's hostile declaration, submitted with my letter of June 20th, 1836, "had hung fire a little," and "that in ten days or thereabouts" after the receipt by him of that letter, I had "sent the first news of the present plot," (as the interview with the native officers was ever afterwards called,) and that he "then suspended the other question,"—and to his colleagues he excused himself by a candid acknowledgment, "that such delay "should not have occurred; but that pressure of "business in the first instance, and perhaps his "inexperience in the manner of it, prevented his "giving the subject that attention which its im-"portance at that time certainly demanded."

Sir R. Grant's Minute, 27th April, 1837.

Sir R. Grant's Minutes.

And in answer to my memorial, addressed to your Honourable Court, he attempts to diminish the number of days which he actually neglected the affair. But whether Sir Robert Grant had

the case before him more than a month, as it would have been had he been at the seat of government, or only "ten days or thereabouts," in consequence of being at his country residence, the delay to the Raja was the same, viz. thirty-two days; which was long enough to embolden him to follow up his hostile demonstration, knowing, as he did, that neither Mr. Elphinstone, Sir John Malcolm, nor Lord Clare, the only British governors H. H. had known, would have allowed his resolution to break the treaty and terminate his subordinate relation, to remain as many hours unnoticed as Sir Robert Grant confessedly paused days—knowing as they did that unless the first spark of disaffection in a native Indian state is promptly extinguished, it will kindle into a flame, in which our weak ally must be inevitably destroyed.

Here then I pause to reiterate what I never failed to repeat in every subsequent communication, public or private, to Sir Robert Grant,—that his want of consideration for the Raja's grievances, and of energy in meeting the insult, he, in consequence offered him, were the sole causes of those overt acts of hostility for which chiefly, he has been dethroned.

Appendix B. Copy of my Letter addressed to Sir Robert Grant, dated Sept. 13, 1836, but returned by Private Secretary in Oct. 1836, &c. &c.

The system was now changed. All was energy in devising schemes by which the plot should be matured and detected; for which I should have been at a loss to account, had I not

Private Note and Memorandum in my possession.

been told that in a hasty moment, "a report of "the case had been sent to the Supreme Government and to the Court of Directors; with an "assurance that the Government placed full reliance on the testimony of the native officers; "that many persons of weight went so far as to "think the Raja ought to be sent to Bombay to "have his conduct investigated, and that possession should be taken of his country; but that, "at all events, the affair could not be quashed, "and the question was—how to make the inquiry "most effective? though it was feared nothing more "could be expected from the Raja;" and a paper of hints was sent to me, suggesting "that the "native officers should ask to see the Raja—tell "him they had heard their part of the plot had "been discovered—beg that he would protect "them, either by advancing money to escape "with, or a pass under his hand and seal to "insure them service—that if he gave them money the evidence would be strong—if a paper, "convincing. If, however, he should give them "up to me, with loud complaints of calumny, in "this case I was to pretend to secure them; and "suspicion being hushed, an opportunity would "be afforded of securing the principal agents."

Paper of Hints in my possession.

Honour and honesty, being my motto in public as in private life, I spurned such shifts as these; and left the plot to develop itself, without secretly tempting the Raja to afford me proof of his

having aided it, determining to demand the delivery to me of the persons accused, whenever the matter should transpire, and to take no active part in the Raja's ruin. At the proper moment, and in exact conformity with instructions which I had demanded from the Government, I went to the palace, informed H. H. that some of his subjects were accused of plotting against the British Government, and required them to be delivered over to me. In an hour from that time they were at the Residency—the Raja giving them up instantly. As, however, at an earlier period and before the Raja had committed himself by seeing the native officers at the palace, the Governor wrote to me that "he was anxious at hearing "nothing more from me; and that he could not "help requesting me to send immediately an "official letter, mentioning my impressions con- "cerning the nature, extent, and probable effects "of this plot; and especially how far the Raja "might be suspected of being implicated." I wrote a public letter, in which I noticed an unfounded report that had reached me seven months before, of the Raja's having projected a visit to the Chiefs of Sanglee and Colapoor; and of his having been accused of talking disparagingly of British power; which was, as I have now discovered, instantly seized upon, and again and again pointed to, as being sufficient reason for removing me from Sattara. I hope, however,

Governor's Note to me, Aug. 16, 1836, in my possession.

Resident's Letter to Government, August 18th, 1836.

The Governor's Minutes.

that I have, in the former part of this letter, successfully answered this hidden imputation of neglect of duty, which is the only positive charge against me throughout these papers; and it is manifest that Sir Robert Grant only attached importance to it when it suited his purpose; for, after he had registered it with the other alleged disqualifications to which I have referred, I find him suspending the execution of his sentence against me, and admitting that "the tone of some observations" I had *personally* made to him, after he had written his minutes, had altered his opinion of me, and "led him to hope that I took "a juster view of things at my Residency, and, "under proper advice, might be found competent "to deal with it." The plan of removing me was in consequence suspended two months; and, although during this period I communicated every information and particular connected with the new alliance the Raja had formed, and *never received one line of instruction from the Government* as to the manner in which I should act towards the Raja for the attitude he had assumed; by my manner of dealing with which alone could the Governor have tested the justness of his favourable change of opinion; yet, after these two months, in which I had not been permitted to act, he intuitively reverts to his first impressions, and adds force to them by saying, that I "had become an absolute cipher." Your Honour-

Governor's Minute, 11th April, 1837.

able Court will surely feel the hardship of being the victim of such vacillation and inconsistency.

The next, and as I hope, spontaneous act of the Raja was that to which it had been hinted to me that I should prompt him: he saw the native officers himself which, as well as any other circumstance that indicated hostility, was reported by me with the request for instructions; and after the seizure of the parties, as already detailed, and the loss of another month, the Bombay Government commenced their proceedings against the Raja, which constitute the most remarkable feature of this affair, and placed both me and others in a false position in respect to the Raja.

Resident's Letter to Government, date 7th Sept. 1836.

A secretary and quarter-master-general arrived at Sattara early in October 1836, with orders from the Bombay Government to associate themselves with me, and thus form what was called a commission to inquire into the matter that had been advanced by the native officers against those whom the Raja, in the exercise of his absolute sovereignty over his own subjects had given up to me, and ascertain how far his Highness himself was connected with the plot.

Instructions to the Secret Commission at Sattara, Oct. 1836.

I suggested to these officers on their arrival that they should wait upon his Highness and be introduced by me, which they refused; and seeing that they were not accredited, it was as well perhaps that they should be spared an interview, at

which they could not have produced credentials of their appointment to the office of Commissioners for the trial of his subjects at his own capital—so little attention to the usual forms of transacting business with native Courts was deemed requisite by the Bombay Government towards a prince whom the Honourable Court had delighted to honour; and for whom a sword and letter from your Court were at that time lying in Bombay. It might have transpired too at the Interview that, in point of fact, they had no more authority at Sattara than the Raja had in Bombay. The Raja, however, treated them with the utmost forbearance—never stepped in to prevent his subjects attending their Court, or appeared even to know that such persons were at his capital, which was the more judicious, as a due regard for his own dignity and authority offered no medium between such feigned ignorance, and an order to them to quit his dominions.

I was not consulted as to the formation of the Commission, but appointed a member. Had my opinion been asked, I should have objected to a Court so constituted acting within the territory of a sovereign prince.

Early in the proceedings it became an important question, how far the Raja should be made acquainted with the nature of the Commission. My colleagues urged me, as Resident, to request, or

in other words, command his attendance in person, for by treaty he is bound to attend to the advice of the Resident on all occasions.

I objected, and proposed that the Commission, in a body, should wait upon his Highness; and on this amendment being rejected, I entered a protest to the effect: "That as attending personally "would tend to lower his dignity in the eyes of "his subjects, I declined giving this advice to the "Raja, in the character of Resident; but that I "would willingly attend him as one of the Com- "mission, and offer him the option of attending "personally, or by Vakeel or counsel;" adding "that so long as his Highness was only under "accusation, he could not be treated with too "much attention or respect." The point was referred for the decision of the Governor, who at once objected to his being assisted by counsel, and directed me to introduce the secretary to the Raja—to whom a letter from the Governor was presented, advising him to attend a commission, the existence of which was then, for the first time, announced—and my duty as Resident was clearly put in commission by orders that "*In the future "course of these proceedings, I was to defer to the "opinion of the majority; not only as one of the "Commission, but in my political capacity, when- "ever a point shall arise connected with the inves- "tigation.*"

Proceedings of Commission at Sattara, Oct 1836.

That I performed my duty in entering this

protest, and declining to advise the Raja to the humiliation of attending a commission, two members of which would not wait upon him, either on reaching his capital or departing from it, was never doubtful; but it is strongly confirmed by a minute of Sir James Carnac, dated June 19th, 1839, in which he objects to the Raja (even at the eleventh hour) being brought before any Court for trial as follows:—"A prince "suspended from his sovereignty and put upon "his trial, though acquitted, would be irrepara- "bly injured in the estimation of his subjects; "he would command little respect from them, "when they saw with how little consideration "he was treated by his ally.

Minute of Sir James Carnac, June 19, 1839.

It should have been clear to every reflecting mind, that to the respect invariably paid him by every Governor, until Sir Robert Grant's time, was the Raja indebted for the consequence he held; that as a breath had made, so could a breath destroy it; and that it was therefore of the last importance to adhere in our intercourse with him to those forms of etiquette which encircle royalty everywhere, without which it could not exist twelve months anywhere; and to which Asiatics, above all people, attach the greatest consequence. The Rajah did attend the commission, and from that moment the charm which had raised him in dignity above the neighbouring dependent chiefs was for ever broken.

I am free to confess that my opinion of the evidence adduced differed so widely from that of my colleagues that I had resolved upon giving a separate opinion: but the proposal on their part to modify their sentiments so as to meet mine to a certain extent, and a consideration of the dilemma in which Government would be placed by any thing short of an unanimous opinion, overruled that first intention; but so numerous and marked were the discrepancies in the evidence—much of which was but the evidence of accomplices still under restraint, and which could, therefore, only be taken as confessions affecting those by whom they were respectively made,—and so gross was the prevarication of Untagie, the chief of the plot, as well as chief informant, that I expressed, at the time, my conviction that for any purpose of dethroning the Raja the proceedings of the commission would be found by Government unavailing.

But for my only act of sacrificing judgement to political expediency, these proceedings would have been quite inoperative; and their weight was indeed much diminished by the minute of Mr. Shakespear in the Supreme Council, which on perusal I was surprised to find closely in accordance with my intended protest. But as I was dissuaded from recording this protest, and by subscribing to the opinion of the majority pro-

moted the views of the Government; and as Sir Robert Grant, while he confesses that only two of the commissioners were, in his opinion, entitled to his "high acknowledgements," yet admits, "that the Government could not well make distinctions in their meed of approbation; for all "practical purposes the acts of the majority "being the acts of the commission." It is the more inexcusable—be the fault that of the Governor, or of the secretaries and clerks entrusted with the execution of his orders—that the resolution of Government founded on those considerations should never have been communicated to me, viz. a resolution that "the *Sattara Commission* "should be informed that the Government are "in the highest degree satisfied with the zeal, "judgment, ability, and activity evinced in the "highly important and delicate investigation "committed to them."

Governor's Minute, 27th April, 1837.

It is not necessary to pursue the subject further. From the departure of my colleagues to my own recall all remained in suspense. I urged upon the Governor, at two interviews which I had with him—one in Bombay and again on the Hills in April, 1837,—that the Raja should be made acquainted with the result of the inquiry, and I suggested that if Government were satisfied with the proof of his guilt, that His Highness should be so informed; and I further suggested that he should, in that case, be deprived of the

October 24th, 1836, to June 14th, 1837.

sovereignty over and reversionary right in the two estates belonging to feudal chiefs situated beyond his boundary as defined by treaty, whose chieftains he had oppressed, and who were most anxious to be transferred to British protection. By this punishment the Rajah would have been reminded of the power of the Government and its promptitude in upholding its dignity; the questions that had divided and embarrassed the two Governments would have been set at rest; and the Raja's disposition to oppress effectually curbed.

But neither this nor any other communication was noticed; though when the season of exchanging honorary dresses between the Governor and the Raja came round, and the latter sent his usual present to Sir Robert Grant, in compliance with the advice I had given him, on its being asked, lest his omitting to do so should be added to the catalogue of his other crimes—the opportunity of at once insulting him and degrading me was eagerly seized upon; and the letter and present, which it would have been most disrespectful in the Raja to omit sending, were returned. And when a large estate lapsed by the death of the Jageerdar, who held it of the Raja on feudal tenure, the British Government took possession of it informally, and in direct breach of the orders of your Honourable Court, which had admitted that such lapses must fall to the Raja, by the terms of

the treaty. Such then were the measures which it was my fate to witness, and in which I was called on to take part; and I must confess that I shall ever consider it an honour to have been found wanting in the "tact and vigour, and dexterity," that would have made me an efficient instrument for the execution of purposes for which history may, it is to be feared, affix a stigma on the British name.

Governor's Minute, April 8th, 1837.

A third reason assigned in the Governor's Minutes for my recall is the admitted fact, "That "the Raja held me in great personal dislike, and "that I was the object of his aversion." Though I cannot discover the Governor's authority for this language, it may be admitted that the great personal dislike and aversion, as well as contempt, which the Raja felt for Sir Robert Grant and his government, might have been partially reflected from them to me, their organ and representative; but I have shewn that these extreme feelings arose entirely from Sir Robert Grant's procrastination, and indifference to the Raja's grievances and complaints; and the ineffectual attempt to deceive the Raja, to which he did not scruple to stoop when this neglect transpired; though even at so late a period as that of the commission, Ballajee Punt Nattoo deposed that the Raja disliked me personally, only "because I prevented "him from oppressing his Jageerdars, and was "inimical to his employment of Dr. Milne, (who by

Commission Proceedings at Sattara, October, 1836.

this time had been appointed by the Rajah in supersession of Syed Meer), or, in other words, only because I did my duty in protecting those to whom British guarantee was extended, that they should be so protected; and because I would not otherwise countenance a violation of the terms existing between the two States; and which violation, it must be evident, Sir Robert Grant had encouraged by his utter neglect of my report of the Raja's first infraction of the treaty by the clandestine appointment of Syed Meer; a report which Sir Robert Grant was afterwards obliged to admit to have been of the greatest importance. In a word, it was evident that every Resident who was faithful to his trust would be as unpopular with the Raja as myself; and the triumph of the Raja on my recall was over the Bombay Government, and not over the Resident personally; for he believed it to be but the first step to a full redress from the Supreme Government, to which, by his agent Dr. Milne, he had appealed. Moreover, I reported to Government that, after the departure of the two other Commissioners, his Highness "returned to the usual mode of transacting bu- "siness, by consulting the Resident on all occa- "sions; and with his usual spirit had again com- "menced upon his public Works," for the mutual benefit of the States; and on the eve of my departure, I informed Government, that in all affairs unconnected with the Commission, the advice of

My letter and documents attached, dated June 20, 1836.

Resident's Report to Government, dated December 1st, 1836.

Resident's letter, June 14th, 1837.

the Resident had been attended to, and business transacted as heretofore; and that as the best means of evincing his desire to be reconciled to, and conciliate me, the Raja had placed at my disposal 19,000 rupees for the formation of a lake on the Mahabulyswur Hills, a work I had originally suggested to him, and he knew to be a favourite scheme of mine; observing that I might apply the sum either to that work, or to the completion of the unfinished road through his territory to Poona, and he would in that case assign 20,000 rupees the next year to the lake. And when the news of my recall reached him, H. H. begged me not to quit his Court without receiving a public entertainment from him; and when that was declined, asked, as a last token of friendship, that I would permit his servants to bear the palankeens of myself and family from Sattara, and his camels to carry my baggage, and that I would write to him from England.

I appeal to your Honourable Court whether, under such circumstances as these, it could be said with truth that I had lost my influence, or, as Sir Robert Grant expresses it in one place, "become a cipher," except in the treatment I experienced from my own Government, which Sir Robert Grant admits took no notice of the Raja after the Commission, "except to introduce the new Resident;" and neither replied to my letters, nor gave me instructions as to my future rela-

tions with his Highness, or information as to the consequences that were to be the result of that Commission.

The weakest reason (and therefore that which I have placed last in order) for my recall is stated to be, that " my recollection had become " confused; that the Governor had heard from " good authority that my health was far from " being established."

Sir Robert Grant had heard from the best authority, viz. myself, that though I had suffered severely from fever, I should not avail myself of a sick certificate till matters were restored between my Government and that of the Raja.

But my defence on this point will surely suggest itself. No one will forget the circumstances under which Sir. Robert Grant was soon after taken from the evil to come — from the signally disastrous result of that policy which he believed only to require " dexterity " to be successful; whilst I have been spared, I am thankful to say, to witness the catastrophe which I predicted, and the discomfiture of the Bombay Government, by the execution on the part of the Raja of that determination which he repeated to me from the window of his palace as I bade him farewell: " That he would surrender his " territory rather than concede the smallest point " till his grievances had been heard and re- " dressed."

Appendix. Letter from Government, June 6, 1837.

I now turn from the real to the assigned causes for my recall, and to the manner in which my removal was carried into execution. I was told: "That my influence over the Raja had "confessedly ceased to exist, and that his feel- "ing towards me was one of aversion;" but instead of following this up by an expression of opinion, that this state of things was partially, at least, produced by my "neglect," "want of "vigour," "tact," and "dexterity," and "shat- "tered health," or even leaving me to infer that something more was intended than was expressed by the passage, "To what cause or causes this "state of things is to be ascribed, the Governor "in Council does not think it necessary for "the purposes of the present communication to "inquire;"—the greatest solicitude is exhibited to prevent my suspecting that any blame was ascribed to me; and an attempt is made to impress me with the belief that the Government considered the Raja to have withdrawn his confidence from me unreasonably and ungratefully, but that he was "in a state of high and almost "morbid excitement," and "that it was quite "agreeable to experience, that over a mind thus "affected, some *new* person might acquire an in- "fluence which is denied to a long-known "adviser." And lest this should not be sufficient to blind me, whilst my reputation is secretly wounded, it is subjoined; that the Governor was

" anxious in the mode of accomplishing the " change, to avoid wounding the feelings or im- " pairing the credit of an officer of my standing " and service; that he would be much con- " cerned if my quitting my Residency were to " be interpreted in a manner which was not in- " tended." And in conclusion, I am informed: " That, in adopting the measure announced, the " Governor in Council was actuated by no un- " friendly disposition towards me, but was only " solicitous to carry into effect a public object " of importance without subjecting me to unne- " cessary pain or reproach."

Whilst the Governor was thus leading me to infer that, in his opinion, the Raja's ingratitude and unreasonableness arose from a morbid state of mind, and not from any fault or defect in me; I find him taking credit with his Council for the ingenuity with which in this letter, *framed with his own hand*, he had " foreborne to disclose " broadly his opinion of my incompetence; at the " same time that he had been careful to say " nothing inconsistent with that opinion, or which " could embarrass him in expressing it, if I " should be so ill-advised as to take any " step that might render such expression un- " avoidable." Governor's Minute, April 11th, 1837.

It is wonderful that the Governor should have hoped to circumvent me by the specious pretexts set forth in this letter, to which I would invite

the particular attention of your Honourable Court; for, although he could not have anticipated that I should ever see his minutes against me, or his secret instructions to my successor, he could hardly have expected it to escape my observation that, immediately after telling me, " That a *new* " *person* was required to ascertain whether he " might not succeed by the reciprocations of a " free and friendly intercourse in winning from " his Highness that confidence which he had, " however unreasonably or ungratefully, with- " drawn from me;"—immediately after telling me this, he announces the " *new person*" to be one of the Commissioners of Enquiry who sat at Sattara, who must necessarily have been, at least equally with myself, " an object of aversion" to the Raja; and who could not have been expected to heal that " morbid state" of which he, in the exercise of his painful duty, had been one of the most exciting causes; much less to win the Raja's confidence. But it has now transpired that no such motives dictated the choice; and, as if to make the contrast between the real and the declared objects of the change the more striking to the public, in juxta-position with the letter to me, now stands, in the volumes of Sattara papers, that to my successor; ordering him to enter upon an enquiry into a charge supposed to be sent in by the mother of the confined Govind Rao, implicating the Raja, his brother,

Instructions to Col. Ovans, June 13, 1837.

and all those in his Highness's confidence; and he was moreover directed "to be distant and "reserved in all his communications with the "Raja." And the acting Resident reports, that in obedience to these instructions, he had checked the advances the Raja did seem to make of throwing himself into his hands. And his first act was, the recommendation to Government of an order consigning the Raja's favourite Govind Rao, still under mild constraint at Poona, to almost solitary confinement at Amednuggur. I quote the words of the new Resident's letter: "It is to be hoped that this measure, if adopted; "may induce *his mother* and his other friends to "come forward and disclose all they know, as "the only means of assisting him." This recommendation was highly approved and adopted, nor was Govind Rao released until after the Raja had been deposed, and then without trial. Your Honourable Court cannot fail to discover in such measures as these an explanation of the inflexible uncompromising state of mind in which Sir James Carnac found the Raja. Had Sir Robert Grant done at first what his successor had no opportunity of doing until the affair was beyond the reach of palliation and conciliation; had he even, after the interview with the native officers, sharply reprimanded the Raja in person at Sattara, he would have been saved; and a full explanation would have satisfied him. But it

Acting Resident's Report, dated 24th June, 1837.

must be quite clear to every one that the case was hopeless, from the appointment of the Commission.

Secondly, I was told, in my order of recall, "That it had been stated, and generally believed, that, in consequence of my impaired "health, it was my intention to relinquish my "post; and that, as it was perfectly well known "that my health would justify my leave of absence, he would grant me leave from an early "day's date, placing *meanwhile* an *acting* officer "in charge of the Residency." While the Governor penned this to me, he recorded a secret promise to his Council, that when the arrangement of my retiring on sick certificate had been effected, he would take measures to induce me to resign the Residency altogether; and when he stated to me that it was generally believed I was about to relinquish my post, he knew from myself, as already stated, that I was determined not to relinquish my post till matters were restored between the Raja and the Bombay Government; though my health certainly was such as rendered a change advisable, and enabled me to obtain a certificate, when I was relieved and wished to come home, to appeal to your Honourable Court.

Governor's Minute, Mar. 30, 1837.

In reply to this letter, on which I have dwelt so long, I announced to the Government that I considered myself aggrieved, and should exercise

Resident's Letter, June 10, 1837.

my right of appeal to your Honourable Court. Immediately after which I received an offer, at the suggestion of the Governor, as I can prove, who professed to believe that I had been "negligent," and "that my health was shattered "and impaired by long service," of the high post of Acting Quarter-Master-General to the end of the year,—of a post always arduous and responsible,—and of which, under other circumstances, I should have been proud. But duty to myself obliged me to decline the offer of a temporary appointment; by the acceptance of which I should have registered my own disgrace; and subscribed, as I now discover, to all the imputations that have been secretly recorded against me; though I cannot allow this opportunity to pass without expressing my acknowledgments to Lord Keane for the proof of his confidence which that offer conveyed; and of regard for my honour and interests which in this, as on other occasions during that trying period of my life, I received at the hands of his Lordship.

Letter from Mil. Secretary to Commander-in-chief, dated from Dapnaru, June 16, 1837.

I would now, in conclusion, appeal to the candour and justice of your Honourable Court, whether you can adhere to the opinion expressed in your Secretary's letter, with reference to my Memorial, that "the local Government appeared "to be anxious to carry their resolution of "changing Residents at Sattara into effect in the "mode least calculated to wound my feelings,"

Secretary's Letter to me, dated August 29th, 1839.

or whether, on the facts now disclosed to the East-India Company and the public, for which disclosure and this opportunity of defending myself, I am indebted to the liberality of the Right Honourable the President of the Board of Controul, I am not entitled to some proof that your Honourable Court, from whom I have now been soliciting justice more than three years, is sensible of the injury I have sustained; and that I have not lost the confidence of those whom I feel that I have served during forty years zealously and faithfully; preserving untainted my own honour and credit, at the same time that I have endeavoured to uphold the character of my country in the distant empire over which she exercises paternal rule.

I have the honour to remain,
Honourable Sir,
Your most humble and
obedient Servant,
PETER LODWICK,
Major-general.

The Oakery, Beckenham,
October 9th, 1840.

APPENDIX.

(A.)

SECRET DEPARTMENT.]

Sattara, June 20th, 1836.

SIR,

I have the honour to request you will bring to the notice of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council that having reason on private information to suppose that His Highness the Raja had, without communicating his intentions to the Resident, either entered into engagements with (or adopted preliminary steps to that end) a person, named Syed Meer, a Mussulman inhabitant of Bombay, to act as his accredited agent or Vakeel in the settlement of certain disputed points of a political nature, arising out of the several articles of his treaty with the British Government, and that it was the intention of His Highness to send such vakeel either to Calcutta or to England; I requested an interview with His Highness, which took place on the evening of the 16th instant, in presence of Appa Sahib Maharaj and Balla Sahib Senaputtee.

Substance of what took place at an interview with His Highness June 16, 1836, and translation of a memorandum sent in by His Highness, date June 16, 1836.

2. The detail of what passed I now submit to the consideration of Government, together with translation of a memorandum since given in by the Raja.

3. Although His Highness had occasionally hinted the probability of his being eventually obliged to resort to this measure, I was not prepared for its immediate adoption, and especially after the assurance given by the Right Honourable the Governor during the late interview at Nher, that the several questions at issue should be referred to the consideration of the Honourable Court without further delay.

4. It appears, however, that a copy of the treaty and every document relating to the claims of His Highness supposed to be founded upon that treaty, have been given to Syed Meer, who had an interview with the Raja; but, so far as I can ascertain, has not hitherto received any definite instructions or authority to act as his agent or vakeel.

5. How far this conduct on the part of His Highness is in accordance with the fifth article of the treaty granted with the territory by the British Government I am not prepared to give an opinion, but submit the case for consideration. The motive for keeping me in ignorance of the transaction is evident; for being bound to consult the Resident on all occasions, and to abide by his decision and advice, His Highness was well aware of the result of a reference in the present case; and that the consequence of acting in decided opposition to the Resident's opinion might be deemed a decided violation of the second article of the treaty.

6. In extenuation of the Raja's disingenuous conduct in the case now submitted to Government, I may be allowed to observe that during four years, and particularly the last year, his feelings have been in a state of increasing

excitement respecting what he considers an infraction of the treaty from time to time on the part of the British Government; and these feelings being restrained by the prospect of a reply from the Honourable Court, acquired additional force in ascertaining during the late interview with the Right Honourable the Governor that no reference had hitherto been made to the Court of Directors; and from that moment he evidently resolved to appeal through an agent of his own; and this, I believe, His Highness hinted to the Governor during the interview; he certainly has a full conviction of having done so.

7. I hope to be honoured with early instructions as to the line of conduct I am to adopt in consequence of the late breach of confidence on the part of the Raja—the first instance within my knowledge; as his intercourse with me had been carried on in perfect good faith and firm reliance on the friendship of the British Government.

I have the honour, &c. &c.

(Signed) PETER LODWICK,
Resident.

To J. P. Willoughby, Esq.
Secretary to Government.

A true Copy.
PETER LODWICK,
Resident.

Substance of a Conversation which took place during an interview with his Highness the Raja, June 16th, 1836.

The conversation was introduced by the Resident's noticing the reports in circulation, and his having been informed that his Highness had engaged an inhabitant of Bombay named Syed Meer, as his Vakeel, to be em-

ployed in obtaining his supposed rights over his Jageerdars; that this had been effected secretly without any communication with the British Government. The Resident put the question to his Highness as to the general truth or falsehood of this intelligence.

In reply, his Highness commenced by declaring that the subject to which this conversation referred had been a source of unhappiness to him for the last four years; that the late Governor had promised on his visit of ceremony to refer the case; that the present Governor had last year given an assurance to the same effect; but at the late private interview in May last, on his Highness requesting to be informed when a reply from the Court of Directors to a representation submitted last year by the Resident might be expected, he was told that no representation of the case had yet been made to the Honourable Court—his Highness became much agitated; declared that his food was hateful to him, and that he had no happiness.

On bringing his Highness back to the simple question, he acknowledged that he had sent for Syed Meer, and that he had entrusted him with copies of the treaty with the British Government, and other documents relating thereto. His Highness denied having gone beyond this, and declared that he had informed Syed Meer that nothing should be done in the affair until the approaching Dussera.

The Resident replied by pointing out the departure of his Highness from that confidence in the British Government and its accredited agent which had hitherto directed all his acts; and further observed upon the assurance which the Right Honourable the Governor had given to his Highness at Malcolm Peyth, that he would immediately address the Home Authorities, &c. The Resident

pointed out the friendly feeling towards his Highness and his Government which the Bombay Government and the Honourable Court had invariably expressed and acted upon; ending by an allusion to the fifth article of the treaty, by which his Highness engages "To forbear from "all intercourse or correspondence with all persons of "whatever description, who are not by the above articles "rendered subject to his Highness's authority."

At the close of the interview his Highness became more calm, and agreed to give in a statement of what had taken place in regard to Syed Meer, in order to the Resident's framing a report for the information of his Government.

(A true statement and copy.)

PETER LODWICK,
Resident.

Translation of a Yad or Memorandum from his Highness the Raja to the Resident, dated June 16*th*, 1836.

After compliments.—Although some cases took place formerly, consequent upon the interpretation of the treaty, and some discussion by letter and yads occurred between this and the British Governments during the time of Governor Elphinstone, yet the Vahevat (management) had been conducted here agreeable to treaty.

In the time of Governor Lord Clare, Mr. Warden, then in the agent's cutcherry, raised new doubts on the misrepresentations of his Khamdars, and infringed the rights of this sircar. His decisions upon the subject have been confirmed by the British Government, without any regard to former writings (or custom), and being made known to Colonel Lodwick, the Resident, were by him communicated to this Government.

The letters addressed from hence to Mr. Elphinstone,

Colonel Robertson, and Captain Grant were perused by the Honourable Court of Directors, who, in returning them, sent their decision to the Bombay Government regarding the Jageerdars dependent on this Government. Yet the Court's decision is not carried into effect; nor does it appear that a further reference is made to the Honourable Court.

Governor Lord Clare having returned to Europe, Sir Robert Grant succeeded as Governor; to whom all the circumstances were explained last year as well as this, yet no arrangement has been made to this day, but I am told a reference will be made to England.

The Governor in Council has not yet made the said reference, neither is it made known here that existing differences will be settled, or within what period the reply from Europe may arrive, until when the Vahevat (management) should be continued to us as heretofore.

On the occasion of a dispute which took place between the Supreme Court and Governor Sir John Malcolm, the Government had this settled by sending Colonel Barnwell immediately to Europe. It is now some years since the present case has been referred to Government, yet has it not been decided.

Any person, great or poor, wishing to submit his grievances to the British Government at Bombay, does not previously make his intention known to this Government. This measure is not in violation of good faith, yet the case is referred from this to the decision of the British Government.

In consequence of a difference of construction put upon original documents by the Bombay Government, and which appears to be in opposition to the rights of this Government; to prevent the chance of future misconstruction, this Government proposes to lay its claims be-

fore the Government of Calcutta, and the Honourable Court of Directors; and in the event of its not being finally settled by them, to bring the same to the notice of Parliament and His Majesty in England; those that can be settled, it is well; and those which cannot, to have them settled by such reference.

Syed Meer is the person selected for this duty; he has been made acquainted with all the papers, &c. connected with the disputed rights and interests of this Government, but he is desired not to leave this country until he receives further orders from this Government to that effect.

At an interview which took place with the Resident, he asked why this was not made to him, and what objection there was on our part to consult with him on the subject? To which the reply given was, that you, the Resident, had personally explained all the circumstances in our presence to Governor Sir Robert Grant, and that there was no objection to make you acquainted with the intended plan, &c. The differences which arise, and the infringement of the rights of this Government by the Bombay Government, it is invariably stated cannot be settled in this country, and must be referred. It is therefore intended to submit the case to Europe direct for final settlement, and this yad is sent for your information.

(True translation.)

Signed, PETER LODWICK,
Resident.

(True copies.)

PETER LODWICK,
Major-General.

(B.)

Copy of a Letter addressed to Sir Robert Grant, which accompanied my Memorial, submitted July, 1837.

Sattara, Sept. 13th, 1836.

HONOURABLE SIR,

WITH reference to my official letter of the 10th instant, on the subject of his Highness the Raja's extraordinary line of conduct in the attempt to seduce native officers and others from their allegiance, I take the liberty of privately offering my sentiments on a subject which is calculated to excite some compassion if the views I have, after consideration, taken of the case be well founded. I may be deceived, but it appears to me that the Raja is acting under the agency of a mind diseased, which may be considered a sort of monomania.

The one dominant feeling of his mind during the last two years has certainly been the infraction of the treaty by a denial of his rights over the Jagëerdars. This formed the only subject of grievance at the period of Lord Clare's visit to his Court, and was partially set at rest by the assurance that his claims should be referred to the consideration of the home authorities.

It was the one subject equally paramount at the visit paid you at Mahabulysur in May 1836, when an assurance that the claim should be referred to the Court of Directors proved equally satisfactory as on the former occasion.

Resident's Report, July 3, 1835.

After my report on this subject had been submitted to Government until the last visit of the Rajah in May 1836, his Highness was continually questioning me as to the

time when a reply from the Honourable Court might be expected. On learning from you that his claims had not been *specially* referred, I have no doubt the most violent feelings were from that moment engendered. *He withdrew his confidence from the Resident*, and resolved upon the measure of sending an agent to England.

On this subject I had the honour of reporting in June last; and his Highness has since made repeated enquiries as to the result, which it was out of my power to answer satisfactorily as that Report was never acknowledged. In the meantime several karkoons have been and are still employed in Bombay, as noticed in my private letter of the 19th of August, replying to yours (confidential) of the 16th August. The Chief-justice, Mr. Wathen, and several other public and private individuals, if my information is correct, have been applied to, and the karkoons are at this moment arranging for proceeding to England from Goa, from the difficulty of embarking in a British vessel, without the sanction of Government. Letters addressed to his Majesty, the Court of Directors, Mr. Elphinstone, and other personal friends are in progress at Sattara; and being supported in these unwise measures by the advice of Bulwunt Rao, his Chitnavees and others, his Highness has been gradually advancing. step by step, until he now stands on the very brink of a precipice, from which he can only be saved by the mercy of that power which placed him on the Musnud, "not in right of inheritance but from consideration of the antiquity of his House and its former importance."

Resident's Report, June 20, 1836. Substance of Conference with his Highness and a yad of explanation from his Highness.

That the Raja's mind has become weak to an extraordinary degree is but too evident in his actions. He has lately formed a company of women, arming them with muskets, and even drilling them to the management of

guns cast expressly for the purpose. Women are also taught to manage elephants, to act as chopdars, massalches, &c. Every designing Faqueer or Gossein offering his services to propitiate the Gods in favour of his wishes is attended to; and at this time three sets of Bramins are performing Anoostan ceremonies at a heavy expense to secure the departure of a ghost supposed to haunt the palace, and for other objects equally absurd and contemptible.

With regard to the alleged conspiracy of the native states, I can discover no proof of it; and on full consideration am disposed to think the Raja has been deceived by artful impostors or interested advisers.

When addressing you privately on the 9th instant, I had not seen the depositions made by the native officers. It appears to me that the instructions given to these men (by his Highness) and his remarks bear the stamp of madness; whilst the granting an interview is not less indicative of it, being opposed to the habits of native princes, who invariably trust to the agency of others, aware of their extreme fidelity, and leaving themselves the power of denying the authority having been granted. The allusion to myself is equally wild, as I never, on any occasion, told his Highness he would be obliged to go to Calcutta or Bombay.

I am fully aware that serious notice must be taken of so gross a violation on the part of the Raja of fidelity to his engagements, and but that it might be deemed presumption, I should be disposed to recommend that the Jageers of the Punt Suchew and that of Aukulkote (which were the occasion of offence) should be taken from the Sattara state, and become feudatories of the British Government, a measure that would be highly gratifying to

those chiefs themselves, who, but for my repeated interference, would have been the constant objects of oppression and insult.

The punishment of Govind Rao and Anuntjee appears called for; and this would be felt by his Highness as a severe punishment (to himself), whilst the example would not fail to have a salutary effect upon those persons by whose advice and flattery he is principally guided, and who are the least deserving of his confidence.

I have the honour, &c. &c.

(Signed) PETER LODWICK,
Resident.

The Right Hon.
Sir ROBERT GRANT, *K.C.H.*
&c. &c. &c.

(A true copy.)
PETER LODWICK, *M.G.*

(C.)

No. 134 of 1837.

SECRET DEPARTMENT.]

Bombay-Castle, 6th June, 1837.

SIR,

In reference to your letter of the 30th ultimo, I am directed to address you particularly on the present state of your relations with the Raja of Sattara, a subject which appears to call for deep consideration on the part of Government.

2. From your letter just adverted to, from your evidence

before the Sattara Commission, from your previous letter to Government of the 13th ultimo, and from many corroborative circumstances, it appears that your influence over the mind of the Raja has not only declined, but at length ceased to exist, that his feeling towards you is now one of aversion, or hostility, and that in place of conforming to your advice, as he is bound to do by treaty, he acts as if he were totally independent of treaty and of all control.

3. It would further appear, that he has for some time been led by the counsels of two or more corrupt and unprincipled natives attached to his Court, and that he is at present also in close communication with certain Europeans at Bombay.

4. To what cause or causes this state of things is to be ascribed, the Governor in Council does not think it necessary for the purpose of the present communication to enquire. But the effect is obviously most unfortunate, and not more contrary to the intention of the treaty than to the general policy of the British Government. The control to be exercised by the Resident over the mind of his Highness forms an essential and an indispensable link in the relations between the two States. Released from that check, the authority enjoyed by the Raja must be practically greater than befits a situation of political dependence, and is in danger of being applied to purposes injurious to himself, and subversive of his connexion with the British power.

5. It is true that if his Highness acts in opposition to the Resident's advice, he violates the treaty; and that by threatening him with the consequent penalties, this Government might induce him to reconsider his conduct. But it forms no part of the policy of employing a British Resident at a native Court, that he should govern only by the means of terror. The intention is, that by firm, wise,

and conciliating management, he should win the affections, or at least should command the respect, of the prince to whom he is attached; and that the compulsory power with which he is armed should be reserved for extreme cases, and should on all ordinary occasions be disguised under the reciprocations of a free and friendly intercourse.

6. The Governor in Council thinks these observations peculiarly applicable to Sattara at the present crisis. Some time may elapse before the Government of India comes to a decision on the recent transactions at that place. In the meanwhile the Raja having shaken off the yoke of the Resident, seems to be abandoning himself to his own caprices, or to the worse counsels of evil-minded favourites. There is no conjecturing, under these circumstances, to what lengths he may proceed, or how far he may be led to aggravate the difficulties, already fearful enough, in which he is involved.

7. On the other hand, should some arrangement be made, as the Governor in Council cannot but hope there will be, for continuing the Raja with whatever diminution of power in possession of his Raj, it would be highly desirable that he should enter on the new order of things with a mind conciliated to it, and this can scarcely be looked for, while his feelings are in a state of utter estrangement from the British Representative at his Court.

8. Impressed with the force of these considerations, it has been a matter of anxious thought with the Government in what way it would be possible and most advisable to give them effect.

9. It was a short time since stated, and generally believed, that in consequence of your impaired health, it was your intention to reliuquish your post, and retire to Europe. The Governor in Council, while he sincerely lamented your indisposition, yet deemed this a good opportunity of ascer-

taining whether some other officer, placed near the Raja, might not succeed in winning from his Highness that confidence which he had withdrawn, however unreasonably or ungratefully, from the actual Resident. The Raja's feelings appear to be in a state of high and almost morbid excitement; and it is quite agreeable to experience, that over a mind thus affected, some new person should acquire an influence which is denied to a long-known adviser.

10. Under the apparent suspension of your purpose of retirement, the Governor in Council was desirous of effecting a change of Residents in some other manner; the public interest in his opinion making such change necessary; while at the same time he was anxious, in the mode of accomplishing it, to avoid wounding the feelings or impairing the credit of an officer of your standing and service.

11. Imperative circumstances, however, now leave the Government no option. It is found necessary, under instructions this day received from the Government of India, to proceed without a moment's delay to measures which it will belong to the Resident to conduct, but which, if once undertaken, must be continued by the same hands by which they are commenced. It is therefore evident that whatever change is to take place in the Residency must be made immediately.

12. The Governor in Council sees, however, no occasion why it should even now be made in any such way as to hurt your feelings. It is perfectly well known that your health, impaired by long service, is in a state which would justify your obtaining leave of absence, and the Governor in Council is quite prepared, on the production of the usual certificate, to grant you such leave from an early day's date, placing meantime an active officer in charge of the Residency.

13. The Governor in Council will be happy if this ar-

rangement is made; as he would be much concerned if your quitting your Residency were to be interpreted in a manner which is not intended; but he thinks it his duty at the same time to state unreservedly, that the change itself is indispensable.

14. In conformity with the views of Government already stated, Lieutenant-Colonel Ovans, who is to have charge of the Residency, will quit Bombay for Sattara in the course of two, or at the most, of three days; and on his arrival at the latter place you will be pleased to deliver over charge to him.

15. You will observe that with reference to the leave of absence to be obtained, it will be well for you to repair to the Presidency as early after giving up charge as may be practicable. But it is not the wish of Government to press you on this point to act otherwise than may entirely suit your convenience.

15. In conclusion, I am directed to inform you, that in adopting the measure announced by this letter, the Governor in Council is actuated by no unfriendly disposition towards you, but is only solicitous to carry into effect a public object of importance, without subjecting you to unnecessary pain or reproach.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

(Signed) W. H. WATHEN,

Chief Secretary.

To the Resident at Sattara.

True Copy.

PETER LODWICK, *Col. Resident.*

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